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On the Interpretation of Decision Theory

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)409-433
Number of pages25
JournalEconomics and Philosophy
Volume32
Early online date12 Aug 2015
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 2016

Abstract

This paper explores the contrast between mentalistic and behaviouristic interpretations of decision theory. The former regards credences and utilities as psychologically real, while the latter regards them as mere representations of an agent's preferences. Philosophers typically adopt the former interpretation, economists the latter. It is argued that the mentalistic interpretation is preferable if our aim is to use decision theory for descriptive purposes, but if our aim is normative then the behaviouristic interpretation cannot be dispensed with.

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  • Full-text PDF (accepted author manuscript)

    Rights statement: This is the author accepted manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online via Cambridge University Press at https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/economics-and-philosophy/article/on-the-interpretation-of-decision-theory/3EC062BA52DD6385A0C6B7276580FB61. Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.

    Accepted author manuscript, 423 KB, PDF-document

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