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Knowledge-How, Abilities, and Questions

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-19
Number of pages19
JournalAustralasian Journal of Philosophy
Early online date11 Feb 2018
DOIs
DateAccepted/In press - 1 Feb 2018
DateE-pub ahead of print (current) - 11 Feb 2018

Abstract

The debate about the nature of knowledge-how is standardly thought to be divided between intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of propositional knowledge, and anti-intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of ability. In this paper, I explore a compromise position—the interrogative capacity view—which claims that knowing how to do something is a certain kind of ability to generate answers to the question of how to do it. This view combines the intellectualist thesis that knowledge-how is a relation to a set of propositions with the anti-intellectualist thesis that knowledge-how is a kind of ability. I argue that this view combines the positive features of both intellectualism and anti-intellectualism.

    Research areas

  • anti-intellectualism, intellectualism, know-how, knowledge-how, knowledge-wh, practical knowledge

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