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On the value of participation: Endogenous emergence of social norms in a three-player ultimatum game experiment

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On the value of participation : Endogenous emergence of social norms in a three-player ultimatum game experiment. / Grimalda, Gianluca; Kar, Anirban; Proto, Eugenio.

In: International Review of Economics, Vol. 55, No. 1-2, 01.04.2008, p. 127-147.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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Grimalda, G, Kar, A & Proto, E 2008, 'On the value of participation: Endogenous emergence of social norms in a three-player ultimatum game experiment', International Review of Economics, vol. 55, no. 1-2, pp. 127-147. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12232-007-0036-z

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Grimalda, Gianluca ; Kar, Anirban ; Proto, Eugenio. / On the value of participation : Endogenous emergence of social norms in a three-player ultimatum game experiment. In: International Review of Economics. 2008 ; Vol. 55, No. 1-2. pp. 127-147.

Bibtex

@article{12a2585a279548bab35ffd2f1335b3dc,
title = "On the value of participation: Endogenous emergence of social norms in a three-player ultimatum game experiment",
abstract = "We report results from two different settings of a three-player ultimatum game. Under the {"}Monocratic{"} rule, a player is randomly selected to make an offer to two receivers. Under the {"}Democratic{"} rule, all three players make a proposal, and one proposal is then randomly selected. A majority vote is required to implement the proposal in either setting. Although the two rules are strategically equivalent, different patterns of behaviour emerge as the number of interactions increase. Under the {"}Monocratic{"} rule, proposers seem to be entitled to claim a larger share of the pie, and receivers are more likely to accept, than in the {"}Democratic{"} rule. We speculate that institutions allowing more participation in the process of collective choice lead to a more socially responsible behaviour in individuals.",
keywords = "Institutions, Majority ultimatum, Participation",
author = "Gianluca Grimalda and Anirban Kar and Eugenio Proto",
year = "2008",
month = "4",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1007/s12232-007-0036-z",
language = "English",
volume = "55",
pages = "127--147",
journal = "International Review of Economics",
issn = "1865-1704",
number = "1-2",

}

RIS - suitable for import to EndNote

TY - JOUR

T1 - On the value of participation

T2 - Endogenous emergence of social norms in a three-player ultimatum game experiment

AU - Grimalda, Gianluca

AU - Kar, Anirban

AU - Proto, Eugenio

PY - 2008/4/1

Y1 - 2008/4/1

N2 - We report results from two different settings of a three-player ultimatum game. Under the "Monocratic" rule, a player is randomly selected to make an offer to two receivers. Under the "Democratic" rule, all three players make a proposal, and one proposal is then randomly selected. A majority vote is required to implement the proposal in either setting. Although the two rules are strategically equivalent, different patterns of behaviour emerge as the number of interactions increase. Under the "Monocratic" rule, proposers seem to be entitled to claim a larger share of the pie, and receivers are more likely to accept, than in the "Democratic" rule. We speculate that institutions allowing more participation in the process of collective choice lead to a more socially responsible behaviour in individuals.

AB - We report results from two different settings of a three-player ultimatum game. Under the "Monocratic" rule, a player is randomly selected to make an offer to two receivers. Under the "Democratic" rule, all three players make a proposal, and one proposal is then randomly selected. A majority vote is required to implement the proposal in either setting. Although the two rules are strategically equivalent, different patterns of behaviour emerge as the number of interactions increase. Under the "Monocratic" rule, proposers seem to be entitled to claim a larger share of the pie, and receivers are more likely to accept, than in the "Democratic" rule. We speculate that institutions allowing more participation in the process of collective choice lead to a more socially responsible behaviour in individuals.

KW - Institutions

KW - Majority ultimatum

KW - Participation

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=42549095696&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s12232-007-0036-z

DO - 10.1007/s12232-007-0036-z

M3 - Article

VL - 55

SP - 127

EP - 147

JO - International Review of Economics

JF - International Review of Economics

SN - 1865-1704

IS - 1-2

ER -