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Structural empirical evaluation of job search monitoring

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)879-903
Number of pages25
JournalInternational Economic Review
Volume60
Issue number2
Early online date14 Dec 2018
DOIs
DateAccepted/In press - 15 Feb 2018
DateE-pub ahead of print - 14 Dec 2018
DatePublished (current) - 1 May 2019

Abstract

To evaluate search effort monitoring of unemployed workers, it is important to take account of post-unemployment wages and job-to-job mobility. We structurally estimate a model with search channels, using a controlled trial in which monitoring is randomized. The data include registers and survey data on search behavior. We find that the opportunity to move to better-paid jobs in employment reduces the extent to which monitoring induces substitution toward formal search channels in unemployment. Job mobility compensates for adverse long-run effects of monitoring on wages. We examine counterfactual policies against moral hazard, like reemployment bonuses and changes of the benefits path.

    Research areas

  • Unemployment duration, Search effort, Randomized social experiment, Multi-tasking, Search channels, Treatment, Job mobility, Job duration, Wage, Active labor market policy

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  • Full-text PDF (accepted author manuscript)

    Rights statement: This is the author accepted manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online via Wiley at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/iere.12376 . Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.

    Accepted author manuscript, 249 KB, PDF document

    Embargo ends: 14/12/20

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