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How Italian Football Creates Italians: The 1982 World Cup, the ‘Pertini Myth’ and Italian National Identity

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How Italian Football Creates Italians: The 1982 World Cup, the ‘Pertini Myth’ and Italian National Identity

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ABSTRACT

Italy’s victory in the 1982 World Cup is usually narrated through the figure of Sandro Pertini, the President of Italy who attended the final as a spectator. It is also often described as an ‘anti-fascist’ and ‘democratic’ World Cup. This paper looks at the ways in which that victory intersected with forms of national identification, and unpacks the forms in which the stories coming out of the tournament provided a perfect framework for such identification – redemption, the wise father-figure, the artists, the workers, the underdogs. The paper goes on to critique the ways in which the simplistic link between national identity and football has been made in the past, and the descriptive accounts of this tournament to date. The latter part of the paper looks in detail at the figure of Pertini and his relationship with the 1982 victory. It is argued that Pertini’s 1982 image provides Italians with a rare example of a universally popular moment, which has been exploited by both right and left in the years that followed. It is also argued that, Pertini’s connection with the victory was very carefully stage-managed and needs to be seen in terms of the framing provided by television and commentary. Pertini himself managed the event perfectly so as to create osmosis between his own personality and the football team itself. However, the link between Pertini and 1982 came at a cost. His own radical past was toned down to the point of being forgotten, and he was re-invented as a bland figure ‘Italy’s grandfather’. A final section looks at the possible effects of the 1982 victory, including the idea that what has been termed the ‘footballization’ of Italian society really began after 1982, and not with the rise of Silvio Berlusconi in the mid-1980s as is often claimed.

In 1982, Italy won the football World Cup in Spain after a very poor start. Italian football was still recovering from a traumatic scandal – known as the Totonegro affair – that had seen players arrested and stringent bans handed out. One of the players banned for match-fixing, Paolo Rossi, became a national hero in Spain as top scorer in the tournament. This paper revisits that tournament in an attempt to analyze the connections between national identity and sporting events. Using new historical theories relating to the formation of Italy in the
nineteenth century, the paper looks at why and how the narrative of the 1982 World Cup worked as a national story. The role of the Italian President, Sandro Pertini, who is often identified with the 1982 victory, is also analyzed in detail. The paper argues that sporting events are important vectors of emotions that can make a nation itself seem real, at least for a time, and that the framing of those events is crucial to their understanding and memory.

**National Identity, Emotions and Sport**

Football matches are laden with political and cultural symbolism. (Nicola Porro and Pippo Russo)²

National discourses were constructed through extremely seductive communicative means … [and] were able to provoke strong emotional reactions. They reached an increasing number of people [and] could transform a basic hypothesis (the existence of a nation) from a remote and abstract idea into something which seemed to have a role and weight in an effective reality. (Alberto Maria Banti)³

Italy was unified ‘late’ in a period that ran through much of the nineteenth century and formally ended with Rome becoming the capital of the country in 1870. This complicated and controversial unification process took place through a series of wars (with victories and defeats) and revolutions. A minority of nationalists led the movement for Italian unification. For many years, the history of what was known as the Risorgimento (Italian for ‘rebirth’) was either told as the great deeds of Great Men, or as a failed revolution. Italian national identity has often been described as ‘weak’ or ‘incomplete’. In recent years, however, a new body of theoretically informed research has revitalized the history and understanding of Italian unification.

This trend has sometimes been seen as a ‘historiographical revolution’. The main claims of this ‘new Risorgimento history’ have been that identification with something called ‘Italy’ was created through a ‘Risorgimento canon’ of texts of various kinds – poems, novels, art works, historical studies, stories from the past. This identification led to ‘deep emotions’ that inspired a number of people to fight for the creation or re-creation of something called Italy. Many were even prepared to die for this cause. It was through this ‘Risorgimento canon’ that ‘the future young patriots of Italy “discovered” the nation’.⁴ The nation was imagined as ‘a voluntary pact amongst a free and equal fraternity; an organic community; an extended family; and a shared historical identity’ it was a ‘community established by the bonds of affection, nature, kinship and history’.⁵ The radical aspects of this new Risorgimento history lie in a much more positive approach to the ideas behind that movement. The use of methodologies inspired the history of emotions and has also been applied here to the ‘Risorgimento canon’, allowing for an understanding of what it was that led people to support a united Italy not just in theory, but through their deeds and – in some cases – their martyrdom.

As Alberto Banti and Paul Ginsborg have written:

The (narrative or ritual) practices of nationalism during the Risorgimento attempted to understand the nation as a community of fighters, who had signed up to a common sentimental pact in the name of a para-metaphysical entity – the nation/fatherland. And the key point which sanctified political activity, which made it sacred and beyond debate, something to be believed in – was the ultimate figure of sacrifice – the martyr.⁶
By concentrating on emotions, narratives and rituals, and analyzing the communicative strategies used by the leaders of the movement, these studies have challenged stale orthodoxies.

Can this type of methodology and analysis be applied to sport? Does sport have its own ‘canon’ of events – games, texts, goals, victories, defeats, commentaries, celebrations – which work as narratives around which emotions can be provoked and identifications formed? Can a World Cup victory, in Banti’s words, ‘transform a basic hypothesis (the existence of a nation) from a remote and abstract idea into something which seemed to have a role and weight in an effective reality’?

The State of the Art

In terms of the 1982 World Cup (and many other similar events), historians and even sports historians have tended to simply describe these events, rather than analyze or unpick them. They have bought into the semi-mythical versions of the 1982 World Cup and have often simply accepted the official rendering of that period. This kind of descriptive account – as with the myth of the cyclist Gino Bartali relating to the events of 1948 in Italy, which I have analyzed elsewhere – then becomes repetitive. In the case of 1982, a ‘standard story’ was already well established at the time, as the events themselves were unfolding. This ‘standard story’ has been frequently reproduced (almost word for word, ‘event for event’) in subsequent accounts.

Let us take for example one of the few academic accounts of the 1982 World Cup victory and its supposed links to Italian national identity, Stéphane Mourlane’s ‘Italy, World Football Champion 1982: A New Risorgimento?’ published in 2012. Mourlane begins with this bold statement of intent: he will analyze ‘the important role that football has played in Italian society’ and the way that it became ‘almost an essential element in the construction of national identity’. However, the rest of the article provides no evidence and no real argument to back up this claim. Statements are simply presented as fact, such as this one: ‘For Italians, whose national identity (unlike that of other countries) had not been forged on the battlefield, national sportsmen were expected to represent the country’s prestige and pride’. Perhaps the almost continual wars which Italy fought from the nineteenth century right through to 1945 might well be seen as one way in which forms of (contested) national identity were formed. After all, 571,000 Italians died in World War One.

With regards to the role of Sandro Pertini in the events and memory of 1982, Mourlane simply repeats the official version of the story: ‘Elected in July 1978 at the age of 82, President Pertini was the incarnation of democratic values for the Italian people because of his anti-fascist activities as a youth’. At no point is there any attempt to question or unpick perceived notions of an automatic link between something called ‘national identity’ and something called ‘the World Cup’. At no point is there any sense that statements of protagonists of such events should not necessarily be taken at face value. This article, unfortunately (with some exceptions), represents the current state of scholarship with regard both to links between national identity and sport in Italy, and the particular importance of the 1982 World Cup. It is time to start to unpick and analyze just what it was about that event – that ‘text’ – which led to such ‘deep emotions’ in 1982. In what ways did the 1982 story fit with national narratives and potent forms of mobilization about national identities? How much of this myth was
constructed and how much was spontaneously created from below? How important was the historical, social, cultural and political context in which the 1982 victory took place?

I will now attempt to answer these questions. This paper will look first at the general question of sport, football and national identity. I will then analyze the specific context of the 1982 World Cup – historically, socially, culturally and politically but also in sporting terms. Then, I will look in detail at what it was about ‘1982’ which worked so well in terms of national identification – in line with some of the theoretical insights provided by the New Risorgimento Histories which I have already outlined. The next section will look in detail at what I will call ‘the Pertini myth’. Finally, I will examine the legacy of 1982 in a series of fields and spheres.

In general, it appears clear that many studies of sport and national identity have simply trotted out the well-worn phrase ‘imagined community’ (Benedict Anderson) without further explanation or analysis.16 Anderson argued that:

nationality, or, as one might prefer to put it in view of that word’s multiple significations, nation-ness, as well as nationalism, are cultural artefacts of a particular kind. To understand them properly we need to consider carefully how they have come into historical being, in what ways their meanings have changed over time, and why, today, they command such profound emotional legitimacy.17

Yet, many of the studies which cite Anderson’s phrase ‘imagined community’ do not do this work. They concentrate on the ‘imagined’ nature of that so-called ‘community’, but fail to look into detail at how exactly they have ‘come into historical being’ and why they have created such ‘profound emotional legitimacy’. This paper will attempt to do this work for one important sporting event – the 1982 World Cup – and only with regard to Italy. It is rare for sophisticated and new understandings of national identity to be applied to sport, although this is changing thanks to a series of studies in recent years. Often, it is claimed that sport ‘creates’ something called ‘national identity’ in an uncomplicated and direct way. There seems to be considerable confusion about the links between national identity and sporting achievement and events. As White argues, football is often ‘seen to be both constituted by national characteristics (the team plays in the national style), and read as constitutive of those same characteristics (the story of how the team is becomes the story of how the nation is)’.18

By using the new theoretical frameworks I outlined earlier, and thinking critically about the way sport works and creates an arena or the possibility of strong, ‘deep’, emotional responses to events, we can think more carefully about what (if anything) is being created by specific sporting events and how these effects might manifest themselves. Sport often seems to force people to ask themselves the question ‘what is the nation’? And this question is not just asked about one’s own nation, but also about others. This can work in a variety of different ways. For Galeano (talking about Uruguay), ‘The sky-blue shirt was proof of the existence of the nation’.19 While Andrea Pirlo wrote in his recent autobiography that when he scored his penalty in the 2006 World Cup Final, ‘it was precisely in that moment that I understood how beautiful it was to be Italian’.20

Meanwhile, Hoberman has written that ‘sportive nationalism exists, not as an inchoate mass emotional condition, but as the product of specific choices and decisions made by identifiable political actors’.21 But surely ‘sportive nationalism’ can be both of these things? Why should we choose between them? It appears to be possible that sporting events can
produce a strong emotional response and that they can be part of the construction of a specific narrative by politicians and others.

**Football and ‘Deep Emotions’**

My use of these new Risorgimento histories as applied to sport allows us to link up a number of aspects of the connections between a sporting event and forms of national identification. It also allows us to grasp the power of football itself, the national team, and the World Cup in particular. Football, as is well known, has the capacity to focus the attention of disparate communities – at the same time, in the same place, in terms of the same event. It utilizes a universal language that is easy to learn and allows for conversation (chat) about football before, during and after games. Football makes people cry, laugh, shout, throw things, jump up for no reason, run around the room, take their clothes off, kiss complete strangers, run down the street, get themselves tattoos they regret – and all of this in 90 minutes (the perfect time for a narrative, as Hollywood once understood) with an interval.

**1982 and Its Historical Context**

In 1982, Italy was emerging from the ‘years of lead’, more than a decade of political violence. The ‘years of lead’ were a period marked by bombings and political assassination (in part by the right, in part by the left) which marked Italian society after the upheavals of 1968. That decade of violence divided Italy and saw democracy itself come under threat. By 1982 the extremists had largely been defeated, although the wounds of that decade were still very fresh. The country was also on the verge of a decade of growth after a long period of stagnation. It was also (finally) moving towards a different kind of post-Cold War political settlement – with the Socialist Party at the helm and the radical politics of the 1960s and 1970s consigned to the past. This would be a decade when the fashion industry replaced the steel industry, when Dolce and Gabbana, Armani and Versace would emerge to become world leaders. It would also be a decade where Italian football would play a major role – tactically and in terms of image. Italy was setting trends – *footballization* would proceed apace in the 1980s.

In 1986, a young, charismatic and talented entrepreneur purchased AC Milan. In 1988, he appointed an unknown and even younger manager Arrigo Sacchi, who practised a high-pressing, attacking brand of football that consigned *catenaccio* to the dustbin of history. *Catenaccio* (or padlock) is a term often applied to the defensive aspects of Italian football, in particular in the 1960s and 1970s. Although this term was often detached from the reality of actual play and tactics, it also marked a defensive mind-set that often privileged caution over attacking and expansive football. Serie A, in the 1980s, was the most glamorous and high-quality league in the world. Boniek was already playing there in 1982, and Falcão was already part of the AS Roma team, Platini joined Juventus in 1982 along with Boniek, Zico joined Udinese in 1983, Socrates played for Fiorentina from 1984 to 1985, Diego Maradona signed for Napoli in 1984, Gullit, Van Basten and Rijkaard joined Milan in 1987, Junior played for Torino from 1984 to 1987. Almost all the stars of 1982 came to play in Italy. Tactically, financially and in terms of media strategy and influence – and marketing – 1982 appeared to have an extraordinary impact on Serie A itself. These players were also a constant reminder, for Italian fans, of that tournament.
It was also far enough away from fascism and the war to create distance from that regime (with its two World Cups) and the catastrophic events linked to the end of fascism. This was a tournament watched by a generation born after the war. The players themselves were all part of the post-war generation – with the exception of the goalkeeper and captain, Dino Zoff. Beppe Bergomi had been born in the 1960s, the others were all from the 1950s. Two key figures in the 1982 story, however, were from a pre-war generation – Enzo Bearzot and Sandro Pertini.

1982, Nostalgia and Repetition

Despite the importance of the 1982 victory in cultural, economic, social and political terms, no serious research has been carried out into that event and its aftermath in Italy. There is a standard story here that is simply repeated – ad nauseam. This is a story that, as time goes by, nostalgia takes over from direct memory, losing any edge or any element of contradiction. No new elements are added. There is, it appears, nothing more to say about 1982. This standard story is framed so as to exclude some of the more problematic areas of that past from the narrative.

Thus, the role played by Paolo Rossi and others in the so-called totonero scandal is barely mentioned. Even when the scandal is cited, it is assumed that his long ban was unjust and that he was a victim of a conspiracy. The overall victory – as in 2006 – wiped out most bad memories of scandal and match-fixing, at least as far as the national team was concerned, and its stars.

In addition, the dark side of the 1982 victory is either celebrated as a sporting masterpiece – the brutalization of Maradona by Gentile in the Argentina match, for example – or simply hushed up – as with the accusations of match-fixing during the tournament itself involving Italy, which were censored in the press after 1982 – but continued to surface largely because of the stubbornness of one journalist – Oliviero Beha. Memory and forgetting thus work in tandem. 1982’s ‘happy ending’ eliminates all other aspects of the story in the re-telling.

The 1982 ‘Text’

As the captain of the football team called government, which in these forty days had had its own difficult rounds to get through and still has many tough matches to play, I also see in this … a good omen for my squad. (Giovanni Spadolini, President of the Council of Ministers, 13 July 1982)22

So, what was it about the 1982 ‘story’, the ‘text’ of that tournament (from an Italian point of view) which made it so powerful in terms of national mobilization and national identity – and how does this fit with the new theories linked to the Risorgimento and unification which I have laid out thus far? Once we start to unpick them, many of the stories from the 1982 tournament were a perfect fit with the understanding of ‘deep emotions’ and their link to national identification.

First, there was a story of redemption. Redemption or rebirth was a key feature of the Risorgimento and the history of the Italian nation – with recovery from military defeats in the nineteenth century or from the potentially disastrous retreat at Caporetto in 1917 leading to eventual victory. Italy’s history was also marked by individual stories of redemption and sacrifice, which were told as part of the Risorgimento canon. In 1982, this sense of
redemption worked at the collective level – a team which was playing appallingly badly suddenly started playing incredibly well – winning four games in a row and beating the best teams in the world, one after the other. But this redemption was also individual. The villain, the most criticized player of all, the man who had been banned for match-fixing for three years – turned into an instant national hero. This was deep redemption. Paolo Rossi was paying for his sins, he had redeemed himself, and an entire nation, at the same time. In doing so, he also helped draw a huge historical veil over the 1980 match-fixing scandal that had so shocked the nation and outraged its football fans. A low point became a high point. Rossi had gone from jailbird and criminal defendant to a household name (in a good way) in a few days.

This redemption took place during the tournament, in full view of everyone concerned. When the World Cup started Paolo Rossi was not fit. He only had three games under his belt – three games in two years. As Mario Sconcerti wrote 'he was underweight, thin, lacking in muscles strength due to the lack of games he had played … he hardly touched the ball in the first three games', Sconcerti continued, ‘and he didn't touch the ball in the first game in the second round … he was inert, not there, frankly his presence as a great forward seemed absurd’. Gianni Brera wrote that 'Rossi appeared to be an ectoplasm of himself'. Rossi's individual redemption was also that of Italian football, and Italy as a whole. His story became the most well-known of all, and he developed quickly into a global star – Paolorossi.

A further story of redemption was provided by Dino Zoff, captain, goalkeeper and, in sporting terms, a veteran. Zoff had been blamed by many for the 1978 World Cup defeat against the Netherlands and there were frequent claims that he was too old for the job. His extraordinary performance as captain and goalkeeper in 1982, at the age of 40, silenced these critics forever. Zoff was another key symbol of the victory. He lifted the cup, he was the elder statesman (on the pitch and as ‘father’ of the team/the nation). His hands holding the cup were immortalized in stamps and other images – and often it was enough to simply show those hands in order to identify Zoff in his 1982 guise.

Further redemption came for the manager, Enzo Bearzot, who had suffered the ire of the Rome and Milanese press for his supposed failure to select two players in particular: Inter’s Evaristo Beccalossi and Rome’s Roberto Pruzzo. During the initial phase of the tournament, the relationship with the press became so bad that the team imposed what is known in Italy as a ‘silenzio stampa’ (press blackout). Gianpaolo Ormezzano later described the atmosphere as that of ‘journalistic terrorism’. Press conferences were still held, but lead by a man of very few words – Zoff – accompanied by Bearzot, who took responsibility for the whole team. Bearzot also became a national hero after the victory, and those bitter arguments were quickly forgotten. His decision to select Rossi was praised to the stars – retrospectively. He was also reborn.

The second image/story from the 1982 text was another familiar one in terms of national narratives, and the Risorgimento itself. This was a story of a small, brave, band-of-brothers, fighting in a hostile terrain, and coming through against all the odds. This was also a story which could be seen in the narratives which emerged during the Risorgimento, as with Garibaldi’s recovery from defeat in 1849, and the heroic tales of the volunteer army he brought together to fight for Italy in Sicily in 1860. The Risorgimento was full of stories of heroic defeats and equally heroic and unlikely victories. Thus, the 1982 story also worked because Italy won as underdogs – against the mighty Brazil and then the fearsome West German team. When Italy were favourites (on other occasions, or earlier on in the
This aspect of the narrative was less powerful and had less ability to draw on the emotions.

A third element to the story was the brotherhood and unity amongst different kinds of Italians represented by the team itself (symbolically and in reality). The 1982 team included Italians from north and south, from the working class and the middle class, with different skills and different specialities, but all of whom were working towards the same end. This was a national team in every sense of the word. The romantic artists played alongside a set of hard-working ‘water carriers’. So the cultured left boot of Giancarlo Antognoni complemented the calculated, cool violence of Claudio Gentile’s man-marking evisceration of Maradona, and the perpetual movement of Gabriele Oriali was the perfect foil the rapacious, darting runs of Paolo Rossi, while the skill and movement of Bruno Conti set up chances for the elegant ‘big pin’, Alessandro Altobelli, who always seemed to have more time than anyone else to score. At the back there stood a player who seemed to float across the grass, and who rarely appeared to tackle anyone – Gaetano Scirea. A player who, it is said, played ‘in silence’. Could we also describe the 1982 team as ‘a community of fighters’ in the words of two leading Risorgimento historians, Alberto Maria Banti and Paul Ginsborg. The leaders were heroic, taciturn, and unmoveable – in the true Risorgimento tradition. They showed their worth through deeds, not words – like Garibaldi himself.

But words were also important, as they had been in the formation of the Italian nation itself. Beyond the leaders on the pitch, there were the leaders off it – the generals, the tacticians, the chiefs, the ‘wise old men’ of the nation. Enzo Bearzot had never managed a club side of any importance. He had been groomed for the national team for years (this was a particularly successful tactic in the Italian set-up – managing the national side is light years away from managing a club side). Bearzot took the violent criticism of the press on the chest – deflecting it from his players. As we shall see, Sandro Pertini also played a key role in this sense.

In terms of ‘deep emotions’, we should not forget the games themselves. These were epic matches, judged by some to be amongst the very best in the entire history of the World Cup. Paolo Rossi’s hat-trick against Brazil took place in the context of ebbs and flows, dramatic come-backs and episodes with intense visual power. The goals themselves were works of art, combinations of grit, geometry, skill and the anarchic dribbling of Bruno Conti. They also overturned sporting stereotypes. This was light years away from anything that resembled catenaccio. Italy’s second goal in the final saw two defenders passing the ball to each other in West Germany’s penalty area. The final emotional release came with Marco Tardelli’s powerful cross-shot, which left Germany’s goalkeeper motionless. Tardelli set off running, arms out wide. It was ‘Tardelli’s scream’, a moment repeated so often it emblazoned on the minds of millions – many of them also screaming, back home, in their living rooms.

So 1982 worked perfectly on a whole series of levels as a national text. Its narratives were universal and particular. The 1982 ‘event’ contained a series of stories that could be told and re-told, while other elements of the ‘expedition’ could be conveniently forgotten, or simply used to reinforce the mythical elements of the tale. The characters and stories were all there – and they could be visualized – they had all been seen. But the final piece of the jigsaw was provided not by a footballer, but by a politician – Sandro Pertini. In most people’s memories, and in the standard 1982 story, Pertini plays a key role.
The Pertini Myth, 1982

You are an example of a serious Italy – and Italy which believes in itself. (Sandro Pertini to Dino Zoff [cited in Ghirelli])

I am here because the Italian people wants to be close to those athletes who have brought us such honour. And I represent the Italians. (Sandro Pertini)

The President showed all of his humanity, his incredible vivacity, his extraordinary ability to be close to popular sentiment. (Antonio Ghirelli)

What I shall call the ‘1982-Pertini myth’ was born early and fixed in time – in fact it first appeared at the same time as the events themselves were taking place, and in particular during the final itself. This myth was in part constructed by Pertini himself and his advisors – and it was highly successful in terms of a certain kind of national identity and Pertini’s own popularity. It also worked perfectly to underline the distraction that many people believed the World Cup also represented. This was a myth that worked from above and from below. It was not ‘spontaneous’ as has often been claimed, but perfectly set up to fit the moment and framed by the images provided by television during and after the final. But this is not all that happened. This was a myth that worked so well in part because of the type of country that Italy had become by 1982, and in part because of the personality of Pertini himself.

It is useful, at this point, to look for a moment, at this analysis by Lucy Riall of Giuseppe Garibaldi (the great military hero of Italian unification) and his influence:

Modern political heroes, like the nationalist movements with which they are identified, are often treated as political inventions imposed from above on a passive population. I will suggest instead that, while there was a great deal about Garibaldi’s appeal that was planned by political leaders, his definition and creation as a political hero was still largely a collaborative effort, involving audience participation as well as directions from the stage. The public’s enthusiasm for Garibaldi reflected a broader contemporary appetite for romantic heroes and adventure stories, and Garibaldi modified his political image to fit this popular demand. The task of Garibaldi was not only to make Italy, he also had to make Italy convincing.

Now, if we replace the word ‘Garibaldi’ with the word ‘Pertini’, nothing really changes, in the context of the late 1970s and 1980s and the 1982 World Cup victory. Pertini’s myth was knowingly constructed from above by Antonio Ghirelli (his press officer during his first period in office, and an expert on Italian football) and Pertini himself – a real, plain-talking, pipe-smoking man with an extraordinary past, a man almost overloaded with history – Italian history – who inspired love and devotion amongst many Italians. This was a two-way process.

So important was Pertini’s role in the 1982 World Cup that the event is often described as ‘Pertini’s World Cup’. Yet, Pertini only saw one game in the flesh (the final) and even in that case, he decided to attend – it is said – at the last minute. Before the final, Pertini stayed in Rome, but photographs of him watching games on television were released to the press.

It was important to show that he was interested in what was going on in Spain, just like almost every other Italian. Part of the idea was to construct the idea of Pertini as both ordinary and extraordinary at the same time – as a man of the people and someone special. This image was already well in place by the time the 1982 World Cup began. As Silvio Lanaro has written, Pertini ‘was never over-the-top, but always very well aware of the part he was playing …’ [He] ‘placed himself above politics in a natural way which everyone saw as sincere. He was a man of spartan tastes and a studied form of straightforward emotions’. Riccardo Lombardi [a fellow Socialist] argued that he wouldn’t move a finger if the TV cameras were not there to record things. He often went out into the streets, and liked
appearing in crowds, and he celebrated like a kid when Italy won the 1982 World Cup. In July 1982, this well-manufactured image (which, in many ways, was similar to the ‘man of the people’ image cultivated by politicians through time from Mussolini to Berlusconi to Blair) would fix itself forever on the public consciousness. Football would be the vehicle for that triumph.

Pertini flew out to Spain on the morning of the final, 11 July 1982. He took a DC9 – an Italian military plane, and was the only Italian politician to be present. Pertini was very clear that he and he alone would represent Italy during the final. He arrived in Madrid to be met by King Juan Carlos himself at the airport. Then it was off to the team hotel. According to Italo Moretti, Pertini failed to show up at a party in the Italian embassy in Madrid after the game. He preferred to go to a local bar and watch some Spanish dancing. He spent just one night in Spain. Pertini himself said that he had not wanted to bring the team bad luck, and thus did not attend previous games. The real decision, however, was probably a more cynical one – Pertini turned up once Italy’s tournament had already become a success. Even if they had lost in the final, it is likely that Italy would have returned as heroes. It was a no-lose situation for Pertini by the time the final began. By attending the final the risks of association with overall defeat were minimized.

What was it about Pertini’s actions that impressed them onto the Italian national consciousness? First, there was the figure of the man himself. Pertini was tiny, bespectacled, ageing. He usually smoked a pipe (he amassed a private collection of some 700 pipes all – it was said – given to him as presents), and wore a suit, like many men of his generation. He looked like an ordinary ‘grandfather’ and he was no longer a partisan politician, but the President of Italy, the Head of State, the President of all the Italians, as he himself had put it at the time of his election. Physically, Pertini was perfect for the role – especially next to King Juan Carlos and in comparison with the German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt.

During the match, Pertini turned into a fan like any other – just like the millions across Italy, celebrating in the same way, at the same time. Pertini, however, was in front of the cameras. Most fans were watching him watching the game. The key difference was that Pertini was there, sitting next to the King of Spain. But it is as he was not. In that moment, the Italians and Pertini (and the players on the pitch – were fused as one – the identification was total. When Altobelli raised his hands after the third goal that put Italy 3–0 up, Pertini also raised his hands in exactly the same way.

He had become the 12th player, and the television director went to him after every goal. Those goals, in popular memory, became associated with Pertini. He was fused with those millions of Italians watching the game back in Italy and in emigrant communities across the world. Inevitably, from that moment on it would be almost impossible to separate the two events – the game and Pertini’s celebration in the stands. They had become the same thing – inseparable – part of the same story. This was marketing of a sophisticated kind – product association. Pertini had become a brand, a brand associated with victory and joy.

Secondly, there was Pertini’s (supposed) lack of concern for protocol. Despite his role and his institutional position, Pertini acted (it seemed) like an ordinary fan – like any ordinary fan, just like one of the millions of ‘virtual’ managers who comment on tactics every week in bars and front rooms across Italy. His tactical advice was meaningless (although it has since been endowed with great wisdom) and was the kind of thing you would probably have heard in any bar at that time, in any part of Italy. But his phrases were used to emphasize his ordinariness. When Italy scored, he jumped up, he gesticulated, turned round, looked
for Italian allies (there were not many, he had made sure of that), he spoke to himself, or to nobody in particular (like all fans do). Pertini was Head of State, but he could have been anybody. No wonder that some cartoonists occasionally depicted him as wearing an Italy shirt like the players on the pitch.

This anti-political politics, this Pertini as man-of-the-people, was an image that had been carefully cultivated by the President ever since his election in 1978, by a huge majority of Parliamentarians. As Lanaro has argued, ‘he often went beyond the strict rules governing his role … but above all he continued to talk, and talk, and talk, trusting … his extraordinary capacity to communicate, and in the authority he had been given as father of the nation and in his media-friendly image’.36

Pertini, for example, refused to move into the Quirinale Palace, preferring a ‘modest’ flat in the centre of Rome. No trappings of power for him. Like Garibaldi, he was a modest man who nonetheless dedicated himself to his role as President – travelling widely and inviting school groups and others to the Palace to meet him. Pertini became a kind of lay Pope. He also insisted in being driven around by his wife in a small red 500 car (he could not drive). There were stories that he often tried to throw off his body-guards and he was straight-talking when it came to corruption, the mafia, politics and everyday life. Pertini was ‘anti-political’ well before anti-politics came into fashion.

Pertini had become President at an extremely difficult time for Italy – in the midst of the ‘years of lead’ linked to political violence and a deep economic (and political) crisis. He became known as the ‘Funerals’ President’ for his constant presence at the funerals of those killed thanks to this violence. He was also fond of taking the part of the people against the state (and politicians) at certain times, as with his emotional denunciation of state inefficiencies after a traumatic earthquake in the Neapolitan area in 1980, or his speeches attacking political corruption. The anti-political, man of the people, Pertini’s image was already well in place, in the public mind, before the 1982 World Cup took place.

The perfect, final touch to all this was the card game on the plane back, with the World Cup sitting on the table. The game itself was a typical Italian game, played largely by old men in bars – *scopone* – and usually in groups of four. The group itself was well chosen – Pertini himself, Bearzot, Franco Causio (an older player who had been given a brief appearance in the final) and the patriarchal captain, Dino Zoff. The cup had been won, it was there, but Pertini was just a normal man – one of *us* – and someone who got angry when he lost at cards. Moreover, the card game – seen today – is essentially tinged with nostalgia. Both Pertini and Bearzot are now dead, you cannot smoke in planes any more and airline table-seats are long gone. The card game was immortalized in photographs and films. Pertini was bringing the World Cup home to his people.

On Monday morning, the day after the game, the DC9 returned to Rome – this time with Pertini, the entire team, and the World Cup. The Minister of Sport was also in the plane, something that apparently irritated Pertini, who was the first off the plane in Rome. Modestly, it is said, he did not want to carry the cup. But he was identified with the victory – the first person the crowds saw in Rome. The return was perfectly stage-managed. There were thousands of fans inside the airport and hundreds of thousands on the roads leading to Ciampino. Pertini, it is said, successfully argued that the team (and himself) should return to Rome by car instead of helicopter. This was a stark contrast with the fallout after the 1970 World Cup, where the players and manager had been forced to hid in a hanger to escape the wrath of the fans, or 1966 with the infamous ‘tomatoes’ of Genoa. The celebrations
continued (officially) with a dinner (Pertini sat himself between Bearzot and Zoff) and a team photograph, with Pertini in the middle. As with previous victories in 1934 and 1938, Pertini milked the triumph for all it was worth.

**Pertini's Past and 1982: An Anti-Fascist World Cup?**

So, did Pertini’s past matter in all this, as is often claimed? Was this, in some way, an *anti-fascist* World Cup? Pertini’s life-story appears to encapsulate, on its own, Italy’s ‘short twentieth century’. A reformist socialist, he fought and was decorated in World War One (and witnessed the near defeat of Italy’s armies at Caporetto in 1917). He then took part in the radical upheavals of the post-war period. A dedicated anti-fascist he was a friend of Giacomo Matteotti, who was murdered by the fascists in 1924 after a speech denouncing irregularities and violence during the elections of that year. Pertini was targeted by the fascists, and beaten up on a number of occasions. Forced into exile in France, he returned in secret to Italy in 1929 and was then arrested and sent into internal exile. He also helped other well-known anti-fascists escape from Italy.

On the 10 September 1943 he took part in what was officially the first act of the armed resistance – the failed ‘defence of Rome’ against the Nazis at Porta San Paolo (alongside some regular troops). It is said that he helped build the first barricade there. Arrested in October 1943, he managed to get himself released from Rome’s partly Nazi-run city-prison. In May 1944 he was in occupied Milan and he also found time to take part in the dramatic battles around the liberation of Florence in the same year.

As one of the leaders of the armed resistance in 1943–1945 he took part in the decision-making that led to the execution by partisans of Benito Mussolini on Lake Como in April 1945 and the beginning of the final insurrection in Milan which liberated the city before the Allies arrived. Pertini’s brother Eugenio was executed in Flossenburg concentration camp by the Nazis on the 25 April 1945 – Italy’s official day of liberation.

In the post-war period, Pertini was amongst those who drew up Italy’s modern, anti-fascist constitution. In 1960, he made an extraordinary speech in Genoa – a city that would see widespread rioting over a neo-fascist congress planned for the city. It was not a conciliatory speech: ‘We have made some errors’, he said and we have been too kind to our enemies. This kindness has meant that today the fascists act as if they are in charge, and they have even said that the execution of Mussolini was murder. Yet, to the neo-fascists who are still out there I say – I am proud of having ordered the execution of Mussolini – because I, along with others, merely carried out that death sentence which had been pronounced by the Italian people twenty years earlier.\(^{37}\)

Pertini played a key role in Socialist Party politics and worked as a journalist before he was elected as the first Socialist President of Italy in 1978. He became by some distance the most popular President in the history of the Republic.

Pertini’s media-savyness was in (large) part created through the work of his press officer from 1978 to 1980, Antonio Ghirelli. One of the greatest and most distinguished of Italy’s sports journalists and writers, he had written the first history of Italian football, which was published in 1954.\(^{38}\) Ghirelli had extensive experience of dealing with the press (and the sports press) from the inside and understood how Pertini’s ‘popular’ appeal could be manipulated to good effect. Although Ghirelli had resigned in 1980, his legacy remained.
Pertini was well aware of the power of football in the Italian national consciousness, and its cultural and political pervasiveness.

One of the effects of Pertini’s powerful association with the 1982 World Cup victory was that his radical past was pushed into the background. He became universal, safe and almost cuddly. He developed into ‘Italy’s grandfather’, with his ubiquitous pipe. In order for Pertini to become universal, Pertini’s past had to be forgotten. This was not an anti-fascist World Cup, it was a post-political world cup. It prefigured (and also created) the ‘footballization’ of Italy in the 1990s. Without Pertini, there could be no Berlusconi. 39

Framing the World Cup: A Televisual Experience – Context and History

The power of the 1982 ‘text’ was also linked to the medium through which it was transmitted, and the particular historical phase of that medium in the early 1980s. In that pre-internet era, Italians consumed the World Cup tournament almost entirely through their own private televisions, in their own sitting rooms or kitchens. There were a few big screens set up in 1982 (in Piazza del Popolo in Rome, for example) but millions of Italians stayed at home, or went around to friends. The 1982 final achieved a 95% television share. This remains a record, and one that will never be beaten, given changes to the media system. Only a stubborn 5% watched the other channels, it is said. There really would never be an event like it, before or since.

Thus, on that hot day in July, between 32 and 40 million Italians sat down (or stood, or slouched), at the same time, from Sicily to Piedmont and watched the same game, with the same commentary, without mobile telephones or twitter. Football’s ability to unify an entire country was exacerbated by the social and technological context of the time, the peak-time nature of the tournament and the success of the national team.

The match was framed, in addition, by the commentary of Nando Martellini – a reassuring presence who knew exactly what he was doing. Martellini was experienced and had clearly prepared some of his commentary beforehand. Thus, when the referee raised the ball above his head to signal full-time (a bizarre gesture which remained in the memory of many), Martellini announced the famous phrase ‘Campioni del mondo, Campioni del mondo, Campioni del mondo’. This was not just a brilliant use of a classic advertising technique – the repetition of the same phrase – but an explicit reminder that this was Italy’s third World Cup. The victory of 1982 was described, by many, as Italy’s first ‘anti-fascist’ trophy, but those other victories were certainly still meant to count. The television director was crucial to the framing of the event, cutting frequently to Pertini in the stands and thus fixing the association between the President and the game itself – and the victory. Altobelli-Pertini-Rossi-Tardelli, all became one, fused in the popular consciousness. Those emotions were unleashed through a unique, singular and unrepeatable visual and aural experience. Television was central to the power of that event.

1982, La Festa

Obviously it is crazy to throw yourself into a fountain and it would be ingenuous to think that everyone who waves an Italian flag is a patriot. However, we saw people jump into fountains at night and wrap themselves in flags which they had abhorred for so long. (Gianni Brera)40
The party had begun well before the game was over. As the final whistle blew in 1982, millions of Italians poured onto the streets, not just in Italy but all over the world – from Toronto to Sydney to Buenos Aires to London. This was a spontaneous street party that, in popular memory (and sometimes in reality), went on for days. Not everybody went to work the next day. Impromptu tables were set up and food and drink were passed around. The symbols of the nation were exhibited without shame, or fear and streets were ‘re-taken’ (albeit briefly) after the dark years of ‘lead’.

This party had some ritualized elements to it – the random driving of cars, hooting of horns, full of people hanging out of windows. Fountains became swimming pools (it was hot). Fake ‘death’ notices were issued for Germany. But there were some new elements to the celebrations. Many emigrants remember 1982 as the first time they were able to really feel in control – that they counted in the countries they had emigrated to. The party in Toronto, for example, was extraordinary for its size and length. Italian emigrants in Sydney later remembered that this was the first time they felt they had really been noticed by their fellow countrymen.

In Italy, journalists noticed the proliferation of Italian flags – something which had been rare and had polarized Italians in the political struggles of the 1960s and 1970s. As Luciano Curino wrote in _La Stampa_, ‘there have never been so many flags on the streets. Many still had the Savoy symbol, and had clearly been found at the bottom of cupboards after some forty years or so’. There was a sense that these dusty (and pre-Republican) flags had become acceptable again, with the 1982 victory. Children were dressed in Italian colours, and buildings were painted in the same way. A sense of community was created. To cite Curino again, ‘This is a night where everyone speaks informally and there are continual hugs and the repetition of the phrase: “we are champions of the world”’. And this sense of community went beyond those who were football fans, including ‘from fans to those who know nothing about football’. There was also a downside to these vast celebrations – at least 10 heart attacks, fights, car crashes and the like. A 20-year fan fractured his back in the Trevi fountain. In Genoa, another man shot at a neighbour because of noise. He was arrested for attempted murder. All over Italy televisions exploded from the strain. Small fires were lit in the streets. In Rimini, a man stuck a nail in his foot as an offering for the national team (before the game). He ended up in hospital, claiming that if Italy had lost, he would have committed suicide.

**Other Victories, Different Times**

By 2006 (the next Italian world cup victory and final appearance) things had changed dramatically. For one thing, the match was on two different networks, and a number of spectators chose Sky over the RAI coverage. So there were at least two sets of commentators (and summarizers) involved. In addition, Italy in 2006 was a completely different country to the Italy of 1982. Five million immigrants had arrived in the 24 years between the two tournaments. Moreover, thousands of big screens were put up all over Italy in 2006. In many ways, the match was watched as if it was ‘just’ another match – as if the fans were in a stadium. This made it similar to a big Serie A game – whereas, in 1982, it was clearly a different experience, experienced above all within the domestic space. The 2006 experience was diluted and its memory was inevitably destined to sink into those of club-level Champion’s
league or Serie A victories, whose celebrations were becoming more and more similar to each other – increasingly ritualized and instantly forgettable as a result.

A crisis of the Italian nation-state also took hold in the 1990s and 2000s. Over this period, two separate but connected trends have seen a sustained political and historical attack on the Risorgimento and on Italy itself. In the North, ever since the late 1980s, the regionalist Lega Nord movement has propagated an anti-Risorgimento version of the past from within and outside of government. This idea of past was accompanied, in the present, by the symbols of a ‘new (imagined) northern nation’ (with its own history): Padania. Lega strategy gave Padania a flag, a history, an anthem, a set of regular events and anniversaries, a football team, a cycling race and an institutional base. Although never hegemonic nationally, as the 2011 national celebrations would show, the Lega nonetheless planted the idea of an alternative to Italy in people’s minds, or reinforced that alternative when it was already there. This was a nation-building strategy, and an extremely flexible one. It was riven through with contradictions, but this was part of the point. It also pushed a powerful critique of the Risorgimento itself, its symbols and its history, while imitating its methodology. Lega politicians openly supported whichever team was playing Italy, and cheered when Italy lost. They set up their own football team – Padania – which played friendlies against other non-aligned nations. Not all of the millions of people who voted for the Lega supported this ‘policy’ by any means, but a significant minority almost certainly did. For the first time in Italian contemporary history, a political force that was in government at a local and national level had rejected ‘la nazionale’. It was a break with tradition that belied the sporting unity of the past. Identities were fracturing.

The party after the 2006 victory was certainly spectacular, and national, but it was also a little tired. It did not have the spontaneity or the unifying power of 1982. The year 2006 had no Pertini to centre around. The celebrations were similar to those after a (by now fairly routine) Champion’s League victory, and they lasted for less time than those in 1982. Moreover, the meaning of the nation had changed. Italy had been footballized. It was used to winning things at club level. Perhaps, and this is a hypothesis which only time will reveal to be true, or otherwise, club and local identities were finally supplanting those of the national team?

1982, After-Effects and Memory

Football helps us understand society. (Franco Ferrarotti)

It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the long-term effects of the 1982 victory in terms of national identity, Italian society and the ‘footballization’ which many people have identified as taking place in the 1990s and 2000s. We can only draw three tentative conclusions here. First, the Pertini myth remains powerful, turning up in politician’s speeches and advertisements at regular intervals. For example, in his first speech to Parliament on taking office in February 2014, Matteo Renzi said that

On the 24 February 1990 … Sandro Pertini died. I remember his attitude, which all of us remember, especially in the face of the problems of those terrible years, as well as in the better moments, as when the world cup came back from Madrid.

This was a durable myth, and a non-controversial one (a rarity in Italy). Everyone could agree on Pertini in 1982. This was, without doubt, a feel-good moment. Secondly, numerous
cultural products continue to re-evoke 1982 in ways which link nostalgia, memory and forgetting. These range from films (for example, Marco Tullio Giordano’s *La meglio gioventù* (2003) or Giovanni Veronesi’s *L’ultima ruota del carro* from 2013, but see also the official World Cup film *G’olé!*), to biographies, songs and other accounts. Dino Zoff, Paolo Rossi and others have told their stories on numerous occasions. Even moments of mourning, such as the death of Bearzot in 2010, were linked to that event. Zoff, Conti and Rossi were amongst the pall-bearers that day. The victory of 1982 remains one of the most powerful collective moments of national identification from Italy’s post-war period. Finally, the legacy of 1982 allows us to re-think the chronology of the ‘footbalization’ of Italy, which is commonly associated with the rise of Silvio Berlusconi to political power in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Perhaps we should start this period of ‘footbalization’ in 1982, with Sandro Pertini’s ‘spontaneous’ celebrations in the stands in Madrid? Did 1982 help the triumph of ‘Made in Italy’? Did the association of politics, sporting language, the nation, television and football really begin there? Was Berlusconi (once again) simply building on existing trends, rather than inventing them? Was 1982 the moment when Italy became, in the words of Beha and Ferrarrotti, ‘a Republic based on football’?

Notes

5. Ibid., 124.
12. The literature on this subject is vast, but see John Foot, *Italy’s Divided Memory* (New York: Palgrave, 2011).


27. Outside of Italy, there was general condemnation of the way Gentile ‘marked’ Maradona out of the game. Brian Glanville described the way that Gentile ‘clobbering, holding, hacking and impeding Maradona out of the game, may be said to have won Italy the match’ (Brian Glanville, *The Story of the World Cup*, [London: Faber, 2010], 250).


30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.


34. Sometimes Pertini becomes the ‘father of the nation’: ‘a bit like everyone’s father, a symbol for everyone and also the man who was able to criticise the political institutions’. See Roberto Zoldan, *Pertini Presidente di tutti gli italiani* (Milan: Marzorati Editore, 1985), 15. All translations are my own.


39. See the photos of Benito Mussolini with the 1938 World Cup winning team and that of Pertini with the 1982 team, [http://www.storiedicalcio.altervista.org/italia_fascista_1938.html](http://www.storiedicalcio.altervista.org/italia_fascista_1938.html) and [http://www.magliarossonera.it/198182_albumond82.html](http://www.magliarossonera.it/198182_albumond82.html).
40. Brera, *La leggenda dei mondiali*, 90.
42. Ibid.
44. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-GAMMhGn5Sc](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-GAMMhGn5Sc) (accessed 7 January 2015).

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