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Body, Mind and Sleepiness:
On the Abhidharma understanding
of *styāna* and *middha*

Rupert Gethin
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1. **Listing dharmas**

Our modern textbooks of Buddhist thought inform us that the Theravāda tradition recognises seventy-two or eighty-two dharmas, the Sarvāstivāda tradition seventy-five, and the Yogācāra tradition one hundred.¹ In fact, at least if we confine ourselves to the Indian sources, it seems that only the Theravāda tradition ever actually gives a definite figure for the number of *svabhāva-dharmas*, that is irreducible qualities, it recognises, and then only in four relatively late texts: two works of Anuruddha, *Abhidhammatthasāṅgaha* and *Nāmarūpapariccheda* (tenth century?), Sumaṅgala’s commentary to the former (*Abhidhammatthavibhāvinītiṅka*, twelfth century), and Kassapa of Cola’s *Mohavicchedani* (thirteenth century) all inform us that there are precisely seventy-two *sabhāva-dharmas*, leaving out of the reckoning the ten ‘unproduced’ (*anipphanna*) material dharmas, that are

not strictly dhammas in their own right.²

So far as I know, in no Indian Sarvāstivāda work, nor in Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhaṣya, is there any specific mention of ‘seventy-five dhammas’: nor do we ever find a list that consists of exactly seventy-five dhammas. The notion that Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa recognises just seventy-five seems to derive from a work of one of Xuanzang’s disciples, Puguang’s Fazongyuan 法宗原 (seventh century).³ And as for the Yogācāra, the list of one hundred dhammas derives from a short work that merely lists the dhammas, attributed in China to Vasubandhu but in Tibetan tradition to Dharmapāla: the Dasheng baifa mingmen lun or ‘Lucid Introduction to the One Hundred Dhammas’.⁴

To insist that the Abhidharma traditions tend to avoid final numbered lists of dhammas may seem of little consequence. Clearly by the time the Theravāda Mahāvihāra commentaries were being compiled in the fifth century, a final list of seventy-two dhammas was established: it is just a matter of doing the arithmetic.⁵ Yet the very fact that in doing the arithmetic we might hesitate to include or exclude the ten anipphanna material dhammas—which are, after all, in all the lists—is telling. Just what

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⁵ Vism 443–72: 4 + 24 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 36 + 6 + 1 + 1 + 4 + 2 = 81 (chapter XIV §§ 35, 36, 82, 126, 129, 133, 159, 166, 168, 170, 176); on distinguishing the ten anipphannarūpas see Vism 450 (XIV 73). The asamkhata-dhātu is omitted here as the list is based on the five skandhas.
is a dharma? While Ābhidhmikas of all schools went some way in defining what a dharma is supposed to be, it is apparent that they sometimes had difficulty in applying the category consistently to the lists and terms they inherited from the Nikāya-Āgama texts.

The earliest Abhidharma lists of dharmas found in such texts as the Theravāda Dhammasaṅgani and Sarvāstivāda Pāṇcavastuka are explicitly open, and since some of its dhammas are reducible, the Dhammasaṅgani clearly uses dhamma not only in the sense of an irreducible quality. This tradition of open lists is maintained in such texts as the Path of Freedom. Clearly the texts of all schools—the Theravāda, the Sarvāstivāda, and Yogācāra—bear witness to continued discussions and even uncertainty about what items should be included in the lists of dharmas. While certain items are always there, there remains a fuzziness around the edges. The debates and discussions about just what should be considered a dharma and what should not be are never finally resolved. Reflecting this, there remains a certain reluctance and hesitancy to say categorically that such and such is the definitive list of dharmas.

In the Abhidharmakośa, the dharmas are listed in chapter two. After a

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7 Having listed the fifty-six dhammas that constitute the first type of consciousness (Dhs 9, § 1), the Dhammasaṅgani provides definitions of each in the form of registers of terms (Dhs 9, §§ 2–57). Certain registers are used for several different dhammas, making it apparent that certain of the fifty-six dhammas are considered equivalents. On the basis of these definitions, we in fact have only thirty distinct qualities present in this first type of consciousness. Cf. As 134.

8 Following the English translation, see N. R. M. Ehara, Soma Thera and Kheminda Thera, The Path of Freedom. Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1977), p. 247. But the text perhaps should be read as simply stating that ‘apart from feeling and perception all mental-factor dharmas are the aggregate of formations’. T 1648: 32.447c13: 除受想一切心數法行陰. I am grateful to Lin Qian for this observation.
discussion of the twenty-two faculties, Vasubandhu tells us that dharmas are comprised by five basic categories (*vastu*); matter (*rūpa*), consciousness (*citta*), the associates of consciousness (*caitasika*), forces disassociated from consciousness (*citta-viprayukta-samskāra*) and the unconditioned (*asamskṛta*). The understanding of *citta* as a single dharma and the list of the fourteen disassociated forces seem straightforward. Vasubandhu’s list of the *caitasikas* is perhaps less so. He concludes by noting that there are some further *caitasikas* that are ‘not fixed’ (*anīyata*), that is, that may or may not arise in connection with certain types of consciousness: thinking (*vitarka*), examining (*vicāra*), regret (*kaukṛtya*), sleepiness (*middha*), ‘and so on’ (*ādi*).9 Yāsomitra’s commentary quotes a mnemonic verse which indicates what is meant by ‘and so on’ here: aversion (*pratīgha*), greed (*rāga*), conceit (*māna*), and doubt (*vicikṣā*), making a total of eight unfixed dharmas.10 And Vasubandhu speaks precisely of these additional four in his exposition of the association of *caitasikas* a few pages later.11 For the unconditioned and material dharmas we must look back to chapter one where the former are listed as three (I 4–5). A little further on at the beginning of verse nine Vasubandhu tells us that *rūpa* consists of the five

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9 Abhidh-k-bh 57.8–9 (bhāṣya to II 27); uktā ime pañcapraṇārāś caitāḥ | anye ’pi cāniyatāḥ santī vitarkavicāraukṛtyamiddhādayah |. Cf. Abhidh-dī 79.6–7: vyākhyaṭāḥ pañcapraṇārāś caitāḥ | anye ’pi cāniyatāḥ pāthyante vitarkavicāraukṛtyamiddhādayah |

10 Abhidh-k-vy 132.20–22: atrācāryavasumitraḥ samgrahaślokaṃ āha: vitarkacāraukṛtyamiddhāparamīhaṃsaḥ | mānaḥ ca vicikṣā cety aṣṭāv anīyatāḥ smṛtā  ||

senses, their respective objective fields, and the ‘non-informative’ (avijñāpati). This might suggest just eleven distinct dharmas, which is how Puguang counted. But this is in the verse portion of the text, and when Vasubandhu defines the sphere of touch in the next verse, he tells us that this in turn comprises eleven distinct items (dravya-svabhāvam): the four elements, plus smoothness, roughness, heaviness, lightness, cold, hunger, and thirst. The use of the term dravya or ‘real entity’ here might suggest that we should count a total of twenty-one material dharmas, but then for consistency’s sake we should also perhaps count the sub-varieties of visible form, sound, taste and smell. Yet not all these appear to be understood as dravyas. In fact there seems little reason to think that Vasubandhu intended to depart from the usual Sarvāstivāda practice of counting the sphere of touch as five dharmas (the four elements, plus the additional portion) and listing the material dharmas as in total fifteen. This would give a list of seventy-nine dharmas. But perhaps the more important point is that there remains some ambiguity about just what items are to be counted as separate distinct dharmas, and it is not at all clear that there is any definitive Sarvāstivāda list of dharmas. The way Skandhila lists dharmas in his Abhidharmāvatāra might suggest adding two further caítasikas, ‘gladness’ (prāmodya) and ‘disenchantment’ (nirveda).

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12 Abhidh-k-bh I 9a-b (5.22): rūpam pañcendriyāṇy arthāḥ pañcāvijñāptir eva ca |
14 Abhidh-k-bh 7.9-10: spraṣṭavyam ekādaśadravyasvabhāvam | catvāri mahābhūtāni śāksṇatvam karkaśatvam gurutvam laghutvam śitam jighatsā pīpāsā ceti | |
15 Abhidh-k I 10.
16 This problem of the use of dravya in the context of material dharmas is in fact discussed at some length in the bhāṣya to Abhidh-k II 22 (Abhidh-k-bh 52.23-54.2).
17 See Abhidh-k-bh 23.19–23.20 (I 35): spraṣṭavyam dvividham bhūtāni bhautikam ca | tatra bhūtāni catvāri | bhautikam śāksṇatvādi saptavidham |. For the usual Sarvāstivāda listing of material dharmas see, for example, the Prakaraṇapāda (T 1542: 26.692b24–27), PañcaV 8–7, Abhidharmāvatāra (T 1554: 28.980c10–19).
Turning to the Yogācāra lists, alongside the Dasheng baifa mingmen lun’s one hundred dharmas, we have a list of eighty-five in Vasubandhu’s Pañcaskandhaka, and one of 108 in Asaṅga’s Abhidharmasamuccaya. The differences in number mostly concern the forces disassociated from consciousness and the unconditioned dharmas, but also, in the list of one hundred, the material dharmas. This issue of just how many dharmas the Yogācārins recognise is further complicated by the fact that their exegetical traditions indicate that a number of the dharmas in the lists—non-informative matter and the twenty secondary defilements—are anyway not distinct entities (dravya) but only nominal (prajñapti). All this suggests that the Yogācārin lists acknowledge the ambiguous status of a dharma and in fact abandon the attempt to provide an inventory of ultimately irreducible qualities. The approach is more pragmatic: here is a practical and useful listing of dharmas.

That determining the lists of dharmas of these schools is problematic illustrates something that becomes clearer as we begin to compare the lists across schools. It often appears that one school has completely omitted a

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18 Chinese 欣 (T. 1554: 28.982b15–17) and Tibetan rab tu dga’ ba. (sDe dGe 4098: 306v5–6); Chinese 聖 (T 1554: 28.982b18–20) and Tibetan skyo ba (sDe dGe 4098: 306v4–5). Imanishi, Das Pañcavastukam, p. 19 draws attention to this Abhidharmāvatāra list and suggests Sanskrit prahāraṣa and nirvid. See also Kuala Lumpur Dhammajoti, Entrance into the Supreme Doctrine: Skandhīla’s Abhidharmāvatāra (Hong Kong: Centre of Buddhist Studies, University of Hong Kong, 2008), pp. 31–32, 150–51.

19 Pañcask 1–23; Abhidh-sam (P) 3–12.

dharma from its reckoning. On closer examination, the difference is not so much that the missing item is not acknowledged at all, but rather that it is not given the status of a *dharma*. This is not necessarily insignificant, but it is nonetheless often a point of some subtlety and in part reflects a tension between Abhidharma as an abstract system of thought and a practical tool informing the religious and contemplative life of Buddhist monks and nuns. In the remainder of this article I hope to illustrate some of these issues in general before turning to the specific problems of classifying sleepiness and what these reveal about the Abhidharma understanding of the relationship between mind and body.

2. The *rūpa*-dhammas

The lists of material dhammas of all schools are more or less based on the common inherited Nikāya-Āgama formula that the *rūpaskandha* consists of the four principal elements (*mahābhūta*) and matter that is dependent on those elements (*upāda-rūpa*). The understanding of the four elements of earth, water, fire and wind is in part phenomenological: the four elements are different dimensions of what we experience through the sense of touch (*kāyendriya*): the resistance, cohesion, temperature, and movement of material things. There is some discussion and difference of opinion between the schools on the question of whether we can directly feel ‘water’ (cohesion, fluidity). And as I have already mentioned, the Sarvāstivādins, and the Yogācārinis, argue that the sense of touch comprises additional qualities that cannot be directly reduced to the four elements: smoothness, roughness, heaviness, lightness, cold, hunger, and thirst.\(^{21}\) This explains

\(^{21}\) *Abhidh-k-bh* 7.9-10: *spraṣṭavyam ekādaśadravyasyavabhāvam | catvāri mahābhūtāni śāksyātvam karkaśatvam gurutvam laghutvam śitam jighatsā pīpasā ceti.* *Abhidh-k-bh* 23.19-23.20 (I 35): *spraṣṭavyam dvividham bhūtāni bhautikāṃ ca | tatra bhūtāni catvāri | bhautikāṃ śāksyātvādī saptavidham |
why the Sarvāstivādins list the sphere of touch (sprastavya) in addition to
the four elements, while the Theravādins do not: for the Theravādins the
sphere of touch is subsumed within just three of the four elements, namely,
earth, fire and wind. The inclusion by the Sarvāstivādins of heaviness and
lightness as dimensions of the sphere of touch also begins to explain their
omission of at least one dharma found in the Theravāda list of material
dharmas, precisely lightness. Once more, I think, we have a tension
between the phenomenology of experience, which means these qualities
need to be distinguished, and the more abstract notion of a dharma as an
irreducible quality, which makes it uncertain how, or even whether, to
distinguish such qualities as dharmas in their own right. There is also a
tension here between accounting for a quality that inheres in external
material things themselves (my body is heavy or light), and how we
experience material things (my body feels heavy or light).

The Theravāda list of twenty-eight material dharmas includes ten
items that are considered ‘not produced’ (anipphanna) by the operation of
causal conditions, in contrast to the other eighteen material dharmas, which
are ‘produced’ (nipphanna) dependent on real causal conditions. These
‘unproduced’ material dharmas are thus not true dharmas, things that
occur dependent on the activity of other things that occur; they are not
‘conditioned’ (samkhata). On the other hand, they are not ‘unconditioned’
(asamkhata) in the technical Abhidharma sense of a true dharma that
exists beyond the realm of causal conditions like nirvana, ‘the uncondi-
tioned element’ (asamkhata-dhātu).22 But significantly one of the ten,
namely space (ākāśa), is considered unconditioned by the Sarvāstivādins. In
short, the ten anipphanna-rūpas are purely nominal or conceptual, though
the Theravāda tradition chooses not to treat them under the category of

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22 Y. Karunadasa, The Buddhist Analysis of Matter (Colombo: Department of
\textit{paññatti}.

Part of the motivation for including these items in the list of dharmas seems to be what might be loosely called the phenomenology of experience: an account of the phenomena of embodied existence without reference to these would in significant respects be lacking. The Theravādins’ ten \textit{anipphanna-rūpas} are a way of accounting for certain significant dimensions of our experience of the physical world: for example that certain bodily gestures we see and certain sounds we hear communicate meaning (\textit{kāya-viññatti}, \textit{vācī-vaññatti}); that our bodies may feel light (\textit{lahutā}), supple (\textit{mudutā}), workable (\textit{kammaññatā}). Of course, this is not a strict phenomenology based on an explicit philosophical position, and in attempting to articulate a coherent system the Abhidharma was confronted by and, to a greater or lesser extent, embraced abstract issues of ontology, epistemology, and logic as well as the traditions handed down in the Nīkāyas and Āgamas.

The three qualities of lightness (\textit{lahutā}), softness (\textit{mudutā}), readiness (\textit{kammaññatā}) included in the Theravāda list of ‘unproduced’ material dharmas have no simple counterpart in the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra lists, though as I have just remarked, lightness is included in their account of the sphere of touch. But these three Theravāda material qualities are further paralleled in the Theravāda list of mental qualities, where we find twelve \textit{caitasikas} common to all skilful consciousness that form six pairs by virtue of the fact that one member is defined as related to the body (\textit{kāya}) and the other as related to the mind (\textit{citta}): tranquillity (\textit{passaddhi}) of body and of mind, lightness (\textit{lahutā}) of body and of mind, softness (\textit{mudutā}) of body and of mind, workableness (\textit{kammaññatā}) of body and of mind, adaptability (\textit{pāguññatā}) of body and of mind, straightness (\textit{uñukatā}) of body and of mind.

These six pairs of \textit{caitasikas} are absent from the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra lists (although one pair is at least partially represented in the
single skilful quality of praśrabdhī) and seem to be an innovation of the Dharmasāṅgani.\(^{23}\) They thus appear to be a deliberate addition to the Theravāda listing of dharmas, yet one that becomes standard. One of each pair being bodily and the other being mental is explained in the Dharmasāṅgani itself with reference to the skandhas: bodily tranquillity, and so forth, is tranquillity of the skandhas of feeling, perception and mental forces; mental tranquillity, on the other hand, is tranquillity of consciousness itself. In giving this explanation, which might seem artificial and contrived, it is significant that the Dharmasāṅgani is not forced into it by having to accommodate pre-existing Nikāya-Āgama dharmas. As I will argue, it fits better with the overall Abhidharma scheme to see the Dharmasāṅgani’s inclusion and account of these terms as articulating an understanding of the way in which mind and body relate and interact. This becomes clearer when considered in the light of the way in which the Abhidharma deals with the dharmas of sluggishness (styāna) and sleepiness (middha), which I shall turn to presently.

3. The Abhidharma model of the unskilful (akuṣala) mind

The way caitasikas are classified in the dharma lists of the Theravādins, Sarvāstivādins, and Yogācārins in part reflects one of the basic sets of three categories used to classify dharmas: kuśala, akuṣala and avyākṛta, the skilful, unskilful and undetermined. That is, in the first place caitasikas are grouped depending on whether they are intrinsically unskilful (akuṣala) or intrinsically skilful (kuśala). A further set is identified as comprising caitasikas that are in themselves neither akuṣala nor kuśala, but potentially

\(^{23}\) We do not find them in any other Pali canonical text. In the Nikāyas we find only mentions kāyapassaddhi and citta-passaddhi in the context of the sambojjhaṅgas (S V 66; cf. Vibh 228).
either, depending on circumstances: these become *akūśala* or *kuśala* by association. Within these three basic classes of *caitasikas* there are further subdivisions. Thus within the group of *caitasikas* that may be either *akūśala* or *kuśala* depending on circumstances, all three schools distinguish between those *caitasikas* which must necessarily occur in any process of consciousness and those that may occur but need not occur. That is, certain *caitasikas* are fundamental to the very process of being conscious or aware of an object; without them it is impossible to be conscious. Other *caitasikas* are connected with particular occurrences of consciousness. It is apparent that while there is some agreement about which *caitasikas* belong to these two groups, there are also significant differences.

Leaving that aside, within the sets of *caitasikas* that are intrinsically *akūśala* and *kuśala* it is also apparent that there are further subdivisions according to certain schools but the rationale for these is not immediately apparent. To begin with the Theravāda list of *akūśala caitasikas*, we find first four *caitasikas* that are universal to all types of *akūśala* mind; they in effect detail the four basic qualities of the *akūśala* mind: it is fundamentally and wilfully deluded (*moha*), it is shameless (*ahirika*) and reckless (*anottappa*)—that is, it has no regard for the harm it is doing to both oneself and others—and it is restless or ill at ease (*uddhacca*).²⁴ It is apparent from the system of which this list is a kind of mnemonic abstraction that we have two further subdivisions in the remaining *akūśala* dhammas and that the whole list is based round three dhammas that from an early date in the development of Buddhist thought in India are called ‘roots’ (*mūla*): greed (*lobha*), hatred (*dosa*) and delusion (*moha*).

These three dhammas represent fundamental *akūśala* dispositions of the mind which nourish other related *akūśala* dispositions of the mind allowing

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²⁴ Vism 468–71 (XIV 159–78). My brief characterization of the *akūśala* mind draws on the definitions of each dharma given here.
them to grow and flourish. As I have just noted, according to the Theravāda model, the basic unskilful mind consists in four qualities: it is deluded, shameless, reckless and restless. Such a mind may just remain in this fundamentally deluded state, yet it is also prone to react to the objects that are presented to it in one of two basic ways. In the first place it may like, become attached and cling to some objects; this is the flourishing of the mind rooted in greed. In the second place it may dislike, push away, and feel aversive to some objects; this is the flourishing of the mind rooted in hate. But, according to this model, it cannot do both at the same time: greed and hatred are mutually exclusive.

The full list of caitasikas indicates that this basic model of the mind can be refined by identifying certain specific varieties of both greed and hate. We may be attached to certain unhelpful views, and ways of seeing the world (ditthi); we may be conceited by way of attachment to certain ideas we have about ourselves in relation to others (mana). We may not like others having what we do not have and so experience envy (issa); we may not like the idea of others having what we do have and so through stinginess (macchariya) resist sharing; we may not like some action we have performed in the past and experience regret (kukkucca). Finally we may not feel sure that we like or dislike something and be plagued by doubt (vicikicchā). This does not quite exhaust the possible varieties of the akuśala mind. The greedy mind may in addition feel sluggish and drowsy; the hateful mind too, but not, it seems, the simply deluded or doubtful mind. What this amounts to phenomenologically is the suggestion that we may feel sleepy in a way that is pleasurable or in a way that is not pleasurable: we may enjoy and indulge the feeling of drowsiness as we lie in bed in the morning or we may feel tired and grumpy as we drag ourselves out of bed. This basic Theravāda model of the unskilful mind may be set out in schematic form as follows:
The developed Theravāda model adds further refinements to this model but not in terms of basic caitasikas, and these further refinements need not concern us here. But why just these sub-varieties of greed and hate? This question becomes all the more acute when we consider the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra models of the akusala mind.

The Sarvāstivādin model of the akusala mind has much in common, although it is in some respects more complex, and in some respects simpler. What it has in common is that it too assumes a basic set of defilements associated with ignorance that characterise all unskilful states of mind. It is more complex in that instead of working with just the three fundamental root defilements of greed, hate and delusion (although these are still assumed), it adds three further primary defilements—conceit (māna), view (drṣṭi) and doubt (vicikitsā)—giving a total of six. It is simpler because it suggests that only one additional defilement at a time can be added to this basic set, while the Theravādins allow more than one additional defilement.

To expand, the basic set of defilements that must always accompany ignorance, and hence characterises the basic akusala mind, includes the three found in the Theravāda list, but adds four more: negligence
(pramāda), apathy (kauśidya), faithlessness (āśraddhya), and sluggishness (styāna). The last of these dharmas (styāna) is included in the Theravāda list of unskilful dharmas (thīna), it is simply that it is considered particular or occasional (aniyata) rather than fixed. I will return to the significance of this below. The other three are apparently not included in the final Theravāda list of dharmas. Yet it turns out they are not entirely absent from the Theravāda system; they are listed and defined in the Vibhaṅga, the second work of the canonical Theravāda Abhidharma in the traditional order, but do not come to be distinguished as separate dharmas.25 The addition of pramāda as a universal of unskilful consciousness is perhaps not unconnected with the fact that in the Sarvāstivādin system smṛti (mindfulness) is taken as something common to all types of consciousness, while in the Theravāda system it is an exclusively skilful dharma. The Theravāda commentaries routinely explain pamāda and appamāda with reference to respectively the loss or presence of mindfulness.26 Given that the Sarvāstivāda system treats smṛti as a general and universal quality of mind, it is not surprising that an additional quality is used to highlight care and attention or its opposite, negligence. But in sum, the Sarvāstivādins effectively add to the account of the unskilful mind. Not only is it by default deluded, shameless, reckless, and restless, it is in addition inherently negligent, apathetic, faithless, and sluggish.

The Theravāda account of the unskilful mind is straightforwardly built

25 Vibh 348 has uddhaccam kosajjam pamādo and ahirikam anotappam pamādo as sets of three; Vibh 383 gives a set of seven asaddhammas (assaddho hoti, ahiriko hoti, anottappi hoti, appassuto hoti, kusito hoti, mutṭhassati hoti, duppanño hoti); for definitions see Vibh 369–72.

around the three *akusala* roots. While these three roots clearly also inform the basic structure of the Sarvástivāda account, three further qualities are highlighted as basic unskilful dispositions (*anuśaya*) or defilements (*kleśa*): conceit (*māna*), views (*drṣṭi*), and doubt (*vicikitsā*). All three feature in the Theravāda account but there the first two are subordinated to greed, and the last to delusion. In the Sarvástivāda account all three are effectively treated as cognitive as opposed to affective defilements: that is, they are in some sense elaborations of the ways in which a mind that has not eradicated the root defilement of ignorance may misunderstand the way the world truly is. Of particular note is the Sarvástivādin understanding of 'view' (*drṣṭi*) not as a distinct dharma but as a particular manifestation of 'understanding' (*prajñā*), one of the *caitasics* that is considered universal to consciousness (*cittamahābhūmiṇa*).

The Sarvástivādins then classify the remaining defilements as secondary defilements (*upakleśa*) that are explicitly subordinated to these six primary defilements (ignorance, greed, aversion, conceit, view, doubt). This gives a total of nineteen *caitasics* that are secondary defilements.

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27 For the six *anuśayas* or *kleśas* see Abhidh-k V 1 c-d (Abhidh-k-bh 277.10–12, 278.8–9); for their relationship to the three *akusala-mūlas*, see Abhidh-k V 20 (Abhidh-k-bh 291.5–10). Cf. Abhidh-di 220.6–8.


29 Abhidh-k V 46 (Abhidh-k-bh 312.6–9).

30 To my knowledge they are never given in one single list. At Abhidh-k V 47 (Abhidh-k-bh 312.11–15) we find a list of ten *paryavasthānas* (a term which should mean something like 'obstacle', but Tibetan and Chinese translations as well as explanations of Pali *pariyutthāna* suggest that these are qualities that envelop or possess the mind, q.v. BHSD): *āhrikya*, *anapatrāpya*, *irṣyā*, *māṭṣaryā*, *auddhatya*, *ācāra-dhikya*, *ācāra-paratāpya*, *ācāra-afyā*, *ācāra-niṣdyā*, *ācāra-ṇivṛtti-dhikya*. 
These thus go beyond the explicit list of ten in the standard enumeration of caitasikas found in chapter two of the Kośa. In addition it includes two dharmas, regret (kaukṛtya) and sleepiness (middha), that in the Sarvāstivāda system are not always defilements, and seven that are found in all instances of akuśala consciousness. The Sarvāstivādin sources explicitly relate sixteen of these secondary defilements to the six fundamental defilements: that is, they explain that each secondary defilement is a product (nisyanda) of a specific primary defilement.31

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defilement</th>
<th>rāga</th>
<th>avidyā</th>
<th>pratigha</th>
<th>māna</th>
<th>drṣṭi</th>
<th>vicikitsā</th>
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<td>āhṛikya</td>
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<td>vihimsā</td>
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<td>upanāha</td>
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<td>mrakṣa</td>
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31 kaukṛtya, styāna, middha, krodha, mrakṣa. Abhidh-k V 49 (Abhidh-k-bh 313.9–12) adds a list of six kleśamālas: māyā, śāṭhya, mada, pradāśa, upanāha, vihimsā. There remain three akuśala-caittas that are upakleśas by implication: pramāda, kauśidya, āśraddhya. See also Abhidh-di 306.6–309.6.
This parallels what is found in the Theravāda system, namely that view (diṭṭhi) and conceit (māna) are in some sense dimensions of greed (lobha), while envy (issā), stinginess (maccharīya) and regret (kukkucca) of hate (dosa). The difference between the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda system here is that while in the Theravāda system a secondary defilement when it arises will occur in addition to the fundamental root, in the Sarvāstivāda system the secondary defilement takes the place of the fundamental root defilement, thus greed (rāga) may be replaced by (or better, take the form of) concealment, or aversion may take the form of anger.32 The fundamental defilement of ignorance (avidyā), however, always remains and is not cancelled out or transformed by the addition of a further defilement. We can set out the Sarvāstivāda model of the akuṣala mind in a scheme that closely parallels the Theravāda model.33

31 Abhidh-k V 48b–50 (Abhidh-k-bh 312.21–213.19); see also Abhidh-di 309.6–311.25. The term nisyaṁda/naisyaṁdika is defined as an effect that is similar to its cause (Abhidh-k-bh 95.20–21: nisyaṁdo hetusadrśah | hetor yah sadrśo dharmah sa nisyaṁdaphalam).
32 See Abhidh-k II 29 and bhāṣya (Abhidh-k-bh 58.3–14).
33 Cf. how Ghoṣaka’s Abhidharmāmṛtarasa (T 1553: 28.970c17–20) divides defilements into three spheres (āyatana): the desirable sphere (iṣṭāyatana) of kāmacchanda, mātsarya, abhidyā, samnidhi, etc.; the undesirable sphere (aniṣṭāyatana) of pratigha, kalaha, īrṣyā, etc.; neutral sphere (madhyāyatana) of moha, māna, etc. See José van den Broeck, La Saveur de l’immortel (A-p’i-t’an Kan Lu Wei Lun): La version chinoise de l’Amṛtarasa (Louvain-la-Neuve: Université Catholique de Louvain, Institut Orientaliste, 1977), p. 130.
Table 3. The Sarvāstivāda model of the *akuśala* mind:

| + rāga 貪 / mrakṣa 覆 / mātsarya 樑 / māyā 訒 / mada 蠱 | avidyā 無明 | + pratigha 視 / krodha 怒 / īrṣyā 嫉 / vihimsā 害 / upanāha 恨 |
| + drṣṭi / pradāsa 悟 / śāthya 諦 |
| + vicikitsā 猶豫 / kaukṛtya 惡作 |
| + middha | + middha 眠 |
| + middha | + middha |

For the Sarvāstivādins, then, a fundamentally *akuśala* mind rooted in ignorance and consisting in seven further qualities is prone to respond to objects of consciousness with either greed or one of its closely related secondary defilements, or with aversion or one of its closely related secondary defilements. Alternatively some kind of additional cognitive dysfunction may occur not associated with either greed or aversion. We can note that in comparison with the Theravāda model, the Sarvāstivāda model gives a greater variety of closely related qualities for both greed and hate, and also that in two instances a secondary defilement is associated with a different primary defilement. Thus greed may manifest as concealing one’s faults (*mrakṣa*), or deceit (*māyā*) or arrogance (*mada*), and hate as anger (*krodha*), or cruelty (*vihimsā*), or enmity (*upanāha*), and views as obstinacy (*pradāsa*), or deviousness (*śāthya*); while stinginess (*mātsarya*) is considered to issue from greed (*rāga*), and regret (*kaukṛtya*) from doubt (*vicikitsā*). It is worth noting that once again the Sarvāstivāda’s additional secondary defilements are mentioned in a Theravāda canonical
Abhidharma text, yet are not distinguished as separate dharmas.\(^{34}\)

While setting out the Sarvāstivāda model in this way seems to me a legitimate interpretation of what is presented in the sources, it does not in every detail fit with the manner in which the secondary defilements are explicitly said to issue from the fundamental defilements. Concealing one’s faults (\textit{mrakṣa}) is in fact said to issues from both greed and ignorance.\(^{35}\)

And despite the fact they occur in all defiled states of consciousness and can thus routinely occur disassociated from greed and associated with only ignorance, two of the secondary defilements—restlessness (\textit{auddhatya}) and shamelessness (\textit{āhrikyā})—are said to issue from greed rather than ignorance.

Whether this apparent anomaly is discussed in any ancient source, I do not know, but it is worth briefly comparing this Sarvāstivāda account of the relationship between fundamental defilements and secondary defilements

\(^{34}\) Vibh 349, 357–58 (\textit{kodha, upanāha, makkha, pāḷasa, māyā, sātheyya}); 350 (\textit{mada}), 369 (\textit{viheṣā}).

\(^{35}\) Vasubandhu notes that some say that \textit{mrakṣa} issues from \textit{rāga}, some from \textit{avidyā}, some from both; he suggests it can be understood as issuing from \textit{rāga} and \textit{avidyā} for those of repute and no repute respectively. Abhidh-k V 48c (Abhidh-k -bh 313.1–3): \textit{mrakṣe vivādah} | \textit{trṣnāniṃśyanada ity eke} | \textit{avidyānīṃśyanda ity apare} | \textit{ubhayor ity anye} | \textit{yathā kramam jñātajñātānām iti} | | Abhidh-k-vy 494: yathākramam jñātajñātānām iti | \textit{rājādibhir jñātānām mraksavatām pudgalānām mrakṣas trṣnānisyandah: mā me lābhasthāraṇa na bhaviṣyatīti. ajñātānām avidyānīṃśyandah karmasvakatām aśraddadhānāḥ tad avadyam prachtādayati: na parasyāmtike viśuddhyartham desyatīti | evam ubhayāniṃśando mrakṣa ity eke} | | “In the case of those of repute and of no repute respectively”: In the case of people of repute who conceal their faults, their concealment is the product of greed; princes and the like do not want to lose their fame and fortune. In the case of those of no repute, concealment that is the product of ignorance—not keeping faith in the ownership of deeds—hides their fault; they will not confess it for the sake of purification in the presence of another. In this way, concealment is the product of both greed and of ignorance.’
with what is said in Yogacāra sources on the topic. Yogacāra sources, such as Asaṅga’s *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and Sthiramati’s commentaries to Vasubandhu’s *Pañcaskandhaka* and *Trimsikā*, using a different terminology similarly relate the secondary defilements to the fundamental defilements, in a manner that is closer to the Theravāda scheme in so far as they refer to just three of the fundamental defilements: secondary defilements are understood as a part or portion (*amśa*) of greed, aversion or delusion (Table 4).36

### Table 4. The relationship of primary and secondary defilements according to the Yogacāra

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>rāgāṃśīka</th>
<th>mohāṃśīka</th>
<th>pratigha- / dveśāṃśīka</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>āhirikya</td>
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<td>anapratāpya</td>
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<td>vihiṃsā</td>
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<td>pradâsa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ṛṣya</td>
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The Yogācāra account goes some way to addressing the apparent anomaly in that it sees āhārika as a part of either greed, hatred and delusion, but it follows the Sarvāstivāda account in taking auddhatya as a portion of greed.

4. The Abhidharma account of sleepiness

I wish now to focus in more detail on the differences between the Theravāda, Sarvāstivāda, and Yogācāra accounts of dhammas with reference to specific caítasikas: stīpa and middha. This example is interesting in its own right, but it also aptly illustrates the interplay between tradition, psychological introspection and more abstract reasoning in the classification of dhammas.

As we have seen, in the developed Theravāda Abhidharma system, sluggishness (thīna) and sleepiness (middha) are exclusively unskillful caítasikas. The implications of this are that to feel drowsy and sleepy is a sure indicator of an akuśala mind state. That a dull and drowsy state of mind is regarded as something basically akuśala or unskillful is hardly surprising. Western contemplative traditions too, going back to Evagrius of Pontus (346–399 CE) and his list of eight principal evil thoughts which included acedia, focus on sloth as one of 'the seven deadly sins'.\(^\text{37}\) For the Buddhist tradition the pair of sloth and sleepiness is prominent in the sûtra literature as the third of five hindrances (nīvarana/āvarana) that need to be overcome to attain dhyāna and develop the seven constituents of awakening.\(^\text{38}\) And that dullness and drowsiness are essentially mental

\(^{36}\) See Abhidh-sam (G) 17.14–18.15; Trimś-bh 90.13–98, 15; Pañcask-vbh 64.10–73.3.


phenomena is also born out by common experience. Reading through a seemingly endless paper on the intricacies of the Abhidharma classification of dharmas we may well find our eyelids feeling heavy and our heads dropping for a moment. Yet if someone were to offer the prospect of something more entertaining our dullness and drowsiness might well vanish in an instant to be replaced by enthusiasm and alertness. Clearly dullness and drowsiness must be all in the mind. Even so, surely sometimes we feel dull and drowsy simply because we are tired—after a long walk, or a day spent doing hard physical work. Why should this be considered aκuṣala? Surely this is simply a natural consequence of the way the mind and body work.

This may in part have been precisely the point that certain broadly Theravāda Abhidharmikas wanted to make in insisting that in contrast to thinā, middha was not a caitasika-dharma but a rūpa-dharma: that is physical drowsiness. The Mahāvihāra Theravāda commentarial sources devote some space to trying to refute this notion of middha-rūpa, which they attribute to the Abhayagirivihāra traditions.39 They point out that according to the scriptural sources middha is unambiguously a hindrance and something to be abandoned, and hence must be a mental defectilement. In response to the Abhayagiri suggestion that since the Buddha himself slept he must have experienced sleepiness, the Mahāvihāravāsins claim that he slept not because of middha, but because of ‘exhaustion of the body’ (sarīragilāna) or ‘weakness of the physical body’ (karajākyassa dubbalabhāvo). I shall return to this discussion later, but on common-sense grounds the Abhayagiri position seems not entirely unreasonable and the

Mahāvihāra response in part a question of semantics (whether to call the reason a Buddha sleeps ‘material sleepiness’ or ‘weakness of the body’). There is also perhaps some ambiguity about the precise classification of *middha* in Theravāda canonical Abhidharma sources.

The canonical *Dhammasaṅgani* does not list *thīna* and *middha* as constituents of any kind of consciousness, whether skilful, unskilful, or undetermined. These dharmas are thus two of what the commentaries like to refer to as the ‘or-whatever-other’ (*yevāpanaka*) dharmas of the *Dhammasaṅgani*’s open ended and incomplete lists of dharmas. The omission is somewhat surprising given that *thīna* and *middha* feature in one of the basic lists of the Nikāya-Āgama literature: the five hindrances. The omission is in part made good in the division of the *Dhammasaṅgani* called ‘the section of summary definitions’ (*nikkhepakanda*).40 Here the *Dhammasaṅgani* defines *thīna* as sickness (*akālātā*) and unworkableness (*akammaṇṇātā*) of mind, adding a series of eight synonyms based on the roots *li* (to lie, recline) and *stāyai* (to be collected into a mass), suggesting an understanding of *thīna* as a kind of mental stiffness and sluggishness. It defines *middha* on the other hand as sickness and unworkableness of the *body*, and then gives two synonyms based on the root *nah* (to bind, tie, fasten), suggesting figuratively tying down or enveloping, followed by ‘being closed in’ (*antoṣamorodho*), and ‘nodeling off’ (*pacalāyikā-soppam*),41 the definition of *middha* finishes with three terms for sleep all from the root

40 Dhs 180–234 (§§ 981–1367). The *nikkhepakanda* works its way systematically through the twenty-two sets of three-dharma categories and 100 sets of two-dharma categories that form the *māṭikā* set out at the beginning of the whole text. Frauwallner regards this as the original core of the *Dhammasaṅgani*. The hindrances are the basis for a group of five sets of two-dharma categories, the first of which is ‘dharmas that are hindrances and dharmas that are not hindrances’.

41 The term *pacalāyikā* (Sanskrit *pracalāyati, pracalāyita*) seems to connote the nodding of the head and its falling forward.

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svap (soppam supanā supitattam). The terms use with reference to middha are thus more suggestive of the physical manifestation of sleepiness and drowsiness.\(^{42}\)

The commentary, however, explains that when the Dhammasaṅgani describes middha as sickness and unworkableness of the body, this does not mean that middha is physical, rather ‘body’ here stands for the three mental skandhas other than viññāna.\(^{43}\) This commentarial explanation follows the Dhammasaṅgani’s own method in dealing with the six pairs beginning cittapassaddhi and kāyapassaddhi that I have already mentioned. The Dhammasaṅgani itself explains kāyapassaddhi as tranquillity of the aggregates of feeling, perception, and formations; and cittapassaddhi as tranquillity of the aggregate of consciousness.\(^{44}\) In applying the same logic to the distinction between thīna and middha as unworkableness of the mind and body respectively, the commentary may well be reflecting a position already firmly established in the Dhammasaṅgani. But equally it seems possible that this issue may still have been undecided when the Dhammasaṅgani was finally fixed as a text. Counting against accepting the commentary’s interpretation as the correct one is the fact that if the Dhammasaṅgani had wanted to define thīna and middha in these terms it could have done so itself. Moreover in the case of all six pairs the Dhammasaṅgani defines both the ‘bodily’ variety and the ‘mental’ variety

\(^{42}\) Dhs 204–205: yā cittassa akallatā akammaññatā oliyanā salliyanā līnam līyanā liyitattam thinam thiyāna thiyitattam cittassa | idam vuccati thinam ... yā kāyassa akallatā akammaññatā onāho pariyonāho antosamorodho middham soppam pacalāyikā-soppam supanā supitattam | idam vuccati middham ||

\(^{43}\) As 378: kāyassā ti khandhattayasāṅkhātassa nāmakāyassa.

\(^{44}\) As 14–15: yā tasnim samaye vedanākkhandhassa saṅākkhandhassa sankhārakkhandhassa passaddhi paṭipassaddhi passambhanā paṭipassambhanā paṭipassambhiyttam | ayam tasnim samaye kāyapassaddhi hoti ... yā tasnim samaye viññānakkhandhassa passaddhi paṭipassaddhi passambhanā paṭipassambhanā paṭipassambhiyttam | ayam tasnim samaye cittapassaddhi hoti.
using exactly the same set of terms. In the case of *thina* and *middha*, as we have just seen, this is not so. In addition to sickness and unworkableness, a series of quite distinct terms is used for each, suggesting that here the *Dhammasaṅgani* understands that the distinction between *thina* and *middha* lies in something more than the former being unworkableness of ‘mind’ (the consciousness aggregate) and the latter unworkableness of ‘body’ (the aggregates of feeling, perception and formations).

We can add a further consideration in support of the idea that the *Dhammasaṅgani* might be regarded as at least open to treating *middha* as something separate from *thina*, and so as having a physical dimension. The canonical Theravāda Abhidharma texts, including the *Dhammasaṅgani*, *Vibhanga*, *Kathāvatthu* and *Paṭṭhāna*, frequently seem to assume and work with a list of just ten *akusala* dharmas, sometimes collectively referred to as the *kilesa-vatthu*. This list consists of *lobha*, *dosa*, *moha*, *māna*, *diṭṭhi*, *vicikicchā*, *thina*, *uddhacca*, *ahirika*, and *anottappa*.\(^{45}\) The list thus omits *middha*.\(^{46}\)

The *Treatise on the Path to Liberation* (T 1648 解脫道論 *Jietuo dao lun*) is well known as one of two texts translated into Chinese apparently from a Pali original. There are good reasons for regarding this as a text of the Abhayagirivihāra.\(^{47}\) The text anyway clearly follows broadly Theravāda

\(^{45}\) See Dhs 214, 257; Vibh 341; Kv (with *rāga* for *lobha*) 80, 131–32, 156–57, 168–69, 206, 386–88, 405, 535. This lists also omits *kukkucca*, but that is not an argument for suggesting that it is physical, but it might be an argument for suggesting *kukkucca* (like *middha*) is not exclusively *akusala*, which is precisely the position we find with regard to *kaukrtta* in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma.

\(^{46}\) The list of ten *kilesavatthu* may inform the *Dhammasaṅgani*’s listing of *dharmas* present in *akusala* consciousness; see Dhs 75, 78–79, 83–86 (§§ 365, 381, 387–90, 413, 418, 422, 425, 427, 429): *micchādiṭṭhi*, *ahirika*, *anottappa*, *lobha*, *moha*, *dosa*, *vicikicchā*, *uddhacca*. Of the ten *kilesavatthu*, *māna* and *thina* are missing.

\(^{47}\) The question has been discussed at length. An Abhayagiri affiliation cannot be strictly proved, but as Cousins has recently shown in reviewing the matter, we have
Abhidharma traditions.\textsuperscript{48} Yet it preserves a distinctive list of just sixty-six dharmas which includes among the material dharmas physical sleepiness (\textit{middha-rūpa}).\textsuperscript{49} The list of \textit{akusala-dhamma}-s appears to follow the list of ten items just mentioned (adding \textit{kukkucca}).\textsuperscript{50} In sum, the \textit{Vimuttimagga} may preserve an older list of \textit{akusala-caitasikas}, closer to the \textit{Dhammasāgāṇi} and canonical Abhidharma traditions, and those traditions are somewhat vague about the nature of \textit{middha}.\textsuperscript{51}

To sum up, according to the developed Theravāda Abhidharma of the Mahāvihāra, both \textit{thīna} and \textit{middha} are mental phenomena, \textit{caitasika-dharmas}, that occur only in \textit{akusala} types of consciousness. The Abhayagiri Ābhidharmikas on the other hand disputed this, arguing that while \textit{thīna} was an unskilful mental dharma, \textit{middha} was physical drowsiness, a \textit{rūpa-dharm}, so neither skilful nor unskilful.

As we have seen above, the Sarvāstivādins held that \textit{styāna} is a quality

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\textsuperscript{48} It sets out the scheme of twelve unskilful consciousnesses (T 32.460c6–16) and so seems to assume the general scheme of eighty-nine types of consciousness; it knows the distinctive Theravāda theory of the consciousness process (\textit{citta-vīthi}) (449b6–c16); its list of material dharmas includes the physical basis of consciousness (445c25, 446a28, b8); it classifies \textit{priti} as \textit{samskāraskandha} rather than \textit{vedanāskandha} (as the Sarvāstivādins and Yogācārins do) (447c10); it does not recognise the category of forces disassociated from consciousness. See Ehara, \textit{Path of Freedom}, pp. 238, 240, 247, 255–57, 319–320.

\textsuperscript{49} T 32.445c17–446a29; 447c10–448a26; see Ehara, \textit{Path of Freedom}, pp. 237–40, 246–51. For \textit{middha-rūpa} 睡色, see T 32.445c25, 446a28, b11, 447a29.


\textsuperscript{51} Of course, the strongest argument against this is the simple fact that the \textit{Dhammasangani} fails to list \textit{middha} as a \textit{rūpa-dharm} in the manner of the \textit{Path of Freedom}. On the other hand, as I have already noted, it does not list \textit{thīna} and \textit{middha} as constituents of any state of consciousness either.
of all instances and types of *akūśala* consciousness: the *akūśala* mind is inherently sluggish. The sluggish quality of the *akūśala* mind is underlined by the fact that it is said in all cases to possess a further quality, that of lethargy or apathy (*kauśīdya*). In addition to these two qualities, the *akūśala* mind may on occasion be characterised by the quality of *middha*. But for the Sarvāstivādins *middha* is not exclusively a quality of the *akūśala* mind. Both the *kuśala* and the *avāyākṛta* minds may on occasion possess this quality.\(^{52}\) That is, the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma traditions allow that sleepiness or drowsiness may in certain circumstances not be *akūśala* at all, but just, as it were, natural qualities of the mind.

In this context it is worth noting that the canonical Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma also presents a list of ten *caitasikas* common to all types of defiled consciousness that does not, however, include *styāna*.\(^{53}\) In addressing the question of why he presents only six in the *Kośa*, including *styāna*, Vasubandhu points out that five of the ten are redundant since they are *caitasikas* that are universal to all consciousness appearing in this list in their unskilful mode.\(^{54}\) With regard to the omission of *styāna* he observes that some argue it is not included on the grounds that it has the property of being conducive to a desirable quality, concentration: a sluggish person achieves concentration quickly, while a restless person does not. Vasubandhu unequivocally rejects this reasoning, suggesting the two


\(^{54}\) Muddled mindfulness (*musita-smṛti*) is just defiled mindfulness, distraction (*vikṣepa*) is just defiled concentration (*samādhi*), *inappropriate attention* (*ayomiśo manaskārah*) is just attention, wrong commitment (*mithyādhiḥmokṣa*) is just commitment. See Abhidh-k-bh 56.11–19 (*bhāsya* to II 26a-c); cf. Abhidh-dī 75.1–6.
qualities of sluggishness and restlessness anyway occur together. But the significance in the present context is that we have a record of a further hesitation to classify a caitasika associated with sleepiness (in this case styāna) as simply unskilful.

Vasubandhu in the Abhidharmakosā defines styāna as heaviness of the body and heaviness of the mind, unworkableness of the body and unworkableness of the mind. He further explains that this mental dharma is termed bodily in the same way that a feeling of pain or pleasure is called bodily: although all feelings are strictly mental some are experienced through the sense of touch. Turning to middha, this is succinctly defined as a feeling of mental compression, oppression or weighing down (abhisamkṣepa) that incapacitates the body: it renders one incapable of holding together or supporting the body, presumably referring to one’s posture, particularly in meditation. Its arising, it seems, manifests in the feeling that one needs to lie-down. Thus, while middha is something mental, the nature of its physical manifestation, its effect on the body, is emphasised; the author of the Abhidharmadīpa tells us that it is this mental feeling of weighing down that is called sleep.

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55 Bhāṣya to Abhidh-k II 26 a-c (Abhidh-k 56.23–27): evam tvāhuḥ paśhitavyam bhavet samādhyanugunatvāt tu na paśhitam | kṣiprataram kila styānacaritaḥ samādhim utpādayen nauddhatyacarita iti | kah punah styānacarito yo nauddhatyacaritaḥ ko vā nauddhatyacarito yo na styānacaritaḥ | na hy ete jātu sahacariṣnutām jahitāḥ | tathāpy yady asyādhimātram sa taccarito jñātavyāḥ | Cf. Mahāvibhāṣā at T 1545: 27.220a17–19.

56 Abhidh-k II 26b (Abhidh-k-bh 56.7–9): styānam katamat | yā kāyagurutā cittagurutā kāyakarmanyakatā cittākarmanyakatā | kāyikam styānam caitasikam styānam ity uktam abhidharme | katham caitasiko dharmah kāyika ity ucyate | yathā kāyikī vedanā ||. Cf. Abhidh-di 74: styānam kāyacittākarmanyakatā |

57 Abhidh-k V 47c (Abhidh-k-bh 312.17): kāyasamādhāranāsamarthaś cittābhisamkṣepo middham |

58 Abhidh-di 308: cittābhisamkṣepah svapnākhyah.
of the pair has much in common in the two traditions, yet the Sarvāstivādins do not define *styāna* as simply the mental counterpart of *middha* in the manner of the Theravāda Mahāvihāravāsins.

Thus the Sarvāstivāda tradition and Theravāda Mahāvihāra tradition agree on seeing *middha* as something essentially mental in opposition to the Abhayagiri wish to see it as something physical. Yet they disagree on whether *middha* must always be unskilful: for Mahāvihāravāsins this is so, but for the Sarvāstivādins *middha* may in certain circumstances be undetermined or even skilful. There is, however, a certain common ground between all three positions: they all emphasise the physical manifestation of *middha* and they all see *middha* as in some sense closer to the physical.

5. **Body, mind and sleepiness**

In defining *styāna/thina* both the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda traditions use the term *akarmanyatā*, unworkableness or unreadiness. I noted above that the positive counterpart, *kammaññatā*, workableness or readiness, features in the Theravāda listing of dharmas as three distinct items: (1) workableness of *rūpa*, (2) ‘workableness of body’ and (3) ‘workableness of mind’. The first is something material, though as a kind of matter classed as ‘not produced’ (*anipphanna*) it is not quite a dharma; along with lightness and softness, it characterises the manner in which *rūpa* manifests or is experienced in the bodies of living beings.\(^{59}\) The last two together constitute one of six pairs of *caitasikas* defined as ‘mental’ and which are present in all *kuśala* states of mind. Representing Sarvāstivāda tradition Vasubandhu glosses *styāna* as heaviness (*gurutā*) of both body and mind, which in turn resonates with a further positive counterpart that in the Theravāda list of dharmas is given as a kind of *rūpa* and also one of the six

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pairs, namely ‘lightness’ \( (lahutā) \). And finally we can note that Yaśomitra adds in his explanation of \( sthāna \) that it is opposed to tranquillity \( (prāśrabdhi) \), yet another of the \( dharmas \) given in the Theravāda list of the six pairs.

As I noted earlier, the conception of the six pairs appears to be an innovation of the \( Dhammasangani \). Nonetheless the basic terminology of the pairs does have important Nikāya-Āgama precedents and resonances. Frequently in the Nikāya-Āgama literature the Buddha’s strategy in teaching is described as softening the minds of his audience with talk of generosity, the precepts, and the advantages of renunciation to the point that he knows their minds are ‘soft’ \( (muducitta) \), ‘healthy’ \( (kallacitta) \) and free of the hindrances \( (vinivaraṇacitta) \), that is, free of, among other things, \( thīna \) and \( middha \). But being free of the hindrances is in the Nikāya-Āgama literature precisely the prerequisite for the development of \( samādhi \) and \( dhyāna \). In the \textit{Dīgha-nikāya} the successive attainment of the four \( dhyānas \) is introduced in the following way:

When he sees that the five hindrances have been overcome in himself, gladness arises. When one is glad, joy arises. The body of one whose mind is joyful becomes tranquil. One whose body is tranquil experiences happiness. The mind of one who is happy becomes concentrated.\(^{62}\)

\(^{60}\) Abhidh-k-vy 130: \( kāya\)garutā cittaguruteti prāśrabdhipratipakṣo dharmah |

\(^{61}\) For example, MN I 379–80: \( yadā bhagavā anāśi upālim gahapatim kallacittam muducittām vinivaraṇacittām udaggacittam pasannacittan, atha yā buddhānam sāmākamānī dhammadesanā tām pakāsesi dukkham samudayam nirodham maggam. \) Cf. Madhyamāgama parallel at T 26: 1.630c2–10; SBV I 140–41, 142, 169.

\(^{62}\) The formula begins either \( tassa […] pāmojjam jāyati or labhati […] pāmojjam \) and then proceeds \( pāmojjịm ḍītī jāyati | pītīmanassa kāyo paśambhati | paśaddhakāya sukkhab vedeti | sukkhino cittam samādhiyati \) \( (e.g. DN I 73.20–23 \( (tass’ ime pañca nivaraṇe paheine attani samanupassato pāmojjam jāyati) \), MN I 37.31–33, 283.21–25). \) It occurs some forty times in the Theravāda Nikāyas. For the
Although this formula is not used in other Nikāya-Āgama sources that have come down to us to introduce specifically the dhyānas, it is nevertheless widespread and clearly represents for the later tradition a standard way of describing the mind-body process of becoming concentrated in meditation. It is found in the Śrāvakabhūmi, and both Harivarman and Sthiramati refer to this formula as a standard formula of the Sūtras: ‘As it is said in the Sūtras.’ In fact Yaśomitra quotes the formula in full and refers to it again when commenting on Vasubandhu’s definition of tranquillity (praśrabdhi). Significantly the formula moves from the mind to the body and back again: a joyful mind results in a tranquil body; a tranquil body results in a mind that is happy and concentrated. Further we can note that in the Nikāya-Āgama texts the mind that has achieved the fourth dhyāna is described as, amongst other things, a mind that has ‘become soft’ (mudubhūta) and ‘workable’ (kammaniya); or according to the Sāghabheda-vastu Sanskrit text ‘straight’ (rijuhūta) and ‘workable’ (karmanya).

This brief consideration of the Nikāya-Āgama sources that must have been at the forefront of Ābhidharmikas’ minds when drawing up and classifying their lists of dharmas, has provided us with some context for four of the six terms that are found in the Theravāda list of six pairs of caittasikas and for two of the three relevant terms in the list of anipphannarūpa: passaddhi, mudutā, kammanītā, and ujañātā. It is clear that some of

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Śrāv-bh 59: avipratisārinah prāmodyam pramuditacittasya prīrir jāyate | pritamanasaḥ kāyāḥ praśrābhyate | praśrābhyakāyāḥ sukham vedayate | sukhitasya cittaṃ samādihiyate |. Trīṃś-bh 80: pritamanasaḥ kāyāḥ praśrābhyata iti sūtre vacanāt |. *Tattvasiddhi (T 1646: 32.248b17): 如經中說心歡喜身得猗（‘As is said in the Sūtras, “The body of one whose mind is joyful becomes tranquil.’”

Abhidh-k-vy 54.128.

SBV II 246.14.
the same terminology permeates the Abhidharma discussions of *styāna* and *middha*. It is also apparent that these Nikāya-Āgama contexts raise precisely the same issue that the Abhidharma discussions of *styāna* and *middha* wrestle with: the relationship between certain mental states and the body. It also seems reasonable to assume that both the original Nikāya-Āgama contexts and the Abhidharma discussion of the issues raised are in part informed by contemplative practice, although this is not made explicit.

Finally we should note again Vasubandhu’s definition of *praśrabdhi* as readiness of mind (*cittakarmanyatā*), to which Yaśomitra adds the gloss ‘lightness of mind’ (*cittalāghava*).66 Vasubandhu also considers the question of whether a specifically physical *kāya-praśrabdhi* should be recognised alongside *citta-praśrabdhi*: the precedent for this is a Śūtra passage that mentions both with reference to *praśrabdhisambodhyānga*.67 The Sarvāstivāda position is that the designation *kāya* here is analogous to the manner in which feeling can be called bodily; it is something mental experienced through the sense of touch. The Sautrāntika position is that, indeed, *praśrabdhi* is also something physical. In effect, however, this discussion reveals that the Sarvāstivāda position is much closer to the Theravāda position than the mere list of dharmas might suggest. The Sarvāstivāda discussions reveal that in effect Sarvāstivāda tradition subsumes the Theravādins’ *kāya-passaddhi*, *citta-passaddhi*, *kāya-lahutā*, *citta-lahutā*, *kāya-kammapaññatā*, *citta-kammapaññatā* under a single dharma, namely *praśrabdhi*.

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66 Abhidh-k-bh 55.9; Abhidh-k-vy 128.
67 Abhidh-k-bh 55.9–18 (II 25), 438.21–439.18 (VIII 9b). For the Śūtra source, see T 99: 2.192c28, parallel to SN V 66.25.
6. Do buddhas sleep?

Clearly sleep was an issue for ancient Indian ascetics. The issue of delighting or indulging in sleep (nidrārāma) is frequently mentioned in the Nikāya-Āgama and later literature. A Nikāya-Āgama passage of particular importance in this regard is found in the Mahāsaccaka-sutta in the Theravāda tradition and the Kāyabhāvana-sūtra in the Sarvāstivāda tradition. This sūtra takes the form of dialogue between the Buddha and, significantly, the Jain Saccaka (Sātyaki).68 The Jain asks the Buddha if he ever sleeps during the day. The Buddha acknowledges that he recalls returning from collecting alms in the last month of the hot season, eating his meal and then spreading out his robe, lying down on his right side and, mindfully and fully aware, falling asleep. The Theravāda commentarial tradition, however, must explain that such sleep has nothing to do with what are for it the unwholesome mental qualities of thīna and middha:

The sluggishness and drowsiness that usually arise before and after sleep in the case of those in training and ordinary beings are cut off by the path of arhatship. However, on account of the weakness of the physical body those who have destroyed all defilements do enter into bhavanga. When this occurs unmixed

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68 MN I 249; for the Sarvāstivāda counterpart see Liu Zhen, ‘Versenkung und Askese: Eine neue sanskrit-Quelle zur Buddha-Legende’ (PhD dissertation, Munich, 2008), 133–34: yat tad agnivesyāyana samyagvadanto vadeyur | asammosadharmo satvo loka utpanna iti | satvasāraśreṣṭho 'parīdatta[cita]h sukhaduhkhabhābhyām iti | mām tat samyagvadanto vadeyus | tat kasya hetor | aham asmy agnivesyāyana asammosadharmā [sic] satvo loka utpannah satvasāraśreṣṭho 'parīdatta[cita]h sukhaduhkhabhābhyām iti | abhijānāti bhavān gautamo diviśvāpnam muhūrtam | abhijānāmy agnivesyāyana griśmānām paścime māse muhūrtam klāmam | idam atraie sammoham ity āhur | āgama tvam agnivesyāyana tvayā na sukaram ājñatum yathā saṃmūḍho bhavaty asammūḍho vā || The sūtra is also quoted in the Da zhi du lun (T 1509: 25.699a7–15).
[with other types of consciousness], they sleep. This is what is termed 'sleep' in their case. Accordingly the Lord said, 'I do recall, Aggivessana, how in the last month of the hot season, having returned from my alms round and eaten my meal, I have spread out my robe folded in four, lain down on my right side and, mindfully and fully aware, gone to sleep.' This weakness of the physical body is not destroyed by the path, and applies to matter that both constitutes and does not constitute a sentient being. In the former case it applies at such times as when one who has destroyed all defilements had been on a long journey or is tired after doing some work. In the latter case it applies to leaves and flowers, for the leaves of some trees unfold because of the warmth of the sun, and fold at night; the flowers of lotuses open because of the heat of the sun, and close at night. But this sleepiness of those who have destroyed the defilements is not the result of anything unskilful.69

This developed Theravāda theory of sleep builds on a passage in the Milindapañha that distinguishes between three phases of sleep.70 The first is drowsiness, defined as the tying down, enveloping, weakness, sluggish-

69 As 378–79: idam vuccati thinamiddhanīvarāṇan ti idam thināṇ ca middhaṇ ca ekato katvā āvaranaṇāthena thinamiddhanīvarāṇan ti vuccati. yaṃ yebhuyyena sekkhaputhujjananām niddāya pabbabhāga-aparabhāgesu uppaiajati tam arahattamaggena samucchijjati. khināsavanām pana karajakāyassa dubbalabhāvena bhavangotaranam hoti, tasmām asammissē vattamāne te suṇā, sā n’esaṃ niddā nāma hoti. ten’ āha bhagavā: abhijānāmi kho panāhām aggivessana gihānanm pacchime māse [...] catuggunanm sanghātim paṇḍapetvā dakkhinena passena sato sampajāno niddām okkamītā’’ ti. evarūpo panāyam karajakāyassa dubbalabhāvo na maggavajjho, upādinnahe pu anupādinnahe pu labbhati. upādinnahe labbhamāno yadā khināsavo dighamaggam gato hoti, aṇṇataram vā pana kammam katvā kilanto, evarūpe kāle labbhati. anupādinnahe labbhamāno pawnapuppheche labbhati. ekaccānañhi rukkhanaṃ paṇṇāni sūriyatapena pasāriyanti rattim paṭikutanti, padumapupphādini sūriyatapena pūphante, rattim pana paṭikutanti idam pana middham akusalattā khināsavanām na hoti ti. CF. Sv II 528–29; Ps II 292–293; Mp 14 22–3; It-a II 68.

70 Mil 300. Cf. Vibh-a 408.
ness of the body: its unworkableness (kāyassā onāho pariyonāho dubbalyam mandatā akammaññatā kāyassā). The second is the state of one who is half awake, overwhelmed by ‘monkey sleep’ (kapiniddāpareto vokinnakam jaggati). The final phase is the entering into ‘the existence-continuum’ (bhavaṅgagati). It is during ‘monkey sleep’ that one dreams (kapiniddāpareto supinam passati), while deep dreamless sleep is characterised by the continuous and uninterrupted flow of bhavaṅga. The point the Atthasālinī and other Theravāda commentaries are at pains to make is that, while ordinary human beings reach deep dreamless sleep via unskilful drowsiness and dream sleep, buddhas and arhats do not; they enter directly into deep dreamless sleep. And deep dreamless sleep is characterised by the uninterrupted flow of bhavaṅga, a mode of consciousness that is neither skilful nor unskilful, but undetermined. In the case of ordinary human beings it will be one of nine classes of consciousness that is the karmic result (vipāka) of good or skilful consciousness.

In all this there is a tension between on the one hand an understanding of the Buddha’s mind as intrinsically bright and alert and thus unable to display signs of sluggishness and fatigue when, say, yet another of his

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71 Vism XIV 114 states that when no other cittā arises interrupting its flow, such as when one has fallen into dreamless sleep, and so on, bhavaṅga occurs endlessly, like a flowing stream (asati santāna-viniṇṇatte aṇāsmin cittāppade nādisotam viya supinam apassato niddokkhananakālādisu aparimānasamkham pi pavattati yeva ti).

72 Of the total of eighty-nine classes of consciousness distinguished in the Theravāda system, nineteen among the thirty-six vipākas are said to be able to perform the function of bhavaṅga: investigating consciousness resulting from the unskilful, investigating consciousness resulting from the skilful, the eight sense-sphere resultants with motivations, the five form-sphere resultants and the four formless-sphere resultants (Vism XIV 113-14). For further details see R. Gethin, ‘Bhavanga and Rebirth According to the Abhidhamma’, in The Buddhist Forum, Vol. III, ed. by Tadeusz Skorupski and Ulrich Pagel (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1994), pp. 11-35 (18-19).
followers makes demands on him, and on the other hand a sense that, given the physiological need for sleep, it does not seem right to suggest that all sleepiness is simply unskilful. To resolve this tension the Abhayagiri Theravādins suggested that there was a kind of sleepiness called middha that was straightforwardly physical. The Sarvāstivādins suggested simply that not every case of middha or sleepiness was akuśala. The Mahāvihāra Theravādins suggested that there is a ‘weakness of the physical body’ (karajakāyassa dubbalabhāvo) that is not exactly sleepiness but nevertheless means that even buddhas and arhats must ‘sleep', or at least allow their minds to enter into the dreamless state of bhavanga for a period to time each day.\(^3\) But the Abhidharma discussion remains informed by an awareness of the subtle interplay of mind and body.

\(^3\) As Bareau has noted, according to Vasumitra the Mahāsāṃghikas held the position that buddhas neither sleep nor dream (T 2031: 49.15c2: 佛無睡夢), and according to the Mahāvibhāṣā the Vibhajyavādins held the position that buddhas do not sleep (T 1545: 27.410b26–29); André Bareau, Les sectes bouddhiques du petit véhicule (Saigon: École Française d’Extrême-Orient, 1955), 59–60, 173
Abbreviations

Abhidh-di Abhidharmadīpa, ed. by Padmanabh S. Jaini (Patna: 1977)
Abhidh-av-ṇṭ Abhidhammāvatāra-navatīka, Bṛ, 2 vols (Rangoon: 1962)
Abhidh-sam (P) Abhidharmasamuccaya, ed. P. Pradhan (Calcutta: 1950)
As Atthasālīni, ed. by Edward Müller, (London: 1897, rev. edn 1979)
Bṛ Burmese Chattāhsaṅgiti edition
Dhs Dhammasaṅgani, ed. by Edward Müller (London: 1885)
MN Majjhimanikāya, ed. V. Trenckner, R. Chalmers, 3 vols
Body, Mind and Sleepiness (Gethin)
(London: 1887–1902)

Mp  Manorathapūrañi, ed. M. Walleser, H. Kopp, 5 vols
(London: 1936–1957)

Pañcask  Pañcaskandhaka, ed. by Xuezhu Li, Ernst Steinkellner and Tōru Tomabechi (Beijing, Vienna: 2008).

Pañcask-vbh Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā, ed. by Jowita Kramer (Beijing, Vienna: 2013)


SN  Samyuttanikāya, ed. L. Feer, 5 vols (London: 1884–1898)

Śrāv-bh  Śrāvakabhūmi, ed. K. Shukla (Patna: 1973)


Trīṃś-bh  Trīṃśikāvijñāntibhāṣya, ed. H. Buescher (Vienna: 2007)

Vibh  Vibhaṅga, ed. C. A. F. Rhys Davids (London: 1904)

Vibh-a  Sammohavinodanī (Vibhaṅga-āṭṭhakathā), ed. A. P. Buddhadatta (London: 1923)

Vism  Visuddhimagga, ed. C.A.F. Rhys Davids (London: 1920–1921)

Vism-mhṭ  Visuddhimagga-mahāṭīkā, B, 2 vols (Rangoon: 1960)

Professor,
Department of Religion and Theology
University of Bristol
Guest Professor of 2013,
International College
for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies