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Allusive reference and other-oriented stance in an affinal avoidance register

Abstract

This paper analyzes the social-relational dynamics of in-law name avoidance in Datooga, a Nilotic language spoken in Tanzania. Datooga women avoid referring to their senior affines by birth name, while also avoiding words that ‘allusively’ refer to these in-laws by sharing lexical or phonetic material with their names. These acts of name avoidance are conceptualized here in terms of stance: each instance of avoidance orients the speaker towards her affinal kin. The analysis of this unusual phenomenon emphasizes how speakers construct social relations in discourse not only with immediate speech participants but also with absent others, across time and space.

1. Introduction

Research on language and social relations overwhelmingly focuses on the relationship between speaker and addressee, leaving the third classic speech participant role of “other” (Irvine 1996) undertheorized in comparison. The speaker–addressee relationship, explored through concepts such as politeness, facework, alignment, and affiliation, is of constant and more conspicuous relevance to the analysis of language and social organization, but speakers also index relationships with third parties in their talk. Striking examples of how speakers orient to nonpresent others come from the affinal avoidance registers of sub-Saharan Africa. Among the Datooga of Tanzania, for instance, women practice extensive linguistic avoidance with respect to usually absent and in some cases long dead in-law relations, avoiding not only their names but also lexically related and similar-sounding words. This paper discusses how, through the avoidance of names as well as seemingly ordinary words, Datooga women position themselves relative to third parties. In exploring this relational orientation between speakers and third
persons, I emphasize how language use is sensitive to social relations beyond those of the immediate speech event.

One of the principal ways in which speakers attend to their relationships with third persons in discourse is by means of person reference (Murphy 1988, Enfield & Stivers 2007), e.g., the use of names, kinship terms, or person descriptions, the latter perhaps involving a person’s profession (“the doctor”), a personal characteristic (“the guy with the big hair”), or some attitudinal term (“that idiot”). In-law name avoidance in Datooga is usefully understood in terms of person reference, though it presents a rather elaborate manifestation of it. Datooga avoidance unambiguously concerns person reference where it involves women avoiding their senior in-laws’ names and referring to them with alternative expressions. Yet women also avoid many words that do not refer to individuals, but to inanimate objects or actions, like ‘pot’ or ‘knife’ or ‘hit,’ on account of the lexical and/or phonetic resemblance these words bear to taboo names. Here I argue that these more elaborate cases of avoidance also involve person reference, and I do so by introducing the concept of allusive reference. Allusive reference is an ideologically-mediated semiotic relationship whereby a sign indirectly points to a person by virtue of a conventionalized association between that sign and the person’s name, as agreed upon in a given community of practice. This concept, explained in section 3, makes it possible to describe all aspects of Datooga avoidance as invoking third-person referents (or allusive referents).

After showing how Datooga avoidance always involves some third-person referent, I then frame avoidance in terms of stance; specifically, stances taken towards third persons. In section 4, I combine Haviland’s (2007) concept of triangularity in person reference with Du Bois’ (2007) stance triangle to model what I call “other-oriented stance,” intended to capture the dynamics of how speakers orient to nonpresent others in discourse. Drawing on Stasch’s (2003) work on
Korowai avoidance, I argue that in Datooga, women’s stances of avoidance with respect to their in-law relations index not only their social remove from these individuals but also their social obligation to them, in that women continually invoke these relationships and their own relative deferential positions through the habitual practice of word avoidance. While the main focus is on the speaker–referent axis of the stance triangle, I point, in section 4.2, to the complexity of the social and interactional effects of affinal name avoidance, discussing how avoidance simultaneously shapes relationships between speakers and addressees. The concluding remarks tie in Agha’s (2005) observations about the way in which particular stances, repeated over and over like those of avoidance, can also crystallize into indexes of personhood.

Datooga belongs to the Nilotic language family and is spoken by semi-nomadic agro-pastoralists spread across northern and central Tanzania. Within Datooga, there are numerous ethnic subgroupings, many of which speak distinctive dialects of the language. Data in this paper are taken from recordings of naturally-occurring conversation and interviews in the Gisamjanga and Barabaiga dialects. Data was collected in Mbulu District, Tanzania between 2012 and early 2015. Avoidance words in the examples are indicated in bold.

2. The Datooga avoidance register

In traditional Datooga society, married women show respect to their senior in-laws by avoiding not only their names but also the lexical items from which the names derive, as well as similar-sounding words. This is an example of what Fleming (2014:146) has called “referentially based avoidance registers,” which include the well-known case of *hlonipha* in several Nguni languages of Southern Africa (Kunene 1958, Finlayson 1982, Luthuli 2007), and the affinal avoidance registers of Highland East Cushitic languages of Ethiopia (Treis 2005) (and see other examples
listed in Fleming (2014:126)). As in these other cases, Datooga-speaking women have developed a highly conventionalized avoidance vocabulary to replace taboo words. For example, a woman whose mother-in-law is called Údá-mánàng’ (‘FEM-small’) will avoid this name, regardless of its bearer, along with the adjective mánàng’ ‘small,’ from which the name derives. She will also avoid words considered to sound similar, e.g., mànánda ‘waist,’ which shares the same initial CVC sequence as the name.1,2 A conventional alternative for the ordinary adjective mánàng’ is básàk, an avoidance-specific word of unknown origin. This woman could thus refer to her mother-in-law as Údábásàk and would describe small objects as básàk rather than mánàng’. To replace mànánda ‘waist,’ she could use the conventionalized lexical substitution bugústa ‘middle.’ This practice of linguistic avoidance is known in Datooga as giing’áwèakshòoda, a nominalization of the verb ng’awaas ‘avoid (in speech).’ Additional examples of Datooga words with their avoidance equivalents are given in Table 1.

Datooga society is patrilocal, and women begin practicing giing’áwèakshòoda in earnest after their wedding, a ceremony which usually takes place several months after they have joined their husband’s household.3 Barabaiga and Gisamjanga women avoid up to three ascending generations of in-laws, male and female, though the exact set of avoided relatives varies from household to household. Father-in-law is the central and prototypical target of avoidance in the sense that women’s metapragmatic discussions of avoidance revolve around this kinship category, unless explicitly asked about other avoided relations. Father-in-law is associated with various nonlinguistic prohibitions, too, including physical contact, eye contact, contact with his
belongings, and, in the initial stages of marriage, being seen at all. Linguistic avoidance is thus one aspect of a cross-modal array of iconic-indexical signs of the affinal avoidance relationship.

Women are expected to practice avoidance at all times, regardless of the identity of addressee or the situational context, the only exception being during childbirth, when midwives encourage women to call out taboo names. Recordings of naturally-occurring speech in a small number of Datooga households show that women do not avoid all taboo words with absolute consistency in practice, but speakers’ descriptions of avoidance hold this to be the case. The following example, taken from a recording of conversation, illustrates how linguistic avoidance operates at the utterance level:

(1) á-méeewà jéebú géani hàshàs-án-ga

IMP.SG-loosen.IS child.DEM.PROX get.IMP light-FS-MR

‘Help this child; get him some water’ [lit. ‘loosen this child; get him some lightnesses’]

In (1), the speaker calls to her daughter-in-law in the kitchen to bring her child some water. She avoids the verb wead ‘help’ on account of its phonetic similarity to the name of her husband’s paternal aunt’s son Wéadòoda. Instead, she uses the conventional lexical substitution meew, meaning ‘loosen’ in ordinary usage. She also avoids the word béega ‘water’ and uses the form hàshásánga instead, derived from hàshàs ‘light (adj.).’ Since these avoidance words belong to the family dialect (or ‘familect’ (Crystal 2009), so to speak), her interlocutors have no trouble understanding her and the child is given water. While it is only female, married members of the household who actively use these words, all household members are familiar with them.
For a detailed linguistic description of the Datooga avoidance register, and more ethnographic background, see Author (2015). The rest of this paper is concerned with the social-relational effects achieved by the speaker when she utters the avoidance words in example (1), particularly in relation to the referents of the names that motivate her avoidance.

3. Direct and allusive person reference in Datooga

Affinal name avoidance practices in Datooga are driven by relational concerns about how one should refer to certain third persons. In some cases, this may seem counter-intuitive, since, as we just saw with the example of ‘water’ in (1) above, words associated with affinal avoidance often refer to inanimate objects. To demonstrate how avoidance words always have to do with third-person referents, I will introduce the concept of “allusive reference,” an ideologically-mediated semiotic relationship whereby certain words point to personal names through allusion or through a conventionalized kind of sound symbolism. With this concept to hand, we are then able to say that Datooga women avoid referring to or allusively referring to their senior in-laws by birth name.

In his work on the typology of affinal avoidance registers, Fleming (2014:146) has identified *hlonipha* and related practices (under which Datooga avoidance falls) as “referentially based avoidance registers,” contrasting this with “interactionally based avoidance registers” as found in Australia (e.g., Dixon 1971). Referentially based avoidance is motivated by sensitivities surrounding names on account of their “inherent referentiality” (Fleming 2011:143), their ability to always pick out a specific referent, while interactionally based avoidance is triggered by the identity of particular copresent interactional participant(s). While *giing’áwéakshòoda* is primarily motivated by problems with names and reference, interactional concerns are not
irrelevant to its use, and I discuss speaker–addressee relational dynamics of avoidance in section 4.2.

In what sense is linguistic avoidance in Datooga oriented toward third-person referents? One aspect of the practice, the avoidance of in-laws’ birth names, is referent-oriented in an obvious way: when women make reference to a senior in-law, they choose to use a conventionalized ‘avoidance’ name instead of that person’s birth name. For example, in the following utterance, a young woman refers to one of her male in-laws with the conventionalized giing’áwêakshòoda form of his name, Gídáwápta, rather than his birth name Gídámúlda. The birth name is derived from the verb mul ‘hide, abscond,’ and the verb wap, a close synonym, is the conventionalized avoidance replacement for mul. (The example comes from a researcher-led discussion about avoided names and related words.)

(2) m-òo-wíinyí Gídáwápta fiyá?

NEG-3-smell.like.IS PSN mother

‘Doesn’t that sound like Gidawapta, mother?’

In choosing to use the name Gídáwápta rather than Gídámúlda, the speaker in (2) refers to this absent third party in a manner that is metapragmatically associated with giing’áwêakshòoda and in turn with respectfulness. Conventional lexical substitutes of taboo words, such as wap, function as nonreferential indexicals—indexing acts of avoidance and thus respect—but note that they can also take on the referential indexical properties of taboo names when employed to make reference to in-law relations (often in combination with name morphology, e.g., gídá- ‘masculine name prefix’).
Women don’t necessarily use giing’áwêakshôoda whenever they need to refer to their senior in-laws, though: they also frequently use their in-laws’ ‘domestic’ names in place of their birth names, as in example (3) below. The domestic name is a personal name that children use to refer to their parents and other adults, and which other members of the household, neighbors, and visitors typically use as well. Women acquire their domestic name upon marriage, while men can be given one at any time from childhood onwards, whenever it is felt to be necessary.\(^7\) In (3), a young woman suggests to her mother-in-law’s sister, whose domestic name is Mùdúuláan, that she call her father-in-law in from outside, since there is a small social gathering taking place inside. The speaker refers to her father-in-law by his domestic name, Jáajiida, rather than the giing’áwêakshôoda equivalent of his birth name. (The father-in-law, in turn, would typically refer to his daughter-in-law with her domestic name.)

\begin{flushleft}
(3) \textit{àndákkèa m-ú-gùur-sííñí Jáajiida Mùdúuláan?}
\end{flushleft}

\textsc{NEG.Q NEG-2SG-call-TERM.CP.IS PSN PSN}

‘Why don’t you call Jaajiida over, Muduulaan?’

Through her choice to use the form \textit{Jáajiida}, the daughter-in-law treats the referent, her father-in-law, with an appropriate level of respect, but does not index a conspicuous act of in-law avoidance; many different categories of people, including his wives and grown-up children, use the name \textit{Jáajiida} to refer to this man. In both (2) and (3), the speakers avoid the referents’ birth names, but only in (2) is the referent a target of avoidance in the sense of avoidance as enregistered practice with its attendant indexical meanings.
While the instance of \textit{giing’áwéakshòoda} in (2) is a clear example of a third-person referent as target of avoidance, other aspects of the phenomenon less obviously concern third-person referents, such as when women avoid the lexical item from which a taboo name derives. For example, in the following utterance, made by a woman cutting up beef in the company of several other women, there is no explicit reference to a third person:

(4) \textit{g-àj-ée-géanu gèesh-tá nyábùul-da àk-k-ì-dàbí gíli}

\hspace{1cm} \text{AFF-FUT-1PL-take.CP leg-UR cow-UR SEQ-AFF-2SG-beat.IS thing}

‘You take the cow’s leg and then you hit it with this thing…’

To understand that the speaker in (4) is orienting to a third person, one must know that \textit{nyábùulda} ‘cow’ is an avoidance term used in place of the ordinary word \textit{déeda} ‘cow’ and that one of the speaker’s in-law relations is called \textit{Dúu-dée} ‘black-cow.’ Equipped with this knowledge, we can observe that when the speaker chooses to utter the word \textit{nyábùulda} instead of \textit{déeda}, she indexes her relationship with a nonpresent other, a man called \textit{Dúudée}, by avoiding a word that sounds like his name. However, the referent of the avoidance word is of course ‘cow’ and not \textit{Dúudée} himself, which poses a problem for the claim that avoidance is referent-based: the referent, the cow, is not the focus of avoidance, but rather the in-law relation named \textit{Dúudée}.

Fleming (2014:120) writes that, “even where the linguistic form does not specifically refer to the focus of avoidance, as with a homophone, the social index functions on analogy to the referentially based pattern,” thus indexing the in-law as the focus of avoidance. However, in a footnote he adds that it is “ultimately untenable to call this referent-focused,” since the avoidance forms “in no way refer to the taboo relation” (Fleming 2014:148). Although it is true that
Dúudée is not directly referred to in (4), the speaker avoids uttering this word because for her to say déeda would bring about a similar pragmatic effect to saying the name Dúudée, as a result of a culture-internal, conventionalized association between names and their component lexemes. In this sense, Dúudée is an allusive referent of the word déeda.

Allusive reference is an indirect sign–object relationship that holds between a sign A and an object B, where sign A, in addition to standing for some object A, points to another sign B, which in turn stands for object B. For example, the word form ng’ádiida (sign A) stands for the object LION (object A) for all Datooga speakers. For certain Datooga communities of practice, the word ng’ádiida also points to the name Gídá-ng’ádiida ‘MSC-lion’ (sign B): there is a conventionalized association between these two words such that, for some women, uttering ng’ádiida is akin to uttering the name Gídáng’ádiida (i.e., both violate a taboo). This association is based on shared lexical material: the name is derived from the noun. The name Gídáng’ádiida is itself a sign that stands for a specific person (object B). Thus, the linguistic sign ng’ádiida also points to this individual through allusion, a relationship mediated by lexical overlap between two signs. On the basis of this indirect semiotic link, the word ng’ádiida allusively refers to the person called Gídáng’ádiida.

I have diagrammed this relationship in Figure 1, using Enfield’s (2013) representation of the semiotic process. The diagram represents how a sign (SA) can allusively refer to an object (OB) in addition to the one that it directly refers to (OA). This relationship is indicated by the red pathway from sign A to sign B and then to the latter sign’s denotational object. The first link in this relationship—that one sign points to another sign—is lexically constituted for Datooga: the two signs share lexical material.
As the note beside the second A(gent) in Figure 1 points out, there is a restricted set of people for whom the sign ng’ádiida would allusively refer to the person Gidáng’ádiida in the context of ordinary speech: only those who are aware that the speaker avoids this particular name. Such people, upon hearing a woman uttering ng’ádiida (rather than its conventionalized alternative form séang’dá), might then pick up on the allusive reference to Gidáng’ádiida. A possible I(terpretant), i.e., the reaction of the agent to the sign, could be an expression of shock or surprise that the speaker had broken the name taboo. (We see a report of a taboo violation in Extract 3, below, where a woman claims she was shocked by hearing a woman utter her father-in-law’s name.) For interlocutors who are not familiar with the names of a woman’s affinal kin, these subtle relationships between words and names will go unnoticed. Nonetheless, whether or not a person knows of a particular Gidáng’ádiida and the consequent tabooing of ng’ádiida ‘lion’ among his junior female in-laws, Datooga are aware of the general linguistic relationship that holds between the word ng’ádiida and name Gidáng’ádiida.

The metalinguistic association that Datooga make between a name and its component lexeme—i.e. between S_A and S_B in Figure 1—is evident in how speakers use the same avoidance form to replace a particular lexeme and to create a gĩng’áwẽakshòoda “version” of a name containing that lexeme, e.g., ng’ádiida is conventionally replaced with séang’dá (an avoidance-specific form of unknown origin) and the name Gidáng’ádiida becomes Gidáséang’dá. Further, Datooga speakers have a metapragmatic term for the relationship indicated with the dotted red line between the two signs: they use the word wiiny ‘smell like’ to describe the way in which a word resembles a name. I interpret this usage in terms of traces: a word contains a trace of, or
‘smells like,’ a name, such that the two are indexically connected, like a person and their footprint. The verb *wiiny* is used in other contexts to talk about olfactory traces—a calabash smelling of the sour milk that it had contained earlier, a person’s clothes smelling of smoke after proximity to fire. Ultimately, I think that the relevant trace is between a word and a person, rather than just their name, but this expression, of words smelling like names, is getting at the same idea that my term ‘allusive reference’ is intended to convey: of an indirect link between words and names, mediated by their material substance.\(^\text{10}\)

My claim so far, then, is that in Datooga certain words make allusive reference to individuals by pointing to another sign (a name) that directly denotes that individual. Women avoid both the birth names of their senior in-laws and words that make allusive reference to them by association with their birth names. There is a third type of avoidance that has not yet been discussed: the avoidance of near-homophones of birth names. For example, the verb root *ng’ad* ‘cut; strike’ might be avoided on account of the name *Gidáng’ádiida*. The relationship between these two word forms is based not on shared lexical material, as with *ng’ádiida* and *Gidáng’ádiida*, but on shared phonetic material: the sound sequence *ng’ad*. While this word-name relationship works on the phonetic rather than lexical level, it, too, involves a metalinguistic judgement of similarity which leads Datooga speakers to interpret an ordinary word as indirectly referring to a taboo in-law. As such, I consider this sign–sign relationship as a kind of allusive reference, too. The sign *ng’ad* points to another sign *Gidáng’ádiida* by means of a metalinguistic, conventionalized association whereby speakers link words to names based on shared CVC syllables.\(^\text{11}\) For speakers who are supposed to avoid the name *Gidáng’ádiida*, this metalinguistic association requires that *ng’ad* become a target of avoidance too.
The purpose of this section has been to show how all aspects of in-law name avoidance in Datooga involve person reference. While this is intuitively the case, the details of how this works needed some untangling. Names are straightforward person-referring expressions, but I argue that name roots and near-homophones of names can also allusively refer to persons in Datooga through metalinguistically crafted links with names, based either on shared lexical or phonetic material. Allusive reference refers to a culture-internal metapragmatic understanding of possible relationships between signs (though one that perhaps has wider application for thinking about punning and other kinds of wordplay). Fleming (2011:155) suggests that lexeme and near-homophone avoidance across cultures develop diachronically out of straightforward name avoidance and arise from anxieties that certain words could be mistaken for certain taboo names. This attention to the “material substance of the sign” (Fleming, ibid.) is what motivates the connection between two signs, as diagrammed in Figure 1.12 As Fleming (2011:155–6) points out, once lexeme and near-homophone avoidance become conventionalized, a near-homophone need not actually be mistaken for the taboo name “to have its undesired causal effects.”

Nonetheless, these convoluted aspects of name avoidance practices still revolve, diachronically and synchronically, around the problem of the name, and what it means to call someone by their birth name. For Datooga speakers, who have several different kinds of names as well as other options for referring to each other,13 using someone’s birth name gives rise to certain social-relational implicatures. For a woman to refer to a senior in-law by his or her birth name would suggest that she construes her own social status as sufficiently high relative to this in-law that she is entitled to use their name, i.e., is their senior or their peer. Such an act would be inappropriate (to say the least) in a society that values deferential behavior with respect to one’s senior affines, and seniors more generally. In a woman’s efforts not to refer, or even
allusively refer, to an in-law relation by their birth name, that person is paradoxically made relevant as a referent in interaction—a point to be elaborated on in the next section.

4. Other-oriented stance

The practice of giing ’áwêakshòoda revolves around the presentation of social relations in speech. More specifically, it hinges on concerns about how to refer to one’s in-laws, and how to deal with the problematic property of Datooga words, discussed in the previous section, that they can make allusive reference to persons while denoting something entirely different. The solution Datooga women have found is to avoid such words by choosing alternative lexical items. This practice has, over time, led to enregisterment of a special set of avoidance words, such that avoidance is simply a matter of selecting forms from an ‘avoidance register’ (rather than coming up with an idiosyncratic avoidance strategy each time). The process of enregisterment probably relies more on distinctions drawn between married women’s and other people’s speech (a second-order indexical value of avoidance language), than on speakers keeping track of taboo words and their avoidance counterparts. Nonetheless, these enregistered word forms make acts of name avoidance conspicuous: in women’s efforts not to refer to someone by name, they, on some level, draw attention to that person. In this part of the paper, I consider in more detail how avoidance language mediates relationships between speakers and their senior in-laws, and thus reproduces aspects of Datooga social organization. As I mentioned in the introduction, work on interpersonal relations in sociolinguistics and pragmatics has, understandably, tended to focus on the ways in which language mediates relationships between copresent participants; politeness research, especially, concentrates on speakers and addressees. Avoidance registers like giing ’áwêakshòoda position speakers with respect to typically absent third parties, and as such
draw attention to how language use is shaped by social relations that hold beyond those of the immediate interaction.

Linguists and anthropologists have relatively little theoretical apparatus available to them for probing how speakers orient to third parties and what is accomplished by doing so. One theoretical concept that does attempt to capture the speaker–other relationship is Bell’s referee design, though it is of limited relevance for gíing’áwêakshòoda. According to Bell (2002:147), “referees are third persons not usually present at an interaction but possessing such salience for a speaker that they influence style even in their absence”; e.g., in imagining a certain audience, a radio presenter might shift to a more standard accent. This definition of referees captures something of the ideological status of avoided individuals, in that they do influence women’s lexical choices in their absence. However, unlike Bell’s referee design, Datooga women are not emulating stylistic features associated with a particular group in order to align themselves with that group; they are indexing their relationship with a specific third person through conspicuous avoidance of his or her name. While avoidance and the phenomenon of, say, crossing (where speakers use language of a group to which they are not considered to belong; Rampton 1995) both conjure up images of others relative to which a speaker positions herself, the other is conjured in gíing’áwêakshòoda not by invoking the stylistic emblems of a demarcated group but through avoiding direct or allusive reference to an in-law relation by their birth name.

A more useful theoretical concept for avoidance is that of stance, which has been mentioned in a number of other studies of person reference. Haviland (2007:226) writes that “person reference […] always involves the indexicalities of stance,” and Enfield (2007:119), finding fault with the conversation analytic idea of “default” person reference, argues that “it is not possible in any context to refer to persons without encoding, implying or otherwise making
available a stance towards social relationships that generally applies in the culture.” As discussed, avoidance has a complex relationship with person reference: while using an alternative referring expression for someone’s name is an obvious case of person reference, lexeme and near-homophone avoidance disguise reference not to a person but to some object, e.g., ‘cow’ in example (4). As I have argued, these kinds of words are avoided because they are understood by speakers to allusively refer to someone. The practice of gíng’áwêakshòoda is rooted in concerns about who gets to refer to whom in what manner, and in their elaborate attempts to veil reference to others, women are “encoding, implying, or otherwise making available a stance towards social relationships” (Enfield, ibid). In what follows, I use Du Bois’s stance triangle to model how interpersonal stances are realized through avoidance, and I argue for distinguishing a particular kind of stance category, “other-oriented stance,” which refers to stances speakers take towards absent third parties. In section 4.1, I then attempt to describe the quality of the relational indexing achieved through stances of avoidance, drawing on Agha’s (1993) notion of deference entitlements and Stasch’s (2003:331) ideas about “alterity and obligation” in Korowai in-law avoidance.

In a paper on person reference in Tzotzil gossip, Haviland (2007:229) describes person reference as “inherently triangular”; that is, involving a triangular relationship between speaker, referent, and addressee. We can visualize this understanding of person reference by representing it in terms of Du Bois’ stance triangle, as shown (in slightly adapted form) in Figure 2. This diagram can help us model how reference (or, in our case, avoided reference) to third persons mediates social relationships through stance-taking. Du Bois’ stance triangle consists of three elements: the stance-taking subject (Subject 1), the object of the stance (Referent (person)), and other copresent subjects with whom the stance-taking subject may align (by virtue of the stance-
taking; Subject 2). If we think about Datooga name avoidance in these terms, we can claim the following: when a Datooga woman avoids making direct or allusive reference to, say, her father-in-law by his birth name, she takes a stance towards her father-in-law: she “assign[s] value to objects of interest [in this case, a person, her father-in-law], [she] position[s] social actors [in this case, herself] with respect to those objects […] and [she] invoke[s] presupposed systems of sociocultural value” (Du Bois 2007:139). More specifically, she attributes deference entitlements (Agha 1993) to her father-in-law, she positions herself as his junior, female affine, and in doing so she invokes an understood social hierarchy in which daughters-in-law are in various senses obligated to their senior in-laws.

[Insert Figure 2 here.]

Du Bois’s (2007) “stance object” is, in the cases he discusses, some inanimate referent: a hibiscus cooler, a weekend, a location. These stances mediate interpersonal relationships insofar as they align or disalign speech participants through shared or diverging evaluations of the stance object. Of course, a stance object is very often an animate referent: a third person. One important difference between inanimate referents and person referents as objects of stance is the nature of the relationship between the stance-taker and the object. Taking a stance towards another person, as opposed to an inanimate referent, has potential consequences for the relationship between the speaker and the third person. In his discussion of the role of third parties in communication, Linell (2009) emphasizes the fact that third persons have agency: he defines a third party as someone who “thinks, says or does—or could think, say or do—something which is relevant for the primary parties (here-and-now).” To take this literally, the deference Datooga women show
or fail to show to nonpresent in-laws through their use of *giing’áwêakshòoda* may be reported to those in-laws on a future occasion. In a more abstract sense, a speaker may simply be mindful of a third person’s social identity when she portrays their relationship in a particular way through the act of referring.

It is the agency of a person as stance object that gives these kinds of stances—what I will call “other-oriented stances” in reference to the participant roles of Speaker, Addressee, and Other (Irvine 1996)—a different quality than stances towards inanimate objects. This is reflected in Figure 2 by a small change to Du Bois’s original stance triangle: along the stance subject–stance object dimension, the act of evaluation is now represented with arrows pointing in both directions. The parentheses enclosing the arrow pointing from referent to subject/speaker are intended to indicate that the ability of the stance object to evaluate the subject is only imagined (but nonetheless consequential) at the moment the stance is taken. Other-oriented stances, those taken towards third persons, could be subsumed under the more general term of “interpersonal stance,” though that term is usually associated with stances taken towards addressees, e.g., Kiesling (2004) uses it to describe the casual solidarity achieved by the term *dude*. Other-oriented stances are potentially more complex than addressee-oriented interpersonal stances because they involve all components of the stance triangle: evaluation of some referent, positioning with respect to both referent and addressee, and alignment or disalignment with addressee.

Let us consider how the concept of other-oriented stance can help us analyze the most elaborate cases of avoidance—near-homophone avoidance. In the following two-line extract from an informal conversation, speaker B uses the form *qaniw* instead of *balool ‘speak.’ The verb *qaniw* is an ordinary synonym of *balool*, meaning ‘talk,’ but is used far less frequently in
ordinary speech, and in that sense is a marked word form. It is a conventionalized avoidance alternative for *balool*. In line 1, a woman, A, asks her friend, B, who B’s daughter was speaking to, and B then replies that her daughter was speaking to her on her cell phone.

**Extract 1**

1 A  g-óo-bálóolí ng’èa?
   AFF-3-talk.IS  who
   ‘Who was she talking to?’

2 (0.2)

3 B  qw-á-qáníw-àn àbà jée siimu
   AFF-3-talk-1SG.OBJ  LOC  stomach phone
   ‘She was talking to me on the phone’

In line 3, B avoids the word *balool* because it is understood to allude to the name *Bálàwà*, one of B’s in-law relations. By avoiding making allusive reference to *Bálàwà* and using the *gíng’áwêakshòoda* word *qaniw* instead, B nonetheless makes *Bálàwà* a stance object in this moment, orienting to him as an allusive referent of the avoided word. In the conspicuous act of avoidance, she takes a deferential stance towards the target of avoidance. *Bálàwà* becomes the stance object by means of a complex inferential process: B’s use of the marked form *qaniw* implies avoidance of *balool*, which in turn implies avoidance of a name beginning with *bal*. The addressee may or may not be able to retrieve the allusive referent, *Bálàwà*, but would at least
infer an instance of name avoidance, and thus an act of deference towards some in-law relation.
In orienting to Báläwà as someone deserving of name avoidance, B tends to her relationship with her affinal kin and positions herself as a dutiful daughter-in-law.

4.1. Stances of deference, distance, and obligation

I have repeatedly described the other-oriented stances accomplished through gíing’áwēakshòoda as deferential, and I now want to probe the quality of this stance a little further. That gíing’áwēakshòoda words are indexical of respect is obvious to Datooga speakers. Women and men frequently give a one-word answer to the question of why gíing’áwēakshòoda is practiced: múréeda ‘respect.’ In the following extract from an interview, an elderly woman (W) provides a slightly longer answer to this question but explains that avoidance is simply a matter of respect, the four repetitions of the word múréeda indicating its centrality in her understanding of avoidance. The interviewer (I) is a younger Datooga woman, the elderly woman’s neighbor.

Extract 2

4 W: níí múr-ée-dá

DEM.PROX respect-PS-UR

‘This is respect’

5 (4.8)

6 I: ah haa

‘Ah ha’
This strong metapragmatic association between *giing’áwêakshòoda* and the concept of respect helps us characterize the kind of stance a woman takes towards an in-law by uttering a *giing’áwêakshòoda* word. It is not the act of referring in itself that is disrespectful, but referring by means of a particular name—the birth name. As discussed earlier, one problematic association with using someone’s birth name is that it assumes senior or equal status to the referent. To conspicuously avoid this status indexing, as a woman does when she uses an enregistered avoidance word, is to imply the inverse, i.e., to assert one’s junior status, and thus emphasize the deference entitlements of the referent (Agha 1993) with respect to the speaker.

In the following utterance, for example, a young woman uses the verb *laaj* ‘lend’ instead of *shah* ‘buy’ because the latter form sounds like the name of her father-in-law. In uttering *laaj*, she
projects her father-in-law as a stance object: he becomes relevant in the discourse as an allusive referent of the purposefully omitted word *shah* ‘buy’ and thus a conspicuous target of avoidance. Simultaneously, she indexes the deference entitlements of this stance object relative to herself through her linguistic dexterity in avoiding a word that would allude to his name. Avoidance words in their default use index a nonpresent ‘other’ as a focus of both avoidance and deference.

(5)  
g-ée  (. gíd-  (. bóo-ga  g-éa-láajá  hàad AFF-1PL thing maize-MR AFF-1PL-lend.IS how.much  

‘We – it – how much maize was sold?’

Deference is not the only quality of these avoidance-based stance-takings, however. Work on avoidance practices from other parts of the world highlights other aspects of relational meaning indexed by avoidance. Stasch (2003:329) describes in-law name avoidance among the Korowai of New Guinea as constructing “bonds of conjoined alterity and obligation,” where alterity is symbolized through numerous prohibitions on contact, and obligation is symbolized through the giving of gifts to one’s in-laws, as well as through upholding avoidance practices. Stasch’s ideas about alterity and obligation—or separateness and connectedness—can usefully inform the discussion of what kind of stance a Datooga woman takes when she avoids an in-law’s name. In avoiding another person’s birth name, the speaker indicates that she is not entitled to use it: not only does this index that person’s deference entitlements, but positions the speaker as socially removed and different from the stance object. On the other hand, the act of taking this appropriate stance towards someone—taking such care not to utter their name—emphasizes the obligation the stance subject has towards the stance object. A woman acknowledges her
indebtedness and thus her connectedness to her relatives-in-law through repeated acts of avoidance. An instance of avoidance, such as that represented in (), is thus both a positive and a negative stance, indexing a relationship of separation and connection—or conjunction and disjunction, in Radcliffe-Brown’s (1965[1940]:91) terms. This particular other-oriented stance is associated, culture-internally, with respect and appropriateness, and through its reiteration, also bestows on women particular qualities of personhood, as I discuss in my concluding remarks. The obligatory nature of name avoidance—that women are expected to avoid in all contexts but childbirth—gives these stance-takings an unusual quality. Avoiding a name or a near-homophone is not a spontaneous, dynamic interactional strategy for indexing deference, but an almost invariable aspect of married women’s speech. Avoidance-based other-oriented stances operate on a different level, then, to stances projected by more spontaneous choices in language use. In theory, a woman might criticize her father-in-law in the same utterance that she defers to him through name avoidance. Ways in which the obligatory presence of name avoidance in women’s speech cross-cuts with other kinds of context-dependent interactional work remains to be explored in detail, though the discussion of Extract 4 in the following section gives an example of what an avoidance word can achieve on the speaker-addressee interactional plane.

4.2. Other foci of deference besides (allusive) referents

While I claim that Datooga avoidance speech is primarily referent-focused, it has been suggested that similar name-based avoidance registers are examples of bystander honorifics, e.g., Posthumus (1991) on *hlonipha* in Zulu, and Irvine (2009:164), also discussing *hlonipha*, who suggests the term “remote focus” for more distant bystanders. The key idea here is that in the act of avoidance, women pay respect to overhearing ancestral spirits. For Datooga, linguistic
avoidance is undeniably partially motivated by metaphysical beliefs about links between the spiritual and the human world: Datooga women’s talk about avoidance often invokes the themes of fertility and child-bearing, domains believed to be influenced by the moods of the spirits (Blystad 2000). Women’s violation of the name taboos during a difficult labor, when they are encouraged to shout out the otherwise forbidden names of their in-laws, supports a view of ancestral spirits as overhearers—not, in these unique circumstances, targets of deference, but targets of offence. In this specific context of childbirth, these spectral overhearers in fact seem to take on the role of addressee: women are either calling on them for help, or attempting to enrage them. In more everyday contexts, women’s avoidance practices may be partly guided by an awareness of metaphysical listeners-in, but perhaps only in the sense of the much more general belief that a lack of respect (múréeda) in human behaviour will bring about misfortune (Blystad 2000).

Under certain circumstances, name avoidance may also target immediate, copresent addressees as a secondary focus of deference (Agha 2007:327). For example, if a woman avoids a word on account of an in-law relation who also happens to be addressee, this bestows respect upon the addressee in a similar, though less obvious, fashion to the use of an honorific second person pronoun in other languages. If a woman is talking to her father-in-law and avoids a word that sounds like the name of his brother, she pays him respect by association. For addressees or bystanders who do not count among or are not allied with a speaker’s in-laws, avoidance language may still defer to them in the sense that its use upholds social norms and ideals of appropriateness in verbal behavior. Consider the following extract, in which one speaker (A) reports hearing a woman utter the name of her father-in-law. Immediately prior to this extract, speaker A and two other women are discussing whether women who belong to the Iraqw ethnic
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group (who frequently intermarry with Datooga) practice avoidance. A emphasises with a rhetorical question that they do not avoid and provides the example in line 10 as evidence of this:

**Extract 3**

10 A: éa-ng’ g-åj-åk g-óo-ng’åwēakshì néa índéaréet-tà q-åa-finyí

CONJ-who AFF-FUT-SEQ AFF-3-avoid.AP CONJ past.day-DEM.DIST AFF-1SG-hear.IS
gátm-òo-dá bál-léán-dá Gilléeng’ gw-å-åyéeshà äkóo Gilléeng’
wife-PS-UR boy-SNG-UR PSN AFF-3-say elder.male PSN

“And how will they avoid? The other day I heard Gilleeng’s daughter-in-law say “akoo Gilleeng’”

11 (0.4)

12 Dàtóogá néa néa índéaréet-tà sí-báspàschi

Datooga CONJ CONJ past.day-DEM.DIST 1PL.PRF-be.ashamed

“Goodness me, that day we were ashamed”

13 (0.3)

14 ooh!

In line 12, A reports that the daughter-in-law’s addressees (or perhaps bystanders; it’s unclear from the context what role A played in the interaction) were embarrassed and ashamed on hearing her utter her father-in-law’s name. A also expresses her shock with the exclamatory expression *Dàtóogá* in initial position in line 12, and another non-lexical exclamation “ooh!” in line 14. While this is only a report of a taboo violation—at no point in my recordings does anyone utter a taboo name, for comparison—it suggests that through observing avoidance,
speakers attend not only to their relationships with their affinal kin, but also to their interlocutors, in much the same way as euphemism saves all participants from potential embarrassment or distress.

An additional example illustrates further complexity in how acts of avoidance or nonavoidance mediate relationships between copresent participants as well as between speakers and third parties. Extract 3 showed how a speaker might shock, and therefore disalign with, her addressee through a marked absence of avoidance. In Extract 4, a speaker disaligns with her addressee by using an avoidance word, but in the context of indirect metalinguistic correction. (Line 20 of Extract 4 has been discussed above as example (2), and is repeated here in its larger sequential context extracted from an interview.) My research assistant (I) has just asked how one avoids the word háwéega ‘girls,’ and the senior wife (S) replies to this question in line 15. After a reasonably long pause, the junior wife (J) points out the similarity between the word that her co-wife just uttered, múlèalga, and the name of a taboo in-law, Gídámúlda. (As co-wives, S and J avoid the same set of names.) My research assistant then asks whether the women avoid the word múlèalga, upon which the junior wife then repeats her point (phrased again as a negative question) that the word sounds like a taboo in-law’s name. In line 22, my research assistant checks that the name Gídáwápta is the avoidance equivalent of Gídámúlda, and the junior wife confirms this.

**Extract 4**

15  S: gw-á-yíi múlèal-ga

AFF-3-hear girl-MR

‘They say mulealga’
16 (7.6)

17 J: ândâ g-í-nyáash-t-ánú âdà m-òo-wíinyí Gídáwápta ñiyá nêada?
Q AFF-2SG-ask-CF-OBL.IS DSC NEG-3-smell.like.IS PSN mother NEG.Q
‘Doesn’t what you just said sound like ‘Gidawapta’ [Gidamulda], mother?’

[Two lines omitted]

18 I: múlêal-gá (.) g-í-ng’âwáasí?
girl-MR AFF-2SG-avoid.IS
‘Do you avoid mulealga?’

19 (1.2)

20 J: m-òo-wíinyí Gídáwápta ñiyá?
NEG-3-smell.like.IS PSN mother
‘Doesn’t it sound like Gidawapta, mother?’

21 (6.5)

22 I: Gídáwápta Gídámúldéa?
PSN PSN
‘Is Gidawpta Gidamulda?’

23  J: éa

‘yes’

In referring to a senior male affine by the gíing’áwêakshòoda name Gídáwápta rather than by his birth name Gídámúldá, the speaker takes a stance towards this third party that is culture-internally associated with affinal deference, as I have discussed. If we consider the sequential context of this utterance, we might argue that in using this particular person-referring expression, the stance-taking subject is also disaligning with a copresent subject, her senior co-wife. In line 15, the senior wife provides the gíing’áwêakshòoda word múlèalga, a word that is a near-homophone of the avoided name Gídámúldá (they share the same initial CVC sequence) and is thus technically taboo for the women of this household. (Since these women don’t avoid the word háwéega ‘girls,’ they would not under normal circumstances need to utter the word múlèalga; this avoidance form comes up only in the context of this interview.) In line 17, and then again in line 20, the junior wife points out that the word the senior wife has just uttered, múlèalga, is taboo. She softens her rebuke by using a negative question and referring to the addressee with the familiar kinship term ‘mother.’ Nonetheless, she disaligns with her addressee by calling the addressee’s behavior into question: in referring to Gídámúldá as Gídáwápta, the junior wife takes the expected deferential stance towards him, simultaneously highlighting the absence of deference in her co-wife’s previous turn. The long pause of nearly eight seconds between the senior wife’s utterance of múlèalga and the junior wife’s utterance in line 17 suggests that what is achieved in line 17 is, in conversation analytic terms, a dispreferred action,
which supports the interpretation of this utterance as disaligned. While the senior wife does not respond verbally, in the long pause in line 21 she crosses her arms over her chest and looks in the opposite direction to the junior wife, in a posture of disaffiliation. Du Bois’s stance triangle allows us to get at the multiple indexical meanings of avoidance language here: in uttering the avoidance form Gídáwápta, the junior wife orients to this third person and reproduces his deference entitlements, while at the same time disaligning with her addressee through the implied distinction between Gídáwápta and múlèalga and their respective moral implications. In turn, this act momentarily upends the status asymmetry between senior and junior co-wives.

When speakers take stances towards nonpresent others through their choices about how to refer to them, they not only attend to their relationship with those others, and potentially with interlocutors and overhearers, but they also invite judgements about what kind of person they are. I discuss this point briefly in my concluding remarks.

5. Concluding remarks

I have focused in this paper on how avoidance language positions women relative to nonpresent others. An additional way in which avoidance language mediates social relations is through the “figures of personhood” it conjures (Agha 2005). Like honorifics, avoidance words are not only associated with the act of giving respect but also with the status of being respectful; as Agha (2007:302) puts it, “the tendency to speak respectfully to others is stereotypically revalorized as an index of the respectability of self.” Through linguistic avoidance, and through continual other-oriented stances of the kind described here, women project an image of themselves as respectful and respectable (and also feminine, since this strongly gendered linguistic practice is an index of womanhood). This dimension of avoidance language—the enregistered voice it indexes—is
crucial to the social-relational meaning of avoidance among Datooga. I note here that voicing effects as well as potential addressee-focused deference are all part of what a speaker might achieve in the act of avoidance, though I have singled out referent-focused deference as my main theme. Although these different strands of social meaning cannot be readily untangled in practice, I would argue that referent-focused deference is conceptually primary, and that positioning with respect to self and addressee results from other-oriented stance taking as diagrammed in Figure 2. By avoiding reference, or allusive reference, to a certain other’s birth name, a speaker takes a deferential stance towards that other, and in doing so positions herself in a recognized category of person—respectful women—as well as potentially aligning with her addressee by heeding conventions of appropriateness. Nonetheless, these potential indexical meanings arise out of a more basic act of a woman orienting to an in-law relation by conspicuously avoiding their name.

What is striking about other-oriented stances as achieved through avoidance in Datooga is how linguistically far-reaching they are: an entire special vocabulary has arisen for the purposes of avoiding making reference or allusive reference to senior in-laws by their birth names. While other-oriented stances in most languages may not have such significant linguistic consequences, this stance category is relevant to all human talk. As mentioned at various points in this paper, reference to third persons always entails stance-taking (even in so-called “default person reference”; Enfield 2007), and is thus a rich topic for exploring how nonpresent others are made relevant in speech (e.g., papers in Enfield and Stivers 2007). Referent honorifics fall under this category of person reference, and could also be modeled in terms of other-oriented stances. Gossip as a communicative practice is by definition oriented towards third parties and often serves to align copresent participants relative to the subjects of the gossip (Thornborrow &
Morris 2004, Jaworski & Coupland 2005). Reported speech, which will generally be accompanied by some form of third-person reference, and often occurs in the context of gossip, is an additional linguistic environment in which other-oriented stance may be a useful stance category. These topics would all be worth exploring to consider further how speakers’ relationships with nonpresent others are attended to in discourse and thus how through language use, speakers project more complex constellations of social relations than those that hold only between copresent participants.

1 Datooga names typically refer to some circumstance of the child’s birth—in this case, the baby’s small size.

2 Grammatical abbreviations used in this paper are as follows: 1 ‘first person’; 2 ‘second person’; 3 ‘third person’; AFF ‘affirmative’; AP ‘antipassive’; CF ‘centrifugal’; CP ‘centripetal’; CONJ ‘conjunction’; COP ‘copular’; DEM ‘demonstrative’; DIST ‘distal’; DSC ‘discourse marker’; FEM ‘feminine’; FS ‘formative suffix’; FUT ‘future’; IMP ‘imperative’; IS ‘inflectional suffix’; LOC ‘locative’; MR ‘multiple reference’; NEG ‘negative’; NMLZ ‘nominalizer’; OBJ ‘object’; OBL ‘oblique’; PRF ‘plural’; PL ‘plural’; PRO ‘pronoun’; PROX ‘proximal’; PS ‘primary suffix’; PSN ‘personal name’; PST ‘past’; Q ‘question marker’; SEQ ‘sequential’; SG ‘singular’; SNG ‘singulative’; TERM ‘terminal’; UR ‘unit reference’. Tone marking is frequently omitted on word-final vowels: before a pause these vowels are whispered and thus bear no tone.

3 See Klima (1970: Chapter 6) for a description of Datooga marriage.

7 In Datooga, this name is referred to as qēawīngā dīūiga ‘children’s name,’ i.e., name used by children. I translate this as ‘domestic name’ rather than ‘children’s name’ given the potential confusion arising from the latter term.
8 In the name, the singular suffix -da is omitted, and only the root of the word ‘cow,’ dée, remains.

9 Another piece of anecdotal evidence for speakers’ awareness of the lexical and semantic content of names, unrelated to avoidance, is wordplay involving people’s names. One speaker once mentioned in passing that someone could be named ‘diarrhoea’ on account of either the child or some other member of the family suffering from diarrhoea around the time of the child’s birth. If one wanted to antagonize such a person, one could modify the name slightly so that it meant “s/he who has diarrhoea right now.”

10 An additional interpretation of why Datooga use the word ‘smell like’ to talk about word similarity has to do with ideas of pollution: ‘smell’ may point to the dirtiness and danger of using taboo words. See van Beek (1992) for a discussion of how the conceptual domain of smell is used to symbolize ideas about pollution and taboo among Kapsiki/Higi of Cameroon and Nigeria.

11 While a shared CVC syllable of a word and a taboo name prompts avoidance of that word across Datooga communities, there are also more idiosyncratic choices within a given household about which near-homophones to avoid—see Author (2015) for more details.

12 In our case, connections between signs are drawn based on fear of uttering a taboo word, where elsewhere they might be intended to be humorous, as in punning.

13 As Storch (2005:335) has pointed out for other Nilotic languages, the word for ‘name’ (qēawúnga) in Datooga is inherently plural, reflecting the fact that people have multiple names.

14 See Fleming & Lempert (2011) and articles in the same issue for more on this paradoxical aspect of avoidance.
This aspect of avoidance—how it positions speakers and referents in a relationship of difference—is privileged in Ball’s (2015) analysis of affinal name avoidance among Wauja of Brazil. Ball also thinks about avoidance in terms of stance, and in particular what he calls “alterity stances” (2015:360). Here, alterity, or separateness, is understood as one dimension of the other-oriented stances indexed by acts of avoidance.

For example, failure to avoid is thought to cause problems in childbirth. Another reported consequence of taboo breaking is that a woman’s sacred leather skirt, associated with fertility, will catch fire.

An elderly woman explained taboo violation during childbirth in terms of calling for help in a life-threatening situation, which is reportedly an acceptable thing to do because one has never uttered their names at any other time. In her ethnography, Blystad (2000:124) explains this aspect of Datooga childbirth as a means of angering the spirits, and describes other ways in which people present at the birth create a feverish atmosphere in order to speed up the delivery, e.g., crying, singing, removing the sacred leather dress of Datooga women. We could also explain taboo violations at the time of childbirth in functional terms of pain-reduction: linguistic transgression of referring to one’s in-laws by name may offer relief at a desperate moment, much like swearing. See Stephens and Umland (2011) and references therein for evidence of the pain-reducing effects of swearing.

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Table 1: Examples of avoidance words

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Datooga</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>giing 'áwéakshóoda</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>béega</td>
<td>‘water’</td>
<td>gárbarbágga</td>
<td>derived from gárbarbu ‘cold’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>daah</td>
<td>‘see’</td>
<td>ng’wear</td>
<td>ordinary language: ‘look’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mánàng’</td>
<td>‘small’</td>
<td>básàk</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mànánda</td>
<td>‘waist’</td>
<td>bìguśta</td>
<td>ordinary language: ‘middle’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qáráat</td>
<td>‘hot’</td>
<td>sháng’sháng’</td>
<td>ordinary language: ‘warm’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sídàgèeda</td>
<td>‘needle’</td>
<td>sindáan</td>
<td>from Swahili sindano ‘needle’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>úchúbòoda</td>
<td>‘snake’</td>
<td>dìiyèaydá gëaw</td>
<td>‘long animal’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1

A

$S_A = [ng\acute{a}d\acute{i}:da]$  

$O_A = \text{LION}$

A = someone familiar with speaker’s avoidance practices

$S_B = [G\acute{i}d\acute{a}ng\acute{a}d\acute{i}:da]$  

$O_B = (\text{SPECIFIC}) \text{ PERSON}$
Figure 2

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