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The military step: theorising the mobilisation of the Roman army
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Themes: Roman history, military studies, Latin literature, territory
Word count: 13,743
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Abstract
This article considers the dynamic relationship between the soldier, the army, and the warzone, using contemporary philosophy and military theory to frame a reading of Roman sources. I will discuss how Roman literature reveals geographic space to be transformed by military activity; likewise, how this space and the soldier’s functioning in it synchronously makes the soldier’s body military, specifically, Roman military. The aim is to utilise examples from ancient warfare to reflect on issues of de- and reterritorialisation, in modern critical military studies. I will explore how the soldierly body both constructs and is constructed by the space in which it moves.

Keywords: Roman history, military studies, Latin literature, territorialisation

Introduction
The ancient Roman army is linguistically associated with movement. In Latin literature, Roman legionaries are frequently connoted by a host of synonymous terms which imply movement of some kind, such as cursus, ‘a rushing’ (see Nepos, Mithiades, 1.6), and agmen, ‘a procession, march’, or literally, ‘that which is driven’ (Tacitus, Histories, 1.68). Military terminology still today evokes the constant movement and nomadism characteristic of military life – inherent in the term, the ‘mobilised’ army – a nomadism which is nonetheless integral to the maintenance of fixed territory.

This article aims to show how ancient texts describing the movement of the Roman army, particularly the armies of the Republican period (509-45 BC), can provide a provocative case study for the idea that military activity functions to de- and reterritorialise (Deleuze and Guattari 2013, translated by Massumi) the spaces in and through which it is mobile. As Matthew Rech and his collaborators make clear in their contribution to Critical Military Studies’ first volume, the theorising of geographical space and its occupation ‘has always been intimately associated with the practice of armed conflict, the deployment of armed forces, and the maintenance of military capabilities’ (Rech et al. 2015, 48). The theoretical groundwork for the notion that military movement affects the space, the territory, within and through which it moves will be explored and expounded throughout this article, as it is used to read examples from ancient historiography, poetry, and texts deemed tactical or strategic. The theories and practices revealed in these ancient texts offer a new perspective on the territorialising function of the military. In the application of such theoretical assessment to ancient warfare, I will experientially explore the similarities evident in phenomena recognisable to modern readers but in an ancient context, revealing consistencies and contrasts between modern warfare and one of the greatest military forces in the history of Western civilisation.

In response to the broad history of military geographies being focused largely on material culture and the development of weaponry (Black 2005, 19), this article looks instead
at the construction of military territory as a result of corporeal practices. The Roman empire’s rapid expansion was, of course, made possible by a fluctuating body of men’s bodies, revered as the most ruthless military force in the ancient world (Sage 2008, 267; Alston 2010, 208; Cicero, On the Republic, 3.35-7). Therefore, a consideration of Roman, as much as modern, military geography ought to include environmental, technological and corporeal factors.

The first part of the article will discuss the effect of military mobilisation in geographical environments: the kind of social, cultural and political landscapes which garner prevalent theoretical analysis in modern critical military studies (Woodward 2014; Flint 2005; Higate and Henry 2010), but to a lesser extent in ancient history scholarship (Nicolet 1994; Pomeroy 2003; Riess and Fagan 2017). This first section will therefore demonstrate and encourage a theoretical and critical approach to ancient military praxes, in light of modern theory. The second part of the article will progress this discussion by focusing on the idea that military movement is conducted by bodies. In this way, this article contributes to the fields of both Classics and critical military studies a new theoretical approach to the Roman army, furthering the study of how geographical space is territorialised by also encompassing the discrete space of the soldier’s body in this territorialising process, with the proposition that the body is similarly territorialised by military praxes. This latter part of the discussion is theoretically influenced by modern (late twentieth- and twenty-first century) philosophers, social anthropologists, and military theorists, with the aim of demonstrating how counterpart phenomena in the ancient world can instigate reflection on modern attitudes and practices.

Many scholars adopting a theoretical approach to the military have used examples from ancient history as a foreground for discussing affairs contemporary to them (cf. Agamben 2016; Foucault 1997; Lefebvre 2009), not least because of the oftentimes palpable causal relations or similarities in practices and ideologies. Moreover, Classicists and ancient historians sometimes have little choice but to use the theory of their contemporaries to frame the discussion of ancient culture (Cosmopoulos 2007). While this article does not argue that ancient Roman war-makers and historiographers adopted modern tactics and perspectives, nevertheless, the overlapping of two historical periods can prove a fruitful thinking exercise for reflecting on the impetus, methods and fallout of military mobilisation, transhistorically.

The Roman army, particularly that of the Republic, makes for a pertinent case to be brought to the attention of today’s critical military scholars, owing to their renowned brutal efficiency in conquering territory. The ubiquitous description of the Roman armed forces as a ‘machine’ (Peddie 1994, Nicolet 1980, 90, compare Mattern 2009, 127) should not be readily dismissed as cliché: during the Republican period alone, the territorial space of the Roman state expanded from a tiny portion of the Italian peninsula to roughly five million square kilometres across Europe and North Africa (van Tilburg 2007, 1-11; Nicolet 1994, 1). Paradigmatically, describes Christophe Coker (2002, 39), ‘Roman warfare usually evokes the metaphor of a machine, Greek warfare a duel’, here referring to the discipline of the Roman legion, ‘waging war with machinelike precision’ (Ward 2017, 300). In parallel, the modern armed forces are routinely dubbed a ‘machine’ in military criticism (MacLeish 2015), in this sense conveying how these forces operate uniformly to overthrow the governing power previously assigned to a landscape. In either case, this catalytic force also invests any ‘militarised’ landscape with a new dominating power and, hence, alters its socio-political identity. In ‘Security, Territory, and Population’, Michel Foucault describes the army as a primary governmental ‘apparatus’ of ‘diplomatico-military technology’ (1997, 69, translated by Hurley; also Deleuze and Guattari 2013, 493-7) for the expansion and maintenance of the state. The ‘state’ here includes geographical territory, and all it comprises, governed by a centralised political system. The review of Roman sources in this article therefore has at its philosophical heart this perception of the army as a state operated, territorialising machine – a force mobilised for the safeguarding of sovereignty and the continuance of government
power.

This theoretical focus will be used to frame ancient literary sources and their modern reception, as these primary texts present the most comprehensive evidence for Roman warfare practices, attitudes and experiences, accessible to ancient historians. Given the centrality of organised conflict in Roman society, there are numerous extant texts from the ancient world describing this military success, many written by those who had seen battle themselves. These are mostly historiographic prose, such as Julius Caesar’s accounts of his campaigns in Gaul and the civil wars (58-45 BC, Lovano 2013, 75: ‘a sort of field report to the people of Rome, informing them of what happened “out there”’), or the Greek historian, Polybius’, Roman Histories, written at the close of the Punic Wars against Carthage (264-146 BC) in the mid-Republic. For the most part infused with a perceptible Roman bias, these texts concern themselves largely with tactical manoeuvres and outcomes, but also offer insight into the somatic and psychological experiences of conflict, in the reports of soldiers’ behaviour and the decisions of their generals. However, texts which synthesise notional strategy and military theory are comparatively rare; Vegetius’ Epitome of Military Science, from the fourth century AD, is the only intact extant text specifically dedicated to training and method. Ancient historians are primarily reliant on these tactical and historiographical texts because, unlike in modern military scholarship, first-hand reports of battle from those Roman foot-soldiers (not the higher-ranking centurions or generals) actually mobilised to fight are virtually non-existent.

Instead, a more expressive and individualistic portrait of military life is offered by epigraphic or poetic texts, more speculative in nature. The philosophical and rhetorical writings of Cicero (106-43 BC) provide a prolific source of commentary on the political and civil strife in the Republic’s final decades, also the politician, Sallust’s, War of Catiline (63 BC) and the retrospective Jugurthine War (41 BC). For the purpose of this article, those works at the checkpoint between fiction and history prove most useful, if considered as a reflection of social, cultural and artistic perspectives on warfare in the Roman world: Livy’s vast Latin epic, History of Rome (27 BC to 17 AD), for example, is the only source of information for many key (if debatable) moments in the Republican timeline (although three-quarters of it has survived only through a posthumous abridgement, the Periochae). Select historical and poetic works which retrospectively describe events of the Republic are similarly worth including, such as the unfinished Civil War (65 AD), by first century AD poet, Lucan, a violent and subversive narrative of the civil conflict leading to Caesar’s triumph. Detailed chronicles of prominent generals and their campaigns were compiled by Suetonius (121 AD), Cassius Dio (211-33 AD), and the Greek historian, Plutarch (c. 100 AD), albeit two or three centuries after their subjects’ lives. This article will therefore engage with a range of texts in these categories, to form a representation of military life and its criticality in ancient Rome.

For, until the reforms passed in 108 BC, military service was obligatory for Republican Romans and directly connected to politics and the attainment of a public office (Nicolet 1980, 91-2), with the average length of duty varying between six to twenty-five years. ‘All [Roman] citizens must serve ten years in the cavalry or twenty years in the infantry before the forty-sixth year of their age’, writes Polybius (6.19, translated by Shuckburgh), in the mid-second century BC. This close link between citizen and martial life has led many historians to describe the Republican army as ‘a citizens militia’ (Patterson 1993, 95), as though these two parts were indivisible: ‘like all ancient cities, but perhaps to a greater extent than any other, Rome was a community of warriors’, writes Claude Nicolet (1980, 89, translated by Falla).

The description of a ‘community of warriors’, in The World of the Citizen in Republican Rome, suggests a troubling of the citizen-space as also a military-space (although not explicitly articulated by Nicolet), a troubling which seemingly parallels the function of
the Roman military in simultaneously disrupting or creating other community spaces, in order to construct a peaceful empire. The scholarship, on the whole, eschews analysing this destruction-creation in theoretical terms not immediately practical, political or strategic. Yet, a philosophical approach to Roman expansion allows for a reconsideration of what ‘empire’ and ‘territory’ really signify, in terms of land, people and, crucially, movement. Roman territory can refer not only to trampled earth, but to any space affecting or affected by action, a definition readily applicable to the discussion of other modes of power, past and present. The territorialising function of military praxes is widely recognised tangentially, and sometimes explicitly, in modern military criticism, as evidenced by Rachel Woodward’s seminal Military Geographies (2004; see also Woodward 2014), and Deborah Cowen and Emily Gilbert’s War, Citizenship and Territory (2008). Therefore, through a theoretical engagement with ancient source material, this article will explore how we can reconceptualise the military’s destruction-creation of terrestrial spaces, by also discussing the ‘territorialisation’ of the Roman soldierly corpus. In sum, this article contends that the activity of being-Roman-army exemplarily makes manifest philosophies of territorialisation, in terms of the dynamic interrelation between movement, space and identity.

**Ager Romanus**

It is the mobilisation of the army that expands (through warfare) and maintains (through peacekeeping) political territory (Foucault 1991, 167-8). In the field of critical military studies which concerns itself with military geography, there is a prevailing sense that whether in battle or during peacetime the military has a profound effect on environments and their constituents. ‘For millennia,’ write Cowen and Gilbert (2008, 1), ‘conflicts over the control of people and places have reshaped the organisation of collective human life. War kills, starves, displaces and destroys.’ Woodward’s (2007, 2-3) ‘military geographies’ are environments without even the eruption of battle, where ‘militarism and military activities create spaces, places, environments and landscapes with reference to a distinct moral order’. That land under military control, in peacetime, in preparation for war, or for the maintenance of foreign control of sovereign territory (Woodward 2007, 17-20; Rech, et al. 2015), is a space radically transformed by immediate or adjacent military presence, into ground for training or peacekeeping (Higate and Henry 2010, 44).

This article expands on this field of study by reading the creation-destruction of landscapes by any military activity as an exemplary practice of territorialisation, by the very nature of its imperialistic or defensive purpose. For, a discussion framed by the philosophy of territorialisation allows for an overlap of two major strands in military criticism, both historical and modern: these strands concern the effect of military activity on landscape, and on the soldierly body.

Territorialisation, as a concept, broadens the signification of the terms, ‘spaces’ and ‘territories’, to include how actions reciprocally alter subjects as well as objects, and that actions and actors are not inseparable from their environment. The close relation in Latin vocabulary between words meaning ‘army’, and the actions performed in military space (cursus, agmen), need not necessarily be interpreted as merely economical linguistics, but as symbolic of the (Roman) soldier’s identity being fundamentally linked to movement and territory. Resultantly, ideas concerning the reflexive impact of military geography on human beings, latent in the work of Woodward, and Gilbert and Cowen, can be teased out more explicitly through engagement with the philosophy of territorialisation in the context of an expanding empire, an expansion which simultaneously created both the territory and the subjects of Roman domain.

Foucault, and his contemporaries, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, conjecture ‘territory’ to mean far more than landscape or architecture, or even political dominion, but a
matter of forces and movements, interconnected with political power and cultural space. In Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus, their seminal attack on psychoanalysis and capitalism, the processes of ‘de-’ and ‘reterritorialisation’ (2013, 36, translated by Massumi) designate how certain forces – physical, ideological, cultural, political – destabilise codes, desires and identities relating to spaces (deterritorialisation), and overlay them with alternates (reterritorialisation). These forces function through movement. Spaces-as-territories are affected and produced by actions and intentions, as well as presence: by flows of people, trade, and ideas; those territories affected might be a whole continent, a city, a dwelling, or an individual body (Deleuze and Guattari 2013, 9, 102, 375-6, 502-4; also Deleuze and Guattari 2012, 213-23).

A simple metaphor for conceptualising the territorialisation process, provided by Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus, is ‘bird song: the bird sings to mark its territory’ (2013, 366, translated by Massumi). The nonviolent musical refrain of the bird nevertheless invades the space of its present habitation with the territorial marker of that bird, rendering it ‘the bird’s territory’. For Deleuze and Guattari, and in the wider appropriation of these conceits, territorialising forces often manifest themselves immanently in codes and behaviours, such as language, customs and instincts (2013, 366). Like the territorialising effect of the dawn chorus, the repeated ritual of these behaviours sustains territorial coding.

Socio-cultural-political territories are not wholly defined by the static components which construct their geographical area, but by the actions and functions of their inhabitants (or their invaders), who conduct processes of territorialisation. Henri Lefebvre’s influential The Production of Space provides an extensive exploration of this framework, with repeated references to the conception of space in the Greco-Roman world (2009, 31, 229-45). Lefebvre proposes that movement, activity and associated ideas define spaces and locations: ‘Everyone knows what is meant when we speak of a “room” in an apartment, the “corner” of the street, a “marketplace”, a public “place”, and so on” (2009, translated by Nicholson-Smith, 16; see also Hubbard, Kitchin and Valentine 2004, 5). In this branch of discourse, understandings of space and territory denote not specific physical sites, but crucibles of activity. Every society produces and gives meaning to its own space (Lefebvre 2009, 31; Woodward 2004, 124).

Further, Livio Boni (2011, 55) describes how in the politically-charged philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari, and Foucault (with reference to ‘Security, Territory, and Population’), the city-space is not purely architectural, but ‘una certa densità degli apparati’ [a certain density of apparatuses]. The city is conceived of as an aggregate of social and political machines, which territorialise the space through their functioning and their movement, which creates meaning. The sociologist, Deepak Mehta (2006, 209), writes on this phenomenon with regard to violence and community in cities and neighbourhoods:

An urban neighbourhood may be laid out according to a street plan, but it is not a space until it is marked by people’s active participation, their movements through and around it. But, by the same reasoning, such spaces can also lead to an extraordinary exclusion.

The ‘exclusion’ to which Mehta refers is the non-practicing of certain customs, which results in a symbolic, cultural, non-habitation of that same space. The meanings connected to the territory of that space are maintained by the complementary functioning of the spatial (territorial) populace. Boundaries are subsequently easily definable in terms of the practice or non-practice of accepted behaviours and customs (see MacLeish 2016, 6). Such an understanding of the social space can prove essential for thinking about the territorialising function of the mobilised army – the state’s most physically and symbolically potent political
machine (see Pearson, et al. 2010, 8).

The space of the city or state is resultantly viewed as a spatial region defined by the behaviours which territorialise it as belonging to a certain nation or tribe. The city of Rome is well worth considering in this regard. In both recent scholarship and Roman sources, emphasis is placed on the ‘meaning’ of the ancient metropolis, for its inhabitants and observers, as existing somewhere between its material, historical and metaphysical layers (Edwards 1996; Nicolet 1994; Martial, Epigrams, 12.57). Indeed, the understanding of ‘territory’, discussed above, is reflected in the Latin word, ager, as in the ager Romanus (Roman land), those five million square kilometres which made the Romans the ruling power in the Mediterranean.9 Ager not only translates as ‘land’, ‘the soil belonging to a community’ (see Cicero, On Agriculture, 3.2), but specifically ‘territory’, ‘domain’ (see Livy, 2.16). During the Republic, the sprawling ager Romanus was without fixed boundaries (in contrast to Gallic territory, see Caesar, Gallic Wars, 1.2.3), in which ‘Romans might subject territory to direct rule without clearly defining a province or even achieving a complete pacification’ (Lintott 1993, 31).10 The lack of distinct boundary lines, here intimated, suggests that Roman authority did not rely merely on geographical markers and, resultantly, invites us to question the extent to which these boundaries were limited to territory underfoot (see Mattern 2009, 128).

A more stable proposition is seemingly that ‘Roman’ citizenship, Roman land, and Roman identity, from its inception, was fundamentally related to the coding and territorialising function of military activity. In a practical sense, notes Nicolet (1994, 64-5), military campaigns in the late-Republic critically improved the Romans’ knowledge of European geography (see Polybius, 3.59; Strabo, 3.4.19), particularly in the West. Roman roads, interconnecting populaces across the empire, were built by the army, a point singled out by Lefebvre (2009, translated by Nicholson-Smith, 245) as an example of ‘spatial practice’ used to demonstrate political power: ‘the Roman road, whether civil or military, links the urbs to the countryside over which it exercises dominion.’

Transhistorically, ‘War has been a watershed for citizenship,’ write Cowen and Gilbert (2008, 2), of which the Roman Republic is archetypal. Along those famously direct roads, the army marched into provincial terrain as ‘the torchbearers of civilisation’ (Watson 1983, 144; Vegetius, 3) – by which ‘civilisation’ meant Roman culture, ideology, and customs, and ‘torchbearers’ meant mass slaughter and pillaging (Goldsworthy 2013, 164); ‘birdsong’ of the most violent strain. Roman campaigns effected rapid domination and, importantly, the destruction of lives and ways of life: the ager Romanus can be read as a territory exemplarily reflective of military mobilisation as state power and influence.11

Like a virus infiltrating foreign (or national) terrain, the ancient or modern military body functions to alter or inhibit action within physical landscapes, by introducing the potentiality of violence-production and a new governmental power, disturbing the environment of the host population (Woodward 2007, 89). Vivid accounts of the Roman military’s impact on invaded spaces are offered in Greco-Roman historiographic and poetic literature. Whilst manifold ancient narratives seem, at face value, broadly devoted to the national or political glorification of ‘successful’ conflict (for instance, the transformation of Latium into Rome after six books of battle scenes in Virgil’s epic, Aeneid), certain ancient writers adopted an adversative attitude, subversively or explicitly, by graphically illustrating the ‘environment of alienation and despair’ (Chrissanthos 2007, 235) and the ‘sorrow and horror’ of Roman warfare (Bartsch 1997, 36, on Lucan). These texts resultantly convey the army as demonstrative of de- and reterritorialisation, in modes which realise some of the graver theoretical conceits latent in this philosophy, and in critical military scholarship, more plainly than it is comfortable to consider for a civilisation so influential to Western culture.

The Roman Histories of the Greek historian, Polybius, portray the especial infamy of
the Roman military force during the long struggle between Rome and the relentless threat of Carthage (264-146 BC; see also Livy, 21-30). As a victim of Roman imperialism, himself, Polybius’ writings are a rich source of information about the second century BC Roman military. Namely, writes Charles Lintott (1993, 22), ‘Polybius correctly understood the Roman aim in their greatest bout of imperial expansion as one of exacting obedience, compelling other peoples to obey orders.’ For instance, in Polybius’ account of the invasion of New Carthage (209 BC), he posits that the Roman legions were ordered to kill every person in the city, ‘to inspire terror, so that when towns are taken by the Romans one may often see not only the corpses of humans, but dogs cut in half, and the dismembered limbs of other animals’ (Histories, 10.15, translated by Shuckburgh). Polybius’ account reveals a microcosm of the ager Romanus in its imperialistic, territorialising capacity: the ransacking and mass slaughter described here exemplifies the transformation of territory, by robbing the inhabitants of their control, customs and even the unity of their bodies. This horrifying narrative demonstrates how the presence of the Roman army de- and reterritorialised not only the political governance of the land, but ‘inspired terror’ which mushroomed from its source. The devastation of New Carthage serves as spatial evidence of Roman imperialism and an unwillingness to suffer sovereign threat.

Roman de- and reterritorialisation was not always so dramatically and devastatingly actioned, but can be read in less immediately political, yet still transformative, praxes. In order to achieve such an immense overcoding of geographical territory during Republican annexation, nearly a quarter of the Roman male population served as soldiers at any one time (Erdkamp 2006, 293). To sustain this force required around one-hundred tonnes of wheat per day and herds of pack animals, which marched with the legions (Beard 2015, 177; Livy, 26.8.10-11; Sallust, Jugurthan War, 46.7, 90.2; Strabo, 4.5.2). The Republican military did not have fixed bases, but were a ‘field’, ‘mobile’ army (Goldsworthy 2013, 82). As a result, the army not only actioned political occupations, but physically changed the landscape to reflect its new possession, rendering it a militarised territory for their own nomadic sustenance. Military occupation then, as today, involved a tangible mutation of terrain, ‘a process that requires the active deployment and exploitation of various landscape features, including topography, vegetation and climate’ (Pearson, et al. 2010, 3). As in modern military criticism, the consequences of such creative-destructive activity on campaign led Roman historians such as Sallust to condemn the resourceful reterritorialisation of the earth: ‘And so those soldiers, after they attained victory, left nothing for the defeated’ (War of Catiline, 11.7, translated by Batstone; see also Polybius, 10.16), Sallust remarks in his damming account of the invasion of Carthage.

The process of deterritorialisation could be analogised in a more extreme form in the policy of ‘scorched-earth’ (Latin: vastatio, ‘laying waste’, see Cicero, Catiline, 2.8.18; also Tacitus, Annals, 13.40-1), infamously associated with Roman warfare, and yet in many cases a geographical violence for which the Roman army were not directly accountable. Adopted by the Gauls, a race where the military had a similar cultural centrality, during Caesar’s campaigns of expansion and suppression of Gallic territory in the 50s BC, the ‘scorched-earth’ policy happened as a kind of contagion effect of Roman military presence. In his memoirs, straight from the command tent, Caesar (Gallic Wars, 1.5.2-3, translated in Sabben-Clare 1971) includes description of the Helvetii tribe’s determination to migrate from their region in present-day Switzerland, to southwestern Gaul, following news of the Roman invasion:

When [the Helvetii] thought they were ready for the enterprise, they set fire to their towns, twelve in all, as many as four hundred villages and the rest of their private buildings. They burned all corn except what they intended to take with them so that, with the hope of returning home removed, they would be readier to face every danger.
The Helvetii decimated – deterritorialised – their own dwellings and landscape, leaving it a dead and useless space for Roman reterritorialisation. Unlike many of the invaded communities, who adopted Roman customs and established trade relations with their conquerors (Goldsworthy 2013, 105; Bowman 1994, 61), the Helvetii disallowed the appropriation of Gallic citizens or resources by a new sovereign power. They not only removed Helvetic identity from the land, but rendered it utterly and indefinitely uninhabitable (Caesar, *Gallic Wars*, 1.10-15). Moreover, they prevented any possibility of their migration being stalled (Gilliver 2003, 26); it is this latter, practical motive that seems to frame Caesar’s account, rather than any detriment suffered by the Roman opposition.\(^{15}\)

While the Carthaginian wars were arguably a defensive retaliation against foreign threat, Caesar’s campaigns across Europe and the civil wars, in the first century BC, cannot easily be described as such. In fact, Cicero, a contemporary of Caesar, condemns the general’s attitude to warfare as a turning point for Roman expansionism, stating, ‘It always used to be the policy of our generals to keep these peoples at bay and avoid aggression… But Caesar’s policy has, I observe, been quite different […] he wanted the whole of Gaul forced to recognise our sovereignty’ (*On the Consular Provinces*, 32, translated in Sabben-Clare 1971). Cicero here makes clear the displacement of one state stratification for another, within the geo-political boundaries of (former) Gallic territory. The Gauls’ strategy of retaliation seems clear: prevent the land from being reterritorialised as Roman.

However, during the civil conflict between Caesar and the Republican forces, led by Pompey (49–45 BC), much of the territory was already Roman, and what was at stake was the retention of Republican identity, rather than the uncertainty of Caesarian reterritorialisation. The very nature of civil war is one which still ‘introduces uncertainty, alters expectations’ (Kalyvas 2006, 38), and consequently affects the behaviours of the populace, as much as the earth they inhabit. The turbulence and anxiety induced by civil conflict underpin a later work, Lucan’s *Civil War*: as a poet, Lucan uses history in the capacity of ‘inspiration’ rather than groundwork (Martindale 1993, 19), but he nevertheless paints a picture of Roman military mobilisation comparable to that of Polybius and Caesar.\(^{16}\) Lucan (1.236-46, translated by Duff) describes the arrival of Caesar’s army at Ariminum, adjacent to the Rubicon river in north Italy:

> When the soldiers halted in the captured forum and were bidden to lay down their standards, the blare of trumpets […] sounded the alarm of civil war. […] But when [the citizens] recognised the glitter of the Roman eagles and standards and saw Caesar mounted in the midst of his army, they stood motionless with fear.

The invading force, marching and blaring its war trumpets, here create a visual and aural cacophony – a birdsong – of conflict. The army reject the codes of this territory. By refusing the citizens’ command to ‘lay down their standards’, the Caesarian army asserted its presence with the signifying eagles of their legion, a move which symbolically mimics the physical razing of a foreign city. Barely a line is dedicated to the ease of this capture in Caesar’s commentaries (*Civil War*, 1.8), but the nature of Lucan’s text as poetry allows for a rather theatrical presentation of military territorialisation, by including the fear of the occupied inhabitants, rendering them ‘motionless’, deterritorialised of their subjectivity and agency. Unlike the Helvetii, the citizens of Ariminum are here deprived of their agency by the sudden presence of something unknown. It is as though they are afraid or unable to move until the determination of their territory is resolved. In this way, Lucan’s description of Caesar’s march on Ariminum (and Caesar’s invasion of Rome, Lucan, 3.71-168) portrays the reterritorialising effect of military mobilisation on citizen landscape through both the
behaviour of its invaders and inhabitants.17

Military presence disrupts spaces that were formerly rural or civic with the potential of becoming a base or battleground (Woodward 2004; Pearson, et al. 2010, 10), a potential manifested in modes geographical and human. As Ariminum was already comprised by the ager Romanus, the hostile appearance of recognisably Roman troops made clear that this was civil war. For this reason, the Roman army was not permitted to amass within the pomerium, the city walls (Patterson 1993, 95; Erdkamp 2006, 281), because a mobilised military presence would immediately deteritorialise an otherwise sacred (unarmed) citizen space. These varied narratives from the Roman world therefore provide examples of the metamorphosis brought about by military action, as a direct, and redolently Weberian, impact on geographical and socio-political territory ‘by means of legitimate (i.e. considered to be legitimate) violence’ (Weber 1946, 78, translated by Gerth and Wright Mills), in order to expand and exhibit state power. The devastation of armoured territorialisation was not lost on Roman writers like Lucan, Cicero, or Sallust, the latter of whom emphasised the negative effects of ‘good fortune’ in war: ‘when this contagion invaded like a plague, the state changed, and political power which had been most just and best became cruel and intolerable’ (Cat. 10.1-6, translated by Batstone).

Barbarians
‘The character and presence of the army,’ suggests Alan Bowman (1994, 20), on the Roman conquest of Britain, ‘are central to everything implied by the concept of romanisation.’ Throughout the expansionist campaigns of the Republic, the ‘plague’ of Rome was spread across the Mediterranean by the mobilisation of her troops.18 As those sources included so far have shown, the territorialising effect of this mobilisation was not limited to geographical terrain, but affected the six million inhabitants of its conquered territories.19 These human constituents reacted, resisted, but most commonly surrendered to military presence, themselves making manifest the re-stratification of land, and it is this performative aspect of territorialisation which makes clear how the process affects both the territorialised and the territorialiser.

In the latter part of this article, rather than analysing the army’s movement in larger strategic or economic terms, discussion will focus instead on the discrete, individuated actions which aided and abetted this territorialising process. The conceptualisation and function of the human body as perpetrator of war dominates an extensive branch of modern military criticism, particularly the work of Kenneth MacLeish (2016, 5; see also MacLeish 2012; Scarry 1985; Rech, et al. 2015, 55): ‘The soldier is at once the agent, instrument, and object of state violence, coerced and empowered by discipline, made productive by being subject to countless minute and technical compulsions,’ referring to Foucault’s Discipline and Punish. Neither was the importance of the body’s movement lost on the Romans (Vegetius, 1.1, 18, 28), nor the process by which movement appropriate for the military environment was cultivated. When Woodward writes, ‘Military landscapes are places where the identities of soldiers are forged; these identities, what it means to be a soldier [...] are not innate but rather are made’ (Woodward, 118), she intimates that the ‘making’ of these identities is bound up with the ‘making’ of territory. Roman historians and biographers, Caesar prominent among them, asserted that war ‘makes people great’ (Lovano 2013, 75). It is this dynamic relationship between military landscape and body which will now be explored, by paralleling the territorialising effects of Roman military mobilisation on environment with the effects on the soldierly body, which, as MacLeish suggests, is just as much an ‘object of state violence’, as its agent.

The success of the Roman state in its expansion might at least partly be attributed to the dogma of military might and conquest which pervaded Roman culture, namely, the
collective normalisation of military violence as the means to both citizenship and masculinity (Alston 2010, 205; Chidwick 2017). Young Roman males were raised surrounded by reminders of their ancestors’ victories, which ideologically prepared them for entry into military service at seventeen (Keith 2000, 19; McDonnell 2006, 177-8). It could be argued that simply by participating in the structural, performative codes of the Roman socio-political terrain, Romans were by nature also soldiers (an identity they were arguably forced to adopt during the civil wars; Roller 1996). Various accounts suggest that in the second century BC more than half of Roman citizens served for at least seven years in the army and, as the empire expanded, war became a profession upon which hinged the stability of the state (Coker 2002, 39-40).

However, like Western armed forces today, the Roman army comprised recruits drawn from all corners of Roman domain, who marched, killed and died for a sovereign city-space inside which they may never have physically set foot. In this way, the army’s reputation cannot be credited to bloodline or national identity in a conventional sense, for the geographical terrain on which the young recruit had been born and raised did not in itself matter, only whether that land had been trodden by the consul’s legionaries (indeed, many who fought for Caesar during the civil wars were recruited from colonised Gallic territory; Erdkamp 2006, 294). The only requirement to join the Roman army was citizenship, which was extended to a large number of the lands subsumed by the banner ager Romanus (Ando 2016), with non-citizens still permitted to join the auxiliary forces.²⁰ This diversity was especially predominant after the reforms of 108 BC, which removed the property qualification for enlistment, and made military service a volunteer rather than a conscription system (Sallust, Jugurthine War, 86.1-4; Erdkamp 2006, 187). The result was a mixed national corps, all bracketed as ‘Roman’, but who may not have been raised with the same pervading military interest as the supposed ‘citizens militia’.

How, then, were these heterogenous individuals ‘made productive’ as a unit? Whereas Woodward (2004, 119; Sheers 2014, 24-7) emphasises the role of the (predominantly rural) ‘training ground’ in the forging of military identities, Republican soldiers did not undergo extensive training, in either a rural or an urban setting, that might rival military academies today (Goldsworthy 1998, 195; see also Phang 2008, 80, on climate and body types in ancient warfare). Rather, it was conduct on campaign that made a soldier, and this facet makes Roman military practice particularly pertinent to an argument which concerns the reflexive territorialising effect of military mobilisation.

Despite the sizeable overlap between the roles of citizen and soldier so readily purported in the scholarship, it was only in the Roman army’s assembling as a mobilised force outside the city walls that their territorialising power was activated and validated.²¹ The duty of the Roman armed forces was to ensure the continuing growth and defence of the territory overcoded as ager Romanus, at the fringes of the state. ‘Living in cities was though to ruin soldiers’ (Phang 2008, 81; Tacitus, Histories, 1.53). As the army laid down roads leading back to Rome, each soldier demonstrated a performative Romanness which did not depend on whether the recruit had entered military service as Roman-born, but which indicates instead that the very mobilisation through which conquered territory was de- and reterritorialised as Romanus, at the same time de- and reterritorialised the soldiers’ bodies and subjectivity with a similarly nationalistic outcome.

To a certain extent, nationality was deemed to be as much performative as geographical in ancient Rome.²² In Cassius Dio’s Roman History, the third century AD historian conceives of a speech from 58 BC, again during Caesar’s campaigns against the Gallic tribes, whereby the general explains to his army why, as Romans, they are of a higher calibre than their Helvetii opponents. Dio’s Caesar claims of the Helvetii (38.45.4, translated by Cary; see also Livy, 38.17.5-13):
...they would not prove superior to us in any way. For, to omit other considerations — our numbers, our age, our experience, our deeds — who does not know that we have armour over all our body alike, whereas they are for the most part unprotected, and that we employ both reason and organization, whereas they are unorganized and rush at everything impulsively?

Despite the disputability of this speech as retrospective, the sentiment is significant for many reasons: primarily, because it exemplifies the Roman propagandist attitude to any barbarian race, as uncivilised and lacking discipline. It could be argued that it was the simple legal nomenclature of being ‘Roman’ and not ‘barbarian Other’ which made Caesar’s soldiers (for Dio, at least) superior to the Helvetii tribe. The ‘othering’ of enemy forces, discussed as much in modern as ancient military writing (Partis-Jennings 2017; Higate 2003, 118; Rembold and Carrier 2011, 363; Tacitus, Germanicus, 30), furthermore contributes to the clear definition of boundaries in cultural space (Mehta 2006, 205). Yet, in the passage above, it is interesting to note that the features listed do not include official ethnicity or Roman citizenship, yet, they are corporeal in theme. For one thing, their bodies are technologically advanced by armour, which overcodes their ‘original’ physiology with Roman craftsmanship.23 Yet, Dio specifies that what really made the difference were the combatants’ ‘experience’ and ‘deeds’, in other words, their mobile bodies. Similar sentiments permeate Roman historiographic and poetic texts concerning the cultural, performative differences between Rome and her enemies (Polybius, 10; Tacitus, Annals, 1.67-8, 13.39; Ammianus Marcellinus, Roman History, 31.7; see Phang 2008, 37ff.).

Military mobilisation therefore transformed men not only from citizens to soldiers, but to specifically Roman soldiers. By reterritorialising land as Roman, they assumed Roman identity through appropriate militarised behaviours, as Phang (2008, 79) describes:

Even ethnicity, an essential and objective trait in conventional modern culture, was constructed by discipline. Strict training, work, and social control produced ‘Roman’ soldiers regardless of their original ethnicity and social level. However, authors depicted poorly trained and disorderly soldiers as ‘barbarian’. When the soldiers were well trained and kept in good order, any non-Roman ethnic identity disappeared and they were regarded as Roman soldiers.

Therefore, as expressed by Dio’s Caesar, it was the soldier’s conduct which determined how Roman he was, making his former subjectivity and nationality perhaps irrelevant or, at least, overwritten. ‘Like the auxilia’, writes Ramsay MacMullen (1984, 445-6), ‘the legions lost their ethnic traits’ in the eyes of their generals, through their participation in the behavioural codes of the Roman military space.

The Military Step
‘As condensed sites of national ideals and nationalist violence,’ writes Zoë Wool (2013, 140), ‘militaries are fields that generate both prestige and danger and are the source of powerful, but also ambivalent, identities, social forms, and cultural capital.’ The ‘cultural capital’ in Wool’s statement evokes the idea of ‘making’ Roman identity, sourced in the campus Martius (the military field) and the ager Romanus, at large. The soldiers’ participation in the production of these fields (territories) reflexively produced an appropriate soldierly habitus, ‘deportment’, a term rooted in Roman military dogma (Vegetius, 1.11-27, 2.19-25; Seneca, On Anger, 1.9; Phang 2008, 100; McDonnell 2006, 71), but which can be framed by postmodern connotations of the manufacturing of social and cultural status (Bourdieu 2013).
In this sense, Roman military praxes can be read as mechanistically deterritorialising recruits of their ‘original ethnicity and social level’ on many overlapping strata, reterritorialising them as Roman military.

Attitudes latent in Roman sources, such as the ‘organisation’ of the legions mentioned in Caesar’s speech, and the ‘strict training, work and social control’ in Phang’s description, attest to the making of this habitus through disciplina, the famed ‘discipline’ of the Roman army. It is unsurprising that, in Discipline and Punish, the figure of the soldier is central to Foucault’s considerable discussion of social control: for Foucault, the soldierly body and its movement archetypally conveys the manipulation of human life by the ruling state. Foucault potently describes the soldier as ‘above all a fragment of a mobile space, before he is courage or honour […] The body is constituted as part of a multi-segmentary machine’ (1991, 164, translated by Lane). These same ideas are readily appropriated in military criticism, as in MacLeish (2012, 55): ‘The military body […] represents the transformation of men and women into tools. It is a body instrumentalised via discipline and control.’ The Roman literary canon reveals that this conceptualisation of the soldierly body as a component part, which must function properly in order for the territorialising machine to work, is not confined to recent discourse. Comparative analysis between ancient and modern military theory and practice highlights how the ‘instrumentalisation’, described by Foucault, actually occurs in military spaces.

How precisely was national (and personal) identity in the Roman army ‘constructed by discipline’, as Phang suggests? The historian, Vegetius, produced in the fourth century AD the most comprehensive extant text concerned with the history and practical application of Roman military praxes. Although written well after the fall of the Republic, his Epitome of Military Science drew on traditions and teachings throughout Roman history to provide a manual for ‘the Roman army at its best’ (Goldsworthy 1998b, 9). Vegetius opens with the advice: ‘in every battle it is not numbers and untaught bravery so much as skill and [discipline] that generally produce the victory’ (1.1, translated by Milner), apparent in Caesar’s commentaries (Civil War 1.21, 3.72).

With this perspective, emphasis is on the action of the individual soldier, necessarily before the machine as a whole. Vegetius’ instruction is redolent of Foucault (1991, translated by Lane, 164): ‘Discipline is no longer simply an art of distributing bodies, but of composing forces in order to obtain an efficient machine.’ The strict regimentation of the Roman soldier’s movements is even discernible at the level of Latin linguistics, as Vegetius explains (2.1, translated by Milner): ‘The army received its name from the actual fact and action of exercise, so it was never permitted to forget what it was called.’ Vegetius refers to the word, exercitus: originally connoting ‘an abstract meaning “training”’ (Plautus' The Fisherman’s Rope, 21.7), it came to imply ‘a concrete and specialised sense of a “body of men trained to arms, army”’ (Buck 1919, 11-12). By using exercitus as a designating synonym, as well as a daily exercise, Roman soldiers were perpetually reminded of the importance of their individual movement in maintaining the work of the collective.

Exercitus is not the only term associated with the Roman army which implies the importance of somatic comportment and preparation (Coker 2002, 39). For, ‘the chief function of the disciplinary power is to “train”, rather than to select or to levy’ (Foucault 1991, translated by Lane, 170). Whether Roman or ‘barbarian’, the body had to be overcoded, reterritorialised, from citizen to soldier, from head to toe. Instead of donning the weighty toga (a word associated with peace, see Cicero, On Oratory 3.42), soldiers became synonymous with their caligae, ‘marching boots’, another Roman nickname for legionaries (caligati, see Phang 2008, 17; Pliny, Natural Histories, 7) echoing modern slang, ‘boot’, for an inexperienced soldier. The Romans’ marching in these boots reterritorialised their bodies as well as the ground they covered, making the military step more than just a means of
transferring the army from one location to another, but key to the construction of military territory, overall.26

Despite there being no official military training institutions in ancient Rome, it would nevertheless be fair to state that daily routines functioned superlatively to institutionalise the habits (and habitus) of the deployed men (Goldsworthy 2013, 82-93; Potter 2006, 81). ‘Soldiers’ training,’ writes Phang (2008, 39; see also Watson 1983, 57), ‘was ideally ongoing and lasted as long as they served in the army.’ In this way, the continued operation of exercitus maintained the recruit’s status as Roman and his legitimised participation in the army, just as codes of behaviour render terrain territory. After an initial period of ‘basic’ weapons handling, skill and discipline was primarily cultivated on the march, emphasising the full and immediate geographical immersion into the military career. Crucial to this preliminary instruction was the ambulatura, or ‘military step’, as Vegetius (1.9, translated by Milner) instructs:

So, at the very start of the training, recruits should be taught the military step. For nothing should be maintained more on the march or in battle, than that all soldiers should keep ranks as they move. The only way that this can be done is by learning through constant training to manoeuvre quickly and evenly. For a divided and disordered army experiences danger from the enemy which is always most serious.

The ‘military step’ prompts a rethink of what is meant, in general, by the ‘mobilisation’ of the army. It is clear from Vegetius’ description that its purpose is to correctly arrange the moving soldiers, as a vital exercise in uniformity. It could even be abstracted that the ‘danger from the enemy’ described here does not merely refer to opponent attack, but to the loss of Roman identity only granted to well-functioning soldiers who ‘keep ranks’. As such, the correct pace was necessarily a quotidian practice: ‘at the military step twenty miles should be covered in five hours’, while ‘at the full step, which is faster, twenty-four miles should be covered in the same time’ (Vegetius 1.9, translated by Milner). The same ‘military step’ features in Polybius’ (10.20, translated by Shuckburgh; see also Livy 29.22.1-3) detailed account of Scipio Africanus’ training regime during the campaigns against Hannibal, in Spain (210-6 BC): a march ‘at the double for thirty stades, in their armour’, a ‘stade’ being equal to a stadium lap (approximately four Roman miles).

Crucially, through these en masse routines, such as the ambulatura, armatura (weapons handling) and exercitationes (marches), the army learnt to move together (Vegetius 1.13ff.). This movement generated a uniform muscular memory worthy of the synecdochic Latin word, miles, which translates into English as both ‘soldier’ and ‘army’. ‘The relationship to space of a “subject” who is a member of a group or society,’ writes Lefebvre (2009, translated by Nicholson-Smith, 40), ‘implies his relationship to his own body and vice versa.’ The functioning of the soldier’s body and, importantly, his self-perception were reciprocally determined by his activity as a ‘member’ of the Roman army, whether on the march, in the camp, or in the mêlée. This uniformity was also made flesh tactically in combat, in formations such as the famous testudo, which drew the legionsaries together into one body of shields and swords (Dio, 69.29-30).

According to Vegetius (1.9), young recruits must carry out their drills twice a day, veterans once, in order that muscle memory prevails even at the most difficult and threatening moments (1.26). The practice of the ambulatura in the military space replaced the daily activities of the citizen, who had the right to attempt to preserve his own life if threatened, with a deeply ingrained negation of just that impulse (see Chrissanthos 2007, 218). Any refusal to uphold the rigid structure of the military machine would likely result in the punishment of fustuarium (‘beating to death’, see Polybius, 6.37; Ward 2017, 304),
exacted for disobedience, carelessness and desertion — a punishment which makes brutally clear the soldiers’ bodily rights versus those of the (elite) citizen (Alston 2010, 208-9). The fustuarium was enacted by the transgressor’s comrades (Riess 2017, 304), to accentuate the collective impact of contravention. Polybius (6.38, translated by Shuckburgh) reports that, for the most part, fear of this punishment seems to have been effective in maintaining discipline: ‘Consequently, it sometimes happens that men confront certain death at their stations’, while others would ‘throw themselves upon their foe’ rather than suffer a disgraceful death.

It could be argued that such strict adherence to severe community codes merely reflected the ‘blind devotion to one’s native land’ (Nicolet 1980, 90, translated by Falla) supposedly characteristic of the Roman citizen body, in general. Yet, this normalising reading overlooks the way that soldiers were subject to corporal punishment, whereas citizens were not (Richlin 2005, 195-6), ‘a disciplined un-freedom’ familiar to modern military critics, ‘and empowered to forms of violence often completely contrary to the values of the civilian society they come from and defend’ (MacLeish 2015, 15). As is still the case today, citizen law applied only secondarily in the military space: ‘in the field (militiae) the consuls in command of armies reverted to the unlimited imperium [power] of the kings’ (Brand 1986, 66; see Cicero, On Laws, 3.3). Again, Roman practices, such as the fustuarium, throw harsh light on the ramifications of consigning absolute authority to a commander. The more immanently violent customs and culture of Roman daily life reveal the extent of the soldier’s ‘un-freedom’ in brutal ways: those who fled from battle were crucified or fed to wild beasts, ‘penalties reserved normally for criminals from the lowest sections of society, and not inflicted on citizens’ (Goldsworthy 2013, 101).27

The displacement of civilian for military laws in militarised spaces likewise changed the moral and sociological perspectives on these codes, the most pertinent being the professionalisation of murder (see Scarry 1985, 121-2; Theweleit 2006, 75-6). Despite the centrality of war in Roman culture, the murder of humans was still criminal and hardly habitual. Therefore, ‘Roman military training sought to overcome the natural fear of cold steel and inhibition toward killing at close range’ (Phang 2008, 42). Phang cites Lt. Col. Dave Grossman’s On Killing, in which is described the ‘powerful, innate human resistance to killing one’s own species and the psychological mechanisms which have been developed by armies over the centuries to overcome that resistance’ (2009, 4; see also Bourke 1999, 41-6, 60-9). Roman sources report that commanders, like Caesar (Civil War, 3.85, 92; also Vegetius, 3.12; Melchior 2011, 220), were well aware of the psychological, as well as the somatic, preparation that was needed for successful warfare. In short, constant practice of military movement was specifically designed to render professional soldiers better at killing than dying (Coker 2002, 26).

A refined impetus for violence had to be kept in check, as Phang (2008, 21) points out: ‘disciplina militaris [military discipline] socialised soldiers and rising officers and thus forestalled mutiny, let alone social revolution.’ In Lucan’s Civil War, he imagines that the mutinies against Caesar (nine out of ten legions mutinied during these campaigns; Chrissanths 2001, 75) occurred because the soldiers had been too long out of battle (Luc. 5.240-6), and their swords and blood had grown cold (see also Tacitus, Annals, 13.35). In parallel, Caesar’s commentaries on the same conflict include an account of how his officers contemplated an impromptu attack, merely ‘because they believed that when the troops were in this sort of mood idleness was dangerous’ (Civil War, 2.30, translated by Gardner). This ‘sort of mood’ was restlessness in the camp and fear of the enemy, unhelpful emotions which the commanding officers reasoned could be eradicated by mobilisation (see Seneca, On Anger, 1.11).

Roman source material indicates that training and drill on campaign sustained discipline and habitus, through the repetition of individual and collective movement. Yet, it
seems that beyond the *ambulatura* the soldiers still had to be kept moving, mobilised, in order to maintain a tightly controlled territory (see Theweleit 2006, 154; DeLanda 1991, 113), an idea brought to the fore by the Latin synonyms for ‘army’ – ‘a rushing’ and ‘that which is driven’. Even in peacetime, menial tasks were invented for unoccupied legionaries, with ‘little or no practical value, such as the whitewashing of walls or the polishing of buckets’ (Watson 1983, 143), as stagnant soldiers were arrogant, ‘quick-tempered and violent’ (Phang 2008, 48), and difficult to control. These tasks contributed to the Roman soldier’s generally hard and unpleasant living conditions (‘The soldier’s story is one of constant work’, Chrissanthos 2007, 230-7), affecting difficulties mirrored in reports from the twenty-first century barracks (‘the mundane, chronic bodily burdens of doing military work that often do not rise to the level of straightforward injury’, MacLeish 2016, 5).

Hence, without killing or dying to assuage them, desertion and mutiny were rife in the Roman world (Lintott 1999, 7; Chrissanthos 2007, 244), but any examples of insurrection make clear the consequences of rebellion against the codes of military territory. Caesar, himself, was a notoriously frequent target of insubordination, with a prime example being the ‘Quirites’ speech, during a mutiny of his Tenth Legion in 47 BC, in Campania (Appian, Civil Wars, 2.93; Suetonius, *Julius Caesar*, 70). Allegedly, Caesar quelled the rebellion by addressing the mutineers as Quirites, a term meaning ‘citizens’ and explicitly not ‘soldiers’, therefore not members of the military territory and its codes (Livy, 1.32; Lucan, 5.358; Phang 2008, 90). The legionaries were reportedly so shamed by this antonymic epithet that they immediately rescinded, and the ringleaders were executed. Practice across the board dictated that those who were not slain following insurgency were given different food rations and forced to sleep outside the ramparts (Goldsworthy 2013, 101; Polybius, 6.38-40), as rebellion against military *disciplina* and *habitus* meant ostracization. There was no ‘space’ for disobedience in Roman warfare.

Military movement, in all its forms, highlights the peculiarity of how mobilisation seems to be vital to maintain a boundaried, stable territory, like Mehta’s description of the urban neighbourhood as ‘not a space until it is marked by people’s active participation, their movements through and around it’ (2006, 209). Yet, a territory is not solely established by one-off actions: in order to really reterritorialise a space, these actions must become habitual, as Manuel DeLanda (2010, 14) describes in his work on the perpetuation of communities, developed from the philosophy of Deleuze. Like the birdsong, territory, whether geographical or human, is overcoded by actions regularly performed as *habitus* and *instinct*:

Habit itself would constitute the main process of territorialisation, that is, the process that gives a subject its defining boundaries and maintains those boundaries through time. Habit performs a synthesis of the present and the past in view of a possible future.

‘Habit’ is etymologically rooted in the Latin, *habitus*: the appropriate *habitus* was necessarily demonstrative of the Roman soldier. DeLanda’s description here neatly conveys the importance of routine behaviours in relation to territorialisation and, furthermore, identity; we can in this sense think of the habit-forming ‘military step’ as a ‘process that gives a subject its defining boundaries’. When that subject is the soldier, the ‘boundaries’ are not necessarily those between one soldier and another, but potentially between legion and legion, *miles* and *Quirites*, Roman and barbarian. Once ingrained in the military skeleton, routine military praxes become *habits* producing a *habitus*, resulting from soldierly ‘institutionalisation’ and, as such, they serve to sustain the boundaries, the different territory, of military life (see also DeLanda 1991).
Rome Away from Rome

A theme consistent in the ancient and modern sources included in this article is that, in their ‘national’ service, the army carried Rome with it by extending and preserving the ager Romanus and, therefore, Roman civilisation. This re-production Rome is represented exemplarily in the daily con- and destruction of the military camp (castrorum metatio), a habitual activity designed to occupy the soldiers and maintain discipline (Phang 2008, 67-70; Vegetius, 1.21-5). The camp theoretically displaced a portion of Roman territory onto, or into, new terrain: ‘It is exactly like a legion entering its own city,’ describes Polybius (6.41, translated by Shuckburgh), in his detailed description of the camp layout (6.27-32). The camp was constructed in the same shape in every location: a walled square with four closely-guarded gates (Polybius, 6.31), with allowances made for any amendments necessary according to circumstance (such as the addition of a ditch, see Goldsworthy 2013, 88-9; Vegetius, 3.8). The Roman military camp could, like Lefebvre’s religious-political ‘representational’ spaces, be ‘ritually affixable to any place and hence also detachable therefrom’ (2009, translated by Nicholson-Smith, 237). In this way, the practice of castrametation not only exemplifies the de- and reterritorialisation of foreign territory into ‘Roman’ space, but also mimics how city spaces are produced by the interactions and activities of its constituents. It was both the buildings and the process of constructing and dismantling them which made the camp military, and made its inhabitants Roman soldiers.

Every society produces its own space. As Polybius states, the barracks were like the legion’s own city – a ‘short-lived, artificial city, built and reshaped almost at will’ (Foucault 1991, translated by Lane, 171) – and not an exact replica of Rome. It was a space different in shape and order, both structurally and politically, distinct from the city of Rome, and the rural and urban landscapes surrounding it. Adrian Goldsworthy (2013, 33) claims that, ‘The temporary camps constructed by the Roman army symbolised the ordered existence of citizens whilst they served in the legions’, but while the camp may have ‘symbolised’ citizen territory, it was in effect no such thing: the camp was specifically territory of the nomadic military community, with its own codes of belonging. The differences in legal, social and psychological codes between soldier and civilian make it worthwhile to re-examine the claim that Roman military praxes rendered soldiers and their territory specifically Roman. Soldiers were considered by citizens to be almost as ‘barbaric’ as enemy troops (Phang 2008, 287-8), a stereotype still encountered today (MacLeish 2016, 6), though to a lesser extent (Brooks 2016; Williams 2012). Roman civilians complained that the foot-soldiers who returned from battle bore strange accents, were ‘most savage to look at, frightening to listen to, and boorish to talk with’ (Dio, 75.2.6, translated in MacMullen 1984, 440). Upon closer inspection, those extracted cells of Romanness therefore seem rather synthetic and not wholly compatible with the national body.

In many ways, the expansion of the Roman Republic can be said to typify the concept of ‘franchised’ territory (Higate and Henry 2010, 35): the construction in different locations of boundaried areas under the same sovereign control. The activity of castrametation, like the reterritorialising of earth as battlefield or colonised province, epitomises how territory is created by action. Its constant con- and destruction is bound up with its territorial identity – like the con- and destruction of the human bodies which constitute the military machine. The world of the camp was symbiotic with the soldiers’ movements, hence the Latin word for camp, castra, was another synonym for the legion (Lucan, 1.319, 3.211), and Roman legions would enlarge their camp to intimidate the enemy (Caesar, Gallic Wars, 5.49.7; Frontinus, 3.17.6; Phang 2008, 68). ‘A well-trained legion,’ Milner (1996, 50) comments in his translation of Vegetius, ‘was like a very well-fortified city’.

Conclusion
As Wool (2013, 140) asserts in her discussion of the forging of military identity in the field today, ‘Soldiers are made as men within this field not only through discipline and training, but also, crucially, through their deeply felt attachments to it and to each other.’ For the Roman army, spatial flux was not only fundamental to the ‘continuous production’ of military discipline but, furthermore, soldierly identity. In this article, Latin terminology and Roman military praxes have been read as revealing how the nomadism of the army was paradoxically crucial to its affiliation with the fixed city of Rome, despite the stark differences between soldierly and civilian habits and habitus. The brutality of official penalties draws attention to the importance weighted on physical action proper to one’s relationship to territory. For, ‘The body is the site of the training and capacities that make the modern professional soldier competent and effective’ writes MacLeish (2012, 55), wherein the word, ‘site’, posits the soldierly body as a territory as well as a technology.

Indeed, the rapid and violent expansion of the Roman empire was accomplished through the reterritorialisation of geographical terrain and, likewise, of bodies and identities. Yet, this reterritorialisation did not generate perfectly ‘Roman’ simulacra, rather a synthetic, mass-produced military mutation which purported the illusion, and enforced the sovereignty, of Romaness. In this sense, territory conquered by the Romans is rightly referred to as ‘provincial’ or ‘colonised’, still only quasi-Roman even after years of being ‘civilised’ as ager Romanus – like the pastoral settlements distorted by an awareness of military presence today, ‘even as its role in their lives was utterly routiniséd, normalised, and hidden from an outsider’ (MacLeish 2016, 6).

The significant time gap between ancient Rome and today allows for a certain unbarred scrutiny of antique practices, some of which seem primitive and brutal to modern eyes. However, this article has aimed to show how the theoretical impetus behind many of these practices can be read as continuing to underpin military mobilisation in the twenty-first century. The treatment of Roman literature in this study demonstrates how theoretical concepts can refresh, and be refreshed, by comparison with varied fields of study. These Roman sources, with their parallels in modern military criticism, combine to expose the military institution, transhistorically, as especially culpable for overcoding borders and bodies: like the habits and customs which ‘construct’ cities, and public and private spaces, military activity does the same – but this is a creation of spaces for destruction, a territory of violence and its potentiality. Thinking with philosophies of territorialisation reconfigures how activity is environment, how bodies are territories, and their actions generate these landscapes as much as the ground beneath them. The traces of militarisation do not confine themselves to the ground, but also infiltrate the boots marching upon it. ‘Power produces,’ asserts Foucault (1991, translated by Lane, 194), ‘it produces reality…’ Military might produces militarised territory; it leaves an insignia, and ‘Nothing disappears completely […] In space, what came earlier continues to underpin what follows’ (Lefebvre 2009, translated by Nicholson-Smith, 229).

Notes

1 Compare Roselaar 2016, 138: ‘The Roman army in the first century CE was responsible for a great deal of mobility in the Empire’, given that the army built roads.
2 On this approach in existing Classical scholarship, see Sabin 2000, 3-4, on first-hand accounts of battle: ‘It is obviously perilous to draw comparisons with the much better documented infantry clashes of the gunpowder era, since military technology has changed so much over the intervening centuries. However, the instincts and psychological pressures affecting massed formations of troops in close proximity to similar opposing formations are
unlikely to have changed anything like as much over what is an insignificant interval in evolutionary terms.’ See also Melchior 2011.

3 It should be made clear at this point the difference between the commonly cited ‘military machine’, in the context of military practice, and the ‘war machine’ specific to Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy (2013, translated by Massumi; see also DeLanda 2010, 75). The latter is a complex political metaphor ‘which does not necessarily have war as its object’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2013, translated by Massumi, 484), and although in many ways it is pertinent to this discussion, Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘war machine’ is not what is being referred to, here.

4 Foucault is here arguing for a constitutional departure, in the eighteenth century, from the ‘Roman’ imperial system of government.

5 Frontinus’ *Strategemata*, from the first century AD, survives only in fragments. It is mentioned in Aelian’s *Tactics*, a Greek work on the Hellenic military (second century AD), along with a much earlier text by Aeneas Tacticus on siege operations (fourth century BC).

6 The exception is the discovery of three-hundred documents at Vindolanda, a military camp at Hadrian’s wall, dated to the turn of the second century AD. These letters and military records, albeit fragmented, give a unique insight into daily life in the Roman camp (see Bowman 1994).

7 See also McCormack 2017, on the ‘territorialising practices’ of U.S. security strategies; Higate and Henry 2010, 44; Rech, et al., 2015, 50-1, on the relation between military activity and landscapes: ‘“Military landscapes” thus allow us to locate, place, and situate militaries and their activities, and to inquire as to the more-often-than-not deleterious effects of (sometimes anachronistic) military presences in landscapes.’ Consider Pomeroy 2003, 361: ‘Geography often turns out to be a state of mind rather than a collection of empirically verifiable facts.’

8 Consider also Trigg 2017, on the embodiment of place and non-place. With reference to Merleau-Ponty’s *Phenomenology of Perception*, he writes: ‘spatiality is not a neutral backdrop, but an active field of force, defined by a global meaning’ (132).

9 See Polybius, *Histories* 1.1.5. As such, the Mediterranean therefore became what Erica Bexley might determine a ‘Romanocentric’ universe, a term she uses antithetically in her discussion of the political geography of Lucan’s *Civil War* (2009, 460).

10 This meaning of land ownership correlates with the disparity between a definitive ‘nation state’ and an aggregate ‘territory’. Consider this description of the relatively new state of Afghanistan in the nineteenth century, ‘not a country but a territory. Its borders were a matter of opinion’ (Ansary 2012, 85). Moreover, the Roman state did not always set out to annex every patch of land over which they marched unhindered, but this practice depended on potential financial and defensive gains (see, for example, Livy, 36.17.13-16).

11 See Cicero’s *On the Republic* 3.35-7, translated by Sage: ‘Our people have gained dominion over the world by defending their allies [...] And do we not see that dominion has been given to everything that is best for the greatest advantage of the weak? For what other reason does god rule men or the soul control the body, or rationality dominate desire, anger, and the other defective parts of the mind?’ See also Mattern 2009, 127: ‘[the Romans] perceived foreign policy as a zero-sum game of honour in which one’s perceived ability to inflict violence was the essential, irreducible item on which everything depended.’

12 Carthage, like Numidia and the north east coast of Africa, became Roman provinces, following the conclusion of the Punic wars in the mid-second century BC (Sage 2008, 270). However, as Kiernan writes (2004, 28), ‘Despite the amazing regularity with which Rome went to war in this era, the policy to destroy Carthage was unusual. It was both decided in advance and pursued after the city’s surrender.’
24 Diodorus Siculus, 23.2.1.

23 Relatedly, see Partis-Jennings 2017, on the debate concerning the performative nature of masculinity in warfare; also Morris 1995.

22 ‘Roman’ arms were often copied from enemy troops, or formulated to combat them; see Diodorus Siculus, 23.2.1.

21 This impacted on the social and political status of the soldier. As remains the case today, certain citizen rights were denied or irrelevant to the military. ‘Technically, the citizen under arms appears to have had very similar rights to the civilian, but in fact the soldier was subject to a whole range of more severe penalties for misconduct, and his right of appeal, therefore his libertas [freedom], was limited’ (Alston 2010, 209). See also Brand 1968. For the debate concerning twenty-first century soldiers, see the work of Ross McGarry, especially McGarry 2012.

20 See Phang 2008, 79, on the use of solely Latin and Greek in Roman posts, as the Romans were reluctant to learn foreign languages. See Bowman 1994, 61, on the adoption of Roman names.

19 The population according to a census taken by Augustus (14 AD), although this figure is disputable; see Nicolet 1980, 17. See Phang 2008, 114-15, on military abuse of citizens.

18 For discussion of the many facets of ‘globalisation’ (or ‘Romanisation’) in the Roman world, see Lutz and Lutz 2015; also Pitts and Versluys, 2015.

17 A notorious example of this reterritorialisation of citizen space is the proscriptions of Lucius Cornelius Sulla, which transformed the city of Rome into a killing spree. Following a civil war victory against Gaius Marius (88-82 BC), Sulla’s paranoia as dictator (82-79 BC) led him to eradicate all citizens who might oppose his rule, by posting lists of the condemned in the forum, for anyone to dispatch. In so doing, he ‘filled […] all of Italy with bloodshed’ (Livy, Periochae, 88). Severed heads were piled in the forum, as elaborately recounted in Lucan (2.169-73), overcoming the space formerly for public gatherings as an exhibition of hysteria, with nearly five-thousand victims in a matter of months. ‘Sulla wanted to break all records for variations on the theme of killing’ (Henderson 2003, 42), reterritorialising citizens as executioners, amplifying the mutative effects of civil conflict.

16 For instance, the gruesome imagery of Polybius’ account of the Carthaginian wars inspired the Civil War’s infamous violence (Phang 2008, 43-4; see also Livy, 31.34.4).

15 See Lovano 2013, 75, on Caesar’s commentaries: ‘Caesar’s feigned or conventional or honest respect for the warlike tribes as opposed to the more settled and peaceful tribes hits the reader from the start; this is the Roman attitude of the love of war as a virtue, not as a necessary evil, a theme that we find equally in the works of Tacitus and Sallust.’

14 Further examples of Roman de- and reterritorialisation include the siege of Munda in Spain, a climactic battle during Julius Caesar’s civil wars (45 BC), where the walls Caesar built around the town of Munda were formed of enemy corpses (Caesar, Spanish War, 32; Chrissanthos 2007, 239). See also Kiernan 2004, 27; Appian, Roman History, 8.126, on the (ultimate) sacking of Carthage in 146 BC, in which at least 150,000 Carthaginians were killed.

13 Polybius was an Achaean, taken hostage by Roman invaders in 168 BC (Beard 2015, 186-7), then accepted into Roman society as a close friend of the general, Scipio Aemilianus. He was physically present at the fall of Carthage in 146 BC, a harrowing example of Roman ‘defensive’ might (see Plutarch, Cato the Elder, 26-27, and Sallust, War of Catiline, 10.1-6, on the preceding Senatorial debates).
26 See Elaine Scarry (1985, 118) on theories which posit that ‘the rhythmic movement of marching in step with many men or of firing a gun by following a precise series of forty-two successive acts performed identically by all participants - the disappearance from the soldier’s body of the signs of a particular region or country’.

27 See Melchior 2011, 218: ‘Mortars could not be lobbed into the Green Zone, suicide bombers did not walk into the market, and garbage piled on the street did not hide powerful explosives. The danger for a Roman soldier was largely circumscribed by his moments on the field of battle.’

28 Compare Higate and Henry (2010, 34), on modern peace-keeping practices: ‘We are habituated into space, may fail to reflect on the staged or performed character of social life and are likely to perceive security at the level of the nonconscious, perhaps in an existential sense.’

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