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Inclusive Fitness Maximization: An Axiomatic Approach

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Abstract. Kin selection theorists argue that evolution in social contexts will lead organisms to behave as if maximizing their inclusive, as opposed to personal, fitness. The inclusive fitness concept allows biologists to treat organisms as akin to rational agents seeking to maximize a utility function. Here we develop this idea and place it on a firm footing by employing a standard decision-theoretic methodology. We show how the principle of inclusive fitness maximization and a related principle of quasi-inclusive fitness maximization can be derived from axioms on an individual’s ‘as if preferences’ (binary choices) for the case in which phenotypic effects are additive. Our results help integrate evolutionary theory and rational choice theory, help draw out the behavioural implications of inclusive fitness maximization, and point to a possible way in which evolution could lead organisms to implement it.

Keywords. Hamilton’s Rule, inclusive fitness, kin selection, rational choice

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1. Introduction

A central tenet of inclusive fitness theory is that a trait may be selected for even if it involves some sacrifice to an individual’s personal fitness, provided that it sufficiently enhances the reproductive success of genetically related individuals. Genetic relatedness between social partners can arise for various reasons, in particular kinship. Inclusive fitness is central to much work on the evolution of social behaviour. It has been used to understand diverse biological phenomena including sex-ratios, co-operative breeding, dispersal, reproductive skew, group formation, and more. For introductions to inclusive fitness theory, see Frank (1998), McElreath and Boyd (2007), or Wenseleers, Gardner, and Foster (2010).

J. B. S. Haldane purportedly enunciated the basic idea of inclusive fitness theory in a pub when he quipped that he would sacrifice himself by jumping into a river to save two brothers or eight cousins, a view he only later expressed in print (see Haldane (1955, p. 44)). However, it was W. D. Hamilton (1963, 1964a,b) who first provided a precise formal statement of the theory. In addition to Haldane (1955), other precursors to Hamilton include Darwin (1859), Fisher (1930), and Haldane (1932) (see Dugatkin (2007)).

Hamilton’s original theory contains two distinct though related ideas: firstly, his famous rule for when a gene coding for an altruistic action will be favoured by natural selection; and secondly the idea of inclusive fitness, as opposed to personal fitness, as the quantity that individuals will behave as if they are trying to maximize. *Hamilton’s Rule* is expressed by the inequality $rb > c$. This rule tells us that a gene for altruism will spread so long as the cost $c$ to the altruist is offset by a sufficient amount of benefit $b$ to relatives who are sufficiently close, as measured by the relatedness coefficient $r$. This way of thinking involves taking the ‘gene’s eye view’, that is, looking for the selective advantage that a trait has for the gene that causes the trait, rather than the individual that expresses it. However, Hamilton showed that altruistic behaviour can also be understood from an individual’s perspective. Though an individual performing an altruistic action will reduce its personal fitness (i.e. expected number of offspring), it may enhance its *inclusive* fitness—a measure that also takes into account the effect of the action on the reproductive output of relatives. Under certain conditions, it can be shown that natural selection will lead an individual to behave as if it is trying to maximize its inclusive fitness (see Frank, 1998; McElreath and Boyd, 2007; Grafen, 2006, 2009).
The concept of inclusive fitness is somewhat unintuitive, and critics have questioned both the generality of the theory and the usefulness of the concept (e.g., Nowak, Tarnita, and Wilson, 2010). (Birch (2014) provides an illuminating discussion of the arguments for and against the claims made by Nowak, Tarnita, and Wilson (2010).) While granting that inclusive fitness has its limitations, and that there are other valid ways to study the evolution of social behaviour, here we focus on a conceptually attractive feature of inclusive fitness theory, namely that it allows us to preserve the idea of the individual organism as a quasi-rational agent, choosing between alternative actions according to the criterion of maximal inclusive fitness. This aspect of the theory explains its wide appeal to behavioural ecologists as it allows them to take an adaptationist approach to social behaviour, as has been emphasized in recent work by Grafen (2006, 2009) and Gardner, West, and Wild (2011), among others.

In this article, we offer a novel perspective on inclusive fitness theory by applying tools from the economic theory of rational choice. Our aim is to derive inclusive fitness maximization from axioms on an individual organism’s choice behaviour for the case in which phenotypic effects are additive. Consider a focal individual and the set of other individuals who might be affected by this individual’s actions. At a given point in time, each of the latter individuals stands in a given relatedness relationship to the focal individual. The focal individual is faced with a choice between alternative social actions. Each action leads to a payoff (which could be positive, negative, or zero) for the focal individual and each of the other affected individuals. An individual’s payoff is the incremental change in its personal fitness due to the focal individual’s action. The focal individual’s choice behaviour is described by a binary preference relation on the set of actions. This relation specifies, for any two actions, which the focal individual would choose; in principle, this choice could be directly observed. The question we pose is: What conditions must this binary relation satisfy such that the focal individual always behaves as if it were trying to maximize its inclusive fitness? We also consider a variant of inclusive fitness maximization called quasi-inclusive fitness maximization that can be applied when the focal individual is unable to determine the exact degree of relatedness to some of the other individuals, and axiomatically characterize this behaviour as well.

The axiomatic approach employed here is the standard way of justifying a maximization assumption in rational choice theory, and it is instructive to apply it to inclusive fitness for three reasons. Firstly, it offers a novel
way of forging links, both formal and conceptual, between social evolution theory and economic theory. Many authors have drawn attention to the analogy between the utility-maximizing paradigm of economics and the fitness-maximizing paradigm of behavioural ecology; here we develop this analogy in a precise way by finding the behavioural conditions that are necessary and sufficient for an organism to be representable as an inclusive fitness maximizer. Our results draw on related work in social choice theory, which is the branch of rational choice theory that is concerned with social preferences. Axiomatic social choice theory has been used by Okasha (2009) and Bossert, Qi, and Weymark (2013a,b) to evaluate alternative measures of group fitness in hierarchically structured populations. This article is the first to apply this methodology to analyzing inclusive fitness.

Secondly, our results suggest a possible route by which evolution could program organisms to implement inclusive fitness maximization, or something close to it. That is, the axioms we use to characterize inclusive fitness maximization could be viewed as heuristic rules by which evolution might induce organisms to display optimal behaviour in social settings without having to consciously perform inclusive fitness calculations.

Thirdly, our results help bring out the behavioural implications of inclusive fitness theory, and could thus facilitate its empirical testing. An organism’s binary choices between actions can be directly observed, whereas the consequences of those choices for inclusive fitness are typically difficult to determine. If it could be shown that an organism’s choice behaviour violated one of the axioms below, we could immediately infer that the organism was not maximizing inclusive fitness.

Our model is not evolutionary; rather it is behavioural. Our aim is to characterize mathematically a certain pattern of behaviour that organisms might exhibit, namely inclusive fitness maximization, in terms of the properties of a binary preference relation. We do not assert that the evolutionary process will necessarily lead organisms to exhibit the behaviour in question, nor that it will ‘tend’ to do so, nor that the behaviour, if it evolves, will be stable against mutation; and we do not study the conditions under which an allele coding for the behaviour will be favoured by natural selection. To address these questions would require constructing an explicit evolutionary model and studying its evolutionary dynamics. There is a large literature addressing these questions, and we are not attempting to contribute to it. Rather, our aim is different, namely to supply an alternative mathematical characterization of inclusive fitness maximizing behaviour.
Section 2 describes the formal framework employed here. Our axioms are introduced in Section 3. Our axiomatic characterizations of the two forms of inclusive fitness maximization are presented in Section 4. We discuss the significance of our results in Section 5. The proofs of our theorems may be found in the Appendix.

2. The Model

We consider a set of individuals $I = \{1, \ldots, n\}$. Individual 1 is the focal individual whose actions we are interested in; the other $n - 1$ comprise all the other individuals who might be affected by the focal individual’s actions. We let $r_i \in \mathbb{R}$ denote the relatedness of the focal individual to individual $i$, with higher values denoting a closer degree of relatedness, where $r_1 = 1$. Thus, the set $I$ has an associated relatedness profile $\mathbf{r} = (r_1, \ldots, r_n) \in \mathbb{R}^{n-1}$. At a particular point in time, the profile $\mathbf{r}$ is taken as given. (However we make no assumption about what determines $\mathbf{r}$; it may have ecological as well as genealogical determinants.) If relatedness depends on the evolving trait, then at a subsequent point in time the relatedness profile $\mathbf{r}$ will be different; and our analysis will apply again at that later time modulo the new relatedness profile.

In Hamilton’s original papers, relatedness was defined as the probability that actor and recipient share genes that are ‘identical by descent’, which is determined by their genealogical relationship: this implies that $r_i \in [0, 1]$. However later work, by Hamilton and many others, has shown that the relatedness that matters to inclusive fitness theory is a more abstract measure of genetic similarity (typically, the regression of recipient genotype on actor genotype); for discussion, see Michod and Hamilton (1980), Frank (1998), Grafen (2006), or Rousset (2004, chap. 7). This means that, in principle, the relatedness coefficient can assume any real value, including negative values, and is why we assume $r_i \in \mathbb{R}$ rather than $r_i \in [0, 1]$ for $i \neq 1$. Our formalism is deliberately neutral with respect to the precise definition of relatedness employed, which may be different in different evolutionary models.

At a given point in time, the focal individual can perform a number of different actions, each of which potentially affects the personal fitness (expected number of offspring) of every individual in $I$. We identify an action with a payoff vector $\mathbf{a} = (a_1, \ldots, a_n) \in \mathbb{R}^n$, where $a_i \in \mathbb{R}$ is the incremental personal fitness gain or loss that individual $i$ suffers as a result of action $\mathbf{a}$. The set of all possible actions is $\mathbb{R}^n$. There is a fixed status-quo
payoff vector \( s = (s_1, \ldots, s_n) \in \mathbb{R}^n_+ \) describing the fitness of each individual before any action is performed. Thus, the set of feasible actions is given by 
\[
F = \{ a \in \mathbb{R}^n \mid a + s \geq 0 \} = \{ a \in \mathbb{R}^n \mid a \geq -s \},
\]
where \( 0 \) denotes an \( n \)-vector of zeros. There may be further contingent biological restrictions on the feasible actions in particular cases, but for maximal generality we take the feasible set to be \( F \).

In common with some inclusive fitness models, including Hamilton’s original, we assume that social interactions have additive fitness effects; that is, the focal individual’s action \( a \) adds \( a_i \) to the fitness of individual \( i \) irrespective of what action individual \( i \) may himself perform. This is admittedly a serious restriction, and one that many modern inclusive fitness models do not make. Non-additive phenotypic effects are often handled in inclusive fitness theory by employing weak selection techniques, permitting a Hamilton-type inequality for allele frequency change to be derived (see Rousset (2004, chap. 7)). However it is only in the additive case that a convincing demonstration exists that individuals will behave as if maximizing their inclusive fitness in an evolutionary equilibrium (see Grafen (2006)). Thus restricting our attention to additive phenotypic effects on fitness seems reasonable for the purposes of this paper. Whether this restriction can be dispensed with is discussed in Section 5.

The focal individual’s choice behaviour is described by a binary preference relation \( \succsim_r \) on \( F \). The relation \( \succsim_r \) indicates, for any two actions in \( F \), which the focal individual would prefer given the relatedness profile \( r \); formally, \( \succsim_r \) is a subset of \( F \times F \). As the notation suggests, \( \succsim_r \) is a weak preference relation; that is, \( a \succsim_r b \) means that action \( a \) is either strictly preferred or indifferent to \( b \). From \( \succsim_r \), we can define corresponding relations of strict preference \( \succ_r \) and of indifference \( \sim_r \) by letting \( a \succ_r b \equiv_{df} [a \succsim_r b \text{ and not}(b \succsim_r a)] \) and \( a \sim_r b \equiv_{df} [a \succsim_r b \text{ and } b \succsim_r a] \). The concept of preference being appealed to here is an ‘as if’ one; the preference \( \succsim_r \) is simply a way of summarizing the focal individual’s choice behaviour. That is, \( a \succ_r b \) means that \( a \) is chosen when the options are \( a \) and \( b \), whereas \( a \sim_r b \) means that either of these actions might be chosen when both are available.

The **inclusive fitness** of a feasible action \( a \in F \) is defined as \( \sum_{i=1}^n r_i a_i \). That is, it is a weighted sum over individuals of the action’s payoff to each individual, with weights given by the relatedness profile. Note that we define inclusive fitness for actions rather than for individuals, as recommended by Queller (1996); this corresponds to the ‘inclusive fitness effect’ of Hamilton (1964a). If the focal individual is an **inclusive fitness maximizer**, then
its preference relation $\succ_r$ is represented by the inclusive fitness function, which means that for all actions $a, b \in F$, $a \succ_r b$ if and only if $\sum_{i=1}^n r_i a_i \geq \sum_{i=1}^n r_i b_i$.

If the focal individual is not an inclusive fitness maximizer, this may be because it cannot discriminate sufficiently precisely between different classes of relatives. We define a quasi-inclusive fitness maximizer as an individual whose preference relation $\succ_r$ is represented by $\sum_{i=1}^n \beta_i a_i$ for some vector $(\beta_1, \ldots, \beta_n) \in \mathbb{R}^n$ such that (i) $\beta_i > 0$ if and only if $r_i > 0$ for all $i \in I$ and (ii) $\beta_i > \beta_j$ if and only if $r_i > r_j$ for all $i, j \in I$. A quasi-inclusive fitness maximizer uses a weighted sum of the payoffs to evaluate an action; however, the weights need not be the true relatednesses but, rather, can be any sign-preserving monotonic transformation of them.

The concept of quasi-inclusive fitness maximization is interesting for two different reasons. Firstly, it describes a way that an organism might attempt to maximize inclusive fitness if it lacks information about exact degrees of relatedness, but can tell who it is more related to. Empirically, it seems likely that many organisms are in this situation. Secondly, it highlights the fact that inclusive fitness maximization comprises two logically separate components: (i) evaluating social actions by a weighted sum of the payoffs and (ii) using relatednesses as the weights in the sum. Below, we obtain an axiomatic separation of these two components of inclusive fitness theory.

Our goal is to identify axioms on $\succ_r$ that characterize the focal individual as an inclusive fitness maximizer and as a quasi-inclusive fitness maximizer. Some of our axioms are analogues of axioms used in social choice theory to characterize a weighted utilitarian social objective function (see d’Aspremont (1985) and Bossert and Weymark (2004)). A weighted utilitarian objective has the same functional form as the function $\sum_{i=1}^n \beta_i a_i$ used to represent a quasi-inclusive fitness maximizer’s preferences, but with $a_i$ interpreted as the $i$th individual’s utility and $\beta_i$ as the corresponding social welfare weight. This functional form can alternatively be interpreted as representing the preferences of someone who takes account of the interests of others. In this case, it is natural for the weights to be inversely related to the social distance from the individual whose preferences are being considered, as in the dominant loyalties problem of Harsanyi (1977, sec. 2.3).

We have implicitly assumed that the payoffs (i.e., the incremental fitnesses) are measurable on an absolute scale. This is a stronger assumption than is necessary; both inclusive fitness maximization and quasi-inclusive fitness maximization only require that gains and losses of incremental fitness
are comparable across individuals. The importance of measurement-theoretic issues for the quantification of fitness has recently been stressed by Wagner (2010).

3. The Axioms

In this section, we consider a number of axioms that might be imposed on the relation $\succsim_r$ and comment briefly on their meaning and biological significance.

The binary relation $\succsim_r$ is (i) reflexive if for all $a \in F$, $a \succsim_r a$, (ii) complete if for all $a, b \in F$ with $a \neq b$, $a \succsim_r b$ or $b \succsim_r a$, and (iii) transitive if for all $a, b, c \in F$, $a \succsim_r b$ and $b \succsim_r c$ imply $a \succsim_r c$. An ordering is a reflexive, complete, and transitive binary relation.

**Ordering.** $\succsim_r$ is an ordering.

Ordering is a standard axiom in the theory of rational choice (see, e.g., Kreps (1988) or Bossert and Weymark (2004)). Essentially it requires that the focal individual can rank all feasible actions in terms of betterness, with ties permitted. Though violations of transitivity have been reported empirically in both humans and animals, this axiom is a fundamental part of the meaning of ‘rationality’, and is necessary if an individual’s choices are to maximize any quantity, inclusive fitness or some other. The reader can easily verify that if the focal individual’s choice behaviour violates Ordering, then as a matter of logic, it is not an inclusive fitness maximizer.

The binary relation $\succsim_r$ is continuous if for any action $a \in F$, the upper contour set $\{b \in F \mid b \succsim_r a\}$ and the lower contour set $\{b \in F \mid a \succsim_r b\}$ are both closed.

**Continuity.** $\succsim_r$ is continuous.

Continuity is also a standard axiom of rational choice theory (again see Kreps (1988) or Bossert and Weymark (2004)). It formalizes the intuitive idea that ‘small’ changes in payoffs should not lead to ‘large’ changes in preference. It is an appropriate assumption in any context where payoffs cannot be measured with perfect accuracy or are subject to minor chance fluctuations.

**Payoff Dominance.** For all $a, b \in F$ such that (i) $a_j > b_j$ for all $j \in I$ with $r_j \geq 0$ and (2) $a_j < b_j$ for all $j \in I$ with $r_j < 0$, $a \succsim_r b$. 

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Payoff Dominance says that if one action yields a strictly higher payoff than another for everyone to whom the focal individual is nonnegatively related, and a strictly lower payoff for everyone to whom the focal individual is negatively related, then the former action is strictly preferred. If the focal individual violated this axiom by choosing a dominated action, then its behaviour would seem clearly non-optimal because by simply switching actions, it would either be able to increase the personal fitness of every individual in $I$ to whom it is positively related, or to decrease the personal fitness of every individual to whom it is negatively related. This axiom is closely related to the ‘Pareto principle’ in social choice theory (see Bossert and Weymark (2004)).

**Focal Individual Monotonicity.** For all $a, b \in F$ such that $a_1 > b_1$ and $a_j = b_j$ for all $j \in \{2, \ldots, n\}$, $a \succ_r b$.

Focal Individual Monotonicity says that starting from any action, if the focal individual’s payoff is increased while the payoff of all other individuals is held fixed, then the resulting action is strictly preferred to the original. Thus, the focal individual is not completely other-regarding; it does care about its personal fitness. Again, violating this axiom would seem clearly non-optimal for it would amount to sacrificing one’s personal fitness without a compensating gain in fitness for anyone else. Such a sacrifice would necessarily reduce inclusive fitness (because personal fitness is a component of inclusive fitness); so satisfying this axiom is necessary for being an inclusive fitness maximizer.

**Baseline Independence.** For all $a, b, c \in F$ such that $(a + c) \in F$ and $(b + c) \in F$,

$$a \succeq_r b \iff (a + c) \succeq_r (b + c).$$

Baseline Independence requires the focal individual’s evaluation of an action to be independent of the ‘baseline fitnesses’ from which we start; so if action $a$ is preferred to $b$, this preference will never be reversed by changing the baseline. (Note that on the LHS of the above equivalence, the baseline is the null action $0$, whereas on the RHS it is $c$.) So if an individual prefers $a$ to $b$ today, it should continue to do so tomorrow, irrespective of what fitness-affecting events have occurred in the interim. Another interpretation is to think of $(b + c)$ as the result of performing actions $b$ and $c$ in succession; the axiom then says that if one action is preferred to another, it should remain so irrespective of which other actions have already been performed.
Nepotism. For all \( a, b \in F \), for all \( j, k \in I \) such that \( r_j \geq r_k \), and for all \( x > 0 \), if \( b_j = a_j + x \), \( b_k = a_k - x \), and \( b_i = a_i \) for all \( i \in I \setminus \{ j, k \} \), then (i) \( b \succ_r a \) if \( r_j > r_k \) and (ii) \( b \sim_r a \) if \( r_j = r_k \).

Nepotism captures the idea that the focal individual would prefer to help closer than more distant relatives; this is a central prediction of kin selection theory. The axiom says that starting from a given action, if some quantity of payoff is shifted from one individual to another more closely related individual while everyone else’s payoff is held fixed, then the resulting action will be preferred; while if payoff is shifted to an equally related individual, indifference will result. To satisfy Nepotism, all the focal individual needs to ‘know’ is which of any pair of individuals it is more closely related to, but not by how much. This seems a reasonable idealization of the actual powers of kin discrimination of many animals.

Haldane. For all \( a, b \in F \), if there exist \( k \in \{ 2, \ldots, n \} \) and \( x \in \mathbb{R} \) such that (i) \( r_k \neq 0 \), \( b_1 = a_1 - x \), \( b_k = a_k + x/r_k \), and \( b_j = a_j \) for all \( j \in I \setminus \{ 1, k \} \) or (ii) \( r_k = 0 \), \( b_1 = a_1 \), \( b_k = a_k + x \), and \( b_j = a_j \) for all \( j \in I \setminus \{ 1, k \} \), then \( a \sim_r b \).

Haldane provides a formal statement of the idea that starting from a given action, if we reduce the focal individual’s own payoff by \( x \) and increase the payoff to any other individual \( i \) by \( \frac{x}{r_i} \), then indifference is the result; that is, the focal individual uses relatedness as the ‘exchange rate’ for determining which payoff sacrifices it is prepared to make. The axiom derives its name from Haldane’s remark quoted in the Introduction that it would be a fitness-enhancing sacrifice to jump into a river to save two brothers or eight cousins when \( r = (1, \frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{8}, \ldots) \). Note that this axiom requires only that the focal individual be able to perform ‘egocentric’ comparisons; that is, it must be able to compare the results of transferring its own payoff to others. It does not require comparisons among pairs of actions that involve transfers between two non-focal individuals (unlike Nepotism). Nonetheless, to satisfy Haldane is still a demanding task, as it requires that the focal individual ‘knows’ its degree of relatedness to every other individual in \( I \), and uses this information to compute the level of self-sacrifice it is prepared to make.

4. The Results

We now use the axioms introduced in the preceding section to provide axiomatic characterizations of inclusive fitness maximization (Theorem 1) and quasi-inclusive fitness maximization (Theorem 2).
Theorem 1. The relation $\succeq_r$ satisfies Ordering, Focal Individual Monotonicity, and Haldane if and only if the focal individual is an inclusive fitness maximizer.

Theorem 1 states necessary and sufficient conditions for the focal individual to be an inclusive fitness maximizer, namely that its preference relation $\succeq_r$ satisfies Ordering, Focal Individual Monotonicity, and Haldane. It might be thought that this result is somewhat unexciting on the grounds that the Haldane axiom is conceptually quite similar to inclusive fitness maximization itself. However two points should be noted. Firstly, recall that Haldane concerns only ‘egocentric’ comparisons between actions which involve a transfer of payoff from the focal individual to another individual. The axiom is silent about how to rank pairs of actions that are not of this sort; yet inclusive fitness maximization yields a ranking of all actions in the feasible set. So the conceptual gap between the axioms of Theorem 1 and the characterization is in fact substantial, and the proof correspondingly non-trivial.

Secondly, note that the Haldane axiom on its own does not suffice to characterize inclusive fitness maximization; the other two axioms of Theorem 1 are also needed. Therefore, the theorem helps to clarify the exact logical relation between Haldane’s original idea, as formalized here, and Hamilton’s later theory. Because the two axioms that must be added to Haldane to yield inclusive fitness maximization (Ordering and Focal Individual Monotonicity) are fairly obvious rationality requirements, this vindicates the widely-held view that Haldane had grasped the essence of inclusive fitness theory prior to its detailed elaboration by Hamilton.

Theorem 2. The relation $\succeq_r$ satisfies Ordering, Continuity, Payoff Dominance, Baseline Independence, and Nepotism if and only if the focal individual is a quasi-inclusive fitness maximizer.

Theorem 2 characterizes quasi-inclusive fitness maximization using five axioms that do not include Haldane. As the proof in the Appendix shows, the first four axioms (Ordering, Continuity, Payoff Dominance, and Baseline Independence) imply that the focal individual evaluates actions by a weighted sum of the payoffs for some vector of weights whose signs are the same as the signs of the corresponding relatedness coefficients; the addition of Nepotism then restricts these weights to be monotone transformations of these coefficients. Thus, the first four axioms characterize one component of inclusive fitness theory—evaluating actions by weighted sums of payoffs,
while the fifth axiom ensures a logical link with the second component—using weights that vary positively with relatedness.

Although Theorem 2 only characterizes quasi-inclusive fitness maximization, rather than inclusive fitness maximization itself, it has one significant advantage over Theorem 1, namely, its axioms make weaker informational demands on the focal individual than does Haldane. Consequently, it should be correspondingly easier for natural selection to bring about conformity to them. Recall that Nepotism requires that the focal individual prefers to help closer than more distant relatives; exact degrees of relatedness do not matter. Because kin discrimination is quite common in social species, there is no great difficulty in imagining how natural selection could produce organisms whose choice behaviour satisfies Nepotism. By contrast, it is rather harder to imagine natural selection fine-tuning choice behaviour so as to satisfy Haldane. So although Theorem 2 only yields quasi-inclusive fitness maximization, the axioms it uses are more biologically reasonable.

It is worth commenting on the logical relationship between the axioms used in our two theorems. Because quasi-inclusive fitness maximization is a special case of inclusive fitness maximization, the three axioms of Theorem 1 together imply all of the axioms of Theorem 2. The Ordering axiom is common to both theorems, but as we shall argue, Ordering in combination with either Focal Individual Monotonicity or Haldane does not imply any of the non-ordering axioms of Theorem 2.

Ordering and Focal Individual Monotonicity are not sufficient to exclude non-continuous orderings such as lexicographic binary relations. Furthermore, they place no restrictions on the monotonicity properties of \( \succeq_r \) with respect to individuals other than the focal individual, so they do not imply Payoff Dominance either. In addition, these two axioms do not imply the additive structure required by Baseline Independence or the additive trade-offs employed in Nepotism.

Haldane only applies to comparisons involving the indifference relation \( \sim_r \), and so cannot be used in conjunction with Ordering to determine if the upper and lower contour sets of any action \( a \) are closed, as required by Continuity. Nor do they imply Payoff Dominance, which is concerned with the strict preference \( \succ_r \). Furthermore, these two axioms do not imply the additive structure required by Baseline Independence. The kind of transfers between two non-focal individuals considered in Nepotism cannot be replicated by a sequence of transfers of the kind considered by Haldane when \( r_j \neq r_k \). Moreover, Haldane makes no claims about the strict preference \( \succ_r \),
so Ordering and Haldane do not imply Nepotism either.

5. Discussion

The popularity of the inclusive fitness concept in evolutionary biology arises because it allows social behaviour, even when it is individually costly, to be understood from the perspective of an individual organism ‘trying’ to achieve a goal, thus preserving Darwin’s insight that selection will lead to the appearance of design in nature. (The goal in question, of course, is maximization of inclusive fitness.) This has led many authors to see a link between social evolution and rational choice theory; that is, evolved organisms should behave like rational agents trying to maximize a utility function, where the utility function is inclusive fitness (Grafen, 2006; West and Gardner, 2013).

The use of concepts from rational choice theory in evolutionary biology is widespread, and extends beyond social evolution. To take two well-known examples, optimal foraging models have often been inspired in part by Bayesian decision theory (e.g., Houston and Mcnamara (1980)); while evolutionary game theory has borrowed liberally from the traditional rationality-based game theory (see Maynard Smith (1982); Hammerstein (2012)). More recently, there have been attempts to forge links between social choice theory, another branch of rational choice theory, and evolution (Okasha, 2009; Bossert, Qi, and Weymark, 2013a,b).

At the heart of rational choice theory is the idea of utility maximization by individuals. However, what is not always appreciated by those who apply this idea to biology (and others) is that a widely accepted approach to rational choice called revealed preference theory (see Kreps (1988)) treats utility maximization as a strictly ‘as if’ affair. To describe an individual as a utility maximizer, on this view, is not to speculate about the proximate psychological causes of its behaviour, but rather just to say that the individual behaves as if it were trying to maximize a utility function. Consistent with this behaviourist orientation, in revealed preference theory, theorists do not begin their analysis of individual behaviour by simply writing down a real-valued utility function; rather they begin with a description of an individual’s choice behaviour, which can be summarized in the form of a binary preference relation on a set of alternatives. They then investigate the conditions that this binary relation must satisfy if it is to be representable by a real-valued utility function. This methodology enables clear operational meaning to be given to the hypothesis of utility maximization.
Our approach has to been apply this methodology to the case of inclusive fitness maximization. To that end, we have sought axioms on a focal individual’s preference relation over actions (i.e., payoff vectors) which are necessary and sufficient for this individual to always choose between actions in a way that maximizes its inclusive fitness. Our hope is that this endeavor helps elucidate, in a novel and precise way, the connection between social evolution theory and rational choice theory. By contrast, previous work on this connection, for example Alan Grafen’s pioneering work on the ‘individual as a maximizing agent analogy’ (Grafen, 2002, 2006, 2009), does not take account of the ‘as if’ nature of utility-maximization employed in revealed preference theory, and so has not employed the behaviourist methodology used here. The same is true of much other biological work that draws on rational choice theory.

It is worth explicitly comparing our analysis to Grafen (2006). In that article, Grafen seeks a firm foundation for the idea, popularly assumed in behavioural ecology, that as a result of natural selection individuals can be expected to display inclusive fitness maximizing behaviour. To this end, he studies a simple model of social behaviour in which individuals play strategies which have consequences for their own and others’ reproductive fitness, with the effects on fitness assumed to be additive. Grafen then establishes links between the evolutionary dynamics and the individuals’ strategic choices. While these links fall short of showing that selection will always lead to inclusive fitness maximization (as Grafen acknowledges), they are still significant; in effect, they show that if all individuals choose the inclusive fitness maximizing strategy, then a population-genetic equilibrium will obtain. In the absence of genetic constraints, selection can thus be expected to lead individuals to maximize their inclusive fitness.

Grafen’s analysis draws on rational choice theory by explicitly modelling an individual as attempting to solve an optimization problem. He deduces this individual’s objective function (or utility function) from considerations of evolutionary stability. This work is valuable, and certainly helps to justify the behavioural ecologist’s assumption of inclusive fitness maximization. However, it only goes part way to forging a link between social evolution and rational choice theory because Grafen’s analysis leaves untouched the question of what pattern(s) of choice behaviour are necessary and sufficient for an individual to be representable as an inclusive fitness maximizer. Our analysis answers this question, and thus complements Grafen’s work. In effect, Grafen aims to justify the idea that evolution will lead individuals to
maximize their inclusive fitness; while we aim to show, in terms of observable choice behaviour, what inclusive fitness maximization actually amounts to.

One outstanding issue is whether our analysis can be extended to deal with non-additive costs and benefits, thus capturing traits such as the sex-ratio, dispersal, and more generally phenotypic interactions. Inclusive fitness models usually deal with phenotypic non-additivity in one of two ways: either by invoking weak selection (Rousset, 2004) or by defining the the $b$ and $c$ terms of Hamilton’s rule as partial regression coefficients rather than as incremental payoffs (Queller, 1985, 2011; Frank, 1998; Gardner, West, and Wild, 2011). In principle, the latter approach could be used to define the actions in our model as our formal analysis assumes only that each action $a$ is a vector in $\mathbb{R}^n$. However, the usefulness of extending our analysis in this way is debatable because a satisfactory justification of the idea that individuals maximize their inclusive fitness in non-additive scenarios has not been given. (It is unclear whether Grafen’s (2006) argument can be generalized to non-additive cases; see Gardner, West, and Wild (2011) and Lehmann and Rousset (2014) for conflicting opinions on this issue.)

To conclude, our aim has been to study the connection between rational choice and social evolution theory and to place it on a secure foundation. We do this by seeking to deduce inclusive fitness maximization from a more primitive basis, namely axioms on an individual’s ‘as if preferences’, in accordance with a standard decision-theoretic methodology. Our hope is that this will shed light on the conceptual links between evolution and rational choice theory, show a possible route by which natural selection could bring about inclusive fitness maximization or something close to it, and help to draw out behavioural implications of inclusive fitness theory that are directly testable.

Appendix

We say that the focal individual is an $m$-inclusive fitness maximizer, $m \in \{2, \ldots, n\}$, if, for all $M \subseteq I$ such that $1 \in M$ and $|M| = m$,

$$a \succeq_r b \iff \sum_{i \in M} r_i a_i \geq \sum_{i \in M} r_i b_i$$

for all $a, b \in F$ such that $a_j = b_j$ for all $j \in I \setminus M$. Thus, the focal individual is an inclusive fitness maximizer if it is an $n$-inclusive fitness maximizer.

The following two lemmas are used in the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 1. If the relation $\succeq_r$ satisfies Ordering, Focal Individual Monotonicity, and Haldane, then the focal individual is a 2-inclusive fitness maximizer.

Proof. Consider any $k \in \{2, \ldots, n\}$, $M = \{1, k\}$, and $a, b \in F$. Let $a'_j = a_j$ for all $j \in I \setminus \{1, k\}$ and consider the set

$$L_{(a_j)_{j \in N \setminus \{1, k\}}}(a_1, a_k) = \{(a'_1, a'_k) \mid a' \in F \text{ and } a' \sim_r a\},$$

where $a' = (a'_1, \ldots, a'_n)$. This is the level set of the restriction of $\succeq_r$ corresponding to the set of components $\{1, k\}$ that contains $(a_1, a_k)$ conditional on the remaining variables having the values $(a_j)_{j \in N \setminus \{1, k\}}$. By subtracting $x = -r_k(s_k + a_k)$ from $a_1$ and adding $x/r_k$ to $a_k$ when $r_k \neq 0$ or by adding $-(s_k + a_k)$ to $a_k$ when $r_k = 0$, it follows from Haldane that the point $(a_1 + r_k(s_k + a_k), -s_k)$ belongs to this level set.

In order for the focal individual to be a 2-inclusive fitness maximizer, it is necessary that any point $(a'_1, a'_k)$ in $L_{(a_j)_{j \in N \setminus \{1, k\}}}(a_1, a_k)$ be such that

$$a'_1 + r_k a'_k = a_1 + r_k a_k = a_1 + r_k (s_k + a_k) + r_k(-s_k). \quad (1)$$

Any such point can be reached by subtracting $x = a_1 + r_k(s_k + a_k) - a'_1$ from $a_1 + r_k(s_k + a_k)$ and adding $x/r_k$ to $-s_k$ when $r_k \neq 0$ or by adding $s_k + a'_k$ to $-s_k$ when $r_k = 0$. Thus, by Haldane, it follows that any point $(a'_1, a'_k)$ for which (1) holds is in the level set of the point $(a_1 + r_k(s_k + a_k), -s_k)$. The transitivity of $\sim_r$ then implies that $a' \sim_r a$ for all $(a'_1, a'_k) \in L_{(a_j)_{j \in N \setminus \{1, k\}}}(a_1, a_k)$. By Ordering and Focal Individual Monotonicity, higher level sets of $\succeq_r$ are associated with higher level sets $L_{(a_j)_{j \in N \setminus \{1, k\}}}(a_1, a_k)$.

The same procedure can be applied to $b$. Defining $b'$ and $L_{(b_j)_{j \in N \setminus \{1, k\}}}(b_1, b_k)$ by analogy to $a'$ and $L_{(a_j)_{j \in N \setminus \{1, k\}}}(a_1, a_k)$, it follows that $b' \sim_r b$ for all $(b'_1, b'_k) \in L_{(b_j)_{j \in N \setminus \{1, k\}}}(b_1, b_k)$ and that higher level sets of $\succeq_r$ are associated with higher level sets $L_{(b_j)_{j \in N \setminus \{1, k\}}}(b_1, b_k)$. Transitivity now implies that

$$a \succeq_r b \iff a_1 + r_k a_k \geq b_1 + r_k b_k$$

for all $a, b \in F$ such that $a_j = b_j$ for all $j \in I \setminus \{1, k\}$. Hence, the focal individual is a 2-inclusive fitness maximizer. \qed

The following lemma is established by reinterpreting and adapting the proof of Lemma 3.3.1 in d’Aspremont (1985). D’Aspremont’s lemma is concerned with the properties of weighted utilitarian social objectives.
Lemma 2. If the relation $\succeq_r$ satisfies Ordering, Focal Individual Monotonicity, and Haldane, then the focal individual is an $m$-inclusive fitness maximizer for all $m \in \{2, \ldots, n\}$.

Proof. By Lemma 1, the focal individual is a 2-inclusive fitness maximizer. If $n = 2$, we are done. If $n > 2$, we complete the proof by induction. Suppose that the focal individual is an $m$-inclusive fitness maximizer, where $m \in \{2, \ldots, n-1\}$. We need to show that the focal individual is an $(m+1)$-inclusive fitness maximizer.

It is sufficient to consider the case in which $M = \{1, \ldots, m+1\}$. Let $a, b \in F$ be such that $a_j = b_j$ for all $j \in I \setminus \{1, \ldots, m+1\}$. Without loss of generality, we can suppose that $a_{m+1} \geq b_{m+1}$ (if this is not the case, then the roles of $a$ and $b$ can be interchanged in the following argument). Define $c \in \mathbb{R}^n$ by letting

$$c_j = a_j \geq -s_j \quad \forall j \in I \setminus \{1, m+1\},$$

$$c_{m+1} = b_{m+1} \geq -s_{m+1},$$

and

$$c_1 = a_1 + r_{m+1}(a_{m+1} - b_{m+1}).$$

Because $a_1 \geq -s_1$ and, by assumption, $a_{m+1} \geq b_{m+1}$, it follows that $c_1 \geq -s_1$ and, together with the inequalities in (2) and (3), we obtain $c \in F$.

Using (3) and (4), it follows that

$$c_1 + r_{m+1}c_{m+1} = a_1 + r_{m+1}a_{m+1}.$$  (5)

By Lemma 1, the focal individual is a 2-inclusive fitness maximizer and, thus, (4) implies

$$c \simeq_r a.$$  (6)

It follows from (2) and (3) that $c_j = b_j$ for all $j \in \{m+1, \ldots, n\}$. By the induction hypothesis, the focal individual is an $m$-inclusive fitness maximizer and, thus,

$$c \succeq_r b \iff \sum_{i=1}^{m} r_i c_i \geq \sum_{i=1}^{m} r_i b_i.$$  (7)

Because $c_{m+1} = b_{m+1}$, (7) is equivalent to

$$c \succeq_r b \iff \sum_{i=1}^{m+1} r_i c_i \geq \sum_{i=1}^{m+1} r_i b_i.$$
Furthermore, by (6) and the transitivity of \( \succeq_r \),
\[
a \succeq_r b \iff c \succeq_r b.
\]
Thus,
\[
a \succeq_r b \iff \sum_{i=1}^{m+1} r_i c_i \geq \sum_{i=1}^{m+1} r_i b_i. \tag{8}
\]
Because \( c_j = a_j \) for all \( j \in I \setminus \{1, m+1\} \) and (5) holds, it follows that
\[
\sum_{i=1}^{m+1} r_i a_i = \sum_{i=1}^{m+1} r_i c_i.
\]
Substituting this equality in (8), we obtain
\[
a \succeq_r b \iff \sum_{i=1}^{m+1} r_i a_i \geq \sum_{i=1}^{m+1} r_i b_i.
\]
That is, the focal individual is an \((m + 1)\)-inclusive fitness maximizer.

We now use Lemma 2 to prove that the relation \( \succeq_r \) satisfies Ordering, Focal Individual Monotonicity, and Haldane if and only if the focal individual is an inclusive fitness maximizer, as Theorem 1 asserts.

**Proof of Theorem 1.** It is straightforward to verify that if the focal individual is an inclusive fitness maximizer, then \( \succeq_r \) satisfies Ordering, Focal Individual Monotonicity, and Haldane.

Now, suppose that \( \succeq_r \) satisfies these three axioms. Lemma 2 states that the focal individual is an \( m \)-inclusive fitness maximizer for all \( m \in \{2, \ldots, n\} \) if \( \succeq_r \) satisfies these axioms. Setting \( m = n \), it follows that the focal individual is an inclusive fitness maximizer.

We now turn to the proof of Theorem 2. As a first step, we state a lemma, the proof of which is almost identical to the proof of Theorem 8.1 in Bossert and Weymark (2004) with a reinterpretation of the axioms and a change in notation. As is the case with the lemma of d’Aspremont (1985) used above, Bossert and Weymark’s result is expressed in terms of a weighted utilitarian social objective. The only change needed to apply their proof here is that the payoffs of any individual with a negative relatedness coefficient must be replaced by the negative of this payoff. See also Theorem 4.3.1 in Blackwell and Girshick (1954) for a related result (without the continuity axiom) in the context of decision-making under uncertainty.
Lemma 3. The relation $\succeq_r$ satisfies Ordering, Continuity, Payoff Dominance, and Baseline Independence if and only if there exists $(\beta_1, \ldots, \beta_n) \in \mathbb{R}^n$ with $\beta_i > 0$ if and only if $r_i > 0$ for all $i \in I$ such that, for all $a, b \in F$,

$$a \succeq_r b \iff \sum_{i=1}^n \beta_i a_i \geq \sum_{i=1}^n \beta_i b_i.$$ 

We next prove that $\succeq_r$ satisfies Ordering, Continuity, Payoff Dominance, Baseline Independence, and Nepotism if and only if the focal individual is a quasi-inclusive fitness maximizer, as Theorem 2 asserts.

Proof of Theorem 2. It is straightforward to verify that if the focal individual is a quasi-inclusive fitness maximizer, then $\succeq_r$ satisfies Ordering, Continuity, Payoff Dominance, Baseline Independence, and Nepotism.

Now, suppose that $\succeq_r$ satisfies these five axioms. In view of Lemma 3, all that remains to be established is that, for all $j, k \in I$, the parameters are such that (i) $r_j > r_k$ implies $\beta_j > \beta_k$ and (ii) $r_j = r_k$ implies $\beta_j = \beta_k$.

Consider case (i) first. Suppose that there exist $j, k \in I$ such that $r_j > r_k$. Let $a, b \in F$ and $x > 0$ be such that $a_j = a_k = a_0$, $b_j = a_0 + x$, $b_k = a_0 - x$, and $b_i = a_i$ for all $i \in I \setminus \{j, k\}$. Nepotism implies that $b \succ_r a$. By Lemma 3 and the definition of $a, b$, and $x$,

$$b \succ_r a \iff \sum_{i=1}^n \beta_i b_i > \sum_{i=1}^n \beta_i a_i$$

$$\iff \beta_j b_j + \beta_k b_k > \beta_j a_j + \beta_k a_k$$

$$\iff (\beta_j + \beta_k)a_0 + (\beta_j - \beta_k)x > (\beta_j + \beta_k)a_0$$

$$\iff (\beta_j - \beta_k)x > 0.$$ 

Because $x > 0$, the last inequality implies that $\beta_j > \beta_k$.

The proof of case (ii) is similar. In this case, suppose that there exist $j, k \in I$ such that $r_j = r_k$. Defining $a, b$ as above, Nepotism implies $b \sim_r a$. Replacing the inequalities with equalities in the displayed array, it follows that

$$b \sim_r a \iff (\beta_j - \beta_k)x = 0.$$ 

Hence, $\beta_j = \beta_k$ because $x > 0$. \qed
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