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A Study of the Late Madhyamaka Doxography

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A dissertation submitted to the University of Bristol in accordance with the requirements of the degree of PhD in the Faculty of Arts, the Department of Theology and Religious Studies

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69,220 Words
Abstract

This thesis entitled *A Study of the Late Madhyamaka Doxography* concerns the classification of the Indian Madhyamaka. Our studies of the Indian Madhyamaka classification have largely depended on Tibetan doxographical texts, such as *Grub mtha’*. While these Tibetan accounts systematically exhibit its bifurcation, neither do they always agree to each other, nor always reflect the realities in India.

In the first chapter, therefore, I show three types of classifications of the Indian Madhyamaka according to Tibetan doxographers and problems related to them.

Chapter 2 is allotted to the classification of the externalist Madhyamaka and the internalist Madhyamaka, which are generally called ‘Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka’ and ‘Yogācāra-Madhyamaka’ respectively. Of these, Tibetan doxographers are discrepant especially in terms of to what extent the Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka conventionally follows the Sautrāntika’s view.

In chapter 3, I examine the treatment of Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti in India, who are representative of the Svātāntrika and the Prāsaṅgika respectively. In Indian sources of the late period, we hardly find these terms, any opposition or any view which strictly follows either Bhāviveka’s or Candrakīrti’s position although we so often classify the Madhyamaka into the Svātāntrika and the Prāsaṅgika. This causes a doubt whether this classification existed in India. I propose a possible explanation why it cannot be found.

In chapter 4, I examine the classification of the Māyopamādvyavādin and the Sarvadharma-pratīṣṭhānāvādin. Although this classification is traceable to Indian sources, their explanation is very ambiguous. Tibetan accounts seem to be confused, too, since their explanation of this classification differs significantly.

By examining these classifications on the basis of Indian sources, I attempt to have a comprehensive look on the late Indian Madhyamaka doxography, which has been obscure, so that this thesis can contribute to a better understanding of the late Madhyamaka.
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I wish to express my appreciation to my parents and Yugyō-ji Temple of the Jishū-school for continuous financial aid that enabled me to undertake this research. Finally and above all I would like to acknowledge with deepest gratitude the comfort and support received from my wife, Kai.
Author’s Declaration

I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the Regulations of the University of Bristol. The work is original except where indicated by special reference in the text and no part of the dissertation has been submitted for any other degree.

Any views expressed in the dissertation are those of the author and in no way represent those of the University of Bristol.

The dissertation has not been presented to any other University for examination either in the United Kingdom or overseas.

Signed:  
Date: 26/11/03
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Note on Translation and Transliteration

A few clarifications would be necessary concerning conventions. At the top of each translation, I assigned a number in square brackets [ ] for the sake of convenience. An asterisk * in translation indicates a conjectured but unattested Sanskrit reading based on Tibetan or Chinese. However, I did not use it for the names of philosophical schools, such as Prāsaṅgika, or for proper names of persons and texts, with a few exceptions. (I used it for *Karatalaratna, which only survives in Chinese and for *Lakṣaṇaṭīkā, which does not have a title and was provisionally entitled by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana.) I did not always use it in the main text which is not a translation of a primary source.

In translation, square brackets [ ] indicate words which are not in the original Sanskrit or Tibetan and supplied by the present author. Round brackets ( ) are used to indicate Sanskrit or Tibetan equivalents or explanation.

The original texts of translation are given in footnotes, with the exception of the lṬa ba'i khyad par and the Pañcatathāgatamudrāvivaraṇa, which are given as appendices. I quoted Sanskrit and Tibetan texts from editions of these texts when available. Regarding Tibetan, when no edition is available, I followed the Derge edition and the Peking edition of the Tibetan Tripitaka.

I use following abbreviations when I indicate different readings:

Em. : Emendation (by myself).
Ms. : Manuscript.

The table of transliteration of Sanskrit and Tibetan is shown below. Concerning Sanskrit, I changed nasals (ṅ, n, etc.) in certain editions into anusvāra (ṃ) for the sake of consistency. Regarding punctuation, I add and omit a danda (¦) for Sanskrit and shad
(I) for Tibetan as, I consider, appropriate. I re-transliterate in the following way when an edition which I refer to for my translation employs a different system.

Sanskrit

अ आ ई उ ऊ ए ऐ ओ औ क ख ग घ ङ च छ ज झ ञ ट ठ ड ढ त थ द ध न प फ ब भ म य र ल व श ष

Tibetan:

ཝ ཁ ག ང ཅ ཆ ཇ ཉ ཊ ཋ ཌ ཐ ད ཐ དྷ པ ཕ བ བྷ ཝ ཞ འ ར ལ ཤ བ མ ཡ ཧ ཀ ར ཞ འ
Introduction

0.1 Doxography of the Indian Madhyamaka

As the title shows, the purpose of this thesis is to clarify difference of ideas in the Indian Madhyamaka and to systematically classify these ideas as well as teachers who maintain them. Buddhism had developed a diversity of philosophical thoughts during its existence in India over 1500 years. It came to be roughly classified into four, the Vaibhāṣika, the Sautrāntika, the Yogācāra and the Madhyamaka, towards the extinction of Buddhism in India at the beginning of the 13th C. Even in each of these philosophical schools, there was disagreement in its view and further divisions were made by Indian teachers. My interest is especially drawn to those of the Madhyamaka, which is, later in Tibet, considered the superior philosophical system in Buddhism.

When we undertake studies of Buddhism in India and try to draw a picture of its development, we face many difficulties in finding clues in Indian sources. In general, Indians do not seem to have as much chronological concept as Chinese and Tibetans, who often leave some clues in their works. Chinese, in most cases, record the year in which they translated Indian Buddhist scriptures into Chinese. Tibetans often write the year of birth, death and so forth of Tibetan translators or of Indian teachers who entered Tibet in the text of history, for example. In fact, Chinese and Tibetan records, such as when certain texts were translated, when pilgrims visited India and when Indian teachers were invited, are used to speculate on the chronology of Buddhism in India. As very often pointed out, on the other hand, there are few texts written by Indian teachers themselves that concern the dates of events. Clues for dating them in Indian texts themselves are scarce and often limited to quotations and borrowing of ideas from one another. There are, in addition, many forgeries ascribed to famous teachers. This sometimes causes inconsistency in the works of a given teacher and sometimes confuses our understanding of chronological sequence. These forgeries and lack of chronological clues make it very difficult both to determine dates of teachers and to understand their ideas. When we examine the development of philosophical thoughts and attempt to classify them, they become huge obstacles.
Introduction

Although Indian sources do not give us much information, there are countless texts composed in Tibet that refer to the doxography of the Madhyamaka. So far our understanding of the history and doxography of the Madhyamaka has largely depended on interpretations given by Tibetan texts called Grub mtha', which systematically classify Buddhist (and often non-Buddhist) philosophical schools and scholars according to differences in their views. Even though there are doxographical texts composed by Indian teachers, the designations of sub-schools are different from text to text and their explanations are often too brief to decide what sub-school it is and who belongs to it. Grub mtha' texts, on the other hand, explain divergences of the Madhyamaka in sequence, differences in views among sub-schools, and who belongs to these sub-schools. For this reason, Grub mtha' texts have helped us understand the development of the Madhyamaka thought and greatly contributed to the studies of the Madhyamaka by compensating, to a certain extent, for the lack of Indian sources.

However, there are some problems in depending heavily on Tibetan sources. There exist many Grub mtha' or similar texts in Tibet, but not all agree on the way of classification, names of schools or attribution of teachers to the schools. Mimaki has already shown that these texts as well as various ways of classification in them were developed to a large extent in Tibet. Therefore we must be very cautious in dealing with these texts. If they were modified gradually over a long period of time in Tibet after the extinction of Buddhism in India so that they should provide clearer and more systematic explanations, they might not reflect what actually happened in India. Even though it is necessary to compare doxography described in Grub mtha' texts with Indian sources in order to verify their descriptions, this is often a very difficult task. The fact that the terms used to designate the Madhyamaka sub-schools, ‘Svātāntrika’ and ‘Prāsaṅgika’, have not been found in any Indian sources in a strict sense serves as a good example. In addition, even though some Tibetan terms which could be restored as ‘Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika’ and ‘Yogācāra-Mādhyamika’ are found in the Tibetan translation of an Indian text, these

1 Mimaki [1982a], [1982b] and [1983].
Introduction
terms have not been attested in original Sanskrit. This suggests that the classification of the Madhyamaka common in Tibet may not necessarily have been common in India. Thus, Tibetan doxography of the Indian Madhyamaka can be interpreted as the process of establishing coherent explanations of the Indian Madhyamaka, which had various and, in some cases, contradictory elements. As a consequence, Grub mtha’ texts sometimes contradict each other and contain many problems. In this present work, therefore, I would like to show these problems concerning the Indian Madhyamaka doxography, which mainly originated from dependence on Grub mtha’ and other Tibetan sources.

The problems are indeed too many to enumerate. To give a few brief examples, however, the doxography of the Indian Madhyamaka has been studied mainly based on Tibetan sources whose concern is the Svatantrika-Prasanga dichotomy. Therefore, classification of the Indian Madhyamaka has often been explained on the basis of this dichotomy. On the contrary, we know almost nothing about how the philosophical view of Candrakirti (ca. 600-650), a Prasanga, was treated before the 8th C and there is hardly any surviving text written by the late Madhyamikas (after Santaraksita, i.e. the 8th C) which strictly follows either Bhaviveka’s philosophical position or Candrakirti’s. This causes a doubt whether the Svatantrika and the Prasanga existed in opposition in India.

Second, according to some Tibetan accounts, the Yogacara-Madhyamika is classified into the Sakra school (rnam bden pa) and the Nirakara school (rnam brdzun pa). This Sakra-Nirakara distinction is originally applied to the epistemology of the Yogacara school. Kajiyama explains their difference that if the image (dktra) is real, one will have an image in cognition even when one reaches enlightenment, and if it is false, one will not have any image. If both cognition and images are real and identical, as the

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2 For example, it is reported that Jayananda mentions the Rang rgyud pa in the Madhyamakavataraśīkā (Derge ed. No. 3870 ra 281b6, Peking ed. No. 5271 ra 337a8) and Lakṣmi mentions the mDo sde’i dbu ma pa and the rNal ’byor spyod pa’i dbu ma pa in the Paścaścāratradiśākā (Derge ed. 1842 chi 240a6-b1, Peking ed. No. 2705 ngi 464a3-6) Cf. Ogawa [1984] and Ikakamaya [1976] pp. 199-200.

3 I call the author of the Prajñāpradīpa ‘Bhaviveka’ but not ‘Bhāvaviveka’. See chapter 1, footnote 82 (p. 43).

4 Kajiyama [1975] (pp. 29-30):

Therefore, to the Yogacarin, the image of cognition is the appearance of our mind; and
Sākāra-Yogācāra maintains, either mind will become manifold as objects are, or objects will become one as cognition is. This logical fault can be avoided by the proponents of nirākāra because they, denying the reality of images, hold that cognition, which is real, and images, which are not, are not identical. They are, however, criticised because one cannot have any cognition when one is enlightened.

For the Yogācāra, if an image is real, it exists ultimately and if it is false it does not exist ultimately. For the Mādhyamika, the relation between the reality of images and their existence is not so straightforward. If the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika is a Mādhyamika who accepts the tenet of the Yogācāra conventionally, there will not be much point in distinguishing the Sākāra-Mādhyamika and the Nirākāra-Mādhyamika. Regardless of whether or not an image is real at the conventional level, it appears conventionally for both sides and is empty at the ultimate level. In this case, the only distinction among the Sākāra-Mādhyamika and the Nirākāra-Mādhyamika is whether they hold the conventional reality of images, which is not so important for the Mādhyamikas. On the other hand some modern scholars seem to consider that this is applied to images at the ultimate level. In this case, because nothing is real ultimately for the Mādhyamikas, only whether or not there are images, which are anyway empty, comes into question. As a result, it is very difficult to classify the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika teachers into these two sub-schools because it is not clear on what criteria they should be classified. I have seen few studies done by Western scholars on this matter, and some attempts at classification by Japanese scholars do not seem to be successful so far.  

This necessarily implies that a cognition is always endowed with an image which is represented by our mind. Thus, all the Yogācārinś must be sākāravādins as far as the cognition of common people is concerned. A problem, however, appears in regard to the emancipated person, who is supposed to have acquired nirvikalpajñāna or non-conceptual, super-mundane knowledge. Some Yogācārin thought that knowledge of emancipated person is freed from the fetter of cognitum and cognizer and accordingly is clear like a pure crystal without specks. And they held that this clear, imageless knowledge is essence of cognition, regarding images as false, unreal stains born due to our vāsanā. This is the essential of the nirākārajñānavāda. But others from the same school criticized this theory, saying that what is not real can be never manifested, since otherwise it would entail the unfavourable doctrine of asiṣṭhayāt. Every cognition, inasmuch as it is knowledge, must have an image and yet their is no harm in that an emancipated person’s knowledge is with an image, if he is freed from conceptual thinking, the fundamental of which is the bifurcation of cognitum and cognizer. This is the essential point of the sākārajñānavāda of the Yogācārinś.

5 I will discuss this issue in chapter 4 (p. 211 ff.).
Introduction

It is extremely difficult to solve these problems. I do not think that I could give a definitive conclusion on these matters. There are many other problems surrounding the study of late Madhyamaka doxography. Compared with studies of the early and middle period of the Mādhyamikas such as those of Nāgārjuna, Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti, those of the late Mādhyamikas have not advanced so much, except for those of the so-called ‘Yogācāra-Mādhyamika’ of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. Especially, while some Tibetan accounts classify the late Mādhyamikas into branches and sub-branches, our studies have not reached the point to judge its legitimacy on the basis of Indian sources. Although Tibetan sources have largely contributed to our understanding of late Madhyamaka, it is necessary to examine what evidence Tibetan sources depend on, whether the evidence is traced back to Indian sources and how Tibetan doxography of the Indian Madhyamaka itself has developed. Once we find the basis of the doxography given by Tibetans in an Indian source, it will make it possible for us to judge its legitimacy. Once we find a dichotomy, it leads to further understanding of the late Madhyamaka philosophy because existence of an opposition among the Mādhyamikas suggests that that certain point of the argument was of large interest to teachers in that period. Therefore, it is now necessary to review this phase of the Madhyamaka on the basis of Indian sources.

The other problem concerning the doxography of the Madhyamaka is how we should define ‘school.’ So far we have used the term ‘school’ in an extremely vague way. When we say ‘Prāsaṅgika school,’ it is not clear what kind of school it was, whether there was a group consisting of teachers holding the same philosophical view or a lineage of the same philosophical thought based on the teacher-disciple relation. Furthermore, we are not sure if ‘Prāsaṅgika’, for example, should actually be understood to designate a school. It can be used to classify a person or a view itself or a text which

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6 I call the period of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, during which there was no division in the Madhyamaka ‘early period’, the period of Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti when the distinction of the Svaṭantrika and the Prāsaṅgika is thought to have arisen ‘middle period’ and the period after Śāntarakṣita ‘late period’. Early Madhyamaka, middle Madhyamaka and late Madhyamaka correspond to these period respectively.
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contains a particular view. Because no example of the term ‘Prāsāṅgika’ has been found in Indian sources so far, it may be pointless to discuss it in detail. I also doubt whether the term ‘Mādhyamika’ contains the sense of ‘school’ at all. I am not going to discuss this matter systematically in this thesis, but will mention when a description of some proponent comes up. The purpose of this present thesis is, therefore, to make clear what classifications of the Madhyamaka existed in India as well as what was classified by them.

0.2 Structure of the Present Work

In chapter 1 of this present work, I will first show differences in the classification of the Madhyamaka in Tibetan Grub mtha’ texts and other sources that mention the Madhyamaka sub-divisions in order to examine the ways Tibetan teachers classify the Madhyamaka and the development of the classification of the Madhyamaka in Tibet. We will mainly examine doxography of the dGe lugs pa because it is the basis of our understanding of the Madhyamaka classification. Regarding development of the Madhyamaka doxography in Tibet, I heavily depend on previous studies such as Mimaki’s and can hardly say anything new. I think, however, it is necessary to examine these texts first in order to show how much the doxography of the Madhyamaka changed in Tibet and to what extent the fact is reflected in these texts by comparing them with Indian sources in the later chapters.

Although we classify the Madhyamaka in one way or another, we do not know much about how it was actually classified in India. My interest in this topic started when I read Atiśa’s works. Even though he is said to have been a Prāsāṅgika according to some Tibetan accounts, I could not find, in Atiśa’s works, much evidence that his view

7 In this thesis, if there is no proviso, the term ‘school’ is not used with regard to institutional divisions but to difference of philosophical views.

8 With regard to the name of the author of the Satyadvayāvatāra and the Bodhipathapradīpa, I adopt ‘Atiśa’ following Eimer [1977] although I am not entirely sure which name, Atiśa or Atiśa, is right.

9 Such as the ICang skya grub mtha’ of ICang skya II Rol pa’i rdo rje. See Mimaki [1982a] p. 30 and note 59.
Introduction

is indeed similar to Candrakīrti’s. I felt the need of comparison between Indian texts and Tibetan accounts. Some modern scholars have expressed the feeling that it is not easy to classify late Madhyamaka teachers in the simple dichotomy of the Svātāntreka and the Prāsaṅgika,\(^\text{10}\) which is accepted by Tibetan teachers as well as most modern scholars.

In this present work, therefore, we first examine how Tibetan accounts classify the Madhyamaka. Then an attempt will be made to show what distinction actually existed in the late Indian Madhyamaka.

In chapter 2, we will examine the distinction of the Madhyamaka based on conventional existence: the view which accepts the existence of external objects conventionally and that which accepts mind-only conventionally, which are commonly designated as ‘Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka’ and ‘Yogācāra-Madhyamaka’ respectively. In order to clarify this way of classification, I will pick up passages that mention the classification of the Madhyamaka from selected texts which are placed within the middle and the late periods of the Madhyamaka: Bhāviveka’s Prajñāpradīpa, Śāntarakṣita’s Madhyamakālaṃkāra and his own commentary (vṛtti), Bodhibhadra’s Jñānasārasamuccayanibandhana, the anonymous Bodhisattvācaryāvatārajyākhyānapanājīkā, Lakṣmi’s Pañcakramatikā Kramārthaprakāśikā, Prajñākaramati’s Bodhisattvāvatārapaṇijīkā, Ratnakarasānti’s Madhyamakālaṃkāropadesa and Prajñāpāramitopadesa, and so on. This part of the present work heavily depends on previous works of eminent scholars, namely, Kajiyama for Bhāviveka, Ichigō for Śāntarakṣita, Yamaguchi for Bodhibhadra, Saito for the anonymous commentary on the Bodhisattvācaryāvatāra, Ruegg, Umino and Matsumoto for Ratnakarasānti, and so on.

In this thesis, I refrain from using the terms ‘Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka’ and ‘Yogācāra-Madhyamika’ to denote these views which disagree on conventional existence when I mean that they are not necessarily the Svātāntreka because these terms are commonly used to denote two sub-schools in the Svātāntreka-Madhyamaka. In those Indian texts mentioned above, the dichotomy of the Svātāntreka and Prāsaṅgika is not present. It is not clear at this point if the Prāsaṅgika is included in the view which

\(^{10}\) For example, Ejima [1982] p. 172.
accepts external objects, or even whether or not the dichotomy of the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika existed in India. Therefore, I will provisionally use the terms ‘externalist’ Madhyamaka/Mādhyamika and ‘internalist’ Madhyamaka/ Mādhyamika to denote these two opposing sides. Even though in Indian sources the evidence for this dichotomy is clearer than any other ways of classification, we know little about their tenets, especially that of the externalist Madhyamaka.

Then in chapter 3, we will examine the classification of the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika. Firstly, I compare the view of Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti in India, who are respectively the representative figures of the Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas and the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas, as well as how later Indian and Tibetan teachers treated their thoughts. The former, the comparison of their views, is done by examining their works. Because there are many previous studies that deal with this subject, I only show differences in their views that make it possible for us to understand the criteria of the classification. The latter, transmission of their views, can be done in two different ways: by checking historical records, for example, when their works are translated into Tibetan, and by reading texts written by later teachers who quote their works or support or criticise either view. With regard to later Indian teachers, we look especially at Atiśa, who is very often regarded as a Prāsaṅgika. We will examine his view on the two truths and on inference which Bhāviveka ascribes to the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya) and Candrakīrti to the conventional truth (samvṛti-satya) in order to find out if their views are followed by later Mādhyamikas and why we cannot find clear evidence of this classification in later Madhyamaka texts.

In chapter 4, we will examine a division into the Māyopamādhyavādīn and the Sarvadharmāpratīṣṭhānavādīn. Although this division is also traceable to Indian sources, Tibetan accounts seem to be confused, and their views on this way of classification differ considerably, probably due to the ambiguity of Indian accounts concerning these two sides. This seems to have resulted in confusion among modern scholars, too. We will look into the view of these two proponents on the basis mainly of works written by Advayavajra and his disciples. In addition to this, we also discuss the differences between the Sākāravādīn and the Nirākāravādīn since it seems that the classification of the
Māyopamādvayavādin and the Sarvadharma-pratīṣṭhānavādin is something to do with the Buddha’s cognition.

Thanks to our predecessors’ works, I was able to spot passages that show classification of the Madhyamaka and differences of their doctrines. In Indian sources, however, it is not easy to identify whose view these passages are describing. Texts do not always mention names of proponents but only say “some say” for example. Even if they do, the terms used to designate them are not at all consistent. Some passages are too brief or ambiguous to identify. Moreover, the Mādhyamikas often argue at the level of the ultimate truth. Basically, there is no difference of views among the Mādhyamikas concerning the ultimate truth. Therefore, it is difficult to classify them on the basis of the view on the ultimate truth. Due to these problems, modern scholars do not always agree on how to classify the Madhyamaka. My thesis is also somewhat inconclusive in many respects and it is virtually impossible to understand all the historical events that happened after Candrakīrti or Śāntarakṣita until the extinction of Buddhism in India. However, there is still a need for a comprehensive look at these texts and the late Madhyamaka doxography even though it is a patchwork of fragmentary pieces of evidence. I hope that this present work can contribute to a certain extent to the understanding of the late Indian Madhyamaka by showing a clearer picture.
Chapter 1 Tibetan accounts

As stated above in the introduction, our studies of the history and classification of Indian Madhyamaka heavily depend on doxographical texts called *Grub mtha’*, which deal with Buddhist (and often non-Buddhist) philosophical systems. Texts in this genre show the classification of different philosophical views between Buddhist schools as well as between their sub-schools, and who belongs to these schools. These texts sometimes quote passages from Indian sources to prove their legitimacy. This helps us judge whether or not the description of a certain *Grub mtha’* is justified.

In the *Lam rim chen mo*, whose classification seems to have become the model of later *Grub mtha’* texts, Tsong kha pa (1357-1419), the founder of the dGe lugs pa in Tibet, mentions three different ways of classifying the Mādhyamikas: (1) the Svātantrika (*rang rgyud pa*) and the Praśāṅgika (*thal ’gyur ba*), (2) the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika (*rnal ’byor spyod pa’i dbu ma pa*) and the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika (*mdo sde spyod pa’i dbu ma pa*), and (3) the Māyopamādvyavādīn (*sgyu ma rigs grub pa*) and the Sarvadharmāpratisthānavādīn (*rab tu mi gnas par smra ba*).11 Of these, concerning classification (1), we know that Candrakīrti criticised Bhāviveka over the use of syllogistic inference.12 However we have not found the terms ‘Svātantrika’ and ‘Praśāṅgika’ in any works of the Indian Madhyamaka teachers before Jayānanda (12th C) and do not know if Candrākīrti’s criticism against Bhāviveka created opposing sub-schools in India. Classification (2) is traced back to Indian sources and studied to a certain extent. With regard to the classification (3), we do not know what differentiates these two proponents even though we find these designations in Indian sources. Moreover, *Grub mtha’* texts do not agree on what is the criterion to distinguish the Māyopamādvyavādīn and the Sarvadharmāpratisthānavādīn.

In this chapter, therefore, I will show some examples of the Tibetan doxography of Indian Madhyamaka, and their problems, as a background to our examination of the

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11 These names do not necessarily correspond to the Tibetan terms given in brackets. Concerning these terms, see 1.2 (p. 23 ff.) of this thesis.
12 We will discuss disagreement between Bhāviveka and Candrākīrti in chapter 3 (p. 116 ff.).
classification of Indian Madhyamaka.

1.1 dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po

The Grub mtha’ rnam bzhag rin chen phreng ba of dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po (1728-1791) is one of the most studied Tibetan Grub mtha’ texts. Grub mtha’ texts in this period show an established form of doxography and are the basis of our understanding of the Madhyamaka doxography. It is not clear to what extent Grub mtha’ texts in this period reflect the actual classification of the Madhyamaka in India because they tend to follow earlier Tibetan doxographical works and are not necessarily based on Indian sources. Many of them are also written from the point of the view of the dGe lugs order, whose interest is in Candrakīrti’s Prāsaṅgika. Although they may not properly reflect the doxography of the Indian Madhyamaka, our understanding of its doxography is influenced by them in one way or another. In order to evaluate their reliability, it is first necessary to see how dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po classifies the Madhyamaka in the Grub mtha’ rnam bzhag rin chen phreng ba.

In the Madhyamaka chapter, he gives four topics to be explained: the definition [of the Mādhyamika], the term [Mādhyamika], the distinction [in the Mādhyamika] and the meaning of each division. In the third section (distinction) he explains as follows:

[1-1]

Third (distinction): If a division should be made in the [Mādhyamika], there are two: the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika and the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika.14

According to dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po, thus, Mādhyamika is first classified into the Svātantrika (rang rgyud pa) and the Prāsaṅgika (thal 'gyur ba). Then he again gives four topics to be explained with regard to the Svātantrika: the definition [of the

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gsun pa ni/ de la dbye na/ dbu ma rang rgyud pa dang/ thal 'gyur ba gnyis yod/
Svātantrika], the term [Svātantrika], the distinction [in the Svātantrika] and the way tenets are asserted. He explains the sub-schools of the Svātantrika as follows:

[1-2]

Third (distinction): If a division should be made in the [Svātantrika], there are two: the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika and the Sautrāntikācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika. The Mādhyamika that does not accept external objects but accepts self-awareness is the definition of the former. The foundation of the definition is the ācārya Śāntarakṣita and the like. The Mādhyamika that does not accept self-awareness but accepts external objects established by its particular characteristic (rang gi mtshan nyid) is the definition of the latter. The foundation of the definition is the ācārya Bhāviveka and the like.

There is also an explanation of terms. Concerning the respective establishment of the basis, by reason of maintaining [mind-only] in agreement with the Vījñānavādin, it is called Yogācāra-Mādhyamika. By reason of maintaining the external objects as an aggregate of atoms, in the manner of the Sautrāntika, it is called Sautrāntikācāra-Mādhyamika.¹⁵

Thus Svātantrika is divided into the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika (rmal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma pa) and the Sautrāntikācāra-Mādhyamika (mdo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa). This distinction is based on whether or not they accept external objects and self-awareness. The Sautrāntikācāra-Mādhyamika postulates external objects but does not accept self-awareness. Conversely, the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika asserts self-awareness and denies

  gsum pa ni/ de la dbyul na/ mal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma rang rgyud pa dang/ mdo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma rang rgyud pa gnyis/ phyi don khas mi len zher/ rang rig khas len pa'i dbu ma pa de dang po'i mtshan nyid/ mtshan gzhis ni slob dpon zhi ba 'tsho lta bu/
  rang rig khas mi len zher/ phyi don rang gi mtshan nyid kyi grub pa khas len pa'i dbu ma pa de gnyis pa'i mtshan nyid/ mtshan gzhis ni slob dpon legs ldan 'byed lta bu/
  sgra bshad kyang yod de/ gzhis'i rnam bzlag sems tsam pa dang mthun par khas len pas na mal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma pa dang/ mdo sde pa ltar rdul phra rab bsags pa'i phyi rol gyi don khas len pas na mdo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa zhes brjod do//
external objects. Their designations are considered to be derived from the names of two Buddhist philosophical schools, the Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra, whose views these two Mādhyamikas follow conventionally.¹⁶

He further classifies the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika into two:

[1-3]

Also in regard to the Yogācāra-Svātāntrika-Mādhyamika, there are two: the Mādhyamika that is conformable to the Sākāra school [which maintains the reality of images] and the Mādhyamika that is conformable to the Nirākāra school [which maintains the falsity of images]. The former is Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśila, Āryavimuktisena and the like. The latter is the ācārya Haribhadra, Jītārī, Kambala and the like. It is said that Jītārī is conformable to the Samala-Nirākāra school, but Kambala conformable to the Nirmala-Nirākāra school.¹⁷

The Yogācāra-Svātāntrika-Mādhyamika is further divided into the Mādhyamika that is conformable to the Sākāra school (rnam bden pa dang mthun pa'i dbu ma pa) and the Mādhyamika that is conformable to the Nirākāra school (rnam brdzun pa dang mthun pa'i dbu ma pa). The latter is further divided into one that is conformable to the Samala-Nirākāra school (rnam brdzun dri bcas pa dang mthun pa) and one that is conformable to the Nirmala-Nirākāra school (rnam brdzun dri med pa dang mthun pa). Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśila and Āryavimuktisena are classified as the Mādhyamikas that

¹⁶ Concerning the designation ‘Sautrāntikācāra-Mādhyamika’ (mdo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa) I suspect that ‘ācāra’ (spyod pa) is redundant. If the Mādhyamika who follows the Yogācāra conventionally is called Yogācāra-Mādhyamika, the Mādhyamika who follows the Sautrāntika should be the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika. If the Mādhyamika who follows the Sautrāntika conventionally is called the Sautrāntikācāra-Mādhyamika in the sense that those who undertake practice in the way of the Sautrāntika, the Mādhyamika who follows the Yogācāra conventionally would be the Yogācārācāra-Mādhyamika. Therefore I henceforth use ‘Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika’ in this thesis even when the original Tibetan is mdo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa.

¹⁷Grub mtha' rnam bzhag rin chen phreng ba (lida [1980] p. 30, 17-23): rnal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma rang rgyud pa la yang nam bden pa dang mthun pa'i dbu ma pa dang/ rnam brdzun pa dan mthun pa'i dbu ma pa gnyis yod/ dang po ni/ zhi ba 'tsho dang/ ka ma la shi la dang/ 'phags pa grol sde lta bu'o/ gnyis pa ni slob dpon seng ge bzang po dang/ dze ta'a ri dang/ lva ba pa lta bu ste dze ta'a ri nam brdzun dri bcas pa dang mthun la/ lva ba pa ni nam brdzun dri med pa dang mthun par bshad do//
are conformable to the Sākāra school, while Haribhadra, Jitāri and Kambala are classified as the Mādhyamikas that are conformable to the Nirākāra school. This can be shown as follows:

- **Svātantrika**
  - Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika .......................... Bhāviveka
  - Yogācāra-Mādhyamika
    - Sākāra-Mādhyamika ............................. Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla
    - Nirākāra-Mādhyamika .......................... Haribhadra, Jitāri, Kambala
      - Samala-Nirākāra-Mādhyamika........... Jitāri
      - Nirmala- Nirākāra-Mādhyamika ...... Kambala
  - Prāsaṅgika

Although dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po classifies the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika in this way, he does not explain the differences of these sub-schools in detail, especially that of the Mādhyamika conformable to the Samala-Nirākāra school and the Mādhyamika conformable to the Nirmala-Nirākāra school. It is, therefore, almost impossible to ascertain the validity of these classifications on the basis of Indian sources.

On the other hand, dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po gives the definition and the representatives of the Prāsaṅgika as follows:

[1-4]

Second (Prāsaṅgika): When explaining the view of the Prāsaṅgika, there are three topics: definition, [meaning of] the term and the way [their tenet is] asserted.

First (definition): A proponent of no intrinsic nature, who does not hold the establishment through particular characteristics (**rang gi mtshan nyid**) even as common usage, is the definition of the Prāsaṅgika. The foundation of the definition is Buddhaśālā, Candraśīra, Śāntideva and...
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the like.\textsuperscript{18}

This classification held in the dGe lugs order of Tibet, which classifies the Mādhyamika into the Prāsaṅgika and the Svātantrika, the latter of which is further classified into the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika and the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika, is, to a certain extent, adopted by the majority of modern scholars to explain the history and doxography of Indian Madhyamaka.\textsuperscript{19}

It is thought that the Madhyamaka had no division during the period of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, but was divided into the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika in the 6-7th C when Bhāviveka (ca. 500-570) criticised Buddhapaśita (ca. 470-540) and later Candrakīrti (ca. 600-650) raised an objection to Bhāviveka in support of Buddhapaśita. Here according to dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po, the difference between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika is whether or not they accept establishment through particular characteristics (rang gi mtshan nyid, svalakṣaṇa) conventionally. Later, at the end of the 8th C, when Śāntarakṣita (ca. 725-788) adopted the mind-only theory to explain conventionality, the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika was divided into the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika and the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika. This classification is based on their view of conventional existence. The Yogācāra-Mādhyamika holds mind-only conventionally and the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika accepts external objects conventionally. The Yogācāra-Mādhyamika was further divided into the Sākāra-Yogācāra-Mādhyamika and the Nirākāra-Yogācāra-Mādhyamika in the same way as in the Yogācāra. The latter is further divided into the Samala-Nirākāra-Yogācāra-Mādhyamika and the Nirmala-Nirākāra-Yogācāra-Mādhyamika although dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po does not mention the criteria of this last distinction. He here quite systematically classifies Madhyamaka sub-schools and distributes teachers. However, there are some problems in these classifications.

\begin{verbatim}
gnyis pa thal 'gyur ba’i lugs bshad pa la/ mtshan nyid/ sgra bshad/ 'dod tshul dang gsun/ dang po ni/ rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa thal snyad tsam du yang ni bzhed pa'i ngo bo nyid med par snra ba de thal 'gyur ba’i mtshan nyid/ mtshan gzhi ni/ sangs rgyas bskyangs/ zla grags / zhi ba lha lta bu’o/\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{19} For example, Skilton [1994] (p. 116). Also see Williams [1989b] p. 57 ff.
Firstly, as often pointed out, no one has yet found the Sanskrit terms ‘Prāsaṅgika’ and ‘Svātantrika’ in an opposing sense in Indian sources, and existence of these traditions is questioned. As we will discuss later in this chapter, this problem is implicitly expressed already by Tsong kha pa (1357-1419), the founder of the dGe lugs order of Tibet, in the *Lam rim chen mo.* Moreover, we hardly find any texts or teachers that strictly follow the view of Candrakīrti in India. Although silence is not definitive, there is a possibility that the Mādhyamikas did not form the two opposing traditions after Candrakīrti. At least, this absence of his followers makes it almost impossible to trace the actual transmission of his thought in India.

Secondly, the classification of the Prāsaṅgika and the Svātantrika and the classification of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika and the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika are two completely different ways of classifications. The former classification is based on whether they accept establishment through particular characteristics conventionally and the latter on whether they accept self-awareness and external objects, according to dKon mchog ’jigs med dbang po. Mimaki’s study shows, however, that these two distinct divisions were combined in Tibet in the process of development of doxography and understanding the history of Indian Buddhism, and they were dealt separately in early *Grub mtha’* texts.

Thirdly, the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika is said to postulate external objects but does not accept self-awareness even though the Sautrāntika is understood to accept both external objects and self-awareness. To cite an instance, in verse 23 of the *Jñānasārasamuccaya*, the Sautrāntika’s tenet is explained as follows:

[1-5]

The objects of perception produce cognition with images, [but] are not accessible for sense faculties. Space is like a son of a barren woman and the two cessations (*nirodha*) are like space. (v. 23)

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20 See [1-17] (p. 26).
21 We will discuss this issue in chapter 3 (p. 116 ff.).
22 See Mimaki [1982a] and [1982b].
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Conditioned entities are not insentient, and there is no one who grasps the three times. [However] it is not the case that a material form of an aggregate [of atoms] does not exist. The Sautrāntikas consider in this way. (v. 24)23

Here, an Āryadeva24 explains that the Sautrāntikas assert that in fact our cognition is not perception of external objects through sense faculties, which have contact with external objects, but cognition has images in itself. This suggests that the Sautrāntika is understood to maintain self-awareness by the Mādhyamikas. Unlike the Yogācāra, however, the Sautrāntikas do not deny the existence of external objects as shown in verse 24.

In the Triyāṇavyavasthāna, Ratnākaraśānti (B)25 explains the tenet of the Sautrāntika in a similar way:

[1-6]

The Sautrāntikas consider that apprehension (blo, *dhi) arises together with images. And they hold that the images of apprehension themselves

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śākārajñānajñakā dṛṣṭā nendriyagocarāḥ
vandhyāsutasamanṛṣyonirodhau vyomasannibhau II 23 ll
sāṃskārā na jādāḥ santi taikāyānugamo na ca I
asan na saṃcitaṁ rūpaṁ iti sautrāntikā vidūḥ II 24 ll
(1) Ed: rūpaṁ

Concerning asan na saṃcitaṁ rūpaṁ, Mimaki [2000] (p. 239 note 22) gives the following observation: asan na saṃcitaṁ rūpaṁ is a reconstruction from the Tibetan version, but it is confirmed by the commentary of Bodhibhadra: rnam par shes pa las gud na rdul phra rab bsags pa'i gong bu'i gzugs med pa ni min no zhes 'dod pa ste (ISSN 196.15-17 = P 49a7-8). On the other hand, the reading of the manuscript asad apratigha-rūpaṁ (non-resistant matter [= avijñāpti] is nonexistent) corresponds with the Sugatamatabhāṅgakārikā of Jītārī (thogs bcas gzugs min yod ma yin) and his auto-commentary confirms this reading: thogs pa med pa'i gzugs yod min zhes gsungs so/ll thogs pa ste rang gi yul du gzhon 'byung ba'i ggs byed pa rnam par rig byed ma yin pa zhes bya ba'i gzugs gang la med pa de yang yod pa ma yin te/ (SMVBh 94.25-96.1 = P 322b4-5). The verse cited in the Vimalaprabhā has almost the same form as Jītārī’s. I do not know for the moment how to analyse correctly what happened with the manuscript of the Jñānasūrasamucaya.

24 The Jñānasūrasamucaya is ascribed to Āryadeva. However, he is not identical with the author of the Catuḥśataka. Even though previous studies show that the Jñānasūrasamucaya is not a genuine work of Āryadeva, it was probably considered to be his authoritative work by later Indian Mādhyamikas, such as Bodhibhadra, who composed a commentary on the Jñānasūrasamucaya.

25 With regard to Ratnākaraśānti (B), see chapter 4, footnote 2 (p. 212).
arise from images of others, [i.e. external objects,] similar to them, but these [images] have the established nature conformable to the colour of atoms. Moreover, they do not accept these three times and postulate that even the unconditioned entities are like a son of barren woman. 26

In this text, the epistemology of the Sautrāntika is explained briefly but to the point. With regard to epistemology, the Sautrāntika insists that our cognition has images but they are not images of external objects themselves. Images of our cognition, however, arise as being similar to images of external objects, i.e. aggregates of atoms. This explanation is in line with that of the Jñānasārasamuccaya. This view that images belong to our cognition is called the sākāra view. On the other hand, proponents of the nirākāra view maintain that images belong to external objects and are projected on our cognition which is like a crystal. This is the distinction of the sākāra and nirākāra among externalists. 27

Thus in the works of the Indian Mādhyamikas, the Sautrāntikas are understood to accept self-awareness. If Bhāviveka is called a Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika only because he maintains the existence of external objects in the same way as the atom theory of the Sautrāntika, his ontology corresponds to that of the Sautrāntika, but his epistemology does not. Ontology and epistemology of Śāntarakṣita, a Yogācāra-Mādhyamika, on the other hand, correspond to those of the Yogācāra that denies external objects and accepts self-awareness. Because maintaining the existence of external objects is nothing but accepting the atomic theory, there is not much point in calling a Mādhyamika who holds the existence of atoms but does not accept self-awareness a Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika.

26 Triyānaryavastāthāna (Ilayashi [1996] p. 51, 8-12, Derge ed. No. 3712 tsu 100b4-5, Peking ed. No. 4535 nu 111b1-3):

27 The classification of sākāra and nirākāra is applied to both internalist and externalist views. The Sautrāntika and the Sākāra-Yogācāra maintain the former view, and the Vaibhāṣika and the Nirākāra-Yogācāra hold the latter. The proponents of the sākāra view maintain that cognition is an image itself that belongs to cognition. The proponents of the nirākāra view maintain that cognition is not an image itself. Concerning this classification among the Yogācāras, see Kajiyama’s explanation in note 3 above.
On the contrary, it could be more appropriate to call him a Vaibhāṣika-Mādhyamika because the Vaibhāṣika accepts the atomic theory and denies self-awareness. Therefore, this explanation given by dKon mchog ’jigs med dbang po in the Grub mtha’ rnam bzhag rin chen phreng ba is not very convincing. It seems that the first appearance of these terms is in the Ita ba’i khyad par written by Ye shes sde. I will mention this problem later in this chapter, when we examine the Ita ba’i khyad par.

Lastly, it is not clear if it is possible to apply the classification of the Sākāra and the Nirākāra, which are originally used to distinguish the Yogācāra depending on whether or not cognition has images ultimately, to the classification of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika which accepts the mind-only view only conventionally. In terms of the distinction of the Sākāra- and the Nirākāra-Yogācāra-Mādhyamika, however, there is an Indian account which mentions this distinction. While dKon mchog ’jigs med dbang po does not give any evidence for this distinction of the Mādhyamika, ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa (1648-1722), who classifies the Mādhyamika basically in the same way as dKon mchog ’jigs med dbang po in the Grub mtha’ chen mo, quotes a passage from Sahajavajra’s Tattvadasaka: Sahajavajra, commenting on verse 2b of the Tattvadasaka, states as follows:

[1-7]

28 According to the JiUnasarasamuccaya, the Vaibhāṣika holds that images we perceive belong to external objects that are aggregates of atoms, as seen in verse 22 (Mimaki [2000] p. 238, 4-5):

According to the wise, apprehension arisen from eyes has no image, but one experiences accumulation of atoms directly. This is considered to be the tenet of the Kashmir Vaibhāṣikas.

aksājā dhīr anākārā sāksād vedānusācāyaṁ ī
dhmatām ītī kāśmīravaibhāṣikamatāṁ mātaṁ ī 22 ī

Nevertheless, dKon mchog ’jigs med dbang po understands that the Sautrāntika who follows scriptural authority does not accept self-awareness while the Sautrāntika who follows reasoning accepts it. (See Sopa and Hopkins [1976] p. 92) Therefore, if this division of the Sautrāntika existed in India, the externalist Mādhyamika who does not accept self-awareness is rightly called Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika. At least in the JiUnasarasamuccaya, however, we do not find this division of the Sautrāntika.

29 See 1.2.1 (p. 31 ff.).

30 This is discussed in Matsumoto [1980b] pp. 162-165. It seems that ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa follows Tsong kha pa’s explanation in the Legs bshad snying po. See 1.2, especially [1-20] (p. 30). Concerning the classification of the Sākāra-Mādhyamika and the Nirākāra-Mādhyamika, see 4.2 (p. 211 ff.) of this thesis.
Alternatively, “Neither Säkāra nor Nirākāra”\(^{31}\) means that the Sākāra-Madhyamaka (\(rnam \ pa \ dang \ bcas \ pa'i \ dbu \ ma\)) and the Nirākāra-Madhyamaka (\(rnam \ pa \ med \ pa'i \ dbu \ ma\)) are these two main [tenets] to be highlighted.\(^{32}\)

After this passage Sahajavajra names Śāntarakṣita and Kambala as proponents of the Sākāra-Madhyamaka and the Nirākāra-Madhyamaka respectively. Therefore this distinction given by 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa and dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po is justified in terms of being based on an Indian source. It is also known from this that Śāntarakṣita was regarded as the Sākāra-Mādhyamika and Kambala as the Nirākāra-Mādhyamika already in India by the 11th C.\(^{33}\) Nevertheless classification of Haribhadra and Jītāri into the Nirākāra-Mādhyamika is problematic. dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po does not give us any reason for their classification. As Matsumoto points out,\(^ {34}\) however, 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa quotes from Haribhadra’s \(Abhisamayālāṃkāra Sphuṭārthā\) to justify his classification of Haribhadra as a Nirākāra-Mādhyamika. The original passage of Haribhadra is translated as follows:

[1-8]

[Then he], observing that when there is no perceived object, there is no perceiving subject, [should] shake off even this state of representation-only (\(vijñaptimātratā\)), whose nature is the image of the perceiving subject.

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There is neither Sākāra nor Nirākāra for those who desire to know the reality.
na sākāranirākāre tathātām jñātum icchātāh ! (v. 2ab)
I here follow the reading of Shastri.

\(^{32}\) Tattvadaśakaṭīkā (Derge ed. No. 2254 wi 164bb5, Peking ed. No. 3099 mi 180a5-6):
yang na/

\(\text{rnam bcas ma yin rnam med min //}\)

\(\text{zhes bya ba ni rnam pa dang bcas pa'i dbu ma dang/ rnam pa med pa'i dbu ma gsal(1) bar bya}\)
\(\text{ba'i gtsos bo 'di dag go(2) //}\)
\(1) D: gsal, P: bsal. (2) D: gtsos bo'i di dag go, P: gtsos bo 'di dag go.\)

\(^{33}\) Sahajavajra is considered a disciple of Advayavajra and Advayavajra is contemporary with Atiśa (982-1054). See Hadano [1987] (pp. 168-169 and pp. 172-173).

[Then he should] ascertain that nothing but the non-dual (advaya) cognition is existent in reality.\textsuperscript{35}

According to Matsumoto, this is the stage of denying the view of the Sākāra-Cittamātra from the viewpoint of the Nirākāra-Cittamātra in gradual stages of cultivation (bhāvanākrama) from the externalist view through the view of the Sākāra-Cittamātra and the Nirākāra-Cittamātra to that of the Madhyamaka. This way of progressing stages from a lower view to a higher one is also seen in Śāntarakṣita’s and Kamalaśīla’s works.\textsuperscript{36} Kajiyama examines this matter further. According to him, this passage corresponds to [1-11] of the following passage in the Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka of Haribhadra, which we have in Sanskrit:

[1-9]

To explain, [a Yogin should] abandon attachment to the Self, considering that there is no Self because of emptiness of arising or cessation.

[1-10]

[Then he should] recognise as having a nature free from the [Self] the [five] constituents, and so on, which arise in dependence and whose characteristic is arising and cessation. [Then he], whose attachment to the mind in its aspect of the perceiving subject is unremoved, [should] remove attachment to external objects, thinking that because blue and its cognition are always perceived together, this is indeed mind-only and not external objects.

[1-11]

\textsuperscript{35} Spūṭārthā, (Amano [1975] p. 227, 23-26, Derge ed No. 3793 ja, Peking ed. No. 5191 ja 144a\textsuperscript{6}-7):

gzung ba med na 'dzin pa med do snyam du nges par sams pa 'dzin pa'i rnam pa'i mthsan nyid rnam par rig pa tsam de yang bsal te/ gnyis su med pa'i ye shes 'ba' zhi g 'di yang dag par yod pa'i ngo bo yin no snyam du nges par byas nas/

\textsuperscript{36} Matsumoto [1980b] p. 174. I will compare the stages of cultivation given by Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra in 4.2 (p. 240 ff.) of this thesis.
[Then he], observing that when there is no perceived object, there is no perceiving subject, [should] shake off even this state of representation-only (vijñaptimātratā), whose character is the image of the perceiving subject.

[1-12]

[Then he should] ascertain that nothing but the non-dual (advaya) cognition is existent in reality.

[1-13]

[Then he should] meditate that in reality that [non-dual cognition (advayajñāna)] also lacks its intrinsic nature like an illusion because it arises in dependence, and free from the nature of one sided reflection of existence, non-existence and so on. When the power of the meditation is completed, and like some people’s knowledge of jewel, silver, and so on, there arises apprehension illuminating by itself like an illusion, with all causes of faults eliminated, free from conceptualisation and which is somehow individually known, the Yogin should completely abandon the obscurity of what can be known (jñeyāvaraṇa).

Kajiyama points out\(^38\) that this is nothing but stages of cultivation from (1) abandonment of the view of outsiders who have attachment to the Self [1-9], through (2) abandonment of the view of the Sautrāntika and the Sarvāstivāda who have attachment to external objects [1-10], (3) abandonment of the view which seems to be the Sākāravāda

\(^37\) Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā (Wogiwara [1932] p. 884, 18-p. 885, 1):

of the Cittamātra [1-11] and (4) abandonment of the view of the Nirākāra-Cittamātra [1-12], up to (5) the highest truth of the Madhyamaka in which even non-dual knowledge, i.e. self-awareness, which is maintained to be free from the subject-object dichotomy by the Nirākāra-Cittamātra is empty because of dependent origination [1-13]. As a result, he confirms Matsumoto’s claim that this is not a sufficient evidence to classify Haribhadra into the Nirākāra-Mādhyamika.39 On the other hand, it is not clear on what basis Ḫam dbyangs bzhad pa and dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po classify Jitāri into the Samala-Nirākāra-Mādhyamika.40

In this way, Grub miha’ texts in the later period contain some problematic classification and we cannot accept their explanation without careful examination. Because it seems that the Lam rim chen mo composed by Tsong kha pa is the basis of these doxographical texts of the dGe lugs order, we shall examine it next in order to compare the early accounts and the later ones.

1.2 Tsong kha pa

The Lam rim chen mo, composed by Tsong kha pa (1357-1419), the founder of the dGe lugs order of Tibetan Buddhism, is of special interest to us in terms of its classification of the Indian Mādhyamaka. In that text, he gives three ways of classification of the Mādhyamikas: (1) the Svātantrika (rang rgyud pa) and the Prāsaṅgika (thal 'gyur ba), (2) the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika (mdo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma ba, *sautrāntikācāra-mādhyamika) and the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika (rnal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma ba) and (3) the Māyopamādvyayavādin (sgyu ma rigs grub pa) and the Sarvadharma-priṣṭhānnavādin (rab tu mi gnas par smra ba).41 Not only does he mention the names of these sub-schools and their views but also gives the ground for their validation. Considering his influence

40 Shirasaki [1986] classifies Jitāri into the Samala-Nirākāra-Mādhyamika. I am, however, not fully convinced with his argument because I doubt that there was the distinction of the Samala-Nirākāra-Mādhyamika and the Nirmala-Nirākāra-Mādhyamika in India. I discuss this matter in the fourth chapter.
41 Concerning the designations of the third classification in Sanskrit and in Tibetan, see Ruegg [1981a] (pp. 58-9) and Napper [1989] (p. 403 and p. 813, note 562).
on later Tibetan Buddhism, we can assume that his classification may have become a model of the classification of Indian Madhyamaka in Tibet. In some parts, however, his expression is somewhat ambiguous and it has caused controversy among his disciples. To examine his account, I first translate the part of the Lam rim chen mo which is related to the classification of Mādhyamikas:

[1-14]

Concerning the [classification of Mādhyamikas] certain spiritual advisers (dge ba'i bshes gnyen) of the previous generation said:

Mādhyamikas, who are designated according to the way of positing common usage (tha snyad, *vyavahāra), are of two types: the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamikas, who assert that external objects exist at the level of common usage, and the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas, who assert that external objects do not exist at the level of common usage. [Mādhyamikas] who are designated according to the way of postulating the ultimate are also of two types: the Māyoramādavyāvādins (sgyu ma rigs grub pa), who assert that collection of the two, appearance and emptiness, is an ultimate truth, and the Sarvadharmāpratisthānavādins (rab tu mi gnas par smra pa), who assert that the mere elimination of discriminative thought (*prapañca) with respect to appearances is an ultimate truth.

They asserted that the former of these two are the masters Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and others. The common usage māyoramā and apratisthāna are asserted also by some Indian teachers.\(^{42}\)
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Indeed, in general, some Indian and Tibetan ācāryas who claimed to be the Mādhyamikas did make such assertions, but what is to be settled here is just the views of the great Mādhyamikas who are followers of the ācārya Nāgārjuna. Who can explain the subtleties? Moreover, the statement by the great translator, bLo Idan shes rab, that classifying [the Mādhyamikas] into two by way of their mode of asserting the ultimate is a presentation generating delight in the obscured is very good.

For, their assertion appears to be an assertion that the mere object which is comprehended by inferential reasoning is an ultimate truth, whereas it is said in both Śāntarakṣita’s Madhyamakālaṃkāra and Kamalāśīla’s Madhyamakāloka that an object comprehended by reasoning is designated ultimate due to being conformable to the ultimate truth. Also since the other great Mādhyamikas do not assert that the mere object which is elimination of discriminative thought through reasoning is the ultimate truth, [this] is not good. 43

Concerning this, the ācārya Ye shes sde explains that in the Madhyamaka treatises composed by the ācārya noble father (Nāgārjuna) and his son

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43 Lam rin chen mo (p. 572, 8-17):

spyi brus ma bar kha' che ba'i rgya bod kyi slob dpon 'ga' re de ltar du 'dod pa yod mod kyang/ slob dpon klu sgrub kyi rjes su 'brang ba'i dbu ma ba chen po mams kyi lugs ji liar yin cem la dbab par bya yi/ phre mo mams su zhig gis bshad par nus/ gzhan yang/ don dam 'dod tshul gyi sgo nas gnyis su bzhag pa ni mongs pa ngo mthar skyed pa'i mams gzhag go zhes lo tsha'a ba/ chen po blo Idan shes rab gsum ba ni shin tu legs te/ de dag gi 'dod pa ni rigs shes rjes dpag gis gzhal ba'i don dam don dam bden par 'dod par snang la/ rigs shes kyi gzhal bya ni don dam bden pa dang nithun pas don dam zhes btags par dbu ma rgyan dang snang ba gnyis ka nas gsums pa'i phyir rol/ dbu ma ba chen po gzhlan mams kyang rigs pas spros pa bead pa'i don de tsam ni don dam bden par mi bzhed pas legs pa ma yin rol/ (1) Ed. lo tshha ba
(Āryadeva), the way external objects do and do not exist was not made clear, and that after them the ācārya Bhāviveka, having refuted the view of the representation-only, posited a view in which external objects exist at the level of common usage. Then because the ācārya Śāntarakṣita made a different way of Madhyamaka which teaches, depending on Yogācāra texts, that external objects do not exist at the level of common usage and also teaches that mind lacks intrinsic nature ultimately, the Mādhyamika became of two types. The former is designated Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika and the latter Yogācāra-Mādhyamika. [Concerning his explanation,] the sequence of history is evident in this way. 44

[1-17]

However, although the ācārya Candrakīrti asserts that external objects exist at the level of common usage, because he does not agree with proponents of other doctrines it is not appropriate to call him a Sautrāntika-[Mādhyamika]. Likewise, it is very irrational again to assert that he accords with the Vaibhāṣika. 45

Scholars of the later dissemination to the range of the snowy mountains (Tibet) use the twofold common usage, Prāsaṅgika and Svātāntrika for Mādhyamikas, and because this accords with Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā, you should not think that it is their own fabrication. 46

44 Lam rim chen mo (p. 572, 17-p. 573, 5):
'di la slob dpon ye shes sde na ref slob dpon 'phags pa yab sras kyis dbu ma'i bstan bcos mdzad pa las phy'i don yod med kyi tshul gsal bar ma mdzad 1a/ de'i 'og tu slob dpon legs ldan 'byed kyis mam par rig pa tsam gyi lugs sun phyung ste/ tha snyad du phyi'i don yod pa'i lugs mam par bzhag go/ de nas slob dpon zhi ba tshos mal 'byor spyod pa'i gzhung la brten nas tha snyad du phyi rol med pa dang don dam par sems rang bzhin med par ston pa'i dbu ma'i tshul mi 'dra ba zhiig mdzad pas dbu ma ba mam pa gnyis su byung zhiing/ snga ma la mdo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma ba zhes pa dang phyi ma la nyal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma ba zhes btags so zhes 'chad pa ni byung ba'i rim pa de ltar du mongon no/

45 This view is based on Candrakīrti’s statement in the Madhyamakāvatārābhasya. See chapter 2.11. Cf. Legs shad snying po (p. 132, 17-p. 133, 5).

46 Lam rim chen mo (p. 573, 5-10):
'on kyang slob dpon zla ba grags pa ni tha snyad du phyi rol yod par bzhed kyang grub mtha' smra ba gzhang dang sgo mi bstun pas mdo sde spyod pa zhes byar mi rung la/ de bzhin du bye brag tu smra ba dang mthun par 'dod pa'ang shin tu mi rigs so/
Therefore, [Mādhyamikas] are certainly of two types: those who do and do not assert external objects at the level of common usage. Also if names are designated according to the way the view ascertaining emptiness, the ultimate, arises in the continuum, they are of two types, the Prāsaṅgika and the Svātāntrika. 47

These passages tell us many important points in terms of the divisions of Mādhyamikas. Since I raised four questions in the previous chapter, let us see how Tsong kha pa’s account deals with these problems.

Firstly, concerning the question whether the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamaka and the Yogācāra-Mādhyamaka are sub-schools of the Svātāntrika, it seems that Tsong kha pa does not combine the classification based on conventional existence and that of the Prāsaṅgika and the Svātāntrika although he does not include Candrakīrti in the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika. This is in line with the theory that the combination of these two classifications was developed in Tibet. 48

Secondly, passage [1-17] suggests that there was controversy over the validity of the classification of the Prāsaṅgika and the Svātāntrika. The oldest textual evidence of the term ‘Svātāntrika’ is Jayānanda’s commentary on the Madhyamakāvatāra, which

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47 Lam rim chen mo (p. 573, 10-12):

des na tha snyad du phyi rol ’dod mi ’dod gnyis su nges la don dam pa stong pa nyid nges pa ’i lta ba rgyud la skyed tshul gyi sgo nas ming ’dogs na’ang thal rang gnyis su nges pa yin no/

48 Mimaki [1982a] and [1983] (pp. 161-165) shows that according to dBus pa blo gsal (14th C) these two are not regarded as subdivisions of the Svātāntrika. When dBus pa blo gsal distinguishes the Svātāntrika and the Prāsaṅgika, he classifies Jñānagarbha as a Svātāntrika. However, when he distinguishes how Mādhyamikas understand the conventional world, he classifies Jñānagarbha as a ’Jig rten grags sde spyod pa’i dBus ma pa (Lokaprasiddha-Mādhyamika?) together with Candrakīrti. He classifies Jñānagarbha neither as a Yogācāra-Mādhyamika nor as a Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika which are often regarded as a subdivision of the Svātāntrika-Mādhyamika. This possibly implies that these two types of Mādhyamika sub-divisions, i.e. Svātāntrika:Prāsaṅgika and Yogācāra:Sautrāntika had not been combined at the time of dBus pa blo gsal. Mimaki also shows that Tsong kha pa, who is roughly contemporary with dBus pa blo gsal, does not clearly combine these two types of classification in the Lam rim chen mo.

was written outside India in the 12th C.\textsuperscript{49} Tsong kha pa seems to have known the fact that these terms are not found in Indian sources but gives support to this classification on the basis of the *Prasannapadā*. At the same time, this shows the fact that some Tibetan teachers before Tsong kha pa had already raised a question with regard to the validity of this classification.

Thirdly, concerning the derivation of the term ‘Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika’ and disagreement of epistemology between the Sautrāntika and the Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka, Ye shes sde’s account on the division based on conventional existence is regarded as authoritative since Tsong kha pa follows it. He does not explain here if Bhāviveka is called a Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika in the sense of one who follows the view of the Sautrāntika conventionally. However, when Tsong kha pa excludes Candrakīrti from the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika, he explains that Candrakīrti’s view on conventionality accords neither with the Sautrāntika nor with the Vaibhāṣika, and that Śāntarakṣita follows Yogācāra texts. Therefore we can assume that Tsong kha pa uses the term ‘Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika’ in the sense of the Mādhyamika who follows the view of the Sautrāntika conventionally. He, however, does not clearly mention that Bhāviveka’s epistemology corresponds to that of the Sautrāntika school. Therefore, it is not clear if Tsong kha pa holds that Bhāviveka denies self-awareness conventionally from this part of the *Lam rim chen mo*.

Nevertheless, Tsong kha pa mentions the epistemology of Bhāviveka’s system in the *Legs bshad snying po*, which is translated as follows:

[1-19]

> With regard to this, [i.e. how conventional objects and cognition are maintained,] the noble father (Nāgārjuna) and son (Āryadeva) do not teach clearly by distinguishing whether external [objects] exist or not, at the level of common usage. However, this ācārya (Bhāviveka) maintains that at the level of common usage, external [objects] exist, cognition from sense faculties does not perceive them without having images but perceives by possessing images, and these two [external objects and cognition] are

\textsuperscript{49} See p. 43 footnote 81.
earlier causes and later effects.\textsuperscript{50}

Here Tsong kha pa understands that Bhāviveka maintains cognition with images (sākārajñāna) conventionally. Bhāviveka’s view on conventionality is thus explained in accordance with the view of the Sautrāntika in terms of ontology as well as of epistemology. If we postulate the sākāra view, we have to accept self-awareness because what we actually perceive is an image in cognition, and an external object is not directly perceived by cognition. This does not agree with the view of dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po in the Grub mtva' rnam bzhag rin chen phreng ba, which explains that the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamikas deny self-awareness conventionally.\textsuperscript{51} It is surprising that later dGe lugs teachers did not follow Tsong kha pa’s view because it makes more sense if the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika follows the Sautrāntika conventionally in terms both of epistemology and ontology.

Finally, concerning the Sākāra-Yogācāra-Mādhyamika and the Nirākāra-Yogācāra-Mādhyamika, Tsong kha pa does not provide any information in the Lam rim chen mo. Instead, he presents the division of the Māyopamādhyayanādīn and the Sarvadharmāpratīṣṭhānavādīn, which is not mentioned in the Grub mtva' rnam bzhag rin chen phreng ba of dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po. It is not clear by what criterion the Māyopamādhyayanādīn and the Sarvadharmāpratīṣṭhānavādīn are classified, except for Tsong kha pa’s predecessors’ opinion that it is the classification based on the ultimate truth. On this point, Napper has done an excellent study.\textsuperscript{52} According to her, later commentarial tradition is divided into two groups. One group of teachers hold that the Māyopamādhyayanādīn and the Sarvadharmāpratīṣṭhānavādīn are alternative names for the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika. The other group of teachers maintain that Tsong kha pa denied legitimacy of this classification. This seems to have been caused by the

\textsuperscript{50}Legs bshad snying po (p. 109, 17-p. 110, 3): 'di la 'phags pa yab sras kyis ni tha snyad du phyi rol yod med phyec nas gsal bo r bshad pa med la slob dpon 'dis tha snyad du phyi rol yod pa dang dbang bo'i sles pas don mam mod du mi 'dzin gi/ram idan gyi sgo nas 'dzin pa dang de gnyis rgyu'bras snga phyi bar bzhed do/

\textsuperscript{51}See [1-2] (p. 12).

\textsuperscript{52}Napper [1989] pp. 403-440.
ambiguity of the passage [1-15] above. It seems he does not support this classification given by earlier teachers because Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, whom they regard as the Māyopamādhyavādins, do not postulate that the mere object which is comprehended by inferential reasoning is the ultimate truth. It is, however, not clear whether he points out only a misunderstanding of the earlier teachers or denies this way of classification entirely. As a result, some later dGe lugs teachers understand that this classification is illegitimate and others consider that the Māyopamādhyavādin and the Sarvadhmāpratisthānavādin are another designation of the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika.

Although Tsong kha pa does not mention the classification of the Sākāra-Mādhyamika and Nirākāra-Mādhyamika in the Lam rin chen mo, he does briefly mention it in the Legs bshad snying po:

[1-20]

This view [of Śāntarakṣita] maintains that appearance of blue, yellow and others are real. Because it is explained in this way in Dharmakīrti’s view, too, this is the Mādhyamika that conventionally maintains [mind-only] in accordance with the Sākāra school. It establishes self-awareness conventionally, but does not clearly explain whether or not it establishes the ālayavijñāna. It is, however, seen to be on the side of not maintaining it. The pandita Sahajavajra explains that the Mādhyamika that maintains, at the level of common usage, that appearance of blue, yellow and others are unreal, in accordance with the Nirākāra school, seems to be explicated by the ācārya Kambala. 54

53 In passage [1-15], Tsong kha pa says, “[this] is not good.” It is not clear whether this classification is not good, i.e. he denies this classification, or this explanation is not good, i.e. he accepts the classification itself.

54 Legs bshad snying po (p. 119, 1-7):

lugs ’dis sngo ser la sogs pa’i mam pa dngos por ’dod de/ chos kyi grags pa’i bzhed pa yang de ltar ’grel pa thwa snyad du mam bden pa ltar ’dod pa’i dhu ma pa’o/ rang rig thwa snyad du ’jog la kun gzhis ’jog mi ’jog gi tshul gsal bar ma bshad kyang mi bzhed pa’i phyogs su mongon no/ thwa snyad du sngo ser la sogs pa’i mam pa mam dngos por med pa mam rdzun pa ltar ’dod pa’i dhu ma pa ni/ slob dpon lba ba pas bkar ba ltar yin no zhes pa ’dul ba lhan cig skyes pa’i rdo rjes bshad do//
Śāntarakṣita and Kambala are understood as the Sākāra-Mādhyamika and the Nirākāra-Mādhyamika respectively on the grounds of Sahajavajra’s statement. This is probably the basis of ‘Jam dbyangs bzhad pa’s explanation in the Grub mtha’ chen mo. Here Śāntarakṣita is considered a Sākāra-Mādhyamika. It should be noted that his name is also given by some earlier teachers as a Māyopamādhyavādin in the Lam rim chen mo, and that the explanation in [1-14] seems to have something to do with existence of appearance at the ultimate level. Therefore this distinction may be related to the distinction of the Māyopamādhyavādin and the Sarvadharmāpratīṣṭhānavādin. In any rate, it is necessary to examine both Indian sources and other Tibetan sources mentioning these distinctions.

In this way, Tsong kha pa gives three different types of distinction in the Lam rim chen mo, i.e. the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika, the Śvātāntrika and the Prāsaṅgika, and the Māyopamādhyavādin and the Sarvadharmāpratīṣṭhānavādin. In addition to them, he mentions the Sākāra-Mādhyamika and the Nirākāra-Mādhyamika in the Legs bshad snying po. It seems that Tsong kha pa’s view became the model for later Tibetan doxography of Indian Madhyamaka since most of the classifications known from later accounts were already mentioned by him. Nevertheless, later doxographers’ views do not always agree with his, and all of these classifications contain problems in one way or another. In the following sections, therefore, we will examine how other Tibetan teachers explain these classifications.

1.2.1 Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika and Yogācāra-Mādhyamika

Of the four different types of classification which Tsong kha pa presents in the Lam rim chen mo and the Legs bshad snying po, the classification of the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika is based on the Ita ba’i khyad par composed

55 See 1.1, quotation [1-7] (pp. 19-20).
56 To be precise, he gives four, including distinction between the Mādhyamika of fundamental texts (gzhung phyi mo’i dbu ma pa) and the partisan Mādhyamika (phyogs ’dzin pa’i dbu ma pa). I, however, do not examine this classification because they are not rival factions existing at the same time.
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by Ye shes sde (ca. 8-9th C), as described in the Lam rim chen mo. Ye shes sde was a chief translator (zhu cheng gyi lo tsä ba) at the time of the earlier dissemination of Buddhism into Tibet. As he translated many texts, it is probable that his account is relatively reliable. It seems that this text is, among Tibetan texts, the source of the terms ‘Sautrāntika-Mādhyamaka / Mādhyamika’ and ‘Yogācāra-Mādhyamaka / Mādhyamika’ which are used to name the externalist and the internalist Madhyamakas / Mādhyamikas. Concerning this way of classification, the question is how the terms were derived. Tsong kha pa seems to understand that the externalist Mādhyamikas represented by Bhāviveka is called ‘Sautrāntika’-Mādhyamikas because he asserts that external objects and cognition with images exist conventionally in agreement with the Sautrāntika view. This means that the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika maintains both self-awareness of cognition and existence of external objects. dKon mchog ’jigs med dbang po in the Grub mtha’ rnam bzhag rin chen phreng ba, however, explains that Bhāviveka denies self-awareness conventionally. It is now necessary to examine how Ye shes sde understands this classification in the ITa ba’i khyad par, which is the oldest account of this classification known to us. As Ueyama reports, the contents of the ITa ba’i khyad par kept in the Tibetan Tripitaka are considerably disarranged, compared with the ITa ba’i khyad par found in Dun-huang. The following translation of the ITa ba’i khyad par (the part of exposition of Madhyamaka views) is therefore based on Pelliot Tibetan No. 814, which is edited by Ueyama.

Translation of the ITa ba’i khyad par

[1-21]

If one asks what are the characteristics of the two types of Madhyamaka

57 According to Ueyama’s study, Fa chen (Chos grub), in the Da cheng dao yu jing sui ting shu, a commentary on the Satalistambasūtra, quotes passages from Ye shes sde’s ITa ba’i khyad par (Ueyama [1968] pp. 147-155 and pp. 193-207). A manuscript of the commentary is written in 838 (Ueyama [1967] pp. 152-153). On the other hand, Ye she sde mentions Kamalasila (ca. 740-797) in his ITa ba’i khyad par. Therefore, Ye shes sde is considered to have lived around the second half of the 8th C and the first half of the 9th C.

58 See [1-16].


60 The text is edited in Ueyama [1977] pp. 32-33. See Appendix 1 (p. 276 ff.).
(dbu ma rnam gnyis), [they are as follows]:

[1-22]
Formerly, the Madhyamaka teacher, ācārya Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva only made Madhyamaka treatises, and there was no division into the two types.

[1-23]
After it, the noble Asaṅga and Vasubandhu made the treatises which maintain mind-only. Having established that although external objects do not exist, consciousness appears as objects, they explained that pure non-dual consciousness exists ultimately as well. Later, however, there lived a Madhyamaka teacher called Bhavya (Bhāviveka), who acquired perfection which has instruction of Nāgārjuna’s view. Having refuted the opinion of representation-only, he composed [a text] called Prajñāpradīpa (shes rab sgron ma), a commentary on the Madhyamakakārikā (dbu ma'i kā ri ka) composed by the ācārya Nāgārjuna, and [a text] called Madhyamakahṛdaya (dbu ma'i snying po).

[1-24]
The intermediate teacher called Śāntarakṣita, having depended on the treatise of representation-only, the Yogācāra[bhūmi], composed by the ācārya Asaṅga, composed a Madhyamaka treatise called Madhyamakālaṃkāra, which establishes representation-only conventionally, following its (the Yogācārabhūmi’s) view but explains that even consciousness lacks intrinsic nature ultimately. Because two [types of] Madhyamaka treatises which do not agree slightly came into existence, [the texts] composed by Bhāviveka are named mDo sde (spyod) pa’i dBu ma (Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka?), and [the texts] composed by

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61 According to Matsumoto [1981a] (p. 115, note 16), the original Tibetan word is mdo sde pa’i dbu ma in Peking edition (No. 5847 cho 252b1) but Pelliot No. 814 (5a6) has mdo sde spyod pa’i dbu.
the ācārya Śāntarakṣita are named rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dBu ma (Yogācāra-Madhyamaka?).

[1-25]

In [the texts] composed by the ācārya Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, it is explained, as it appears in the Ārya-Prajñāpāramitā(sūtra) and others:

Because on the whole, things arise in dependence, there is arising only in a similar way to illusion conventionally. But it is impossible to arise ultimately either from itself, from others, from both or from non-cause, and there is no intrinsic nature.

Therefore, both [types of] Madhyamakas depend on those [texts of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva].

[1-26]

Of these, the view of the rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dBu ma is explained [as follows]: Conventionally, in conformity to the proponents of representation-only, even if consciousness perceives objects, it is possible to perceive [the objects] because objects themselves are the intrinsic nature of consciousness, due to connection [between cognition and objects] by means of self-awareness. However, if it is postulated that objects are different [from consciousness], because there is no connection to cognition, it is impossible to cognise [them]. Even if it appears that [perception] arises in dependence on external causes, to explain, it is the same way that what is seen in a dream is seeing mind itself without objects, as it is also taught in the Lāṅkāvatāra:

A material form (rūpa) does not exist externally. Internal mind appears as external.62

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Ultimately, even that mind is not established as existent by means of the reasoning 'lack of one intrinsic nature and many'. If [one asks] how, [I answer that] if objects themselves are the intrinsic nature of consciousness, either mind also becomes many because objects are various and many, or objects also do not become diverse, like the mind. Therefore, relying on mind-only, it should be understood that external objects do not exist. Relying on this way of Madhyamaka, it should be understood that even that mind lacks Self, as it is found also in the Ārya-Lokottaraparivarta:

Oh, Jinaputras, the triple world is mind-only, and also the three times are understood as mind-only. Then even that mind is understood to be without extreme and middle.63

Also it is said in the Lankāvatāra:

Having relied on mind-only, one should not consider external objects.
Having abided in the reality, one should go beyond even mind-only.
Having gone beyond the mind-only, one should go beyond non-appearance [of subject and object].
The Yogin who abides in non-appearance sees the Great Way.64

Therefore this way of Madhyamaka does not contradict the sūtras.

[1-27]

The view of the mDo sde dBu ma explains that all external and internal things arise in dependence, in accordance with the view of [the texts] composed by the ācārya Nāgārjuna. Because they arise from causes and conditions conventionally, they exist just like an illusion. But by means of the four-part reasoning that it is impossible [for something] to arise

63 Lokottaraparivarta (Peking cd. No. 761 shi 179b8-180a1)
64 Lankāvatārasūtra, vv. 10:256-257 (Nanjo [1923] p. 298, 5-p. 299,1)
ultimately either from itself, from others, from both or from non-cause, there is no arising of things...\textsuperscript{65}

...[The passage] found in the Ārya-Daśabhūmika:

The triple world is mind-only.

is a denial of the agent and the recipient\textsuperscript{66} because it is said in that very sūtra.

When, in this way, having examined arising in dependence in ten ways, one examined that they are without Self (ātman), without life (jīva), without person (pudgala), empty of substantiality and without the agent and the recipient in nature, the entrance to liberation of emptiness arises.\textsuperscript{67}

It is explained that although it is found in the Ārya-Laṅkāvatāra, and so forth that there are no external objects, mind appears as those [external objects]. This is taught in this way in order to make use for cultivation by denying that things exist ultimately and by postulating mind-only, considering [the fact] that objects, which arise in dependence without being established as existence by nature, are superimposed as existent by conceptual construct.

\[1-28\]

It is said in the Madhyamaka treatise called Madhyamakāloka composed by Kamalāśīla:

Although conventionally the two types of Madhyamakas do not

\textsuperscript{65}The following part that explains the impossibility of the four ways of arising is omitted for it is less relevant.

\textsuperscript{66}The explanation that the sūtra’s passage “The triple world is mind-only” is a denial of the agent and recipient is very similar to the explanation of the externalist Mādhyamika in the Madhyamakālaṃkāratīti of Śāntarakṣita. See 2.7 (p. 85) of this thesis.

\textsuperscript{67}Daśabhūmika (Kondo [1936] p. 102)
agree slightly, there is no contradiction because they are the same
in maintaining that ultimately all internal and external entities lack
intrinsic nature.\textsuperscript{68}

Concerning this description made by Ye shes sde, Matsumoto\textsuperscript{69} made the following
four observations and I do not have much to add to them at this stage. Therefore I will
show Matsumoto’s view on the \textit{I}Ta ba’i khyad par.

First, the designations ‘mDo sde dBu ma’ and ‘rNal ’byor spyod pa’i dBu ma’ are
given respectively to the texts made by Bhāviveka and Śāntarakṣita. In the \textit{Lam rim chen mo},
‘mDo sde spyod pa’i dBu ma pa’ and ‘rNal ’byor spyod pa’i dBu ma pa’ are clearly
used as names of sub-schools while ‘mDo sde dBu ma’ and ‘rNal ’byor spyod pa’i dBu ma’ in the \textit{I}Ta ba’i khyad par are not.

Second, in the \textit{I}Ta ba’i khyad par ‘mDo sde’ of ‘mDo sde dBu ma’ means \textit{sūtras}
such as the \textit{Prajñāpāramitāsūtra} but not the Sautrāntika as a Buddhist philosophical
school. In the same way, ‘rNal ’byor spyod pa’ indicates texts such as the \textit{Yogācārabhūmi}. In
other words, ‘mDo sde dBu ma’ means the Madhyamaka [text] depending on \textit{sūtras}
such as the \textit{Prajñāpāramitāsūtra} and ‘rNal ’byor spyod pa’i dBu ma’ the Madhyamaka [text] depending on the \textit{Yogācārabhūmi}.\textsuperscript{70}

Third, it seems that in the \textit{I}Ta ba’i khyad par the view of the mDo sde dBu ma is
considered superior to that of the rNal ’byor spyod pa’i dBu ma because Ye shes sde
places the description of the mDo sde dBu ma after that of the rNal ’byor spyod pa’i dBu ma.\textsuperscript{71}

\textsuperscript{68} According to Matsumoto [1981a] (p. 111), this is not a word-for-word quotation from the \textit{Madhyamakāloka}, but there is a passage similar to this quotation in the \textit{Madhyamakāloka}. (Derge. No. 3887 sa 159a7-8b1, Peking ed. No. 5287 sa 173b3-4)
\textsuperscript{69} Matsumoto [1981a] (p. 113)
\textsuperscript{70} Matsumoto’s argument on this point is extremely elaborate and I am not confident if I can show
his theory briefly and precisely here. However I think it is necessary to summarise it because his
article is written in Japanese.
\textsuperscript{71} This conclusion does not agree with ICang skya’s view that Ye shes sde was a disciple of
259. Matsumoto’s conclusion is, however, not entirely convincing because the only reason he gives
is that \textit{Grub mtha’} texts tend to place more important doctrines later.
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Fourth in the *Ita ba’i khyad par*, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are not considered to have the same view.72

Of these, the second is of the most interest to us. I show Matsumoto’s theory below:

The construction of the text is: In [1-21] the question “what are characteristics of two types of Madhyamakas” is raised. Then in [1-22], [1-23] and [1-24] brief history of Mahāyāna Buddhism is shown. In [1-25] the view of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva is explained. And in [1-26] and [1-27] the answer for “what are the characteristics of two types of Madhyamakas” is given.

The brief history of Mahāyāna Buddhism is divided into four periods: (1) the period Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva composed the Madhyamaka treatises and there was no distinction of the two Madhyamakas [1-22], (2) the period Asaṅga and Vasubandhu composed the treatises of representation-only (*vijñapti-mātra*), (3) the period in which Bhāviveka, a follower of Nāgārjuna, composed the *Prajñāpradīpa* and the *Madhyamakahṛdaya* and refuted the proponents of representation-only [1-23], and (4) the period in which “Śāntarakṣita, having depended on the treatise of the representation-only, the *Yogācāra(bhūmi)*, composed by the ācārya Asaṅga, composed the Madhyamaka treatise called the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, which establishes representation-only conventionally, following its (the *Yogācarabhūmi’s*) view but explains that even consciousness lacks intrinsic nature ultimately” [1-24]. As a result of this, the two Madhyamakas came into existence. Here it is very clear that the text composed by Śāntarakṣita is called a Yogācāra-Madhyamaka because it follows the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

On the other hand, the reason why the text composed by Bhāviveka is called a mDo sde dBu ma is shown in [1-25]. There the view of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva is shown as “Because, on the whole, things arise in dependence, there is arising only in a similar way to an illusion conventionally. But it is impossible [for something] to arise ultimately either from itself, from others, from both or from non-cause, and there is no intrinsic nature.” This is given as a quotation from the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra*. This is

identical with the view of the mDo sde dBu ma in [1-27], “Because they arise from causes and conditions conventionally, they exist just like an illusion. But by means of the four-part reasoning that it is impossible [for something] to arise ultimately either from itself, from others, from both or from non-cause, there is no arising of things.” In this way, the view in the works of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva accords with the sūtras such as the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra, and the view in Bhāviveka’s works is identical with the view in the works of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva. Therefore, the view in Bhāviveka’s works accords with the sūtras such as the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra.

Furthermore, the statement at the end of [1-26] “Therefore this way of Madhyamaka does not contradict sūtras” reinforces this argument because this passage implies that there is an idea that the mDo sde dBu ma accords with sūtras and rNal 'byor spyod pa’i dBu ma follows treatises such as the Yogācārabhūmi but the latter also does not deviate from sūtras.

In this way, Matsumoto maintains that ‘mdo sde’ of the mDo sde dBu ma in the lTa ba’i khyad par is very likely to have derived from sūtra but not from the Sautrāntika as a philosophical school. He also points out that in this part of the lTa ba’i khyad par, the Sautrāntika is not mentioned even once.

In addition to this, the Pañcakramaṭikā, the only Indian account we know which mentions the classification of the mDo sde’i dBu ma pa and the rNal 'byor spyod pa’i dBu ma pa, does not answer our question clearly. In this text, the mDo sde’i dBu ma pa is considered to maintain external objects and consciousness without images.73 It is rather strange if the term mdo sde’i dbyu ma pa is derived from the Sautrāntika (mDo sde pa) that maintains consciousness with images, in the sense that the mDo sde’i dBu ma pa conventionally postulates what the Sautrāntika postulates ultimately. However, if Matsumoto’s theory is right and the lTa ba’i khyad par reflects what actually happened to the Indian Madhyamaka, it is not contradictory that we call ‘Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka’ denies self-awareness, as is described in Tibetan doxographical texts because mdo sde of mDo sde’i dBu ma pa is nothing to do with the Sautrāntika.

73 See 2.2 concerning the passage of the Pañcakramaṭikā.
To conclude, the classification of the Madhyamaka into the Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka and the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka has a problem in terms of how the designation ‘Sautrāntika’ is derived. In the *Grub mtha’ rnam bzhag rin chen phren ba* of dKon mchog ’jigs med dbang po, Bhāviveka is said to accept existence of external objects. As far as this is concerned, he can be called a Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika. Nevertheless, dKon mchog ’jigs med dbang po considers that Bhāviveka does not accept self-awareness, although the Sautrāntika school apparently holds self-awareness which is associated with images (ākāra). In this sense, the explanation of dKon mchog ’jigs med dbang po is not fully convincing. Although we can trace a similar description back to Tsong kha pa and further to Ye shes sde, the question is not clearly answered. Tsong kha pa considers that ‘Sautrāntika’ of the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika is derived from ‘Sautrāntika’ as a philosophical school and that the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika takes the sākāra view. However, when we examine the explanation of Ye shes sde in the *Ita ba’i khyad par*, which Tsong kha pa indicates as the source of the classification, ‘mdo sde’ of the mDo sde pa’i dbu ma may mean sūtras such as the *Prajñāpāramitāśūtra* and Ye shes sde does not mention the matter of self-awareness or of cognition with or without images (ākāra). In this way, the view that the Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka denies self-awareness and therefore holds the nirākāra view, which is found in the *Grub mtha’ rnam bzhag rin chen phreng ba* cannot be traced back to the *Ita ba’i khyad par* or to the *Legs bshad snying po* although it can be to the Indian source, the *Pañcakramaṭikā* of Lakṣmī. There are at least two hypotheses: The designation Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka is originally derived from the Sautrāntika and for some reason they are considered to deny self-awareness. Otherwise, the designation ‘mdo sde’ of the mDo sde pa’i dbu ma was not derived from the Sautrāntika (mDo sde pa), but later misunderstood to be related to the Sautrāntika and possibly wrongly Sanskritised as the Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka because of verbal similarity of their designations. In this latter case, there is no problem in their postulating the nirākāra view. In addition to this, it is not clear how Candrakīrti’s view on conventional existence was understood at the time of Ye shes sde since he does not mention Candrakīrti.

It is thus impossible to solve the problem only by examining Tibetan accounts due to their inconsistency and it is necessary to look into Indian sources to clarify the
doxography of the Indian Madhyamaka. We will deal with this problem of the classification of the externalist and the internalist Madhyamakas in the second chapter.

1.2.2 Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika

Concerning the classification of the Madhyamaka into the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika, Tsong kha pa briefly explains what differentiates these two. According to him, this classification is based on how the view ascertaining emptiness arises in one’s mental continuum.74 According to dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po, on the other hand, the definition of the Prāsaṅgika is ‘a proponent of no intrinsic nature, who does not assert the establishment through particular characteristics even as common usage’.75 As is implied in their designations, this classification is based on the difference of the methods to ascertain emptiness, namely svatantra anumāna and prasaṅgāpatti.

Even though this classification is very common in Tibet, it is not clear if it existed in India. According to Tsong kha pa, “Scholars of the later dissemination to the range of the snowy mountains (Tibet) use the twofold common usage, Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika, for the Mādhyamika, and because this accords with Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā, you should not think that it is their own fabrication.”76 As is pointed out in many previous studies, this indicates that there was a view that this classification was made up by Tibetan translators of the later dissemination. Indeed we do not find this classification in the lTa ba'i khyad par of Ye shes sde, who was the chief translator of the earlier dissemination.77 Tsong kha pa, in addition, admits that there are no Svātantrikas who criticise the Prāsaṅgika or who mention the dichotomy of the two sub-schools.78 This also shows that as far as he knows, there were no Indian Mādhyamikas who mention this classification after Candrakīrti.

The earliest usage of the classification of the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika is, as

74 See [1-18] (p. 27).
75 See [1-4] (p. 14).
76 See [1-17] (p. 26).
77 See my translation of the Madhyamaka section of his lTa ba'i khyad par in 1.2.1 (p. 31 ff.).
78 Hopkins [1989].
far as we know, by Pa tshab Nyima grags (1055-?). The work of Nyima grags that mentions the classification of the Svatantrika and the Prasangika does not survive. As Matsumoto points out, however, the passage is quoted by 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa in the Grub mtha' chen mo:

[1-29]

According to the statement of Pa tshab rin po che, the two, Prasangika and Svatantrika, are explained:

Bhaviveka holds the view of the svatantra and Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti the view of the prasāṅga.

If [one asks] what is the difference of the Svātantrika and the Prasāṅgika of Madhyamaka, Pa tshab says that the Mādhyamika who accepts the valid means of knowledge (tshad ma, *pramāṇa) induced from objectivity is the Svātantrika, and [the Mādhyamika] who does not accept it is the Prasāṅgika.  

Here the explanation of Nyima grags mentioned by 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa is so brief that we only understand that Bhaviveka is classified into the Svātantrika and Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti into the Prasāṅgika, and that the difference between them is whether or not they accepted the objective validity of pramāṇa. However, it is very clear that Nyima grags knew this classification and used the term rang rgyud and thal 'gyur. He was a translator who worked with the Kashmirian teacher Jayānanda (ca. 12th C). As I briefly mentioned above, Ogawa reports Jayānanda's use of the word rang rgyud pa, which may have been translated from svātantrika, in the Madhyamakāvatāraṭkā, in Matsumoto [1981b] p. 146. See Mimaki [1982a] p. 45, note 110.  

Grub mtha' chen mo (ca 74b5-7, as quoted in Mimaki [1982a] p. 45, note 110):

pa tshab rin po che'i gsung las ... legs ldan rang rgyud phyogs dang/ sangs rgyas bskyangs dang zla ba'i zhab/ thal 'gyur gyi phyogs 'dzin pas thal rang gnyis po gsung/ dbu ma thal rang gi khyad gang yin zhe na/ pa tshab dngos po stobs zhus kyi tshad ma khas len pa dbu ma rang rgyud dang de mi len pa thal 'gyur ba zer skad del...

42
which was written outside India. Yonezawa also reports that a term svatantrasādhanavādin is used to designate Bhāviveka by a Tibetan Dharmakīrti (ca. 12th C), who probably studied Candrakīrti’s works under Abhayākaragupta and wrote notes on the Prasannapadā and the Madhyamakāvatāra, in Sanskrit but with dBu med scripts.

At any rate, we cannot trace these terms back to India in a strict sense, or prior to the 12th C. Nevertheless the terms, svātantrika and prāsaṅgika have, to a certain extent, a connection to India, and it does not seem that they are invented by Tibetan translators alone. What we do not know is how this difference of ideas between Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti was understood by later Indian teachers in the middle and late period of the Madhyamaka after Candrakīrti, i.e. after the 7th C until the 12th C. In chapter 3, therefore, we will examine differences of ideas between Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti, how they are inherited by later Mādhyamikas and why we cannot find a clear distinction between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika in Indian sources.

1.2.3 Māyopamādvayavādin and Sarvadharmāpratīṣṭhānavādin

The last of the three classifications mentioned by Tsong kha pa in the Lam rim chen mo is that of the Māyopamādvayavādin and the Sarvadharmāpratīṣṭhānavādin. According to him, these terms, māyopama and apratīṣṭhāna are used by some Indian teachers, but he does not name who they are. It is also not clear on what basis they are

81 Ogawa [1984] reports that the term ‘Rang rgyud pa’ which may be translated from ‘Śvātantrika’ is found in Jayānanda’s Madhyamakāvatāra (Derge ed. No. 3870, Peking ed. No. 5271):

de’i zhes bya ba ni dbyul ma rang rgyud pa’ol// (Derge ed. ra 281b6, Peking ed. ra 337a8)

‘dis zhes bya ba ni rang rgyud pas so/ (Derge ed. ra 282a3, Peking ed. ra 337b6)

82 Yonezawa [1999]. According to the colophons of three works of Abhayākaragupta, the Abhayapaddhati, the Munimatālanka and the Ṭīnyamaṇḍari, he wrote them respectively in the 25th, 30th and 37th year of the reign of the king Rāmapāla of the Pāla Dynasty. These are 1108, 1113 and 1120 AD. respectively. Therefore, Abhayākaragupta was considered active between the last quarter of the 11th C and the first quarter of the 12th C. See Bühnemann [1991] and Erb [1997] pp. 27-29.

Yonezawa’s article is also important since it points out that this Tibetan Dharmakīrti gives the name Bhāviveka, not Bhāvaviveka, for the author of the Prajñāpāramitā. Ejima [1990] proposed ‘Bhāviveka’ on the basis of Chinese and Tibetan translation as well as of an examination of 12 manuscripts of the Prasannapadā, each mentioning his name four times.

83 See [1-14] (p. 24).
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distinguished. Although Tsong kha pa shows the view of earlier teachers that this classification is based on how they postulate the ultimate truth, he does not agree with these teachers. According to these earlier teachers, the Māyopamādvyavādins assert that collection of the two, appearance and emptiness, is an ultimate truth, and the Sarvadharmapratisṭhānavādins assert that the mere elimination of discriminative thought (prapañca) with respect to appearances is an ultimate truth. This distinction should have something to do with appearance at the level of the ultimate truth, if the view of these earlier teachers is correct. On the other hand, some dGe lugs teachers maintain that the Māyopamādvyavādin and the Sarvadharmapratisṭhānavādin are alternative names of the Svāttantrika and the Prāsaṅgika, and others deny the validity of this classification entirely. Concerning the identification of the Indian teachers, Ruegg indicates Advayavajra, who mentions the Māyopamādvyavādin and the Sarvadharmapratisṭhānavādin in the Tattvaratnāvali. Thus we know that this classification was used by Indian teachers. However, it is still not entirely clear what is the difference between the two.

While some dGe lugs teachers thus relate this classification to that of the Svāttantrika and the Prāsaṅgika, Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507-1554), on the other hand, gives a different account concerning the system of Advayavajra, who mentions this classification. Mi bskyod rdo rje is a teacher in the bKa’ brgyud order who wrote a commentary on Candrabhāgavajra’s Madhyamakāvatāra and its Bhāṣya entitled dBu ma la ’jug pa’i rnam bshad, dPal ldan dus gsum mkhyen pa’i zhal lung dwags brgyud grub pa’i shing rta. In the introduction to this commentary, he explains three lines of lineage through which the teachings of the bKa’ brgyud order are handed down. These three lines are respectively from Nāro pa, Maitrī pa (Advayavajra) and Pa tshab Lo tsā ba. Of these, his explanation of the lineage from Advayavajra is of the most interest to us because Advayavajra seems to be a Sarvadharmapratisṭhānavādin.

81 See [1-15] (p. 25).
84 About identification of Maitrī pa with Advayavajra, see Hadano [1987].
85 Concerning Advayavajra’s position, see chapter 4.
Mi bskyod rdo rje explains his lineage from Advayavajra as follows:\(^{89}\)

[1-30]

The second [lineage] is as follows. It is the master \textit{jina} Maitri\(\text{\textipa{pa}}\) who after keeping in mind that the meaning of the Madhyamaka which Saraha the Elder and the Younger, the \textit{\=ac\=arya} N\=ag\=arjuna and Candtrak\=irti maintained is identical, taught it to others. And with regard to the division of teaching of the Madhyamaka of this system it is called the division of the teaching of \textit{amanasik\=ara} (\textit{\=yi\textipa{d} la mi byed pa}). Also concerning the name \textit{jina} Maitri\(\text{\textipa{pa}}\), he is called \textit{jina} (victor) because having understood the view of the Nir\=ak\=ara-Cittam\=atra [postulated] by the \textit{\=ac\=arya} \=S\=anti\(\text{\textipa{pa}}\) (Ratnakara\=san\=ti) and having debated, he was victorious.\(^{90}\)

[1-31]

Then because the great \textit{\=ac\=arya} Maitri\(\text{\textipa{pa}}\) in the \textit{Tattvada\=saka} explains that:

\begin{quote}
For one who wishes to know the true state (\textit{tathata\(\text{\textipa{\=a}}\))}, it is neither S\=ak\=ara (with images) nor Nir\=ak\=ara (without images). A middle not
\end{quote}

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\(^{89}\) This part of the text is already translated by Ruegg [1988]. However I give my translation below because in some parts there are problematic points which I want to discuss.

\(^{90}\) \textit{\=Du ma la \textipa{jug pa'i rnam bshad}} (5a4-6):

gnyis pa lla\textipa{ra} sa ra ha che chung dang/ slob dpon klu sgub dang zla grags bzhed pa'i\textipa{dbu ma'i don geig par thugs su chud nas gzh\=an la ston par mdzad pa mnga'} bdag rgyal ba ma\textipa{i tri pa ste/ lugs \textipa{\='di'i\textipa{dbu ma'i chos skor la yid la mi byed pa'i chos skor zhes grags la/\textipa{10}}rgyal ba ma\textipa{i tri pa zhes pa'ang slob dpon sha'a nti pas sems tsam mam rdzun gyi phyogs bzung nas brtsad pa las rgyal bas rgyal ba zhes grags so/\textipa{9}}∥

(1) 'This part of Mi bskyod rdo rje's description is not entirely clear. Ruegg [1988] (p. 1255) translates it as follows:

Concerning his being known as Victor (\textit{jina}) Maitrip\=a\=da, he debated with Ratnakara\=san\=ti — who adhered to the thesis of the Al\=ik\=aka-Cittam\=atra — and victorious over him.

From Tibetan it is not clear who holds the thesis of the Nir\=ak\=ara (Al\=ik\=aka)-Cittam\=atra. Although Ruegg understands that Ratnakara\=san\=ti adhered to it, Advayavajra (Maitrip\=a\=da) also maintains the view of the Nir\=ak\=ara-Cittam\=atra-Madhyamaka as Mi bskyod rdo rje later explains in [1-32]. If we consider that Mi bskyod rdo rje is explaining Advayavajra's lineage here, it is possible to interpret that Advayavajra understood the view of the Nir\=ak\=ara-Cittam\=atra which was possibly taught by Ratnakara\=san\=ti.
adorned with the guru’s teaching is [just] mediocre.\textsuperscript{91}

The ācārya Sahajavajra says:

“In this way, this is one who wishes to know the reality which has the characteristic of dependent origination taught by the Mādhyamikas: the noble Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Candrakīrti and others.

Thinking of this meaning, the Bhagavat says:

That which arises from conditions does not arise.
Then there is no arising by nature.
What is dependent on conditions is said to be empty.
He who knows emptiness is heedful.
What arises in dependence has no intrinsic nature.
What has no intrinsic nature does not arise in any way.
Any phenomenon which arises is never found.
With regard to phenomena which do not arise, fools hold that they arise.

and so on. Because of that [it is said by Maitri pa],

a middle which is not adorned with
the guru’s teaching is [just] mediocre.

[The verse means] thus. Because the remainder of negating the division [of the Sākāra and the Nirākāra] is the object which is postulated [in this system], this is said to be a middle, i.e. the doctrine of the intrinsic nature of the true state (tathātā) of yuganaddha adorned with the ornament of the teaching by the supreme guru Bhagavatī which steals the minds of the learned.

na sākāra-nirākāra tathātāṁ jñātum icchatiḥ I
madhyāmā madhyāmā caiva guruvañjanāntakītā II
I here follow the reading of Shastri [1927].
However in respect that the establishment of the truth of cognition, i.e. the remainder of negating the division [of the Sākāra and the Nirākāra], that is to say, negating the Cittamātra, is postulated, asserting [it as] Madhyamaka, is a middle, i.e. mediocre, and not the pure Madhyamaka system. Therefore, it is indicated that he, having adorned [his teaching] with the teaching of the venerable Nāgārjuna and others, explains the meaning of the middle.  

92 Ruegg [1988] (p. 1255-1256) translates this part, as follows:

Now in his Tattvadāsaka (verse 2) Maitripāda has written: ‘For one wishing to know tathātā there is neither the Sākāra nor the Nirākāra: a middle not endued with a Guru’s instructions is only middling’. Therefore Sahajavajra has stated in his comment on this passage that the Mādhyamika thus wishes to know tathātā having the mark of origination in dependence proclaimed by Ārya-Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Candrākirti and the others. As was stated by the Bhagavat with this meaning in mind: What is born from conditions is [really] unborn, there being no birth by self-nature; what is dependent on conditions is stated to be empty (śūnyā), and he who knows Emptiness is attentive; what arises has no self-nature whatever, and whatever has no self-nature arises nowhere; no factor (dharma) is found which is something born, [but] foolish hold dharmas that do not arise to arise. Therefore, if Maitripāda has stated that ‘A middle not endued with a Guru’s instruction is only middling’, the remainder (lha ma) after rejection of the specific [i.e. the Sākāra and the Nirākāra doctrines of the ‘Cittamātra’] is a cognitive object (viśaya) that is postulated; so this teaching of the essence of the tathātā of yuganaddha endued with the excellent Guru’s instructions - the Mādhyamika-
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Concerning the Amanasikāra-Madhyamaka of the great ācārya Maitrī pa, here in Tibet three different kinds of conclusions of his intention arose.

And of the three: (1) realisation after practising the profound and luminous Mantra-Madhyamaka, (2) realisation after practising the profound Sūtra-Madhyamaka and (3) realisation after practising the Nirākāra-Cittamātra-Madhyamaka, the latter, those who explain that the goal of doha is knowledge empty of a perceiving subject and a perceived object, which is self-awareness, self-illumination and the ultimate accomplishment are very many in India and Tibet such as Vajrapāṇi of India, Asu of Nepal and Kor Niru pa.93

Since those who maintained that it was right to explain that this system is

Bhagavatī - captivates the minds of the learned. After having rejected the specific - that is, after having rejected the Cittamātra - to assert that the postulation of a remainder, namely cognition established in reality (ses pa bden grub), is the Madhyamaka is then itself a middling middle, and not the very pure Madhyamaka system. It is accordingly indicated that here [in Maitripāda’s teaching] lies the explication of the meaning of the Middle endued with the teaching of Nāgārjuna and other superiors (guru).

In Ruegg’s translation, it is not clear where the quotation from Sahajavajra ends although Ruegg, in note 31, points out it is from the Tattvadasakatikā. This is in fact up to the end of (1), "...ches 'byung la, in Tibetan, "...which steals the minds of the learned" in my translation and "...captivates the minds of the learned" in Ruegg’s translation (Tattvadasakatikā, Derge ed. no. 2254 wi 166b3-7, Peking ed. no. 3099 mi 182a), but Mi bskyod rdo rje does not clearly indicate the end of quotation.

I wonder if ‘remainder’ described in the part following this quotation, i.e. (2) in the Tibetan text is explanation of ‘remainder’ in the quotation from the Tattvadasakatikā. In the quotation ‘remainder’ of negation of Cittamātra is explained as an object (viṣaya). In Mi bskyod rdo rje’s explanation, on the other hand, ‘remainder’ of negation of Cittamātra is explained as the establishment of the truth of cognition, and asserting it is not the pure Madhyamaka system.

If this is the case, we should understand that in Advayavajra’s system it is postulated that the ‘remainder’ is an object, and that in the other system, it is postulated that the ‘remainder’ is cognition. This may be the distinction between Advayavajra’s and the opponent’s views.

93 dBu ma la 'jug pa'i nām bshad (5b6-6a2): 

slob dpon chen po ma tri pa'i yid la mi byed pa'i dbu ma 'di la bod 'dir dgon pa skong tshul mi 'dra ba gsum byung stel zab gsal sngags kyi dbu ma rtsal du bton nas nyams su len pa dang zab ma mdo'i dbu ma rtsal du bton nas nyams su len pa dang/ sms mram rdzun gyi dbu ma rtsal du bton nas nyams su len pa gsum las/ phyi ma 'di ni gzung 'dzin gyis stong pa'i shes pa rang rig rang gsal don dam du grub pa do ha'i don du 'tshad pa rgya gar phyag na dang/ bal po a su dang/ kor ni ru pa sogs rgya bod du ches mang ngo//
the Madhyamaka did not please many scholars such as Gro lung pa, [they], saying that some sort of systems such as that of amansikāra do not agree with the systems of the Madhyamaka, deny it. Having depended only on this statement, Sa skya pañ chen and some bKa’ gdamgs pas have caused hostility and disrespect (sdang zhen) to a whole division of the pure teaching of amansikāra of the reverend Maitrī pa. Following this, even noble ones who abuse the meaning of Dohasaṅgiti, amansikāra of the great brahmin, and the lord Maitrī pa, the reverend Saraha the elder and the younger have appeared.94

[1-34]

Traditions of the former two are both entirely contained in the master Mar pa and Mi la ras pa.95

From these passages, it is known that there are three different interpretations of Advayavajra’s system: the Mantra-Madhyamaka, the Sūtra-Madhyamaka and the Nirākāra-Cittamātra-Madhyamaka. Of these, according to Mi bskyod rdo rje, the first two are already found in the system of Mar pa and Mi la ras pa, which derived from Nārṇa-pa. It is, therefore, considered that the teaching most peculiar to Advayavajra’s system is that of the Nirākāra-Cittamātra-Madhyamaka.

This description differs from those of some teachers in the dGe lugs order that are discussed above. With regard to the distinction of the Māyopamādvyayavādīn and the

94 dbu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad (6a2-4):

lusgs 'di dbu mar 'chad pa la rigs par smra pa gro lung pa sogs dpyod ldan mang pos ma rangs nas a ma na si pa sogs ci rigs kyi lugs dbu ma pa'i lugs dang ni nthun zhes 'gog par mdzad la/ tshig 'di tsam la brten nas sa skya pan chen dang/ bka' gdamgs pa ci rigs pa zhig gyis rje bstan ma'i tri pa'i chos mnam par dag pa a ma na sa'i skor thams cad la sdang zhen byed dang/ de'i zhar la bran ze chen po'i yid la mi byed pa do la nzung kyi glu'i don dang/ mnga' bdag ma'i tri pa dang rje bstan sa ra ha che chung la skur pa 'debs pa'i skal ba can yang byung snang ngo/

95 dbu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad (6a5):

dang po gnyis kyi bka' srol ni/ rje mar pa dang mi la lta bu la gnyis ka tshang bar bzhugs shing nyams len du mdzad la/...
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Sarvadharmāpratīṣṭhānāvādin made by some earlier teachers given in Tsong kha pa’s Lam rim chen mo, the criteria they give for this distinction is something to do with appearance at the ultimate level. In this case, it is possible that the earlier teachers whom Tsong kha pa refutes consider that this distinction is based on the dichotomy of the Śākāra-Yogācāra-Mādhyamika and the Nirākāra-Yogācāra-Mādhyamika. If this assumption is right, the interpretation by some dGe lugs teachers that Tsong kha pa identifies this distinction with that of the Svātāntrika and the Prāsaṅgika should be wrong.

If we regard the description by Mi brskyod rdo rje as more reliable, considering that he regards himself as a successor of Advayavajra, the distinction of the Māyopamādvyavādin and the Sarvadharmāpratīṣṭhānāvādin can be understood as that of the Śākāra- and Nirākāra-Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas. This also agrees with the classification of Śāntarakṣita in Tsong kha pa’s works. In the Lam rim chen mo, he is said by some earlier teachers to be a Māyopamādvyavādin, and in the Legs bshad snying po, he is said, on the basis of Sahajavajra’s statement, to be a Śākāra-Mādhyamika. Here we can assume, as a hypothesis, that Śāntarakṣita is a Śākāra-Mādhyamika as well as a Māyopamādvyavādin, and Advayavajra is a Nirākāra-Mādhyamika as well as a Sarvadharmāpratīṣṭhānāvādin.

However, Mi brskyod rdo rje does not mention this dichotomy of the Māyopamādvyavādin and the Sarvadharmāpratīṣṭhānāvādin and there is no information about the Māyopamādvyavādin or of the Śākāra-Yogācāra-Mādhyamika. On the other hand, he explains that Advayavajra’s system is concordant with the teaching of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti. It is, therefore, possible to regard Advayavajra as a Prāsaṅgika. At this point, it is too early to draw a conclusion about this type of classification. The matter will be discussed in chapter 4 on the basis of Indian sources.

96 Since being a Prāsaṅgika and being a Nirākāra-Mādhyamika are not contradictory, it is not technically impossible that the Śākāra-Mādhyamaka is the Yogācāra-Svātāntrika-Mādhyamaka and the Nirākāra-Mādhyamaka is the Yogācāra-Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamaka. Even if this is the case, however, it does not agree with the later dGe lugs doxography of the Indian Mādhyamaka, such as dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po’s, which divides the Yogācāra-Svātāntrika-Mādhyamika into the Śākāra- and the Nirākāra-Mādhyamika.

50
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1.3 Summary

As we have observed, while Grub mtha' texts and other Tibetan sources provide us with precious information, they sometimes contradict each other. When we attempt to establish the history of Buddhism in India, therefore, it is necessary to look into Indian sources and find out what they actually record.

In the following chapters we will examine three different types of classification following the Lam rim chen mo of Tsong kha pa: classification (1) of the externalist and the internalist in chapter 2, classification (2) of the Svātāntrika and the Prāsaṅgika in chapter 3 and classification (3) of the Māyopamādhyavādīn and the Sarvadharmapratisthānavādīn in chapter 4.

With regard to the first classification, the following questions are raised. Firstly, Bhāviveka is regarded as a Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika because he asserts the existence of external objects in the way the Sautrāntika does, according to the Grub mtha' rnam bzhag rin chen phreng ba of dKon mchog ’jigs med dbang po (passage [1-3]). However, it is not entirely clear if Bhāviveka actually maintains the Sautrāntika view conventionally in terms both of ontology and epistemology. While dKon mchog ’jigs med dbang po maintains that Bhāviveka does not accept the idea of self-awareness (svaśamvedana) conventionally, the Sautrāntika asserts self-awareness and infers the existence of external objects. On the other hand, Tsong kha pa holds that the Svātāntrika postulate the sākāra view. This amounts to saying that the Svātāntrika accepts self-awareness. As suggested by Matsumoto, moreover, it is very likely that the term indo sde dbu ma was used in the sense of a Madhyamaka text that follows sūtras in the lTa ba'i khyad par, which is the earliest account we know mentioning this term.

Secondly, if the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamaka and the Yogācāra-Mādhyamaka are not necessarily two branches of the Svātāntrika-Mādhyamaka, as Mimaki maintains, there is a possibility that the Prāsaṅgika is included in the former as it asserts the existence of external objects conventionally. Tsong kha pa, however, denies this, as seen in [1-17]. On the other hand, the lTa ba'i khyad par of Ye shes sde does not mention Candrakīrti.

Thirdly, we will also examine if there is any division in the internalist Madhyamaka such as that of the Sākāra-Madhyamaka and the Nirākāra-Madhyamaka although this
division will mainly be discussed in chapter 4 when we examine the classification of the Māyopamādvayavādīn and the Sarvadharmāpratīṣṭhānāvādīn. Even if there is no apparent distinction between the Sākāra-Madhyamaka and the Nirākāra-Madhyamaka, it may be possible to judge whether the view of a certain internalist Mādhyamika is concordant with the Sākāra or the Nirākāra. These three points in question, concerning the classification of the internalist Madhyamaka and the externalist Madhyamaka, will be examined in chapter 2.

Concerning the classification (2), of the Svātantrika and the Pṛāsaṅgika, there is a suggestion that it may not have existed in India. This is implicitly stated by Tsong kha pa in passage [1-17]. He supports this classification assuming that this is not a fabrication by the translators in the later dissemination because the evidence is found in Candrakīrti’s work. On the contrary, this indicates that there was a view that it did not exist in India and was made up by the translators during the later dissemination. This classification is not mentioned in the lTa ba’i khyad par, one of the earliest Tibetan accounts of Indian Madhyamaka doxography. It is, however, problematic to adopt silence as proof. There is a possibility that Ye shes sde did not mention this classification, even if it existed, because it seems that his account is based on the explanation of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalāśīla, which does not mention the distinction of the Svātantrika and Pṛāsaṅgika. To clarify this matter, it is necessary to examine the views of Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti and then to compare them with the views of later Mādhyamikas who are thought to be in either Bhāviveka’s or Candrakīrti’s lineage in order to find out whether their ideas are handed down to the later Madhyamaka teachers. By doing so, we attempt to probe into why we find little evidence of this classification in Indian sources and how their ideas were transmitted to the later Indian Madhyamaka teachers.

We find confusion among Tibetan teachers with regard to the classification (3), of the Māyopamādvayavādīn and the Sarvadharmāpratīṣṭhānāvādīn. There are, at least, three different interpretations of this classification. Firstly, some dGe lugs teachers identify the Svātantrika with the Māyopamādvayavādīn and the Pṛāsaṅgika with the Sarvadharmāpratīṣṭhānāvādīn respectively. On the other hand, others deny the validity of the classification of the Māyopamādvayavādīn and the Sarvadharmāpratīṣṭhānāvādīn. In
addition to these two different interpretations, Mi bskyod rdo rje holds that Advayavajra, presumably a Sarvadharmapratisthānavādin, maintains the view of the Nirākāra-Yogācāra-Madhyamaka. This raises another possibility that this classification is based on the reality of images in the mind: sākāra and nirākāra. The earlier teachers mentioned by Tsong kha pa may have understood it in this way since their distinction of these two proponents is somewhat related to the existence of appearance at the level of the ultimate truth. Even though some dGe lugs teachers hold that Tsong kha pa identifies the Svātantrika with the Māyopamaadvayavādin and the Prāsaṅgika with the Sarvadharmapratisthānavādin, he himself may have had a different view. In the fourth chapter, we will examine Advayavajra’s works to determine what is the difference between the Māyopamaadvayavādin and the Sarvadharmapratisthānavādin. The discussion will proceed on the hypothesis that the Māyopamaadvayavādin and the Sarvadharmapratisthānavādin may possibly be the Sākāra-Mādhyamika and the Nirākāra-Mādhyamika respectively, because both sets of classification indicate the same teachers as representatives.

In the following chapters, we will examine Indian sources which relate to these problems. This will hopefully lead us to a better understanding of the Indian Madhyamaka classification, which has so far depended heavily on Tibetan sources. However, just as Tibetan doxography of the Indian Madhyamaka is, in some respects, not reliable, Indian writers are not necessarily right, either, when they classify Madhyamaka teachers. It must be understood that the main purpose of this thesis is to clarify the late Madhyamaka doxography, i.e. how later Indian teachers understood their predecessors’ views, and classified them accordingly. This does not necessarily mean that they understood their predecessors’ views correctly and classified them properly.
Chapter 2  Externalist and Internalist

As seen in chapter 1, according to the *Lam rim chen mo* of Tsong kha pa, there are three different types of classification of Mādhyamikas. Of these, the classification based on conventional existence, i.e. whether or not they assert the existence of external objects conventionally, is often found in Indian sources after Śāntarakṣita (ca. 725-788). However, it seems that the understanding widely shared by modern scholars that these two proponents are included in the Svātāntrika-Mādhyamika as the Sautrāntika-Svātāntrika-Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra-Svātāntrika-Mādhyamika is based on Tibetan doxography of the Indian Madhyamaka. In relation to this, it is not yet clear if Candrakīrti was excluded from the former, who asserts existence of external objects conventionally. Therefore, I use provisionally the terms externalist (Madhyamaka/Mādhyamika) and internalist (Madhyamaka/Mādhyamika) when I mean that these two views or proponents do not necessarily belong to the Svātāntrika.

In this chapter, we will examine the difference in epistemology and ontology between the two proponents. The epistemology and ontology of the internalist Madhyamaka have been discussed in many previous studies. On the other hand, those of the externalist Madhyamaka are controversial, including the validity of the designation ‘Sautrāntika,’ i.e. whether the epistemology and ontology of Bhāviveka or other externalist Mādhyamikas are identical with that of the Sautrāntika. Later dGe lugs doxographers, such as dKon mchog ’jigs med dbang po, consider that the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamikas do not accept self-awareness. On the other hand, the Sautrāntikas hold that any image we perceive cannot be that of an external object itself but an image in cognition because the object, being momentary, does not exist a moment later when we perceive it. Therefore, they maintain self-awareness that possesses images which are not those of external objects themselves.

According to Kajiyama’s study, it is understood that the epistemology and ontology of Bhāviveka are similar to those of the Sautrāntika. He consequently regards this

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1 Kajiyama [1982] pp. 35-51. Because this article is written in Japanese, I will show his argument and conclusion later in 2.1 (p. 56 ff.).

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designation as appropriate. Most Tibetan doxographical accounts indeed agree that Bhāviveka maintains the existence of external objects that are aggregates of atoms.

On the other hand, Matsumoto maintains that in the ITa ba’i khyad par, ‘mDo sde’ in the mDo sde’i dBu ma is derived from the sūtras, such as the Prajñāpāramitāśāstra, and ‘rnal ’byor spyod pa’ in the rNal ’byor spyod pa’i dBu ma means the Yogācāra treatises such as the Yogācārabhūmi. It should be noted, moreover, that he concludes that these terms which are generally understood to indicate ‘school’ or ‘proponent’ is used to designate texts. From Matsumoto’s study alone, however, it is not clear how they were understood in India. It is possible that the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamaka meant the Madhyamaka texts that follow sūtras, such as the Prajñāpāramitāśāstra, and the Yogācāra-Mādhyamaka likewise meant the Madhyamaka texts that follow the Yogācārabhūmi and similar treatises in India as well. If this is the case, it is not a problem that the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika does not accept self-awareness conventionally, but the Sanskrit reconstruction ‘Sautrāntika-Mādhyamaka’ may not be accurate. Indian sources which mention the doxography of the Madhyamaka are often too brief to give a definitive answer to this problem. Nevertheless, it is possible to show whether they are supportive to either theory or silent, even though there is no guarantee that these later Indian accounts are right.

In addition to this, we discuss if Candrakīrti and his successors should be categorised in externalists together with Bhāviveka. Even though both Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti accept external objects conventionally, Tibetan doxographers do not consider that Candrakīrti holds the same view on conventionality as Bhāviveka. According to Tsong kha pa, for example, Candrakīrti’s view is special and it is not appropriate to assume that his view accords either with the Vaibhāṣika or with the Sautrāntika. If this is the case in India, it may be possible to find a distinction in the externalist Madhyamaka in Indian sources.

On the other hand, Tibetan doxographers classify the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas into the Sākāra-Mādhyamika and the Nirākāra-Mādhyamika. As we have seen in the first chapter, Sahajavajra mentions this classification. We examine if there is any other account

2 Matsumoto [1981a]. See 1.2.1 (p. 31 ff.).
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that mentions this classification in the internalist Madhyamaka when the classification of
the internalist Madhyamaka and the externalist Madhyamaka is mentioned.

Additionally, if we can find any other characteristic that arises from a difference
in epistemology and ontology, it will be discussed to a certain extent to show points of
controversy other than the matter of the existence of external objects.

2.1 Bhāviveka

Bhāviveka (ca. 500-570) is regarded as a Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika in dKon mchog
’jigs med dbang po’s Grub mtha’ rin chen phreng ba, Tsong kha pa’s Lam
rin chen mo and Legs bshad snying po and Ye shes sde’s lTa ba’i khyad par. dKon
mchog ’jigs med dbang po understands that Bhāviveka does not accept self-awareness
but accepts external objects.3 Tsong kha pa considers that Bhāviveka conventionally
maintains existence of external objects and cognition with images.4 Ye shes sde explains
that, according to the view of the mDo sde dBu ma, all external and internal things arise
in dependence and because they arise from causes and conditions conventionally, they
exist just like an illusion.5 With regard to ontology, they all consider Bhāviveka postulates
existence of external objects. Concerning epistemology, however, dKon mchog ’jigs
med dbang po and Tsong kha pa do not agree on whether or not Bhāviveka accepts
self-awareness, and Ye shes sde is silent. Therefore, it is necessary to ascertain if Bhāviveka
himself accepts epistemology of the Sautrāntika conventionally.

The bases of the Sautrāntika view are causality and momentariness. The Sautrāntika
regards the process of perception as causality. If an object is the cause of perception and
cognition is the result, they cannot exist at the same time but in sequence. First, an object
has contact with the faculty of sight and in the next moment cognition of the object
arises. Then, at the moment the cognition of the object arises, the object no longer exists
because of momentariness. It is therefore impossible for cognition to perceive any external
object directly, and cognition and its object cannot exist simultaneously. What cognition

3 See [1-21] (p. 12)
4 See [1-191] (p. 28)
5 See [1-27] (pp. 35-36)
perceives must be an image of the object thrown into the cognition and external objects are postulated only through inference as the cause of images in cognition.

According to Kajiyama’s study, Bhāviveka follows the Sautrāntika in that he accepts external objects which are only inferred and cognition with images. He examines various aspects of Bhāviveka’s ideas in detail. Of these, the following passage in the Prajināpradīpa is of the most interest:

[2-1]

In order to establish the way of the truth of common usage, it is said [in Abhidharma] that [the multitude of the 6 sensory perceptions (vijñāna)] is associated with objects. Because when [the multitude of perceptions] arise due to some object, then its appearance arises, it is said [the multitude of perceptions] is associated with objects. However, it is not because they are connected simultaneously like a wealthy man [that is the simultaneous connection of a man and his wealth].

Kajiyama explains that because the simultaneous existence of cognition and its object is compared to a wealthy man, the negation of this metaphor implies that the relation between cognition and its object occurs sequentially, i.e. as causality. Because an object that is the cause gives rise to cognition with appearance of the object, this is regarded as the sākāra view. Bhāviveka here accepts it as the truth of common usage.

In addition to this, Nönin points out another passage that relates this issue. In chapter 3 of the same work, Bhāviveka analyses epistemology of the Sautrāntika, as follows:

[2-2]

6 Prajināpradīpa (Walleser [1914] p. 43, 14-17, Derge ed. No. 3853 tsha 59b1-2, Peking ed. No. 5253 tsha 71a8-b1):
   dmigs pa dang bcas pa zhes bya ba ni tha snyad kyi bden pa'i lugs rnam par gzhag pa'i phyir
tel/ dmigs pa gang gis skye ba nall/ der snang ba skye ba'i phyir dmigs pa dang bcas pa zhes
   bya'ba' nor can bzhin du dus gcig kho nar 'bro'i phyir ni ma yin no/l

7 Nönin [1986].

57
The Sautrāntika says [as follows]:

Because conditioned things do not have any effect, eyes do not see them, or it is not the others [that see them]. Then if [one asks] why, [I answer] that because it is said in a sūtra that the eye perception arises depending on an eye and material things, you [the Madhyamika] establish only what has already been established, saying that eyes do not see [anything].

Because arising is indeed denied, the eye perception is not accepted. Therefore, it is not establishing what has already been established. There arises no damage to our view because the meaning of the sūtra, which is concordant with the truth of the common usage, is accepted and because the meaning of the sūtra has no logic ultimately.\(^8\)

This passage suggests that Bhāviveka conventionally accepts the Sautrāntika’s epistemological idea that the eye perception arises depending on eyes and material things. As Nōnin explains, this means that there is only a causal relationship between the eye perception and a combination of eyes and material things. It is not the case that material things, which are objects, have simultaneous effects on the eye perception. It becomes clearer from the fact that this argument is presented after Bhāviveka’s criticism over the Kashmirian Vaibhāṣika, who maintains that eyes do the seeing because they are the subject of seeing.\(^9\) Therefore, as Nōnin concludes, Bhāviveka is considered to accept

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\(^8\) Prajñāpradīpa (Derge ed. No. 3853 tsha 77a3-5, Peking ed. No. 5253 tsha 92b7-93a2):

\[\text{mdo sde pa dag na re/} \]

\[\text{'du byed mans la bya ba med pa'i phyir mig kyang lta'}/ \text{bar mi byed la/ gzhan yang ma yin te/ 'o na ci zhe na/ mdo sde las mig dang gsungs mans la bten nas mig gi mam par shes pa skye'o zhes gsungs pas khyed mig lta bar mi byed do zhes zer ba ni grub pa kho na la sgrub pa yin no} \]

\[\text{zhe'ol/ skye ba bkag pa kho nas mig gi mam par shes pa mi 'thad pa'i phyir grub pa la sgrub pa ma yin no/ khas blangs pa la gnod par mi 'gyur te/ tha snyad kyi bden pa dang rjes su mthun pa'i mdo sde'i don khas blangs pa'i phyir dang/ don dam par mdo sde'i don la rigs pa med pa'i phyir rol/} \]

(1) D: lla, P: blla. (2) D: ma yin no, P: yin no.

\(^9\) Prajñāpradīpa (Derge ed. No. 3853 tsha 77a2, Peking ed. No. 5253 tsha 92b5):
the Sautrāntika’s epistemological view conventionally rather than Vaibhāṣīka’s.

From these passages, thus, we find the evidence that indicates that Bhāviveka conventionally accepts Sautrāntika’s sākāra view. It is, therefore, appropriate to call him a Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika in the sense that he accepts the Sautrāntika view conventionally. However, this is not to say that it is without foundation that dKon mchog ’jigs med dbang po considers that Bhāviveka does not accept self-awareness.

2.2 Lakṣmī

To the best of my knowledge, the only Indian source mentioning the terms which may be restored as yogācāra mādhyamika and sautrāntika mādhyamika in a pair is Lakṣmī’s Pañcakramaṭikā Kramārthaprakāśikā. We came to know that there were examples of these terms in the Indian source, after Hakamaya\textsuperscript{10} pointed out that ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa in the Grub mtha’ chen mo cites the work of Lakṣmī. Lakṣmī mentions the terms ‘mdo sde dbu ma pa’ (Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika) and ‘rnal ’byor spyod pa’i dbu ma pa’ (Yogācāra-Mādhyamika), as follows:

\[2-3\]

External objects, which arise from causes and conditions, are established on the one hand, consciousness without images is established on the other hand. Even these two lack intrinsic nature. Thus the reality (\textit{de kho na nyid}, *tattva) is grasped by the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamikas.

External entities are nothing but images of cognition, but even they lack intrinsic nature. Thus the reality is grasped by the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas.

One, having eliminated defilement through the ways of seeing and practice, obtains the dharmakāya. Thus the doctrine is postulated by the Mādhyamikas of the Mother of Victors (rgyal ba’i yum gyi dbu ma pa.

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\textsuperscript{10} Hakamaya [1976]
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"jinajanani-mādhyamikā")

[2-4]

For the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamikas, it is maintained that twelve sense fields (skye mched, *āyatana) which arise from causes and conditions exist in the form of perceiving subjects and perceived objects, but lack intrinsic nature. 12

According to Mimaki, 13 Lakṣmī is a Kashmirian who lived in the 11th C. Although this text is much later than Ye shes sde’s lTa ba’i khyad par, which was composed in the early 9th C, this proves existence of the terms, Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika and Yogācāra-Mādhyamika or similar, in India. 14 According to Lakṣmī, however, the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamikas are understood as proponents of the nirākāra view. They hold that objects, which arise in dependence, exist as well as consciousness without images. On the other hand, the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas maintain that what we perceive as external objects is in fact images of cognition. This is basically the same way of explanation as Ye shes sde because he explains in the lTa ba’i khyad par that, according to the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamaka, external objects arise in dependence and lack intrinsic nature, and, according to the Yogācāra-Mādhyamaka, they are images of cognition. 15 Also it is very likely that the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas maintain the sākāra view because in that view, images are

11 Pañcakramaṭākā (Derge ed. No. 1842 chi 240a6-b1, Peking ed. No. 2705 ngi 464a3-6):

12 Rgyu dang rkyen las 'byung ba’i phyil'i don logs su ’grub dang/ nang ma med pa’i nang ma shes pa logs su ’grub pa ste/ de gnyi ga yang rang bzhin med pa’o zhes mdo sde’i dbu ma pa nangs kyis de kho na nyid gzung ba yin nol/


14 It is the biggest concern here what the original Sanskrit of mdo sde is.

15 See 1.2.1 (p. 31 ff.).
considered to be identical with cognition. Lakṣmī does not give any individual names of these proponents, and it is not clear if Śāntarakṣita and Bhāviveka are intended to be the representatives of these proponents as in the *IIa ba’i khyad par*.

Although we have found an example of this classification and use of the terms, it is still problematic that the only Indian account which mentions the terms which can be restored to Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika and Yogācāra-Mādhyamika explains that the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamikas hold the *nīrākāra* view. In this case, it is doubtful that Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika is meant to be the Mādhyamika who holds the view of the Sautrāntika conventionally because the Sautrāntika holds the *sākāra* view even though they both accept existence of external objects. Therefore it is not clear from these passages how *mDo sde* of mDo sde’i dbu ma pa is derived. Concerning the origin of the terms, Mimaki places priority on Ye shes sde16 because the latter is about two centuries earlier. It is also possible, as Matsumoto maintains, that in the *IIa ba’i khyad par* Sautrāntika-Mādhyamaka was not meant to be the Mādhyamaka that holds the view of the Sautrāntika conventionally, but later Tibetan doxographers misunderstood that they are related because of similarity of these terms.

While this does not explain how the term ‘Sautrāntika-Mādhyamaka’ is derived, this could explain why the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamaka is considered by later Tibetan doxographers to deny self-awareness even though they are supposed to follow conventionally the Sautrāntika view which accepts self-awareness with images. Because this text of Lakṣmī is quoted by ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, it is certain that Tibetan accounts given by dGe lugs doxographers depended on this text and as a result, the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika is said by them to have held the *nīrākāra* view and denied self-awareness. It is then not appropriate to attribute this inconsistency of epistemology of the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika and the Sautrāntika to the misunderstanding by Tibetan doxographers since this is based on the Indian source. Concerning the validity of the term ‘Sautrāntika,’ however, it is not clear from these passages by Lakṣmī how the term is derived.

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16 Mimaki [1982a] (p. 43) and [1983] (p. 163). Also see Williams [1989a] (p. 2) that suggests a possibility that this division which originated in Tibet was subsequently introduced to India.
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In addition to these two Mādhyamikas, Lakṣmī mentions the Mādhyamikas of the Mother of Victors (rgyal ba'i yum gyi dbu ma pa, *jinajananī-mādhyamika). Her explanation of their view is not based on ontology that is the criterion of the classification for the former two Mādhyamikas. Therefore, it is not clear who these third Mādhyamikas are from the brief explanation of Lakṣmī.17

Concerning the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika, Lakṣmī shows her view on self-awareness:18

[2-5]

Because of the reasoning that it is neither from itself nor from another and so on, if one examines the triple world, it is only empty. However, in the position of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamaka, cognition that is self-awareness-only appears as external and internal forms.

And if one asks what difference there is from the view of consciousness with images, [he, Nāgārjuna,] answers, “It has no characteristic like space.” (v. 2:28b)19 This means that that cognition which is free from characteristics, i.e. arising and so on, i.e. which is free from arising and destruction and so on, is the doctrine of the Mādhyamika.

Therefore, it seems as if [cognition] is not self-awareness, and it is in an inexpressible state because the form of self-awareness is not established.20

17 Yoshimizu [1988] (p. 459 and p. 468, note 12) briefly mentions these three classifications and points out that Hakamaya [1976] having quoted passages from the work of Lakṣmī as the source of the classification of the Mādhyamika, only mentions the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika, but not the third classification (rgyal ba'i yum gyi dbu ma pa, which she translate as the Prajñā-Mādhyamika) She also points out that it is not mentioned in Matsumoto [1980b], [1981a] and Kajiyama [1982], which examine the Lakṣmī's classification following Hakamaya's study, either.

18 The most part of the following passages, [2-5] and [2-6] are translated into Japanese in Yoshimizu [1988].

19 Pañcakrama, v. 2:30ab (=v. 3:30ab according to the numbering of La Vallée Poussin [1896] p. 28, 32):

\[\text{sanvittimātrakām jñānam ākāśavād alakṣāṇam}\]

Pancakramaṭikā (Derge ed. No. 1842 chi 230b3-6, Peking ed. No. 2705 ngi 449a2-6):

rang las ma yin gzhan las min/ zhes bya ba la sogs pa'i rigs pas khams gsum mam par dpyad na stong pa/18 kho na yin te/ 'on kyang mal 'byol spyd pa'i dbu ma'i phyogs su rang rig tsm gyi ye shes phyi nang gyi gzugs su snang ba yin na/

'o na mam pa dang bcas pa'i mam par shes pa smra ba las khyad par gang yod ce na smras

62
In this passage the view of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika is explained that cognition that is self-awareness-only appears as external and internal forms. She seems to rephrase it as the view of consciousness with images (nam pa dang bcas pa'i rnam par shes pa smra ba, *sākāravijñānavāda). Her explanation that cognition appears as internal and external forms is regarded as the sākāra view because cognition is considered not different from images in that view. While it is not clear whether her view is also included in the position of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika, it is clear that her explanation is based on the Mādhyamika view in that the triple world is considered empty on the basis of the reasoning that neither from itself nor another and so on. If this position is different from that of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika, it may possibly be identified with the Mādhyamikas of the Mother of Victors (rgyal ba'i yum gyi dbu ma pa, *jinajananī-mādhyamika).

Likewise she later explains cognition, as follows:

[2-6]

It is said “supreme just like the surface of space” and so on, [i.e.]

Then splendour that is supreme just like the surface of space should be observed. (v. 2:60cd)]

Splendour (śod gsal, prabhāsvara), i.e. the reality without images, which is similar to clear lamplight and similar to an ocean without waves, should be perceived.

Splendour is of two types: splendour of mind (sem kyi śod gsal, *citta-
prabhāsvara) and splendour by nature (rang bzhin gyis 'od gsal, prakṛti-
prabhāsvara). Of these, splendour of mind is consciousness without images,
and splendour by nature is empty of all and obtained at the fourth stage.
At this [second stage] the Venerable [Nāgārjuna] accepts only splendour
of mind. Otherwise, the fourth stage would incur an undesired consequence
of meaninglessness because of repetition.

Then if one asks how it is, [Nāgārjuna answers,] “Just like the surface
of space” (v. 2:60d). Just as, even though space is filled with clouds,
darkness, snow, and so on, it does not have impurity, just so the reality
free from false images, which is different from that [reality], should be
perceived, like the surface of space. Therefore, supreme means that it is
more excellent than the view of consciousness-only associated with images
because intrinsic nature of images is not established.23

Again in this passage, Lakṣmī elucidates her view on cognition. She gives two
types of Splendour (prabhāsvara): splendour of mind, which is consciousness without
images and splendour by nature, which is empty of all. This is nothing but the view of
the Nirākāra-Madhyamaka because it proceeds from the stage of the Nirākāra-Cittamātra
where consciousness without images is postulated to that of the Madhyamaka where that

23 Pañcakramatikā (Derge ed. No. 1842 chi 236b5-237a1, Peking ed. No. 2705 ngi 458b2-8):

(1) D: pa'i, P: ba'i, Em: bar. (2) D: 'dra ba'i, P: rgya mtsho dang 'dra ba'i. (3) D: gyi, P:
rdzun. (11) D: pa'i, P: ba'i.
consciousness is also empty. It is also clear that she understands that images are different from the reality, i.e. consciousness. This shows that there was a further classification in the internalist Madhyamaka: the sākāra and the nirākāra. It is also very likely that the Nirākāra-Madhyamaka has something to do with the Ārya school to which Nāgārjuna, the author of the Pañcakrama is considered to belong.

Thus Lakṣmī classifies the Mādhyamikas into the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika. The Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika is considered to maintain the externalist nirākāra view while Bhāviveka maintains the sākāra view. She distinguishes the Sākāra-Mādhyamika and the Nirākāra-Mādhyamika although it is not clear if both are included in the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika. She does not give any names related to these classifications, except for Nāgārjuna who is regarded as the internalist Nirākāra-Mādhyamika.

2.3 Bodhibhadra

Bodhibhadra\(^{24}\) is known to have written the Jñānasūrasamuccayānibandhana, the commentary on the Jñānasūrasamuccaya written by a certain Āryadeva. He is considered to have lived around 10-11th C since Atiśa (982-1055) mentions him as his direct teacher,\(^{25}\) whose teaching he adhered to. He is therefore regarded as a contemporary of Lakṣmī.

The Jñānasūrasamuccaya is a doxographical text which explains and analyses the teaching of outsiders and the four major Buddhist philosophical views. In verses 27 and 28, Āryadeva shows the teaching of the Madhyamaka. Of these, it is verse 28 concerning which Bodhibhadra mentions two types of Mādhyamikas who have opposing views. Verse 28 of the Jñānasūrasamuccaya and part of a commentary given by Bodhibhadra are translated as follows:

[2-7]

Neither existent, nor non-existent, nor both existent and non-


\(^{25}\)See Lindtner [1981] pp. 210-1 and 3.4.2 (p. 188 ff.) of this thesis.
exist, nor even [anything] with the nature of neither [existent
nor non-existent]. The Mādhyamikas know that the reality is free
from the four alternatives (catuskoti). (v. 28)26

Here, also these Mādhyamikas have two conventionally differentiated
positions. Those who do not consider appearance are Bhavya (Bhāviveka)
and others, and those who assert that things which appear are not as they
are [thought to be external], but only internal cognition appears in various
ways are Sāntarakṣita and others.27

Āryadeva denies that the four alternatives (catuskoti) based on existence and
non-existence28 are the teaching of the Madhyamaka. In the commentary on this verse,
Bodhibhadra explains that Bhavya and Sāntarakṣita are two Mādhyamikas who do not
agree on appearance. It is understood here that Sāntarakṣita and others hold the view of
the internalist Madhyamaka, that is to say, the view that what we consider the outside
world is actually the manifestation of internal cognition. This is the sākāra view because
cognition itself appears as objects. The view that cognition which is single appears as
objects which are plural corresponds to that of the Sākāra-Yogācāra.29 On the other hand,
what Bhāviveka and others hold is not entirely clear since the explanation is too brief.

na san nāsan na sadasan na cāpy anubhayātmaṃ
catuskotiviniruktam tattvaṃ mādhyamīkā viduḥ (v. 28)

 tsha 44a7-b1, Peking ed. No. 5252 tsha 51b7-8):
'dir dbu ma pa de dag kyang kun rdzob mam par gzhag pa gnyis tel/ snang ba la mi 'jal ba ni
slob dpon bha bya la sogs pa dang/ snang ba'li dngos po ji la ba ma yin gyi nang gi shes pa
kho na sna tshogs su snang bar smra ba slob dpon zhi ba 'tsho la sogs pa'ol/

28 It is very important to examine how the Madhyamaka teachers understand the four alternatives
(catuskoti). As we will see in chapters 3 and 4, they can be classified depending on interpretation
of the four alternatives and on use of different kinds of four alternatives. The Śvātantrika can be
distinguished from the Prāsaṅgika according to their interpretation of the verse. The Māyopamādyavāyavādīn and the Sarvadharmaśāntarāṣṭrīyavādīn respectively use the four alternatives
based on existence and on permanence.

29 Matsumoto [1984a] (p. 147) assumes that this corresponds to the citrādvaita view of the Sākāra-
Yogācāra.
Kajiyama\textsuperscript{30} interprets ‘appearance’ in the commentary as ‘appearance of images (ākāra) in knowledge’. He accordingly concludes that Bhāviveka is here understood as a Nirākāravādīn. This means that Bodhibhadra’s understanding of Bhāviveka’s view is almost the same as the view of the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika described by Lakṣmī in the \textit{Pañcakramajīkā Kramārthaprakāśikā}. It is again unlikely that the externalist Mādhyamika was considered to have any relation to the tenet of the Sautrāntika.

Bodhibhadra names Bhāviveka and Śāntarakṣīta as the representatives of these two views. Nevertheless he does not mention any other subdivision or the name of a teacher. He does not give any information about Candrakīrti.

2.4 Prajñākaramati

Prajñākaramati (10-11th C),\textsuperscript{31} in the commentary on verse 9:20cd of the \textit{Bodhicaryāvatāra}, discusses self-awareness.\textsuperscript{32} After denying the existence of self-awareness by showing that lamplight is an inappropriate inferential example of self-awareness, he examines the theory of self-awareness given by Śāntarakṣīta, who holds mind-only conventionally. Therefore, the topic here is not self-awareness as ultimate existence, but that at the conventional level. It is also known that he regards Śāntideva, the author of the \textit{Bodhicaryāvatāra}, as an externalist Mādhyamika. Here he first introduces the Yogācāra’s objection that some Mādhyamikas (for example, Śāntarakṣīta) also admit self-awareness, and then quotes two verses from the \textit{Madhyamakālaṃkāra} of Śāntarakṣīta:

\begin{quote}
[2-9]
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{30} Kajiyama [1982] (p. 50.) Because, according to Kajiyama’s study, Bhāviveka was a Sākāravādīn who maintains the existence of external objects, which justifies the name ‘Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika’ (see 2.1), he holds that this passage is based on Bodhibhadra’s misunderstanding.

\textsuperscript{31} Tibetan accounts of the history of Indian Buddhism report that Prajñākaramati was a gatekeeper at Vikramaśila together with Ratnākarasānti, who was a teacher of Atiśa (982-1055). See Roerich [1976] (pp. 205-206) for the account of the \textit{Deb ther sngon po}. Atiśa entered Tibet in 1042. Yamaguchi [1941] (p. 303) and Kajiyama [1982] (p. 17) propose ca. 950-1030 for Prajñākaramati’s date. Therefore, Lakṣmī, Bodhibhadra and Prajñākaramati are regarded as contemporaries.

\textsuperscript{32} Williams [1998] and Shaku [2000] deal with Prajñākaramati’s commentary on verses 9:20 and 25. However I do not agree with Williams’s interpretation of these parts of commentary and Shaku does not discuss much about Śāntarakṣīta’s view expressed in verses 16 and 17 of the \textit{Madhyamakālaṃkāra} that are quoted by Prajñākaramati.
[The Yogācāra says:] This [self-awareness], which is pleasant, is agreeably established [even by the Mādhyamika], because self-illumination [which illuminates] cognition independent of other illumination, and which arises from its own causes and conditions as being opposite to insentient intrinsic nature, is called self-awareness. Even by you, [the Mādhyamikas,] who attack intrinsic nature of blue, this is indeed approved. To this extent, lamplight is also given as an example. Moreover, we do not regard self-illumination as a distinction of [the object of] action (karman), an agent (kartr) and activity (kriyā), because it is not appropriate for a single existent to have three kinds of intrinsic nature such as activity. Then even if there is an objection through the distinction of activity and the others, we[, the Yogācāras,] do not have any damage, because self-illumination originated from a cause in itself cannot be damaged. In this way, there is no faulty consequence shown [by the Mādhyamika] with regard to self-awareness.

It is said [in the Madhyamakālamkāra, 16-17]:

Consciousness arises as what is opposite to those with insentient intrinsic nature. This sentient nature is self-awareness of that [consciousness]. (v. 16)

But, its self-awareness is not based on distinction between activity and an agent, because it is not reasonable that a single thing without parts has three forms. (v. 17)

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33 Bodicaryāvatārapaṇḍjikā (La Vallée Poussin [1914] p. 396, 4-13):

34 Bodhicaryāvatārapaṇḍjikā (La Vallée Poussin [1914] p. 396, 14-7 = Madhyamakālamkāra, vv. 16-17 = Tattvasaṅgraha, vv. 1999-2000):
Chapter 2 Internalist and Externalist

It is first necessary to examine what Śāntarakṣita is trying to show with these verses in the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*. In verse 16, sentient nature is said to be self-awareness of consciousness. It is not unreasonable even for those who deny self-awareness, unless they are materialists, that consciousness which is mental has a sentient nature and external objects which are material have an insentient nature. It can also be understood, in reverse, that material things, which do not have sense, thought and so on, are defined as insentient, and consciousness, which has sense, thought and so on, is understood as sentient. We usually think that this sentient consciousness perceives insentient material things. This dichotomy of sentient and insentient can differentiate consciousness which is the subject of perception from material things which are the objects of perception. It does not necessarily follow, however, that consciousness that has a sentient nature has self-awareness. Therefore a sentient nature alone is not a sufficient reason for self-awareness. Then why is it that Śāntarakṣita defines here that sentient nature is self-awareness of consciousness? In the *Madhyamakālaṃkārayārvṛtti* on verse 16, he explains as follows:

[2-10]

Of these, first, with regard to dualism, the view of consciousness without images, it is not possible that consciousness which does not take appearance of an object has the nature to perceive an object different from itself, because ['perception of object'] is only figuratively used for mere perception of nothing but itself.\(^{35}\)

Śāntarakṣita seems to be saying that cognition, which is sentient, cannot perceive external objects, which are insentient, because they are of opposite quality and cannot have a connection. Because consciousness cannot perceive insentient objects that are

\(^{35}\) *Madhyamakāraṇa-kārayārtti* (Ichigō [1985b] p. 70, 5-8):

del ra zhiṅ gnyis kyi tshul mamb pa med pa'i ram par shes pa'i phyogs ni / ram par shes pa yul gyi snaṅ pa dang ma phrud pa/ bdag tsam riṅ pa tsam la gzhol ba kho nar zad pas/ bdag dang tha dam pa'i don myong ba'i bdag nyid du mi rung ngo/
different in quality, Sāntarakṣita insists, it is necessary for consciousness to have the appearance of an object in itself. Here he, from the point of the view of sākāra, criticises the (externalist) Nirākāravādin, who postulates that when it perceives an object, consciousness does not take in appearance, and that images belong to external objects. Thus although the sentient nature of consciousness itself does not directly indicate the self-awareness of consciousness, incompatibility between sentient consciousness and insentient objects suggests the former’s inability to perceive the latter.

Thus having postulated self-awareness in verse 16 of the Madhyamakalāṃkāra Sāntarakṣita goes on to deny its having three aspects in verse 17. With regard to this, he comments on the verse, as follows:

[2-11]

It is not possible to establish self-awareness in the way it is postulated, in the view of consciousness with images (*sākāravijñāna), that with regard to the object which can throw its image [into consciousness], this state of being the cause is the state of being the percept, and with regard to consciousness which places the form of the object [in itself], this state of being caused to arise is the state of being the perceiver.36

Thus Sāntarakṣita denies the view of the externalists who hold that consciousness has images, such as the Sautrāntika. As we examined previously,37 the Sautrāntika postulates self-awareness which takes images thrown in by external objects. In this case, consciousness does not perceive external objects themselves but images thrown into it by the objects and therefore the difference of their quality does not obstruct perception. The bases of this theory are the ideas of momentariness and causality. If an object is the cause of perception and cognition is the result, they cannot exist at the same time but in sequence.

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36 Madhyamakalāṃkāraya (Ichigō [1985b] p. 72, 1-4):

ji skad du yul rang gi mam pa 'jog nus pa ni rgyu nyid de rig par bya ba nyid yin pa dang/mam par shes pa yul gyi ngo bor bzhag pa ni bskyed par bya ba nyid de rig pa po nyid do zhes/mam pa dang beas pa'i shes pa'i tshul las brjod pa la bur rang rig pa la ni de liar mam pa bzhag par mi 'thad de/

37 See [1-5] and [1-6] (pp. 16-18).
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First, an object has contact with the faculty of sight and in the next moment cognition of the object arises. Then, at the moment the cognition of the object arises, the object no longer exists because of momentariness. It is therefore impossible for cognition to perceive any external object and what cognition perceives must be an image of the object thrown into the cognition.

Śāntarakṣita, however, slightly changes the point of the argument when he explain why this way of perception is impossible. He, immediately after the previous passage, gives the following reason:

[2-12]

It is because it is not reasonable that consciousness without parts has the [three] aspects, which are the result of arising, the cause of arising and the activity of arising, or the three aspects by the distinction of the perceived object, the perceiving subject and perception. To explain, there is no capability [of self-awareness] before arising [of cognition] because of non-existence. When there is capability, just like the form maintained as the cause of arising, the form maintained as the result of arising that is not different from the [cause] has also been accomplished. The activity on itself is contradictory.\(38\)

In this passage, the subject and the object are said to be the result of arising and the cause of arising: literally ‘what is caused to arise’ (bskyed par bya ba) and ‘what causes to arise’ (skyed pa po). The proponent of consciousness with images who maintains existence of external objects postulates that an object can throw its image into consciousness, consciousness places the image of the object in itself and cognition arises in dependence

\(38\) Madhyamakālaṅkāra-vṛtti (Ichigō [1985b] p. 72, 4-10): mam par shes pa cha med pa'i bskyed pa po dang/ bskyed pa'i bya ba dang/ bya ba bya ba dang/ skyed pa po dang/ skyed pa po dang/ bya ba'i tshul du 'am/ rig par bya ba dang/ rig pa po dang/ rig pa'i bye brag gis gsum gyi tshul du mi rigs pa'i phyir te/ 'di lla skye ba'i snga logs na ni med pas nus pa med la/ nus pa'i dus na ni skyed pa po 'dod pa'i ngo bo bzhi du de dang tha ni dad pa bskyed par bya bar 'dod pa'i ngo bo yang yongs su grub ste/ bskyed pa po bya ba dang/ bskyed pa po dang/ bskyed pa po dang/

(1) Ed. las.
on the image. This implies that the image of the object is the cause and the cognition is the result. According to Śāntarakṣita, however, this is not tenable. Before cognition arises, there is no capability of self-awareness. When self-awareness has capability, cognition which is identical with the object is existent. In other words, at the moment the object is existent and cognition is not, self-awareness is not in effect. Then the object cannot be a part of self-awareness. On the other hand, at the moment self-awareness is in effect, the cognition and the object which are identical are both existent. If they exist simultaneously, they cannot be a cause and its result. According to Śāntarakṣita, therefore, in self-awareness there are not the three parts, i.e. the subject which is a result, the object which is a cause and the causality between them which is understood as activity or a function. In this way Śāntarakṣita denies only the causality between an object and cognition and at the same time introduces his idea of self-awareness that is the identity of an object and cognition.\(^{39}\)

In this way Śāntarakṣita refutes the externalist who holds the nirākāra view in verse 16 and the externalist who holds the sākāra view in verse 17. It naturally follows that what cognition perceives must be cognition itself. This conclusion is shown in verse 18 of the Madhyamaka-lāṃkāra (=verse 2001 of the Tattvasaṅgraha) which is not quoted by Prajñākaramati:

\[2-13\]

Then because this [consciousness] has the nature of cognition (bodha), to this extent self-awareness is possible. But how is awareness of any other[s] in the form of an object [possible] by that [consciousness]?\(^{40}\)

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\(^{39}\) Thus Śāntarakṣita, in verses 16 and 17 of the Madhyamaka-lāṃkāra, does not introduce two kinds of self-awareness which Williams [1989b] (pp. 19-35) proposes (self-awareness (i) which takes an object which is consciousness itself, and self-awareness (ii) which has reflexivity not relevant to an object.) Śāntarakṣita, in verse 17, denies self-awareness that arises in dependence on external objects and asserts self-awareness which is based on the identity of cognition and an object, which does not relate to external objects (see v. 18 below), and which rather corresponds to Williams’s self-awareness (i).


\[\text{tad asya bodharūpatvād yuktān tāvat śvavedanam} \]
\[\text{parasya tv arthārūpasya tena śaṅvedanam katham} \]
In this way, by denying the externalist views of nirākāra and sākāra, Śāntarakṣita shows his view on self-awareness and concludes that consciousness perceives itself because it is impossible to perceive any other external objects. Even if one admits the existence of self-awareness, this does not imply the non-existence of external objects as the Sautrāntika holds. Therefore he argues that it is not appropriate for one entity to have three parts and refutes this view of the Sautrāntika. Thus he postulates self-awareness without different aspects which is regarded as self-illuminating like lamplight. The opponent of Prajñākaramati shows, by quoting verses 16 and 17 of the Madhyamakālaṃkāra (=verses 1999 and 2000 of the Tattvasamgraha), that even the Mādhyamika (conventionally) accepts self-awareness and denies external objects.

In response to this objection of the Yogacāra with quotations from the Madhyamakālaṃkāra, Prajñākaramati states as follows:

[2-14]

[This] is said on this point: Having conceded the meaning of words well known as common usage (vyavahāra) by distinguishing activity and an agent, the objection is stated [by you, the Yogacāra], because the word ‘self-awareness’ expresses that meaning. However if you avoid the meaning of the words well known in the world for fear of a fault, then you will be invalidated by the world.41

Prajñākaramati, in this part, points out that it is contradictory if Śāntarakṣita uses the word self-awareness and denies its three aspects as [the object of] action (karman), an agent (kartr) and activity (kriyā) at the same time. Prajñākaramati and Śāntarakṣita agree that the Sautrāntika-type of self-awareness, which has different aspects, is unacceptable. This implies that Prajñākaramati does not follow the epistemological view of the Sautrāntika, that postulates self-awareness with three aspects even conventionally.

41 Bodhicaryāvatārāpañjakā (La Vallée Poussin [1914] p. 397, 1-4):
atrocyate I kriyākarakabhedaṃ vyavahāraprasiddhaṃ sabdārtham adhigamyā dūṣanam uttam svasaṃvedanāsabdasyā taddhābhūdhiḥāyakatvāt I yadi puṇar doṣabhayāl lokaprasiddho’pi sabdārthaḥ paritājyaś tadā lokata eva bādhā bhavato bhāvīyati I
The point of disagreement is self-awareness postulated by the Yogācāra and Śāntarakṣita, which is without different aspects and is self-illuminating. To establish that consciousness perceives consciousness, it is necessary to have another consciousness which perceives that consciousness perceives consciousness. To prove that this is the case, another consciousness is required. Therefore this view that the subjective aspect of consciousness perceives its objective aspect falls into infinite regress. On the other hand, if one denies this distinction of consciousness into different aspects like Śāntarakṣita and the Yogācāra, and postulates self-awareness which is reflexive, like lamplight that illuminates itself without another source of light, it is possible to avoid infinite regress. However it becomes very difficult to explain how we perceive objects in ordinary terms because perception cannot arise without the subject and the object. Thus the self-awareness maintained by Śāntarakṣita and the Yogācāra leaves room for logical contradiction. Prajñākaramati's objection exposes this contradiction briefly and to the point.

At a glance, however, Prajñākaramati's objection here looks very weak because he just says “if you avoid the meaning of the words well known in the world for fear of a fault, then you will be invalidated by the world.” It also looks as if it is not Prajñākaramati himself who makes an objection to this view. However, ‘well known in the world’ (lokaprasiddha) is almost synonymous with the conventional truth (sambhyātisaty). Here he clearly expresses, therefore, that self-awareness is not accepted conventionally.

This attitude towards self-awareness is also reflected in the commentary on 9:25ab. After the opponent's claim that if self-awareness is negated, there cannot be any experience of objects because it is impossible for cognition to perceive 'external' objects, Prajñākaramati states as follows:

[2-15]

When it is said that 'there cannot be common usage such as what is seen,' is it on the level of the ultimate or the conventional? Of these if it is said 'there cannot be [common usage] on the level of the ultimate,' then it is preferable to us, because what is conventional cannot reach the ultimate

\[^{42}\text{Cf. Madhyamakāvatāra, v. 6:9, Satyadvayāvatāravṛtti, 9a2-4.}\]
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thought. But [if it is said] ‘as what is commonly known in the world,’ then he says:

What is seen, heard or known as it is cannot be denied here. (v. 9:25ab)

What is seen as it is means what is ascertained directly by cognition of eyes and other [senses]. What is heard means [what is known] from another person and scriptural authority. What is known means what is affirmed from inference arising from the three-fold inferential mark. On the basis of common usage, here [at the level of the conventional truth] all of them cannot be denied, i.e. cannot be rejected. In the way something is experienced on the mundane level, in that way it, whose nature has not yet been examined, is accepted as what is well known in the world, but not on the ultimate level. Therefore, one who maintains the theory of the ultimate does not make such mistakes that as a result of no [self-]awareness of cognition, there is no experience of objects.\(^{43}\)

Here Prajñākaramati denies the objection that if there is no self-awareness conventionally, it is not possible to perceive objects. He interprets the verse that ‘what is seen’ and so forth are the valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa), i.e. direct perception, scriptural authority and inference, and that these valid means of knowledge are not denied conventionally even though there is no self-awareness. This means that he conventionally denies self-awareness but considers that perception is possible without it.

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\(^{43}\) *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* (La Vallée Poussin [1914] p. 404,11-p. 405, 7):

\[
yad ucyate drṣṭadivyavahāro na syād iti l sa kīṁ paramārthaṁ na syāt saṁvṛtyā vā l tatra yadi paramārthato na sāyād ity ucyate tadā priyam idam asmākam l na hi saṁvṛtasya paramārthacintāyām avatāro 'sti l atha lokapraśiddhitas tadā l
\]

\[
yathā drṣṭaṁ śrutaṁ jñātaṁ naiveha pratiśidhyate l (v. 9:25 ab)
\]

\[
iti l yathā drṣṭaṁ iti cākṣurādīvijñātena pratyakṣeṇa pratippanaṁ l śrutam iti parapudgalād āgamae ca l jñātaṁ iti trīrūpāṇaḥgajād anumānān niścitaṁ l tad etad iha sarvam vyavahāram āśritya naiva pratiśidhyate na vāryate l yad yathā lokālaḥ pratiśyate tat tathaśvāvavāraśvatparam abhyupagamyate lokapraśiddhitāṁ l na tu punaḥ paramārthaṁ l l tena jñānasāṁvedanābhiḥvād arthānadhigamādayo 'pī doṣaḥ paramārthapapaśavādāna iha nāvataranti l
\]
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It is worth noting that these ‘what is seen,’ etc. are in fact considered a kind of definition of the conventional truth here in Prajñākaramati’s commentary. As mentioned above, ‘well known in the world’ (lokaprasiddha) is used as a synonym of the conventional truth (saṃvṛtisatya). In this passage, too, Prajñākaramati explains that what is experienced on the mundane level is accepted as what is well known in the world (lokaprasiddha). This shows that for Prajñākaramati, the conventional truth is what is established through direct perception or scriptural authority or syllogistic inference, and is considered well known in the world. Concerning self-awareness, direct perception cannot perceive it and scriptural authority also denies it. Then it is necessary to prove it by means of inference. Therefore when he criticises Śāntarakṣita’s view of self-awareness, Prajñākaramati says, indicating it cannot be established through inference, “However if you avoid the meaning of the words well known in the world for fear of a fault, then you will be invalidated by the world,” because a contradictory statement cannot be a proposition of syllogistic inference. This amounts to saying that Prajñākaramati commented on the

41 *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, 9:17cd (La Vallée Poussin [1914] p. 391, 12):
And the protector of the world said that mind does not see the mind.

uktāṁ ca lokanāthaṁ cittāṁ cittāṁ na paśyati II

45 For example, Dignāga gives four faulty propositions:
1. Something denied by direct perception, e.g. “Sound is not heard.”
2. Something denied by inference, e.g. “A pot is eternal.”
3. Something denied by authority or doctrine of one’s own, e.g. “The object of perception is not the object of valid means of knowledge.”
4. Something denied by common sense or common usage, e.g. “Śuni is not the moon.”


In this case, Prajñākaramati’s criticism is classified into the fourth case. Thus it is here implied that svasaṃvedana which contains semantic contradiction cannot be a proposition and therefore cannot be established. The view of Williams [1998] (p. 43) that “Prajñākaramati simply fails to state that for Śāntideva, svasaṃvedana is not the case even conventionally” is not sustainable. He, examining Prajñākaramati’s criticism against Śāntarakṣita [2-14], states as follows:

“The world” (i.e., the realm of concern of those who are not considering the ultimate way of things) has a number of layers. Since whatever are the latest scientific discoveries of psychologists psychiatrists and neurosurgeons for example concerning the mind are not matters of ultimate truth, for the Madhyamika they have to come within the conventional. But they do not correspond with the way things are understood by our person-in-the-street. There are specialists within the conventional realm, and indeed Prajñākaramati’s comments rely on the considerably refined specialization of Sanskrit grammarians like Pāṇini and Patanjali. It is actually debatable whether the ordinary person-in-the-street always considers that verbs require agent, action and so on.......Śāntarakṣita can perfectly consistently claim that Sanskrit grammar does not necessarily reflect empirical reality, and the conventional truth anyway means non-ultimate truth, not simply whatever is considered to be true by our poor benighted cowherder..... I do not see that Prajñākaramati would find this unwelcome conclusion. He rather implies in his phrasing that
Bodhicaryāvatāra from the point of the nirākāra view that does not require self-awareness since, according to the nirākāra view, images belong to external objects and not to cognition.

This means that Prajñākāramati considers that Śāntideva is an externalist Mādhyamika who holds the nirākāra view. Considering that Prajñākāramati often quotes from the Madhyamakavatāra of Candrakīrti as support to his commentary, we can tentatively assume that he regarded Candrakīrti as an externalist Mādhyamika who holds the nirākāra view as well. Prajñākāramati, however, does not explain Śāntarakṣita’s system in detail.

2.5 Ratnākaraśānti

Ratnākaraśānti was an eminent Yogācāra teacher who lived around the 11th C in Vikramāśīla. He is mentioned by Atiśa as one of his teachers in the Bodhirnāraṇa-pradīpapanjīka. Therefore he is regarded as almost contemporary with Lakṣmī, Bodhibhadra and Prajñākāramati. When he criticises the Mādhyamikas from the point of the view of the Nirākāra-Yogācāra, he classifies different Madhyamaka views and points out their respective faults. Therefore we find detailed accounts of the Madhyamaka classification in his works. Nevertheless, he does not criticise the views of certain Mādhyamikas individually, but together with some Yogācāra. This makes identification of a certain Madhyamaka view very difficult.

His criticism of the Madhyamaka is found in the Madhyamakālaṇḍkāropadeśa and Prajñāpāramitopadeśa among others. We will look into these works, which have many common or similar passages. In the Madhyamakālaṇḍkāropadeśa, he states as follows:

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his concern is to warn (his opponent or) Śāntarakṣita that as it stands his disagreement is not with himself, Prajñākāramati, but rather with the world, and it is against the world that Śāntarakṣita will have to defend himself. (pp. 41-43)

Williams obviously takes the word ‘world’ quite literally. However, Prajñākāramati defines the conventional world as the world of pramāṇa. Theoretically, an object ascertained through direct perception or inference arises equally to everyone. This is what is meant by ‘well known to the world’ and ‘known to everyone down to a cowherder.’ Here Prajñākāramati does not necessarily mean that a cowherder or a grammarian says that the word svamīvedana is contradictory, but rather intends that it cannot be proved by means of inference and therefore not established in the conventional world, which is the world of pramāṇa.

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46 See 3.4.2 (p. 188 ff.).
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[2-16]

Others who are Buddhists teach as follows:

The Vaibhäsikas are those who maintain that objects such as blue are perceived by cognition without images. It is the Sauträntikas who maintain that cognising images of reflections supplied by objects is perception of objects. Furthermore, the third position that appears like the Madhyamaka, and fourth position of the Yogäcāra, should be refuted by the wise according to the valid means of knowledge, scriptural authority and treatises.

Thus he shows the four philosophical positions of Buddhism: the Vaibhäsika, the Sauträntika, the Madhyamaka and the Yogäcāra. Here his classification is typical of this period. Of these the views of the third and fourth, i.e. the Madhyamaka and the Yogäcāra, are partially shown together:

[2-17]

If some Yogäcāras and Mādhyamikas who assert cognition with images argue:

If blue and illumination were false and not false [respectively], it is not possible to be identical because of the difference in their characteristics. However, if they are not identical, blue and others are not illuminated. If [it is argued] that blue and others are illuminated, they answer that blue and others are not superimposed or arisen as real because it is not different from illumination which

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47 According to Matsumoto [1980], Ratnākaraśānti’s position, i.e. the Nirākāra-Madhyamaka is the real ‘Middle way’ for Ratnakaraśānti and the Mādhyamikas following Nāgārjuna are called ‘Pseudo’ ({{ltar snang ba}}).

48 Madhyamakālaṃkāropadesa (Derge ed. No. 4085 hi 226b4-6, Peking ed. No. 5586 ku 261a1-3): gzhän dag sangs rgyas pa mams ‘di skad du¹ smra ste/ gang zhi g mams pa med pa’i shes pas sngon po la sogs pa’i don rig par ‘dod pa ni bya brag tu smra ba’o/ gang zhi g don gyis plan btags pa’i gzugs bnyan g yis rnam pa nyams su myon ba don rig par ‘dod pa nyid ni mdo sde pa’o/ gzhän dgu ma ltar snang ba’i phyogs gsum dang/ ma’i phyogs bzhi/ tshad ma dang lung dang bstan bsos la mkhas pa mams kyi² sun dbyung bar bya ste/...


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is not superimposed or arisen as real. 49

Here the view of the Mādhyamikas and the Yogācāras who assert cognition with images (shes rab rnam par bcas pa, *sākārajñāna,) is shown. Ratnākaraśānti explains the view of sākāra briefly. It is asserted that cognition (=illumination) and objects, such as blue, are identical and both real. The condition for objects to be perceived is to be identical with illumination. This seems to be in line with Śāntarakṣita’s view on conventionality that external objects that are insentient cannot be perceived and objects must be cognition itself which is sentient.50

In addition to this Ratnākaraśānti shows other proponents afterwards in the same work:

[2-18]

The Yogācāras and the Mādhyamikas who assert [cognition] without images maintain that the accumulation of conceptual construct (rnam par rtog pa’i lus, *vikalpakāya) does not exist in substance (rdzas su, *dravyatas). Even in their view, the valid means of knowledge that is direct perception is free from conceptual construct of the first moment, it is impossible to deny this image [of illumination] at all because there is no inference.51

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49 Madhyamakālaṃkāropadeśa (Derge ed. No. 4085 hi 228a3-5, Peking ed. No. 5586 ku 262b6-8): man ’byor spyod pa pa dang/ dbu ma pa shes pa nam pa dang bcas par smra ba kha cig na re/ sngon po gsal ba dag brdzun pa dang brdzun pa ma yin par ’gyur na chos ’gal ba nyid kyis na de’i bdag nyid du ’thad par mi ’gyur la/ de’i bdag nyid ma yin na/ sngon po la sogs pa gsal bar mi ’gyur na / sngon po la sogs pa ni gsal ba yin no zhe na/ sgron ma btags pa’am dngos por ’gyur ba’i gsal ba las gzhan ma yin pa’i phyir/ sngon po la sogs pa ni sgron ma btags pa’am/ dngos por ’gyur ba yin no zor te/...

50 See 2.4, especially passage [2-9] (pp. 67-68).

51 Madhyamakālaṃkāropadeśa (Derge ed. No. 4085 hi 228b2-3, Peking ed. No. 5586 ku 263a7-8): man ’byor spyod pa pa dang/ dbu ma pa rnam pa med par smra ba mams nam par rtog pa’i lus rdzas su (1) med par smra ste/ de dag gi ltar na yang mngon sam gyi tshad ma ni skad cig ma dang po’i rtog pa dang bral ba yin la/ rjes su dpag pa ni med pa’i phyir rnam pa ’di ni thams cad du dgag par rns yin noll
(1) Em: rdzas su, D, P: rjes su. following the reading suggested by Matsumoto [1980b] (p. 173).
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It is not entirely clear what this passage means.\(^{52}\) The accumulation of conceptual construct (*rnam par rtog pa’i lus*), however, seems to mean the conceptualisation of the unreal (*abhūtaparikalpa*) that causes to arise images of the subject and the object. This implies that conceptual construct (*vikalpa*) is existent as conventional designations (*vijñāapisat*) and consciousness is substantially existent (*dravyasat*). When consciousness does not have any conceptual construct, there is no direct perception of an object because there is neither the subject nor the object, which arise from conceptual construct. It is also not possible to cognise an object through inference because inference is conceptual activity. This does not, nevertheless, mean that there is no cognition at all. Ratnākaraśānti considers that consciousness perceives itself as illumination. This self-awareness is direct perception without conceptual construct and it cannot be denied through inference because there is no inference that can deny it. Although passage is brief, it is clear that Ratnākaraśānti distinguishes the Sākāra-Mādhyamikas and the Nirākāra-Mādhyamikas.

The other position of the Mādhyamaka is explained as follows:

\[2-19\]

Some Mādhyamikas say:

What is well known in the world is the conventional. Because external objects also are well known in the world, they also exist conventionally like mind and mental concomitance. Mind and mental concomitance are delusion because self-awareness is contradictory, just as the edge of a sword does not cut itself. We both maintain that awareness of other things also is just confusion. Therefore because the ultimate is realised with delusion exhausted, with regard to Buddhas, mind and mental concomitance are exhausted. When these happen, then the ultimate, which is the non-arising of all phenomena, is established as experience by obtaining what is concordant. With regard to non-abiding

\(^{52}\) According to the previous studies, such as Matsumoto [1980b] (p. 173) and Umino [1983a] (p. 15) this passage is understood as a ‘criticism’ over the Nirākāra-vādins. However, it seems to me that this is not a criticism but an explanation of the nirākāra view, which Ratnākaraśānti himself maintains.
nirvāṇa, having transformed into the rūpa[kāya] in order to bring
about the benefit for sentient beings and established it, he realises
perfect enlightenment.\textsuperscript{53}

Thus he explains the third position of the Madhyamaka after the Sākāra-
Madhyamaka and the Nirākāra-Madhyamaka. It is evident that this is the view of the
externalist Mādhyamikas because external objects are accepted conventionally together
with mind and mental concomitance. Likewise, Ratnakaraśānti explains the view of the
externalist Mādhyamikas in the Prajñāpāramitopadeśa, as follows:

[2-20]

Some Mādhyamikas say:

Just as mind and mental concomitance exist conventionally, external
objects also exist. But because ultimately mind and mental
concomitance also are delusion by nature, there is not the nature of
self-awareness. In order to bring about the benefit for all sentient
beings in all ways without effort, having transformed into the rūpakāya
and established it like a wish-fulfilling gem, Bodhisattvas realise perfect
enlightenment. On this point, because just as all phenomena do not
exist at all, just so all mind and mental concomitance also do not exist
at all ultimately, rejection of mind and mental concomitance is right

\textsuperscript{53} Madhyamakālaṅkāropadeśa (Derge ed. No. 4085 hi 228b3-6, Peking ed. No. 5586 ku 263a8-b4):
gang yang dbu ma pa kho chig na re 'jig rten la\textsuperscript{(2)} grags pa ni kun rdzob yin te/ phyi rol gyi don yang
'jig rten la grags pas\textsuperscript{(2)}/ sens dang sens las byung ba bzhin du de yang kun rdzob tu yod
pa yin noll/ sens dang sens las byung ba ni 'khrul pa yin te/ rang gyi rig pa 'gal ba'i phyir ral
gri'i sos rang mi gcod pa bzhin noll/ gzhan rig pa yang bslad pa tsam du 'u bu cag gnyi ga 'dod
doll/ de bas na 'khrul pa zad pas don dam pa rtog pa'i phyir rol/ sangs rgyas pa mams ni sens
dang sens las byung ba zad pa nyid doll/ gang gi tshe de mams kyi skye ba de'i tshe chos
thams cad skye ba med pa'i don dam par rjes su byed pa thob pas myong bar bzhag\textsuperscript{(4)} gol/ mi
gnas pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa ni/ sens can sna tshogs pa'i don bya ba'i phyir gzugs byin gyis
brlabs te bzhag\textsuperscript{(4)} nas/ yang dag pa'i byang chub mgon du byed do...
(1) D: las, P: la (2) D: grags pa yin pas, P: grags pas (3) D: gzhag, P: bzhag (4) D: gzhag, P:
bzhag

A parallel passage is found in the Prajñāpāramitopadeśa (Derge ed. No. 4079 hi 152b2-5, Peking
ed. No. 5579 ku 173a1-5).
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perception through concordance because it is impossible in other ways.\textsuperscript{54}

As Matsumoto observes,\textsuperscript{55} the view of the externalist Mādhyamikas thus described by Ratnakaraśānti is comprised of three points. First, the convention (saṃyuktā) is defined as ‘well known in the world,’ and both mind and external objects exist conventionally because they are well known in the world. Second, self-awareness is not accepted because activity on itself is contradictory, just like the edge of a sword does not cut itself. It is not clear whether it is denied conventionally or ultimately in the Madhyamakāṇḍakāropadeśa. It is, however, rejected only ultimately in the Prajñāpāramitopadeśa. Therefore, we cannot know if Ratnakaraśānti considers that the externalist Mādhyamika denies self-awareness conventionally. Third, the ultimate is realised through exhaustion of mind and mental concomitance. Although there is no perception because there are no mind or mental concomitance, it is realised through concordance.\textsuperscript{56} To these three points given by Matsumoto, we can add the fourth point that a Buddha can bring about benefit for the sake of sentient beings, by transforming into the rūpakāya, even though he has no mind or mental concomitance.

The first point is the evidence that this is the view of the externalist Mādhyamika. The second and third explain their understanding of the ultimate. According to Matsumoto’s study,\textsuperscript{57} these three points are all found in Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra and its

\textsuperscript{54} Prajñāpāramitopadeśa (Derge ed. No. 4079 hi 143b1-4, Peking ed. No.5580 ku 162a7-b4):

gang yang dbu ma pa kha cig na re kun rdzob sems dang sems las byung ba yod pa de bzhin du/ phiyi rol don kyang yod pa yin la\textsuperscript{58}/ don dam par sems dang sems las byung ba manis kyang rang bzhing gyis ’khrul pa’i phiyir/ rang rig pa’i ngo bor yod pa ma yin te/ byang chub sems dpa’ manis kyis/ sems can thams cad kyi don mams thams cad du lhun gyis grub par bya ba’i phiyir yid bzhin gyi nor bu itar gzugs kyi sku byin gyis brlabs nas bzhag stel yang dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub mgon sum du mdzad doll/ de yang gang gyi phiyir ji itar chos thams cad don dam par shin tu med pa de bzhin du/ sems dang sems las byung ba thams cad kyang don dam par shin tu med pas/ sems dang sems las byung ba manis shin tu ’gags pa ni rje su mthun bas yang dag par rtogs par yin te/ gzhan la de ni mi rang ba’i phiyir ro...

(1) D: and P: yod pa ma yin la, Êmend it to yod pa yin la following Matsumoto [1980a] (p. 171 note 28). Also see the previous footnote.


\textsuperscript{56} Concordance may require an explanation. Conventionally when the cognition obtains what is concordant to the image of an external object, it is understood as perception. Ultimately although nothing perceives anything, cognition becomes concordant to an object in terms of non-arising. This is said to be experience of the ultimate in the conventional term.

\textsuperscript{57} Matsumoto [1980a] pp. 156-163.
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Bhāṣya and he concludes that the opponent whom Ratnākaraśānti refutes in this part is Candrakīrti. The fourth point is found in the Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra. This view is also considered the criterion to distinguish the externalist Mādhyamika and the internalist Mādhyamika. In this way Ratnākaraśānti classifies the Mādhyamikas into the externalist and the internalist. The views of the externalist Mādhyamikas in his account seems close to those of Prāsaṅgika because they are found in Candrakīrti’s and Śāntideva’s works. However, he does not mention if the externalist Mādhyamikas maintain self-awareness conventionally. On the other hand, he distinguishes the Sākāra-Mādhyamaka and the Nirākāra-Mādhyamaka.

2.6 Summary

When we look into these texts which are later than the 10th C, we can draw a vague picture of the externalist Mādhyamikas and the internalist Mādhyamikas.

As for the internalist Mādhyamikas, Śāntarakṣita is considered representative in the Jñānasūrasamucayananibandhana of Bodhibhadra and the Bodhicaryāvatāraraṇajīkā of Prajñākaramati. Lakṣmī and Ratnākaraśānti do not mention who is the internalist Mādhyamika. On the other hand, Lakṣmī and Ratnākaraśānti distinguish the sākāra view and the nirākāra view in the internalist Mādhyamaka. Neither of the four teachers mentions distinction in the externalist Mādhyamikas.

Concerning the externalist Mādhyamika, Prajñākaramati made the commentary on the Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva from the point of the view of the externalist. In addition, he quotes many verses from Candrakīrti in his commentary. Therefore, we can assume that he regards Śāntideva and Candrakīrti as the externalist Mādhyamikas. Ratnākaraśānti also seems to intend Candrakīrti or his followers when he criticises the externalist Mādhyamika. Bodhibhadra, on the other hand, names Bhavya as the representative of the externalist Mādhyamika. He probably followed the Madhyamakālamantravṛtti, in which a passage from Bāṇīvēka’s Madhyamakahṛdaya is

58 See 2.9 (p. 93 ff.).
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quoted as the opinion of the externalist Mādhyamika. Nevertheless, Bodhibhadra’s understanding of verse 28 of the Jñānasūrasamuccaya does not accord with the way the Svātantrika understands the four alternatives, which we will examine later. If he is an externalist but not a Svātantrika, it is a little strange that he mentions Bhavya when he distinguishes the internalist and the externalist. We will discuss these points in the third chapter.59

Concerning self-awareness, none of the teachers whose works we have so far examined in this thesis explains that the external Mādhyamika positively accepts existence of self-awareness conventionally. Considering that some teachers regard Candrakīrti as the representative of the externalist Mādhyamika, it is not contradictory for the externalist Mādhyamikas to deny self-awareness. However, Lakṣmī maintains that the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika holds cognition without images. Bodhibhadra does not say that Bhavya, the externalist Mādhyamika, accepts the sākāra view or self-awareness.

It should also be noted that among the texts later than the 10th C which we examined, there is no account that mentions difference of the views of Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti or of the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika, and we cannot find the Madhyamaka view that accepts both external objects and self-awareness, either. It is, therefore, tentatively assumed that the externalist Mādhyamika postulated existence of external objects and denied self-awareness conventionally.

The explanation of the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika in the Tibetan accounts we discussed in chapter 1 is concordant with this view of the externalist Mādhyamika shown in the later Indian Madhyamaka texts rather than that of the Sautrāntika, in terms of their postulating external objects and rejecting self-awareness. Nevertheless, in some later Indian Madhyamaka texts, the externalist Mādhyamikas is considered to espouse Candrakīrti or his view. Tibetan doxography of Indian Madhyamaka that classifies the externalist Madhyamaka into the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka and the Prāsaṅgika cannot be applied to the later externalist Madhyamaka. However, this does not necessarily

59 See the following section (2.7) with regard to the Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti. The difference of interpretation of the four alternatives between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika is examined in 3.3.6 (p. 168 ff.). Concerning who this Bhavya is, see 3.5 (p. 199).
mean that there was no Madhyamaka which could be called Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka in terms of postulating external objects and self-awareness in India. We will discuss this possibility in the following sections.

2.7 Śāntarakṣita

Śāntarakṣita (ca. 725-788) in the Madhyamakālāṅkāravṛtti, the auto-commentary on the Madhyamakālāṅkāra mentions two groups of Mādhyamikas who have different views of conventional existence. This is one of the earliest accounts that mention classification of the Madhyamaka into the internalist and the externalist. Concerning the classification of the Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka and the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka, the oldest account that mentions them by name is, as far as we know, Ye shes sde’s Ita ba’i khyad par. In the text, Śāntarakṣita’s works are named as Yogācāra-Madhyamaka. It seems that Ye shes sde’s description of the classification of the Madhyamaka is partly based on this passage of Śāntarakṣita. Śāntarakṣita explains two different ideas of conventional existence in verse 91 and its commentary, as follows:

Some assert that conventional entities are causal relationships and intend to refute all wicked disputes. It should be examined what are these [conventional entities]: How do they have the very nature of only mind and cognition, or how do they also have the nature of external objects? Of these, some are those who seem to assert, according to the latter view:

It is in order to deny the agent and the recipient that it is said that
“[this triple world] is mind-only” in a treatise.  


Almost identical with verse 5:28cd of the Madhyamakaḥṛdayakārikā:  
It is in order to deny the agent and recipient that it is said “[this triple world] is mind-only” in the [Daśabhūmika]śūtra.

Śāntarakṣita also quotes this passage to explain the view of the Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka. See, 1.2.1 (p. 31 ff.), especially [1-27] on pp. 35-36.
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The view of the others is

That which is cause and effect is only cognition. It is ascertained that what is self-established is cognition. (v. 91)

There is no considering any other form of cognition, dismissing the form which is self-established.62 This form which is self-established is also just like the form of a dream, an illusion and like.63

Here the two views of Mādhyamikas are distinguished depending on how they postulate conventional existence, which is understood as causality. Some maintain that causality involves external objects and others hold it is only mind. This is basically the same as the distinction of the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika who conventionally accepts external objects and the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika who does not accept them even conventionally. Those who insist that conventional entities are external are represented by Bhāviveka since the verse quoted here (“It is in order to deny the agent and the recipient...”) is from his Madhyamakahrdayakārikā (v. 5:28bc).64 He regards the teaching of mind-only as a

62 The original Sanskrit of 'the form which is self-established' (rang gis grub pa'i ngo bo) is identified to 'svataḥsiddharūpa' by Matsumoto [1984a] (p. 150). This is based on a passage "svataḥsiddharūpam evādvyam jānām ekasvabhāven" in the Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka of Haribhadra (Wogihara [1932] p. 626, 9-10).


bstan bcos las sms tsam mo zhes gsungs pa ni byed pa po dang za ba po dgag pa'i phyir ro
zhes ji skad du smra ba lta bu'o/ gzhan dag sms pa ni
rgyu dang 'bras bur gyur pa yang// shes pa 'ba' zhig kho na stel// rang gis grub pa gang yin pa// de ni shes par gnas pa yin/ 91 //
rang gis grub pa'i ngo bo bor nas shes pa'i ngo bo gzhan rtog pa med dol// rang gis grub pa'i rang bzhin yang mi lan dang sgyu ma la sogs pa'i gzugs bzhin no/

64 Kajiyama [1982] (pp. 35-38) and Matsumoto [1984a] (pp. 147-151) examined this passage in the Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti and identified the Mādhyamika who insists that conventional existents are external with Bhāviveka. My study depends heavily on theirs with regard to this passage of Sāntarakṣita.
provisional meaning (*neyārtha*), saying, “to deny the agent and the recipient.” However, Śāntarakṣita does not explain the view of Bhāviveka in detail here. As a result, we are not able to judge if Bhāviveka is thought by Śāntarakṣita to have held the *sākāra* view as the Sautrāntika school does.

The others are, as shown in verse 91 of the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, the Mādhyamikas who assert that conventional entities are made of just mind and mental concomitance, according to Kamalaśīla’s commentary, *Pañjikā*. As we will examine later, causality is considered conventional by the Mādhyamikas, and it is said here that it is only cognition. This implies that external things do not have causal efficiency and therefore cannot cause any effect. As a result what we perceive is limited to our cognition itself because external objects do not have any ability to cause cognition. Therefore if verse 91 is Śāntarakṣita’s own view, he indeed holds self-awareness and mind-only conventionally. Based on this evidence, we can be sure that by the time of Kamalaśīla, at the latest, this way of classification had already come into existence.

It should be noted that Bhāviveka and Śāntarakṣita are named as the externalist and the internalist respectively in many later doxographical accounts in India and Tibet, such as Bodhibhadra’s and Ye shes sde’s. It is, therefore, plausible that this passage is the model of this classification.

Additionally, as Matsumoto maintains, if we regard verse 91 as Śāntarakṣita’s own view, he is considered a proponent of the *sākāra* view. After the passage previously

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65 Kamalaśīla comments that “It should be examined” (*de dpyod par bya’o*, See [2-21]) means “By this, two types of ways of the Madhyamaka should be examined”.

66 See 3.3 (p. 149 ff.).

67 Matsumoto [1984a]

68 Those who maintains no difference between cognition and images are regarded as proponents of
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quoted, he comments on it as follows:

[2-22]

Therefore perception of those [material things and others] is perception
of images (ākāra) such as blue which is not different [from perception].

69

In this way, he considers that cognition has images and it is not different from
cognition. This is obviously the sākāra view. He clearly postulates existence of self-
awareness (svasanvedana) without which cognition cannot perceive images which are
not different from cognition itself. This is in clear contrast to Lakṣmī’s understanding
that the reality (splendour of mind) is free from false images, which are different from
it.70 Concerning the classification of the internalist and the externalist, Kamalaśila, who
is regarded as a direct disciple of Śāntarakṣita, has made a more detailed explanation in
the Madhyamakāloka.

2.8 Kamalaśīla

Kamalaśīla (ca. 740-797) is known as a disciple of Śāntarakṣita. He, as his teacher
did, entered Tibet and had a great influence on the formation of Tibetan Buddhism. In
fact, Ye shes sde, in the lTa ba'i khyad par, refers to the Madhyamakāloka of Kamalaśīla
as the conclusion after he explains the views of the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika and the
Yogācāra-Mādhyamika.71 Therefore, examination of Kamalaśīla’s view on the
classification of the Madhyamaka is indispensable. In the Madhyamakāloka, he explains
the view of the externalist Mādhyamikas in detail, as follows:

... the sākāra view. This is discussed in chapter 4.

No. 5285 sa 78b6-7):
(1) D, Ed. sngon po la sngon po la, P: sngon po la.

70 See [2-6] (pp. 63-64).

71 See [1-28] (pp. 36-37).
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[2-23]
Others say: External objects also exist conventionally like consciousness.72

[2-24]
Because external objects are also well known [in the conventional world] like consciousness, there is no damage by [the conventional view] well known. Because if they are examined by reasoning, neither of two, [i.e. external objects and consciousness,] can bear the burden of examination, they cannot obtain the state of existence. But at the level of the truth of common usage (tha snyad kyi bden pa, *vyavahārasatya) both entities are also well known [among people] up to the wife of a cowherd.73

According to Kamalaśīla’s explanation, ‘others’ hold that both mind and external objects exist conventionally and neither of the two can be ultimately existent. This is nothing but the view of the externalist Mādhyamika. Here the conventional truth (= the truth of common usage) is defined as well known (grags pa, prasiddha) in the world.74 This passage itself does not involve any proof to establish existence of external objects but what is ‘well known in the world’ is accepted as conventional among the Mādhyamikas. In Śāntarakṣita’s Madhyamakālaṃkāra the view of the externalist Mādhyamika is not shown in detail. On the other hand, Kamalaśīla introduces it, as follows:

[2-25]
The purpose of the teaching of mind-only is in order to deny the agent and the recipient imagined by outsiders, because, even as common usage,

72 Madhyamakāloka (Derge ed. No. 3887 sa 158b4, Peking ed. No. 5287 sa 172b6):

gzhan dag na re kun rdzob tu rnam par shes pa dang 'dra bar phyi'i don yang gnas pa yin nol/

73 Madhyamakāloka (Derge ed. No. 3887 sa 158b7-159a1, Peking ed. No. 5287 sa 173a1-3):

rnam par shes pa bzhin du phyi'i don yang grags pa'i phyir grags pas gnod pa ma70 yin te/ rigs pas rnam par dpyad na ni gnyi ga yang btag pa'i khur mi bzod pa nyid kyi's dngos po'i gnas mi thob70 la/ tha snyad kyi bden par ni dngos po gnyi ga yang gnag rdzi'i chung na yan chad la grags pa nyid dol/

(1) D: ma, P: yang (2) D: thob , P: thod

74 Compare this passage with [2-15] (pp. 74-75) of the Bodhicaryāvatārapaññikā of Prajñākaramati, and [2-19] (pp. 80-81) of the Madhyamakālaṃkāropadeśa of Ratnakaraśānti.
other agent[s] and so forth except for mind are not established, or it is because the mind is established as fundamental with regard to all phenomena for mind precedes all phenomena.\(^75\)

Here Kamalaśīla presents two different interpretations of mind-only. As Matsumoto points out,\(^76\) the first is Bhāviveka’s since he has the view that the sūtra says that [the triple world] is mind-only, “in order to deny the agent and the recipient” as is shown in the Madhyamakālaṅkāravṛtti on verse 91.\(^77\) The second passage beginning with ‘Or’ can possibly be Candrakīrti’s view because the view that mind is fundamental is found in the Madhyamakāvatāra.\(^78\)

It is thus very likely that both Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti are classified into the externalist without much distinction according to Kamalaśīla. The next argument of the externalist Mādhyamika given by Kamalaśīla immediately after [2-25] is of the most interest to us:

[2-26]

Moreover, it is said:

“There is no object. It is mind-only.”\(^79\)

as well as:

\(^75\) Madhyamakāloka (Derge ed. No. 3887 sa 159a1-2, Peking ed. No. 5287 sa 173a3-4):

\[^{1} \text{D: sems las, P: sams. (2) D: ltos, P: bltos.}\]

\(^76\) See Matsumoto [1984a] p. 155.

\(^77\) See the quotation [2-21] above (pp. 85-86). Candrakīrti, too, in the Madhyamakāvatāra, v. 6:84, maintains that the teaching ‘the triple world is mind-only’ is to deny the agent.

\(^78\) Madhyamakāvatāra, v. 6:87 (La Vallée Poussin [1907-12] p. 185, 10-13): Just as the Buddha speaks of reality extensively, just so mind-only is taught in the [Lāṅkāvatāra]-sūtra because only mind is fundamental in the world. Thus the meaning of the sūtra is not “material things (rūpa) are denied by this.”

\[^{1} \text{de nyid rgyas la sangs rgyas bsnyad ji bzhin// de bzhin sams tsam gtsor gyur ’jig rten la// mdo las sams tsam zhes gsungs geugs ni ’din// ’gog pa de ltar mdo yi don ma yin// 6:87 //}\]

\(^79\) Lāṅkāvatārasūtra, v. 10:146c (Nanjo [1923] p. 284, 1):

nāstī arthaḥ cittātreyānī
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“Mind disturbed by latent impressions (vāsanā) comes to appear as objects.”  

and so on. Even so, it is necessary to accept that it (mind) is certainly accompanied with images (sākāra) because it is never possible for the mind without images (nirākāra) to perceive objects. Therefore, because images of objects do not appear except for images of mind, it is limited only to explain, by means of denial of that [mind without images], that mind is accompanied with images. But it is not understood that there are no external objects from the [statements].

Because this passage immediately follows the previous one, it is understood as the view of the externalist Madhyamika. According to Kamalaśīla’s explanation, the externalist Madhyamika certainly postulates cognition with images in the same way as the Sautrāntika. As we have seen in chapter 1, Ye shes sde is very likely to have followed Kamalaśīla when he wrote the ITa ba’i khyad par. In that case, it is plausible that he had Kamalaśīla’s explanation of the externalist Madhyamika in his mind when he mentioned the Sautrāntika-Madhyamika although this is tentative. In some Tibetan accounts, such as dKon mchog ’jigs med dbang po’s, the Sautrāntika-Madhyamika is explained as proponent of nirākāra or as being against self-awareness, although the Sautrāntika holds sākāra cognition and accepts the existence of self-awareness. These later Tibetan accounts explain that the Sautrāntika-Madhyamika postulates that external objects exist on the basis of the atomic theory held by the Sautrāntika. In other words, the Sautrāntika-Madhyamika follows the view held by the Sautrāntika in terms of its ontology, but not its epistemology. This is

81 Madhyamakālokā (Derge ed. No. 3887 sa 159a2-4, Peking ed. No. 5287 sa 173a4-7): gang yang/ don yod ma yin sans nyid de// zhe bya ba dang/ de bzhing du/ bag chags kyis ni dkrugs pa’i sens// don du snang bar rab tu ’byung// zhes bya ba la sogs pa gsungs pa der yang mam pa med pa’i sens kyis ji ltar yang yul ’dzin par mi rung bas de ’i phyir gdon mi za bar de rnam pa dang bcas pa nyid du khas blang dgos so// de bas na sens kyi rnam pa las ma gtoogs pa don gyi rnam pa(2) snang ba’i phyir de bkag pa(2) sens rnam pa dang bcas pa nyid du bstan pa ’ba’ zhig tu zad kyil/ de las phyi rol gyi don med par rtogs par ’gyur ba ni ma yin nol// (1) D: pa, P: par. (2) D: pas, P: par.
the origin of our question whether or not ‘Sautrantika’ in Sautrantika-Madhyamika is derived from the Sautrantika as a philosophical school. The *Ita ba’i khyad par* does not mention anything concerning how the term is derived. Therefore we do not know in what sense Ye shes sde used this term. We now know, on the other hand, an example of an Indian account in which the externalist Madhyamika is understood to be a proponent of cognition with images (*sākārajñāna*). This indicates that there were the Madhyamikas who could be rightly called the Sautrantika-Madhyamika in terms both of ontology and epistemology. Nevertheless, this does not prove that the externalist Madhyamika establishes the conventional truth according to the view of the Sautrantika because neither Kamalasila nor Ye shes sde mentions the externalist Madhyamika’s relation to the Sautrantika. There still are possibilities that ‘mdo sde’ of mDo sde’i dBu ma in Ye shes sde’s *Ita ba’i khyad par* means ‘sūtras,’ as Matsumoto maintains, and that it is a mere coincidence that the externalist Madhyamika mentioned by Kamalasila postulates cognition with images (*sākārajñāna*) in the same way as the Sautrantika. Anyhow, Kamalasila’s understanding of the epistemology of the externalist Madhyamaka is different from that of later teachers after the 10th C who either understand that the externalist Madhyamikas hold cognition without images (*nirākārajñāna*) or are silent. It does, on the other hand, correspond to Bhāviveka’s understanding of perception.

The other point here is that Kamalasila seems to include both Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti in the externalist Madhyamikas who postulate cognition with images (*sākārajñāna*). According to Tsong kha pa, Candrakīrti’s view on conventional existence is different both from the Sautrantika and the Vaibhāsika, and therefore special. Kamalasila and Tsong kha pa may disagree on whether Candrakīrti should be included in externalist Madhyamika together with Bhāviveka.

We now go on to examine more accounts which mention the classification of the externalist and the internalist Madhyamikas and find out if the externalist Madhyamika

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82 Having examined the same passages, Matsumoto [1984a] (pp. 153-157) concludes that the externalist Madhyamika described by Kamalasila holds the *sākāra* view. He however considers that this view is fiction made up by Kamalasila and it is possible that the Madhyamika who postulated it did not exist in reality. It may be the case that this conclusion is influenced from his study of the *Ita ba’i khyad par*, whose conclusion is that ‘mdo sde’ of ‘mDo sde dBu ma’ means *sūtras* such as the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra* but not the Sautrantika as a philosophical school. See 1.2.1 (p. 31 ff.).
is constantly considered to postulate cognition with images (sākārajñāna) and if it establishes the conventional truth according to the view of the Sautrāntika.

2.9 Bodhisattvacaryāvatāravyākhyānapanāñjikā

The Bodhisattvacaryāvatāravyākhyānapanāñjikā is a commentary on the 9 chapter version of the Bodhi(sattva)caryāvatāra. Neither the name of the author nor the exact date of the text is known to us. It is however clear that this commentary is written after Jñānagarbha (ca. 8th C) because we find a quotation from his Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti. It is also likely that he knew of Sāntarakṣita’s (ca. 725-788) ‘lacking one and many’ reasoning described in verse 1 of the Madhyamakālaṁkāra. Therefore we can tentatively assume that this was composed not long before the beginning of the 9th C or afterwards.

According to Saito’s studies, the author classifies the Mādhyamikas into the Mādhyamikas who assert that external objects exist (phyi'i don yod par smra ba'i dbu ma) and the Mādhyamikas who assert that they are denied (‘di ’gog par smra ba'i dbu ma). He mentions the view of the Mādhyamika who asserts external objects when he explains how a Buddha can appear in front of sentient beings even when he does not have cognition, in the commentary on verses 8:27-28 (36-37 of the 10 chapter version):

[2-27]

Then, if [one says] that when [a Buddha] has no conceptual construct in this way, the Buddha’s appearance in front of disciples as a rūpakāya is

83 Derge ed. No. 3873, Peking ed. No. 5274. Saito has made extensive studies on this text and I am heavily indebted to Saito [1993], [1996], [1997] and [2000].

84 Bodhicaryāvatāravyākhyānapanāñjikā (Saito [1993] p. 59, 8-9):

\[ de nyid phyir na de stong min/ \]

This is an antarāśloka under v. 11 of the Satyadvayavibhaṅga (Eckel [1987] p. 162, 4):

\[ de nyid phyir na de stong min/ mi stsong ma yin yod med min/ mi skye ma yin skye min zhes/ de la sogs pa bcom ldan gsungs/ \]

See Saito [2000] (p. 98 note 6) and [3-38] (p. 154) of the present thesis.

85 Bodhicaryāvatāravyākhyānapanāñjikā (Saito [1993] p. 72, 3):

\[ re zhig gcig dang du ma dang bral ba la sogs pas spyod pa'i dus gang gi tshel... \]

not possible, he (Aksayamati), having considered that there is no contradiction in Buddha’s appearance even without conceptual construct like the wish-fulfilling gem and the wish-granting tree because of the merit of disciples, says ‘the wish-fulfilling gem’ and so on, [i.e.

In the way the wish-fulfilling gem or the wish-granting tree fulfil a wish, in that way the body of the Jina appears by the power of the merit of sentient beings. (v. 8:27)]

But now, if [one says] that [Buddha’s] benefiting sentient beings contradicts his being without conceptual construct, he (Aksayamati), having considered that it is not contradictory to benefit sentient beings even without conceptual construct when being a Buddha because of the transmitted force conceived at the earlier state of Bodhisattva, and that it is the same, for instance, as a pillar of a charmer against poison, says ‘having completed a pillar’ and so on, [i.e.

In the way, when a charmer against poison, having completed a pillar, dies, it neutralises poison and the like, even long time after his death. (v. 8:28)]

These [verses] teach that there is no conceptual construct at the Buddha stage, but do not teach that [a Buddha] has no body or wisdom because those [two] do not contradict as being consistent with seeing and because objects of dreams and like, too, are accepted as being consistent with seeing according to the doctrine of the Mādhyamika who asserts that external objects exist.

Therefore, it is just as the similes such as a wish-fulfilling gem, a wish-granting tree and a pillar, without conceptual construct, appear in various ways and cause effects in various ways, but it is not the case that they themselves also do not exist.

Therefore, it is said that some say this is the Mādhyamika who asserts
that they are denied, [but] I do not regard it in that way.\textsuperscript{86}

The author of this text thus classifies the Mādhyamikas into two, namely the Mādhyamika who asserts that external objects exist and the Mādhyamika who asserts that they are denied. The author of the commentary assumes Akṣayamati (=Śāntideva?), the author of the original verses, is classified into the former.

In addition to this, the commentator, in [2-27] above, mentions ‘appearance’ (snang ba) and ‘causal efficiency’ (don byed pa, *arthakriyā) as “it is as if the similes such as a wish-fulfilling gem, a wish-granting tree and a pillar, without conceptual construct, appear in various ways and cause effects in various ways (de dang de ltar snang ba dang/ de dang de ltar don byed pa yin).” They are given as characteristics of the conventional truth by Jñānagarbha. Therefore Saito assumes that the commentator understands that Akṣayamati, the author of the 9-chapter version, is close to Jñānagarbha in terms of his view of conventional existence.\textsuperscript{87}

The other point here is that Akṣayamati insists that a Buddha can appear in front

\textsuperscript{86} Bodhicaryāvatāra vyākhyānāpanjikā (Commentary: Saito [1993] p. 72, 16-p. 73, 14. Verses: Saito [2000] p. 52, 23-30. The verses are inserted by the present author.):

'on te de ltar rtog pa mi mnga' na gdul bya mams la桑 nga kyi gzugs kyi skur snang ba mi 'thad do zhe na/ rtog pa mi mnga' yang gdul bya'i bsod nams kyi yid bzhiin gi nor bu dang/ dpag bsam gi shing bzhiin du snang ba la 'gal ba med do snyam du bsams nas/ yid bzhiin nor bu zhes bya ba la sogs ps gsung so/

'yid bzhiin nor bu dpag bsams shing/ ci ltar te ba yongs bskong ba/
de bzhiin sens can bsod nams kyi// dbang gis rgyal ba'i sku snang ngo// 27 //

'o na de ltar rtog pa mi mnga' ba nyid yin na sens can giy don mdzad pa 'gal lo zhe na/ sngar byang chub sens dpa' gi gnas skabs kyi rtog pa'i 'phlen slugs kyi sngas rgyas nyid la rtog pa mi mnga' yang sens can giy don mdzad pa mi 'gal te/ dper na nam mkha' lding gi med chad dang 'dra'o snyam nas/ mchod sdom grub pas zhes bya ba msos te/

'mkha' lding grub pas ci lta burl// mchod sdom bsgubs nas 'das gyurd na/
de 'das yun ring fon yang de// dag la stsoogs pa zhi bar byed// 28 //

'di dag sungs rgyas kyi sa la rtog pa med pa ston pa yin giy sdom dang/ ye shes nyid kyang mi mnga' bar ston pa ma yin te/ phyil'i don yod par smra ba'i dus ma'i lugs la de dag ji ltar snang ba bzhiin du mi 'gal ba'i phyir dang/ mi lam giy don la sogs pa yang ji ltar snang ba bzhiin khas len pa'i phyir te/ de bas na dpc yid bzhiin giy nor bu dang/ dpag bsam gi shing dang/ mchod sdom la sogs pa yang rtog pa med bzhiin du de dang de ltar snang ba dang/ de dang de ltar don byed pa yin giy/ de dag rang nyid kyang med pa ni ma yin pa bzhiin nol/ de bas na la la dag na te/ 'di 'gog par smra ba'i dus ma yin yin ges zer ro zhes grags te/ bdag gis ni de ltar ma mthong ngo//

\textsuperscript{87} Saito [1996]. Also the commentator quotes from Jñānagarbha’s Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti.
of sentient beings to help them by keeping his rūpakāya even when his cognition has no object. This can be regarded as another characteristic of the externalist Madhyamaka. This is closely linked with its ontology, i.e. the view that external objects exist as it is used to distinguish between the externalist and the internalist. As we have examined, Ratnakarāśānti mentions similar view when he criticises the externalist Mādhyaṃkā.  

Concerning the epistemology of the externalist Mādhyaṃkā, the anonymous author evidently considers that Aksayamati accepts self-awareness conventionally in the commentary on verse 21-22, as Saito points out.  

[2-28]

Considering that even if it (self-awareness) is not established by direct perception, it is established by inference which is produced from the proof of result, [the Yogācāra] says “if self-awareness” and so on, [i.e.]

If there is no self-awareness, why is consciousness remembered?  
(v. 8:21ab)]

It is considered that [even] if there is no self-awareness which feels happiness and others later, however, causal self-awareness which produces memory exists.

But it is said ‘object of memory’ and so on, [i.e.]

It is remembered, needless to examine, by means of production of objects of remembrance. (v. 8:21cd)]

It should be considered that by means of arising of remembered cognition, ultimate (don dam pa) cognition of self-awareness is not established, because in the way it is stated above the ultimate self-awareness is not established.  

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88 See 2.5 (p. 77 ff.) for the view of the externalist Mādhyaṃkā criticised by Ratnakarāśānti.

gal te mgon sum gyis ma grub kyang 'bras bu'i rtags las skyes pa'i rjes su dpag pas 'grub bo
Chapter 2 Internalist and Externalist

Or rather, if [one says] that if existence of the ultimate self-awareness is not established, it is not appropriate that remembered cognition arises later, [it is answered that] it is remembered because of arising of remembered cognition by means of existence of self-awareness conventionally, although it is not ultimate.

Or rather, if [one says] that it is not appropriate even that it exists conventionally because it is admitted that there is no intrinsic nature, it is said “as they are” and so on, [i.e.]

Everything [such as] what is seen and heard as they are cannot be denied here. (v. 8:22ab)]

Because conventional things such as what is seen and heard are not denied by this [view of the Madhyamaka].

As we have seen in the previous section, Kamalaśīla, who is allegedly a Yogācāra-


Saito [1996] holds that the author of the Bodhisattvacaryāvatāravyākhyānapanājīkā considers that Aksayamati postulates sakārajñāna, on the basis of this passage. Also See Williams [1998] p. 65.
Mādhyamika, regards the externalist Mādhyamika as proponents of cognition with images (sākāra-jñāna). Now in this commentary, too, the externalist Mādhyamika is considered to accept self-awareness conventionally. It is remarkable that the author of the Bodhisattvacaryāvatāravyākhyānāpanjikā made the commentary from the point of view of the externalist Mādhyamika who accepts self-awareness. Although this view can appropriately be called ‘Sautrāntika-Mādhyamaka’ in terms of accepting both external objects and self-awareness conventionally, its relation to the view of the Sautrāntika is not clear. The difference of understanding between the anonymous author and Prajñākaramati will become clear if we compare their commentary on the same verse. Prajñākaramati also comments on verse 9:25 of 10-chapter version, which is the corresponding verse of 8:22 of 9-chapter version. He, in contrast, interprets that what is seen, heard and known respectively mean direct perception, scriptural authority and inference so that it means that valid means of knowledge cannot be denied conventionally even when self-awareness is denied conventionally.2

Thus the anonymous author’s commentary is based on the Madhyamaka view that accepts self-awareness and external objects conventionally, which deserves the designation ‘Sautrāntika-Mādhyamaka’. He, in the same text, shows his understanding of the Sautrāntika when he explains the two truths:

[2-30]

Now, to teach briefly that the nature of an entity should be examined by elimination of false conceptualisation concerning the nature of an entity, it is said that “Concerning that,” [i.e.

Concerning that, two types of people are observed: a Yogin and an ordinary person. Of these, ordinary people are invalidated by Yogins. (8:3)

Even Yogins are invalidated by the superior that is successively higher. Because two kinds [of people] are observed, therefore the

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2 See 2.4 for Prajñākaramati’s commentary on the Bodhicaryāvatāra, v. 9:25.
objects should be examined. (8:4)]

Having just taught the nature of an entity, concerning that, two types of people: a Yigin and an ordinary person, i.e. a Sautrāntika and like, because of being conformable with an ordinary person, are, according to order, observed as the ways of non-duality and duality. Of these the assertion of ordinary people is invalidated by Yogins. But the assertion of a Yigin that is higher than an ordinary person is invalidated by the superior view of the Mādhyamika that is even higher than that. Therefore, [their] characteristics should be examined.93

[2-31]

Now, having first generated the motivation to teach this in detail, then if [one asks] how what an ordinary person asserts is invalidated by a Yigin, [Aksayamati] says that people and so on, [i.e.]

By people entities are observed and conceptualised to be real, but not just as an illusion. Here there is disagreement between a Yigin and people.]

By ordinary people such as the Sautrāntika. Entities are observed, i.e. material things [are observed]. To be real means to be existent as external

objects consistent with seeing (ji litar snang ba). As an illusion means as appearing in that way. \(^{94}\)

These passages are also discussed in Saito’s studies.\(^{95}\) He points out that the Sautrāntika is included in ordinary people in terms of their holding duality of the subject and the object as well as existence of external objects. Because the view that external objects are real is regarded as that of ordinary people represented by the Sautrāntika, it is conceivable that the Mādhyamika who conventionally maintains existence of external object is called a Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika. It is, however, not clear whether this Sautrāntika is here considered to hold self-awareness or whether the anonymous author of the commentary understands that even ordinary people accept self-awareness.

Thus a Mādhyamaka view that can appropriately be called ‘Sautrāntika-Mādhyamaka’ appears in this text although neither does the author explicitly indicate its connection to the view of the Sautrāntika nor mention the term ‘Sautrāntika-Mādhyamaka’.

### 2.10 Bhavya

Concerning the classification of the Mādhyamika into the externalist and the internalist, Bhavya’s Madhyamakaratnapradīpa contains interesting descriptions. I provisionally call the author of the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa Bhavya in order to distinguish him from Bhāviveka, the author of the Prajñāpradīpa and the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā. The date of this text, which will be discussed later in detail in chapter 3, is between Śāntarakṣīta and Atiśa, which is between the 8th and the 10th


\begin{verbatim}
   da ni re zhi de nyid rgyas par bshad pa i dbang du byas nas /'on te 'jig rten phal pa'i 'dod pa ni gang/ de la mla 'byor spyod pas ni ji litar sun 'byin par byed ce nal 'jig rten pa yis zhes bya ba la sogs pa smos te/

\(^{95}\)Saito [1997].
Yamaguchi, one of the first modern scholars who studied the Madhyamakaratnapradipa, excluded this text from the list of the genuine works of Bhāviveka, by examining its quotations.\textsuperscript{97}

The 7th chapter, which is named bsGom pa'i rim pa (the stages of practice, *bhāvanākrama), deals mainly with the way of meditation. Bhavya there mentions two types of the Mādhyamikas when he explains the *sthūlayoga and the *sūkṣmayoga. He distinguishes ‘externalist Madhyamaka’ (phyi rol gyi dbu ma) and ‘internalist Madhyamaka’ (nang gi dbu ma) according to the way of practice. He then explains these two types of Madhyamakas as follows:

After coarse yoga is explained in this way, now the subtle yoga should be explained. This is the subtle [yoga]: Just as all phenomena come into being as appearance of only an illusion of one’s own mind, just so [what is] only an illusion of mind disappears from three times. Because [it has] neither colours nor shape, it is splendour by nature. Because of no appearance, all phenomena should be known to be an illusion of mind. There is a scriptural authority. It is said in the Ārya-Lankāvatāra[sūtra] :

Having relied on mind-only, one should not consider external objects. Having abided in the true state (de bzhin nyid, tathatā), one should go beyond even mind-only. Having gone beyond the mind-only, one should go beyond non-appearance [of subject and object]. The Yogn who abides in non-appearance sees the Great Way.\textsuperscript{98}

\textsuperscript{95} The reason is that Bhavya, in the Madhyamakaratnapradipa, defines the conventional truth in a similar way to Sāntarāksīta (ca 725-788) and quotes from Padmavajra, whose date is also not clear but likely to be in the 9th C. His view is adopted by Atiśa (982-1054). We can therefore tentatively place him between the late 9th and the first half of the 10th C.

\textsuperscript{96} Yamaguchi [1943] reports that Bhavya refers to Candrakīrti by name. This proves that the author of the Madhyamakaratnapradipa is not Bhāviveka. Lindner [1981] and [1982b] regards Bhavya and Bhāviveka as identical by showing similarity of their works. However, there are some differences in important points in their works although they are superficially similar. See 3.5.

\textsuperscript{97} Lanākāvatārasūtra, vv. 10:256-257 (Nanjo [1923] p. 298, 5-p. 299,1) See appendix 1 (p. 277).
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The noble Nāgārjuna, the ācārya Āryadeva and the ācārya reverend Candrakīrti say as below and thus to maintain the conventional truth in the way of the Śrāvaka is the coarse externalist Madhyamaka and to establish that that very [conventional truth] is mind-only is subtle [and] called the internalist Madhyamaka. 99

This passage clearly shows that in India there was the idea that the externalist Madhyamaka accords with the view of the Śrāvaka concerning the conventional truth. The Śrāvaka should be either the Vaibhāṣika or the Sautrāntika in terms of classification as a school according to the doxography given by late Indian Mahāyānists. 100 Therefore this externalist Madhyamaka can be rightly called the Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka if he postulates the view of the Sautrāntika conventionally. He also states which Madhyamaka his text and others belong to:

[2-33]

Therefore most great texts written by them and me are said to be the externalist Madhyamaka. 101

99 Madhyamkaratnapradipa (Derge ed. No. 3854 tsha 280a1-5, Peking ed. No. 5254 tsha 352b7-353a4): de ltar rags pa’i ral ’byor bstan nas/ da ni phra ba’i ral ’byor bstan par bya ste/ ’di ni phra ba yin te/ ji) ltar chos thams cad rang gi sems nyid sgyu ma tsa snang bar ’byung ste/ ’di ltar sems sgyu ma tsa snang ni dus gsum las ’das pa/ kha dog dag dang dbyibs med pa) rang bzhin gyis ’od gsal ba/ snang ba med pas na chos thams cad ni sems nyid sgyu ma yin par shes par bya’ol/

100 For example, Ratnākaraśānti and Atiśa. Sec [2-16] (p. 78) and [3-74] (p. 191).

101 Madhyamkaratnapradipa (Derge ed. No. 3854 tsha 281a2-3, Peking ed. No. 5254 tsha 354a5): de bas dc dag dang bdag gis) gzhung chen po mang po dag bkod pa ni/ phyi rol gyi dhu ma yin no zhes par bya’o/
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As we have seen in chapter 1, Matsumoto maintains that the terms mDo sde dBu ma and rnAl 'byor spyod pa'i dBu ma are used to designate texts in the ITa ba'i khyad par. This passage also shows that these terms can be applied to texts.\(^{102}\) As long as this point is concerned, the ITa ba'i khyad par agrees with the Madhyamakaratnapradipa. On the other hand, even if his assumption that mdo sde of mDo sde dBu ma stands for sūtras in the ITa ba'i khyad par is sustainable, it is highly questionable whether it reflects the classification of the Madhyamaka in India. Bhavya explicitly explains here in this text that the external Madhyamaka establishes the conventional truth according to the Śrāvaka, which is either the Sautrāntika or the Vaibhāṣika.

Bhavya, however, does not mention whether the externalist Madhyamaka postulates sākārajñāna or nirākārajñāna. It is possible that he related the conventional view of the externalist Madhyamaka to the view of Śrāvaka just because of their maintaining existence of external objects. Then his intention here is to say that the externalist Madhyamaka maintains existence of external objects conventionally without examining epistemological differences between the Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika.

Concerning the matter of Śrāvaka, the anonymous author of the Bodhisattvavatāravyākhyāpanjikā regards the Sautrāntika as the representative of ordinary people who hold that external objects exist as they see them. He, on the other hand, considers that the Mādhyamika who asserts that external objects exist accepts conventional existence of self-awareness, that is to say, cognition with images. If we assume that the externalist Mādhyamika conventionally postulates existence of external objects in the way the Sautrāntika does, and that the conventional truth is defined as ‘widely known to the world’ (lokaprasiddha), we can see a consistency in his explanation. This consistency seems to be kept in the Madhyamakaratnapradipa. Bhavya does not mention whether the epistemology of the externalist Madhyamaka is based on the sākāra view or the nirākāra view. He, however, does not explain that the conventional view of the externalist Madhyamaka agrees with the view of the Sautrāntika. According to him, it agrees with

\(^{(1)}\) D: gi, P: gis.

\(^{102}\) See 1.2.1 (p. 31 ff.).
that of Śrāvaka, which includes both the Sautrāntika, which holds the sākāra view, and the Vaibhāṣika, which holds the nirākāra view.

If we gather the clues we examined above in this thesis, it is conceivable why Bhavya relates the view of the externalist Madhyamaka to Śrāvaka but not to the Sautrāntika. In the Kramārthaprakāśikā of Lakṣmī and the Bodhicaryāvatāraṇapāṇījīka of Prajñākaramati, which are both dated to the 11th C, the externalist Mādhyamika is considered to maintain the nirākāra view conventionally or to reject self-awareness conventionally. This does not agree with the view of the Sautrāntika in terms of epistemology. On the other hand, in the Madhyamakośa of Kamalaśīla, which was written in the 8th C, it is explained to hold cognition with images. Bhavya’s Madhyamakaratnapradīpa is roughly dated between the end of the 9th C and the first half of the 10th C. Then it is likely that this text was written while the conventional view of the externalist Mādhyamika was in transition from sākāra to nirākāra. This hypothesis would become more sustainable if we can place the Bodhisattvacaryāvatāravyākhyānapaṇījīka, whose date is not known, before the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa. Although we are not absolutely sure about this because the number of texts we examined is not many enough and the date of the Bodhisattvacaryāvatāravyākhyānapaṇījīka is not certain, we certainly find two kinds of texts which respectively explain that the externalist Mādhyamika maintains the sākāra view, and the nirākāra view. It is probable that at Bhavya’s time the both views are extant and the view of the externalist Mādhyamika is related to Śrāvaka.

The other point which draw our attention is the way Bhavya understands the view of the internalist Madhyamaka. Here he explains that the mind that has neither colours nor shape is splendour by nature (rang bzhin 'od gsal ba, prakṛtiprabhāsvara). This reminds us of Lakṣmī’s explanation of prabhāsva. In Lakṣmī’s Pañcakramaṭikā Kramārthaprakāśikā, splendour of mind is regarded as nirākāra. Bhavya, nevertheless, do not distinguish splendour by nature and splendour of mind (sems kyi 'od gsal, cittaprabhāsvara) and his explanation of splendour by nature rather resembles to splendour of mind postulated by Lakṣmī.

Bhavya mentions the classification of the internalist Madhyamaka and the externalist Madhyamaka in [2-32]. He also implies that Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Candrakīrti mention
the position of the internalist Madhyamaka. Then he indeed quotes verses and passages from their works immediately after [2-32]:

[2-34]

The meaning of this is [explained] extensively as follows. It is said by the venerable Ācārya [Nāgārjuna in verses 3:17 and 22 of the Pañcakrama]:

Nothing whatsoever arises or nothing whatsoever has cessation. It should be known that phenomena are appearance of the nature of mind.

Eyes, the other [sense faculties], and their objects are nothing but five wisdoms. Everything distinguished as internal and external is not different from mind.\(^{103}\)

[2-35]

It is said by the venerable Āryadeva [in verse 51 of the Svābhāvikasāra-ksara-prabheda]:

External objects do not exist. [They are] observed as one’s own mind. One should meditate that even this [mind] is an illusion.

One should be mindful only of the real state (de bzhin nyid, tathatā).

\(^{103}\) Madhyamkaratnapradīpa (Derge ed. No. 3854 tsha 280a5-6, Peking ed. No.5254 tsha 353a4-6):

... zhes gsungs pa’i don rgyas par ni ji skad du/ slob dpon gyi zhul snga nas/
'dir ni gang yang skye ba med// gang yang 'gag pa yod ma yin//
sems kyi rang bzhin mam gnas pa// chos mams nyid ni shes par bya//
mig la sogs dang yul mams nyid// ye shes Inga po nyid dag stel/
phyi dang nang du mam phyed bang// thams cad sems las gzhans ma yin/

\( \text{zh} \) es bya ba la sogs pa mang du gsungs so//

Almost identical with the Pañcakrama, vv. 3:17 and 22 (Mimaki and Tomabechi [1994] p. 33, 29-30, p. 34, 21-22):

na cātrotpadyate kaścin maraṇaṁ nāpi kasyacit 1
saṃsāra eva jñātavyaś caittarpākṣṭhitāḥ 1 3:17 2
akṣāni viśayaś caiva jñānapañcakam eva ca 1
adhhyātmaḥbāhyato bhinnam sarvaṁ māyaiva nānyathā 1 3:22 2

The edition of La Vallée Poussin [1896] (v. 4:17 p. 37, 16-17) has:

na cātrotpadyate kaścit saranaṁ nāpi kasyacit 1
saṃsāra eva jñātavyaś caittarpākṣṭhitāḥ 1
Chapter 2 Internalist and Externalist

It is also said [in verse 58 and 59 of the same text]:

The five [constituents] such as material things (gzugs, rilpa) as well as the twelve sense fields (skye mched, āyatana), the elements (khams, dhātu) conformable to them that are said to be eighteen, the five cognitions and the whole world; everything is nothing but one’s own mind and not different [from the mind].

All those which are distinguished as the eight mountains, the eight oceans, islands and hells, and which are seen as immovable and movable are nothing but mind and not different [from the mind].

104 Madhyamkaratnapradipa (Derge ed. No. 3854 tsha 280a6-b1, Peking ed. No.5254 tsha 353a6-b1):

\begin{quote}
\textit{slob dpon 'phags pa lha'i zhal snga nas/}
\textit{phyi rol don ni yod ma yin// rang gi sems ni mthong bar 'gyut//}
\textit{de yang sgyu mar bsgom bya ziing// de bzhin nyid kyang rjes dran bya//}
\end{quote}

\textit{yang gsungs pa/}

\begin{quote}
\textit{gzugs sogs lnga dang de bzhin skye mched bcu gnyis dang//}
\textit{bco bgyad ces bshad khams ni de ram dang//}
\textit{shes pa lnga dang 'gro ba ma lus pa//}
\textit{thams cad rang gi sems nyid yin gi gzhan ma yin//}
\textit{gang yang ri bgyad dang ni rgya mtsho bgyad mams dang//}
\textit{gling la sogs dang dmyal ba la sogs dbye//}
\textit{gang yang brtan dang g-yo ba nyid du mthong ba del//}
\textit{thams cad sems nyid yin gi gzhan ma yin//}
\end{quote}


\begin{quote}
\textit{madhyam drṣyate cittam bähyam artham na vidyate II}
\textit{evam vai bhāvayen māyā m tatliatām apy anusmaret 115111}
\textit{pliyi rol don ni yod min pas// 'di dag rang gi sems su bṭa//}
\textit{de bzhin sgyu mar bsgons nas ni// de nyid kyang ni rjes dran bya// 51 //}
\textit{rūpāḍipāṇḍakaṃ athāyatanāṇi yāṇi aśṭādaśetī cōṇītāḥ khalu dhātavaśaḥ ca II}
\textit{jñānāni pāṇicā viśyāḥ ca jagatsamastānā māyāmayaḥ sa iha vajradharo 'pi nāṇyat 1158 II}
\textit{gzugs sogs mam pa lnga dang gang yang skye mched mams de nas//}
\textit{bco bgyad ces[10] byar gsungs dang khams ni mam pa lnga dang yang//}
\textit{ye shes lnga po dang ni yul de 'gro ba ma lus kun//}
\textit{sgyu ma las byung de 'dir rdo rje 'dzin de gzhan ma yin// 58 //}
\textit{(1) D: ces, P: zhes.}
\textit{yan parvataḥ astamahāsamudrā dvīpaḥ ca sarve narakādiḥbhṛdhāḥ II}
\textit{yat sthāvaranā jaghamama eva dhṛṣṭaṃ tattat svayaṃ sarvavid eva nāṇyat 1159 II}
\textit{ri mams dang ni rgya mtsho chen po bgyad gang yin//}
\textit{gling mams dang ni dmyal ba la sogs dbye ba mams//}

\end{quote}

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Thus Bhavya’s explanation of the internalist Madhyamaka is based on the works of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, namely, the *Pañcakrama* and the *Svādhiṣṭānakramaprakṛtivṛti*. Immediately after these quotations, passages from Candrakīrti’s and Bhāviveka’s works are also quoted. It may be a little strange that Bhavya refers to Nāgārjuna and others but not to Śāntarakṣita, who is regarded as the founder of the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka when he explains the internalist Madhyamaka. Because these quotations are mostly from later tantric works attributed to the great Madhyamaka teachers, this position of internalist Madhyamaka must have something to do with the tradition of Ārya school in which they are considered to belong to. In this respect, the internalist Madhyamaka described in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* is similar to the Nirākāra-Madhyamika in the *Kramārthaprakṛtivṛti* of Lakṣmī, which is a commentary on the *Pañcakrama*. It must be noted, nevertheless, that in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* it is explained with the quotations that all phenomena, whether they are perceived as external or internal, are not different from mind. In the *Kramārthaprakṛtivṛti* of Lakṣmī, on the other hand, the reality, which is the splendour of mind, is explained to be different from the images of objects. Thus both texts are closely related to the *Pañcakrama*, but the *Kramārthaprakṛtivṛti* of Lakṣmī shows the clearer characteristics of the Nirākāra-Madhyamaka than the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*. Therefore, we can place the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* either in the process of the development of Ārya school towards the clearer nirākāra view, or in opposition to the Nirākāra-Madhyamaka, which is shown in the *Kramārthaprakṛtivṛti*. It is not entirely clear whether there were two opposing positions in the tradition, or the position described by Bhavya preserves the doctrine at a primitive stage of the tradition before fully developing the nirākāra view.

Textual evidence also shows that the verses quoted by Bhavya do not necessarily express the nirākāra view, and are different from those in the original Sanskrit texts that survive to date. As we examined, the passages seemingly quoted from the *Pañcakrama* of Nāgārjuna and the *Svādhiṣṭānakramaprakṛtivṛti* of Āryadeva teach that all phenomena
are not different from mind. Nevertheless, if we look at the corresponding verses of the Pañcakrama and the Svādhīṣṭhānakramaprabheda which are now extant, we will realise that they all lack the parts of the verses that mention non-difference between mind and phenomena. The fourth quarter of the verse 3:22 of the Pañcakrama quoted in the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa ([2-34]) reads, “Everything... ...is not different from mind” (thams cad sems las gzhan ma yin). The corresponding part in the Sanskrit text of the Pañcakrama is sarvāṇ māyaiva nānyathā. There is no word that can be translated into ‘sems’ in verse 3:22 of the Pañcakrama. Instead it has ‘māyaiva’ so that it means “Everything... ...is not different indeed from an illusion”. Likewise, the verses quoted in the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa ([2-35]) have phrases that teach that all phenomena are not different from mind (thams cad rang gi sems nyid yin gyi gzhan ma yin and thams cad sems nyid yin gyi gzhan ma yin) while verses 58 and 59 of the Svādhīṣṭhānakramaprabheda do not have terms which mean ‘mind’. The term ‘sems nyid’ is here substituted to ‘rdo rje ’dzin’ in both verses in Tibetan translation, and to vajradhara and sarvavid in Sanskrit.

In the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa, the externalist Madhyamaka is explained to maintain the conventional truth in the way of Śrāvaka. It is not mentioned whether it particularly follows the Sautrāntika or the Vaibhāṣika. This may be the result of ongoing transition of the externalist Madhyamaka from the externalist sākāra view which is regarded as the Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka to the externalist nirākāra view. It is evident that Bhavya understands that Madhyamaka is classified into the externalist and the internalist according to the view of other schools that it conventionally follows. On the other hand, the internalist Madhyamaka is, in a way, explained to be the Nirākāra-Madhyamaka as seen in [2-32], but not as systematised as the view of the Nirākāra-Madhyamika in the Kramārthaprakāśikā of Lakṣmī. It seems to me that this position is slightly different from the internalist Madhyamaka of Śāntarakṣita which is often referred to as Yogācāra-Madhyamaka in that Bhavya quotes verses from Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Candrakīrti and Bhāviveka when explaining the view of the internalist Madhyamaka. This may also be the result of ongoing transition of the Ārya school’s internalist view from that of the internalist sākāra view to the internalist nirākāra view. Thus the
Madhyamakaratnapradipa contains many pieces of important information concerning the development of different Madhyamaka views in the late period.

2.11 Candrakīrti

It is now certain that acceptance of self-awareness by the externalist Mādhyamikas is evident in the Madhyamakāloka of Kamalaśīla and the anonymous Bodhisattvacaryāvatāravyākhyānapañjikā. Bhavya, in addition, maintains that the externalist Madhyamaka follows the view of the Śrāvakas conventionally. These accounts indicate that there were external Mādhyamikas who maintained, at the conventional level, a view similar to that of the Sautrāntika. In addition to them, there is a passage, in the Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya of Candrakīrti (ca. 600-650), which explains what view the Mādhyamikas hold conventionally:

[2-36]

The wise drew a conclusion that, as this truth called emptiness is not explained without errors in the other texts because they do not belong to the texts of the Madhyamaka, so other texts do not contain the view produced from this view that I here presented with objections and replies, either, like the truth of emptiness.

Therefore, it should be known that the opinion by some that the view that is ultimately held by the Sautrāntikas is maintained by the Madhyamikas conventionally is stated just because the truth of meaning of the texts of the Madhyamaka is not clearly understood.105

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Thus Candrakīrti denies the position that the Mādhyamikas maintain the view of the Sautrāntika conventionally. This passage of Candrakīrti does not accord with Bhavya’s explanation in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* in that the former denies this view but the latter does not. This, nevertheless, implies that some understood that the conventionality maintained by the Mādhyamikas corresponds to the view of the Sautrāntika. Therefore it is possible that the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika came into existence before the time of Candrakīrti.

Tsong kha pa, in the *Legs bshad snying po*, quotes this passage, as the evidence that Candrakīrti conventionally follows neither the Sautrāntika nor the Vaiśehika.\(^{106}\) He also composed a commentary on the *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya* and explained ‘some’ as the Svātāntrikas.\(^{107}\) If he is right, it will be the case that the Svātāntrika-Mādhyamika was considered to hold the view of the Sautrāntika conventionally at the time of Candrakīrti. This does not contradict to the fact that Bhāviveka accepts some views of the Sautrāntika conventionally in the *Prajñāpradīpa*.\(^{108}\) It is, however, not certain if ‘some’ are the Mādhyamikas, or if distinction of ‘some’ and those on Candrakīrti’s side corresponds to that of the Svātāntrika and the Prāsaṅgika, or if this view of the Sautrāntika includes both ontology and epistemology.

### 2.12 Conclusion

The main question of this chapter is whether or not it is legitimate to consider that the designation ‘Sautrāntika-Mādhyamaka’ is derived from the Sautrāntika as a philosophical school, in the sense that the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamikas conventionally understand the world in the way the Sautrāntikas ultimately do. The characteristics of the Sautrāntika view are acceptance of external objects and of self-awareness that is cognition with images (sākārajñāna). According to some Tibetan doxographical texts of the dGe lugs order, as we examined in chapter 1, the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamikas are considered to accept the existence of external objects but to deny self-awareness conventionally. It is


\(^{107}\) *dGongs pa rab gsal* (Peking ed. No. 6143 ca 266b).

\(^{108}\) See 2.1 (pp. 56-59) and Nōnin [1986].

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very likely, according to his statement in the *Legs bshad snying po*, that Tsong kha pa considered that Bhāviveka postulated cognition with images (*sākāra-jñāna*). This is striking in terms of the later dGe lugs doxographers not following his view. It is also not entirely clear how the later Tibetan doxographers reconciled the view of the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamikas that does not accept self-awareness conventionally with that of the Sautrāntikas that accepts it. With regard to the foundation of this classification, it is the *Ita ba'i khyad par* of Ye shes sde that Tsong kha pa gives as an authority.

When we look at the *Ita ba'i khyad par*, which is the earliest account we know of mentioning this classification, we find no statement that relates the Sautrāntika and the mDo sde'i dBu ma. Rather, as Matsumoto maintains, it seems that *mdo sde* of mDo sde'i dBu ma is derived from *sūtra* but not from the Sautrāntika in the *Ita ba'i khyad par*. Also there is no explanation of the epistemological view of the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamaka in the text. Therefore it is not clear, from these Tibetan accounts alone, what the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamaka held in terms of epistemology.

Among the Indian sources we examined in this chapter, only Lākṣmī mentions both of these positions by the names which can be ‘Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika’ and ‘Yogācāra-Mādhyamika’ in original Sanskrit. In the text, the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika is said to postulate cognition without images. This accords with the Tibetan accounts, or rather we should assume that Tibetan doxographers followed the view of Lākṣmī, considering some of them quote from her work as a support. The other Indian texts of the same period that mention the distinction of the internalist and the externalist, those of Bodhibhadra, Prajñākaramati and Ratnākaraśānti do not give the designations ‘Sautrāntika-Mādhyamaka’ and ‘Yogācāra-Mādhyamaka’. None of the externalist Mādhyamaka mentioned in these later texts that are examined in this thesis positively supports conventional existence of self-awareness of cognition. The view of the later externalist Mādhyamaka is in line with accounts of the later dGe lugs doxographers and the description of the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamikas given by Lākṣmī. Nevertheless, the externalist Mādhyamikas described in these texts later than the 10th C seem to have something to do with Candrakīrti, with the only exception of Bodhibhadra who gives Bhavya as a
representative of the externalist Madhyamaka, which requires some more explanation. Prajñākaramati, who gives an objection to the conventional existence of self-awareness, seems to follow Candrakīrti’s view. The externalist Madhyamika whom Ratnākaraśānti tries to refute seems to be Candrakīrti or one who follows him. Therefore I cannot help hesitating to regard these externalist Madhyamikas as Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Madhyamikas although their view accords with the description of the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Madhyamika given by some Tibetan doxographers.

On the other hand, Kamalaśīla and the anonymous commentator on the 9-chapter version of the Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra respectively hold that the externalist Madhyamikas accept cognition with images (sākārajñāna) and self-awareness. In this case, the designation ‘Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka’ is justified in terms not only of ontology but also of epistemology. In addition, Bhavya, in the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa, explains that to maintain the convention (saṃvṛtti) in the way the Śrāvakas do is the externalist Madhyamaka. Here the relationship between the view of conventionality held by the externalist Madhyamikas and the view of other schools is indicated. Candrakīrti, moreover, mentions that there are those who consider that the Madhyamikas conventionally maintain what the Sautrāntikas ultimately maintain, although he does not agree with it. It is not clear who are these Madhyamikas who conventionally maintain what the Sautrāntikas maintain ultimately. They may be Bhāviveka and the follower of his view, as Tsong kha pa suggests, because Bhāviveka seems to maintain that cognition and its objects do not exist simultaneously and to accept some epistemological view of the Sautrāntika conventionally. These pieces of evidence indicates that in India there was a view that the Madhyamikas hold the view of the Sautrāntika conventionally. In turn, this suggests that even though it is very likely, as Matsumoto observes, that mDo sde’i dBu ma is nothing to do with the Sautrāntika in the ItTa ba’i khyad par, some considered that the externalist Madhyamaka had something to do with the Sautrāntika around the times of Candrakīrti and of Bhavya. This may also have been the case around the time of Śāntarakṣīta and Kamalaśīla, which

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109 This Bhavya is probably a Prāsaṅgika since the Bhavya whom Atiśa respects quotes frequently from Candrakīrti and Bodhibhadra was Atiśa’s direct teacher. We will discuss his position in chapter 3. (3.5, p. 199 ff.)
was between Candrākīrti and Bhāvya, and not long before Ye shes sde.

Concerning who is considered an externalist Mādhyamika, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla show Bhāviveka’s view as that of the externalist Madhyamaka. Kamalaśīla, who considers that the externalist Mādhyamika holds the sākāra view, most probably includes both Bhāviveka and Candrākīrti. The anonymous commentator on the 9-chapter version of the Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra may regard Jñānagarbha as an externalist Mādhyamika who accepts self-awareness conventionally. Therefore those who consider that the externalist Mādhyamikas postulate self-awareness give teachers who are classified as Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas by Tibetan doxographers. On the other hand, Ratnākaraśānti and Prājñākaramati seem to regard Candrākīrti as the representative figure of the externalist Madhyamaka. Only Bodhibhadra among the Indian teachers later than the 10th C gives the name of Bhāvya. However none of them distinguishes the views of Bhāviveka and Candrākīrti except for Candrākīrti himself, who denies the opinion that the Mādhyamika conventionally maintains what the Sautrāntika maintains ultimately.

In this way, the understanding of the view of the externalist Madhyamaka is not consistent among Indian accounts. It is as if there were two externalist Madhyamakas, i.e. the Prāsaṅgika and the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamaka if we accept the terms which Tibetan doxographers employ. However, because none of the accounts we examined, except for Candrākīrti’s, mentions any difference between these two externalist Madhyamakas, it seems that this difference did not create two opposing factions. Rather it is likely that the externalist Mādhyamika changed its view as time passed. We can see two different kinds of changes. First, in terms of epistemology, while the externalist Mādhyamikas had been understood to maintain self-awareness that is cognition with images (sākārajñāna) in the early stage of the late Madhyamaka, they were later considered to deny self-awareness, and therefore to hold cognition without images (nirākārajñāna). Second, with regard to the representative figure, it had been Bhāviveka, who is regarded as a Svātantrika, and later changed into Candrākīrti. The earlier externalist Madhyamaka is closer to what we should expect from the designation ‘Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamaka’ and the later one corresponds to what later Tibetan doxographers often describe as the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamaka.
Although this is speculation, I assume that this change is a result of the externalist-internalist dichotomy. Because the internalist Mādhyamikas maintain self-awareness, it may have been inevitable for the externalist Mādhyamikas to change their view from sākāra to nirākāra in order to make a clear distinction because to maintain the externalist sākāra view opens a possibility for the internalist Madhyamaka. Moreover, if the internalist Mādhyamikas were the Svātāntrikas, as Tibetan doxographers maintain, it may also have been necessary for the externalist Mādhyamikas to follow Candrākīrti’s view rather than Bhāviveka’s. This shows that at first the externalist Mādhyamikas had the view that can be rightly called the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamaka in terms of their maintaining self-awareness and external objects and Bhāviveka was considered representative. This shifted, as time passed, so that they objected conventional self-awareness and Candrākīrti obtained the dominant position. It is not clear why Lakṣmī consider the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika postulates cognition without images. It may be the case, however, that in spite of the shift in the views of the external Madhyamaka, the designation ‘Sautrāntika-Mādhyamaka’ somehow survived.

To prove this change in the externalist Madhyamaka, it is necessary to show how the Prāsaṅgika-Svātantrika dichotomy was understood in India because it seems that as the externalist Mādhyamikas changed their epistemological view from sākāra to nirākāra, they started to refer to Candrākīrti more than Bhāviveka. As we have seen, it is not clear what happened to this dichotomy in India after Candrākīrti. Therefore, this classification of the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika is dealt with in the following chapter.

With regard to subdivisions in the internalist Madhyamaka, Ratnākaraśānti clearly mentions distinction of sākāra and nirākāra in the internalist Madhyamaka. It is also evident from the account of Sahajavajra in the Tatvadāsaśakaṭikā that this classification existed in India around the 11th C. Lakṣmī comments on the Pañcakrama from the point of the view of the internalist Nirākāra-Mādhyamaka and compares the view with the sākāra view. Thus we can find the classification between the Sākāra-Mādhyamaka and the Nirākāra-Mādhyamaka in the texts that are relatively late. Śāntarakṣita is regarded as a representative of internalist Mādhyamikas in the Jñānasārasamuccayanibandhana of Bodhiyuddha and the Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā of Prajñākaramati. Sahajavajra regards
him as a Sākāra-Mādhyamika. On the other hand, the Kramārthaprakāśikā of Lakṣmī is a commentary on the Pañca-kramas of Nāgārjuna. Bhavya, in the Madhyamakaratnapradyāna, also quotes the Pañca-krama when he explains the internalist Madhyamaka. Therefore it seems that there were two different types of internalist Madhyamakas related respectively to Śāntarakṣita and Nāgārjuna. They may have become the Sākāra-Mādhyamaka and the Nirākāra-Mādhyamaka. This classification is further discussed in detail in chapter 4.

Finally concerning any other characteristics of the externalist Madhyamaka, the anonymous author of the Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra-vyākhyānapaññikā and Ratnākarasānti understand that the externalist Mādhyamikas consider that the rūpakāya has various effects even though Buddhas must not have any conceptual construct. They both give an example of a wish-fulfilling gem (cintāmanī), which does not have any conceptual construct but has various effects. This view seems to have been based on verse 9:35-36 of the Bodhicaryāvatāra.

It is thus clear that the distinction of the internalist Madhyamaka and the externalist Madhyamaka existed in India. However their views seems to have changed and diverged during the time of the late Madhyamaka. In the following chapters, therefore, we will examine these transition and bifurcation in the externalist Madhyamaka and the internalist Madhyamaka.
Chapter 3 Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika

As presented in chapter 1, the classification of the Madhyamaka into the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika developed mainly in Tibet and there are only the rudiments of this classification in Indian sources with regard to these terms although this classification is generally mentioned when the bifurcation of the Madhyamaka is explained. In chapter 2, it is shown that the distinction between the externalist and the internalist Madhyamakas is present in many Indian sources, but none of these passages shown in the previous chapter mentions this division of the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika within the externalist Madhyamaka, except for Candrakīrti. Some modern scholars, therefore, seem to have doubts on the existence of this classification in the middle period of Indian Madhyamaka. However, even though we cannot find the terms ‘Svātantrika’ and ‘Prāsaṅgika’ in Indian sources, it may be possible to trace actual opposition between the two positions. There is no doubt that Bhāviveka (ca. 500-570) positively employed so-called autonomous inference (svatantra anumāna)¹ to prove emptiness and Candrakīrti (ca. 600-650) criticised it. Previous studies have, to a great extent, clarified the point of disagreement between them. What we do not know is whether or not this actually created two opposing positions of thoughts among the Mādhyamikas, especially among the externalist Mādhyamikas. It is also questioned if there was continuity of Prāsaṅgika thought from Candrakīrti down to later Tibetans, especially Tsong kha pa, who considered the Prāsaṅgika as the foremost view. In order to clarify these points, we will first confirm what we know from past studies with regard to the disagreement between Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti over the use of inference, the dates and order of translation of their works into Tibetan, and Indian commentaries on their works. In addition, we will also compare their interpretation of the two truths which differs according to their position. On the basis of these points, we will examine if their views are preserved as opposed in their successors’ works and why we can hardly find any clear description concerning this classification in Indian texts after Candrakīrti, if there was the classification of the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika.

¹ I only provisionally use translation ‘autonomous inference’ in this thesis. This does not mean that a term svatantrānumāna is attested in any Sanskrit text. See footnote 58 of this chapter (p. 140).
3.1 Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti

While the Prāsāṅgika-Mādhyamika was widely regarded in Tibet as the main stream of Mahāyāna Buddhism after Tsong kha pa, we hardly find any evidence of Candrakīrti’s popularity until around 1000AD. As we have seen in chapter 1, Ye shes sde’s Ita ba’i khyad par, one of the earliest Tibetan doxographical accounts of Indian Buddhism, names Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Bhāviveka, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, but not Candrakīrti. Moreover, Ye shes sde does not mention the Svātantra-Prāsaṅgika distinction although he classifies the Madhyamakas into the Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka and the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka. When we look at the history of translation of Candrakīrti’s works into Tibetan, it seems that in the earlier dissemination of Buddhism into Tibet, Candrakīrti was not considered important. Only his Yuktisāstikāvyātti, a commentary on Nāgārjuna’s work, was translated by Ye shes sde in the 9th C. All the other works of Candrakīrti were translated later than the 11th C. The Madhyamakāvatāra, one of his major works, was translated in the 11th C by Nag tsho and Kṛṣṇa Paṇḍita. Nag tsho was a Tibetan translator whom Atiśa (982-1055) worked with. The other main works such as the Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya and the Prasannapadā were translated by sPa tshab Nyi ma grags. Thus his main works were all translated by translators of the later dissemination.

2 For example, Lopez [1987] (p. 22) states as follows:

The primacy of the Prāsāṅgika view was firmly established for the Tibetan tradition by Tsong-kha-pa, the founder of the Ge-luk (dGe-lugs) order, in works such as the Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path (Lam rim chen mo), the Essence of the Great Explanations (Legs bshad snyng po), and the Great Commentary on (Candrakīrti’s) “Supplement” (‘Jug dik chen mo). In these works he presents both the central issues and most intricate points of the Prāsāṅgika school with a precision and style unmatched in Buddhist literature. Thus, it can be said that from the time of Tsong-kha-pa, if not before, the Prāsāṅgika school was the dominant philosophical system in Tibet.

3 For example, see Dreyfus [1997] p. 19.

4 This seems to be the only work of Candrakīrti translated during the time of the earlier dissemination. It can be regarded as insignificant compared with the fact that Bhāviveka’s Prajñāpradīpa, a commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā was translated in this period together with Avalokiteśvara’s sub-commentary, the Prajñāpradīpaṇḍita.


6 The years of Nyi ma grags’s birth and death are not certain. He translated some texts with a disciple of a joint translator of Blo Idan shes rab (1059-1109). It seems, therefore, that he lived in the late 11th C - early 12th C. See Inaba [1967].
Furthermore, none of Candrakīrti’s works is found in the Chinese *Tripiṭaka*.\(^7\)

As for Bhāviveka, in addition to the fact that he is mentioned by Ye shes sde, his *Prajñāpradīpa* as well as the commentary, the *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā* of Avalokitavrata, was translated during the earlier dissemination. The *Madhyamakārūḍhayakārikā* and its commentary, the *Tarkajñāla*, are mentioned in the *I Dan dkar ma* catalogue as treatises in the process of translation.\(^8\) The *Karatalaratna* (*Zhang zhen lun*) and the *Prajñāpradīpa* were translated into Chinese.\(^9\) Tsong kha pa, when he supports the classification of the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika, says “you should not think that it is their own fabrication.”\(^10\) This statement implies that some teachers before Tsong kha pa maintained that this classification had been made up by Tibetan translators of the later dissemination. Thus there has been a doubt on the existence of this classification in India since the time of Tsong kha pa or even before, and it was probably caused by the lack of reference to Candrakīrti in the records of the earlier dissemination, as well as by the absence of the terms svātantrika and prāsaṅgika in major Indian sources. This evidence shows that Bhāviveka was probably well known in Tibet already at the time of the earlier dissemination but Candrakīrti was not.

In addition, Indian sources suggest that Bhāviveka was the representative figure of the externalist Madhyamaka in the relatively early period. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Śāntarakṣita (ca. 725-788) in the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra-vṛtti* quotes a passage as the view of the externalist Madhyamika from the *Madhyamakārūḍhayakārikā* and Kamalāśīla (ca. 740-797) in the *Madhyamakālōka* mentions the same view.\(^11\) In addition to this quotation, commentarial tradition also shows that Bhāviveka was regarded as important. There are two commentaries on the *Prajñāpradīpa*, one of which was written by Avalokitavrata (7th C?) and the other, which is now lost, was written by

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\(^10\) See chapter 1.2 (p. 26 [1-17]).

\(^11\) See chapter 2.7 (p. 85 [2-21]) as well as 2.8 (p. 89 [2-25]).
Guṇadatta. Thus Bhāviveka’s works are frequently quoted and commented by Indian teachers before the 8th C.

On the other hand, very little is known about the treatment of Candrakīrti in India. There is no surviving Indian commentary on his main works except for the auto-commentary, the Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya and the Madhyamakāvatāraśīka of Jayānanda, which was written in the 12th C outside India. To the best of my knowledge, among the Indian Mādhyamikas prior to Śāntarakṣita, i.e. before the 8th C, only Avalokitavrata in the Prajñāpradīpaśīka mentions him by name as one of the commentators on the Mālamadhyamakārākārīka of Nāgārjuna. Nevertheless, since he does not mention the view of Candrakīrti, we do not know how he considered Candrakīrti’s criticism of Bhāviveka. As for other Indian teachers before the 8th C, it is pointed out that the works of Jñānagarbha and Kamalāśīla may refer to the view of Candrakīrti. Unfortunately, however, they do not give his name and we are not absolutely certain to what extent they know of him.

In the texts composed in the 10th C or later, however, many references of Candrakīrti can be found. Prajñākaramati (10-11th C), in the Bodhicaryavatārapaṇṭiśīka, quotes 6 verses from the Madhyamakāvāra to explain the two truths. Atisa, in the Satyadvayāvatāra and the Bodhimārgapradaṇṭiśīka mentions him by name and also

12 See Lindtner [1981] (p. 211 and p. 212 note 16). Although Atiṣa, in the Bodhimārgapradaṇṭiśīka, reports that Avalokitavrata and Devasārman wrote commentaries on the Prajñāpradīpa, according to Lindtner, it is not Devasārman but Guṇadatta who wrote its commentary.


14 Prajñāpradīpaśīka (Derge ed. No. 3859 wa 73a5, Peking ed. No. 5259 wa 85a8). See Kajiyama [1963]. In the Madhyamakāratnapraṇḍīpa, a certain Bhavya mentions the name of Candrakīrti. The time of its composition is assumed to be around the 9-10th C. See chapter 2, footnote 96 (p.101). This may be the first surviving text which mentions Candrakīrti by name after Avalokitavrata.

15 It is not clear why he does not discuss it while he mentions the Prasannapadi by name. Kajiyama [1982] (p. 16) supposes that Avalokitavrata was contemporary with Candrakīrti, based on the fact that he does not discuss Candrakīrti’s view. There is, however, a possibility that he had not read the Prasannapadi although he knew the name, or that he did not regard Candrakīrti as a major opponent.

16 For Jñānagarbha, see Ruegg [1981a] (pp. 70-71), Eeck [1987] (p. 141, note 120) and Matsumoto [1978]. We will discuss this matter later in this section (pp. 120-124). For Kamalaśīla, see 2.8.

quotes from the same work of Candrakīrti. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Ratnākaraśānti (10-11th C) seems to refer to Candrakīrti, although not by name, when he refutes the view of the externalist Madhyamika.

Therefore we may conclude that Bhāviveka was well known in India and Tibet. However, Candrakīrti was rather neglected in India until the 10th C, i.e. before the time of Prajñākaramati and others, and during the time of the earlier dissemination of Buddhism into Tibet. Concerning these situations surrounding them, it is tempting to suppose that there was no continuous opposition between the two groups in the earlier period of the late Madhyamaka (roughly from the second half of the 7th C until the 9th C) since Candrakīrti’s side was nearly forgotten. On the other hand, the name of Candrakīrti and quotations from his works are very often found in many texts after about 1000 AD, such as those of Prajñākaramati and Atiśa. It is not yet clear what made this change of trend. While there is a possibility that the distinction of the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika did not exist in India for some three hundred years after Candrakīrti, it is unlikely, if not impossible, that his lineage had been extinct in the early stage of history after his death and it revived around 1000 AD since the works of Candrakīrti survive.

Now it is necessary to find out if we can find any texts that mention any difference or controversy between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika. Although Tibetan doxographers give names of major Indian teachers who lived between the second half of the 7th C and the 9th C, such as Śāntideva, Śāntaraksita and Kamalaśīla, we hardly find any dispute over the use of inference in their texts. Śāntideva (ca. 650-700), who is often classified into the Prāsaṅgika by Tibetan doxographers, adheres to the prasanga method, but does not criticise the use of inference at all. This cannot therefore be evidence of the opposition between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika. Prajñākaramati’s commentary on the

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18 For example, Satayādwayāvatāra, v. 19 (Ejima [1983] pp. 365-366):
   slob dpon zla grags ’di skad du//
   thabs su gyur pa kun rdzob bden pa dang// thabs las byung ba dngog dam bden pa dag//
   gnyis po’i dbyce ba gang gis mi shes pa// de dag log par rtogs pas ngan ’gror ’gro// 19 //
   (=Madhyamakāvatāra, v. 6:80)

19 See chapter 2.5 (pp. 80-83).

20 Chos kyi rgyal mtshan, ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa and others. See Mimaki [1982a] (pp. 27-38).
Chapter 3 Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika

Bodhicaryāvatāra, the Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā, which quotes many verses from Candrakīrti probably had a large influence over the classification of Śāntideva into the Prāsaṅgika. As we will examine later in this chapter, on the other hand, it may be the case that the 9-chapter version of the Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra is interpreted from the point of view of the Svātantrika in its commentary, the Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra-vyākhyānapañjikā. According to Kajiyama’s study, although Avalokitavrata puts Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā on the list of commentaries on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, he does not comment on Candrakīrti’s view. If he was conscious of being the Svātantrika and knew of the argument made by Candrakīrti in the first chapter of the Prasannapadā, he could not have helped mentioning it. This also makes us speculate that this difference of attitudes towards use of inference may not have been so important. From these earlier accounts, therefore, it is hardly possible to find any evidence for the opposition between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika.

As far as I know, modern scholars have not yet found any evident account that shows opposition of the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika in Madhyamaka treatises after Candrakīrti before the 9th C. Among teachers of this period who are classified into the Svātantrikas, however, Jñānagarbha (ca. 8th C) is the one who may have mentioned Candrakīrti’s view. According to Ruegg and Eckel, he might criticise Candrakīrti in

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21 See 3.3.2 (pp. 153-155).
22 See Kajiyama [1963] and chapter 3, footnote 15 (p. 119).
23 Ruegg [1981a] (pp. 70-71):

In this treatise Jñānagarbha has mentioned (fol. 11a sq.) some ‘bad disputants’ who held not only that entities such as rūpa are not produced in reality but also that they are not produced even in samvrti, so that they are comparable with the son of the barren woman (vandhyāputra, etc., i.e. a mere flatus vaccis).... The allusion might be to Candrakīrti’s theory of causal indeterminism even on the relative level, or it may be to some other opponent.

Eckel [1987] (p. 141 note 120):

Neither Jñānagarbha nor the subcommentator identifies the objector against whom this argument is directed. Ruegg points out (Literature, pp. 70-71), however, that the objection is similar to Candrakīrti’s conception of relative truth. If so, it is one of the few places in Svātantrika literature where the views of Candrakīrti are addressed. The relevant passage in Candrakīrti is Madhyamakāvatāra 6:36-38...

Both Ruegg and Eckel point out the possibility that this verse of Jñānagarbha is criticism of Candrakīrti. Although Eckel gives vv. 6:36-38 of the Madhyamakāvatāra as the relevant passage, Ruegg seems to indicate v. 6:111 because he considers that the expression ‘the son of the barren woman’ is common to both Candrakīrti’s verse and Jñānagarbha’s.
verse 25 of the *Satyadvayavibhaṅga*:

[3-1]

Some who are famous for their bad argument say, “An entity that does not arise in reality does not arise conventionally either, like the son of a barren woman.” (v. 25)\(^{24}\)

In this verse, arising both at the conventional and the ultimate levels is denied and compared to the son of a barren woman. To be precise, the opponent maintains that arising at the conventional level is impossible if there is no arising at the ultimate level. This verse is quite similar to the following statement made by Candrakīrti in the *Madhyamāvatāra*, verse 6:111:

[3-2]

Neither does the son of a barren woman arise by his own nature in reality nor in the [ordinary] world. In that way, all these entities do not arise by nature in the [ordinary] world or in reality. (v. 6:111)\(^{25}\)

Here Candrakīrti maintains that nothing arises by nature either at the conventional or the ultimate level. This non-arising is compared to the son of a barren woman. With regard to these points, these two verses are similar. Jñānagarbha and Candrakīrti, being Mādhyamikas, would not disagree on non-arising at the ultimate level. Therefore the matter of disagreement is non-arising at the conventional level. If Jñānagarbha, in the *Satyadvayavibhaṅga*, verse 25, indeed criticises the denial of intrinsic nature (svabhāva) which is postulated in the *Madhyamāvatāra*, verse 6:111, this can be regarded as

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\(^{24}\) *Satyadvayavibhaṅga*, v. 25 (Eckel [1987] p. 178):

\[
\text{rtsold gnags pa kha cig ni/ yan dag par dngos ma skyes pa(s)/}
\text{mo gsham bu la sogs bzhin du/ kun rdzob tu yang mi skye zic/}
\]

Also see Eckel [1987] (pp. 141-2, note 120).

\(^{25}\) *Madhyamāvatāra*, v. 6:111 (La Vallée Poussin [1907-12] p. 221, 20-p. 222, 3):

\[
\text{mo gsham bu la rang gi bdag nyid kyis/ skye ba de nyid du med 'jig rten du'ang/}
\text{yod min de bzhin dngos 'di kun ngo bol/ nyid kyis 'jig rten de nyid du ma skyes/}
\]
criticism of the Prāsaṅgika by the Svātantrika. According to Tsong kha pa, the Svātantrika conventionally accepts intrinsic nature but the Prāsaṅgika does not, and this difference of views on conventional existence is one of the most distinctive characters between them.\(^{26}\)

Matsumoto, who at first maintained the same view as Eckel, however, denies this assumption that Jñānagarbha, in the Satyadvayavibhaṅga, verse 25, criticises Candrakīrti. According to him,\(^{27}\) what Jñānagarbha actually criticises here is not the view of Candrakīrti in the Madhyamakāvatāra, verse 6:111, but the view of the Vijñaptivādins which Candrakīrti mentions in verse 6:107 of the same text and its auto-commentary the Bhāṣya:

\[
\text{Here [an objection] is stated [as follows]: If there is not even the slightest intrinsic nature of material things and others ultimately in this way, then there must be no intrinsic nature of them conventionally either because they do not exist ultimately like the son of a barren woman. But there also is intrinsic nature of material things and others conventionally. Therefore there is indeed existence of them ultimately. It is said [about this]:}
\]

\[
\text{If entities do not exist in reality, they do not exist as common usage (tha snyad du, *vyavahāratas) like the son of a barren woman. Therefore, they indeed exist by nature. (v. 6:107)}^{28}\]

As Matsumoto maintains, those whom Jñānagarbha criticised in verse 25 of the

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\(^{26}\) Williams [1989b] (p. 59, 10-24).

\(^{27}\) To be precise, this is first pointed out by Kazunobu Matsuda of Otani University. See Matsumoto [1985], Appendix 2 (pp. 121-124).


\[
\text{dir smras pa/ gal te de ilar gzugs la sogs pa rams la don dam par rang bzhin 'ga' yang med na/ 'o na mo shan gyi bu bzhin du don dam par yod pa ma yin pa'i phyir / de dag gi rang bzhin kun rdzob tu yang yod par mi 'gyur ba zhig na/ gzugs la sogs pa rams kyi rang bzhin ni kun rdzob tu yod pa yang yin no/ de'i phyir de dag gi yod pa nyid ni don dam par yang yod pa kho na'o/ zhes smras pa/}
\]

\[
gal te dngos po rams de nyid du med na/ tha snyad du yang mo gsham bu ji bzhin/ de dag med pa nyid 'gyur de yi phyir/ de dag rang bzhin gyis ni yod pa nyid/ 6:107 //}
\]
Satyadvayavibhaṅga seem to be these opponents mentioned by Candrakīrti in verse 6:107 of the Madhyamakāvatāra. Here the opponent insists that if there is no intrinsic nature ultimately, there must be no intrinsic nature conventionally, but because there is intrinsic nature conventionally, it must exist ultimately. He clearly maintains that things exist by nature both at the conventional and the ultimate levels. The point of this dispute is ultimate existence rather than conventional. In other words, the opponent is trying to establish ultimate existence on the basis of conventional existence.

To reinforce his argument, Matsumoto shows Sāntarakṣita’s sub-commentary on “some who are famous for their bad argument say” that is the introductory part of verse 25 of the Satyadvayavibhaṅga:

[3-4]

And others who hate the way (tshul) of the ultimate, seeking blame, say,

“An entity that does not arise in reality does not arise conventionally, either, like the son of a barren woman.”

Sāntarakṣita considers that the opponents mentioned in verse 25 of the Satyadvayavibhaṅga ‘hate the way of the ultimate.’ If the opponents here were represented by Candrakīrti, it would become absurd because Candrakīrti would not disagree on non-arising at the ultimate level. Here it seems that the opponents are those who attempt to refute the ultimate truth maintained by the Mādhyamikas. Therefore, this also proves that what the opponents intend to do in this verse is not the establishment of non-arising both at the conventional and the ultimate levels, but refutation of non-arising at the ultimate level.

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29 Satyadvayavibhaṅgapāṇjikā (Derge No. 3883 42b3, Peking No. 5283 sa 36a2-3):
<yang don dam pa'i tshul la sdang ba gshan dag klak ka tshol bar byed de/ yang dag par dngos ma skyes pa// mo gsham bu la sogs bzhin du// kun rdzob tu yang ni skye zer//>

30 It is not easy to prove that this opponent is indeed the Vījnāativādīn. Matsumoto [1984b] takes pains to do so by comparing relevant passages from Devendrabuddhi, Jñānagarbha, Śākyabuddhi and Sāntarakṣita who criticize each former teacher in order over this matter. Neither do I discuss this matter further nor show Matsumoto’s argument further because showing that the Satyadvayavibhaṅga verse 25 does not criticize Candrakīrti should suffice our purpose at present.
Another point Matsumoto mentions concerning this matter is lack of the word 'by nature' (svabhāvatas) in verse 25 of the Satyadvayavibhaṅga. Candrakīrti makes an objection to those who confound the non-existence of intrinsic nature of existence with the non-existence of existence. Whether or not it contains the word 'by nature' (svabhāvatas) counts. As Matsumoto admits, the misunderstanding that the Satyadvayavibhaṅga verse 25 indicates the Madhyamakāvatāra verse 6:111 is caused by 'superficial similarity of terms,' and the word 'by nature' (svabhāvatas) makes the opinion peculiar to Candrakīrti. Based on these facts, Matsumoto concludes that Jñānagarbha does not criticise Candrakīrti's view here in verse 25 of the Satyadvayavibhaṅga.

It is also worth mentioning that Matsumoto reports that Śāntarakṣita distinguishes two types of proof in the Satyadvayavibhaṅgapañjikā when explaining the same verse:

[3-5]

This can be either proof or proof by an undesired consequence (*prasaṅga) because there is no other kind [of proof].

Thus even though we cannot find any controversy over the use of inference in the Satyadvayavibhaṅga of Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita, in the sub-commentary, distinguishes the inference and the prasaṅga method. Matsumoto also points out that Śāntarakṣita did not use the term ‘svatantra’ to describe proof (bsgrub pa, *sādhana), and it may be the case that the terms svatantra anumāna and prasaṅgāpatti/āpādana were not commonly used in this period.

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31 My translation.

32 Matsumoto [1984b] (pp. 1-2). However this does not, of course, suggest that Jñānagarbha did not know Candrakīrti but rather shows that he knew the argument in the Madhyamakāvatāra. Matsumoto [1984a] (p. 145) also points out similarity of their definition of the conventional truth as 'covering'. Anyway this cannot be the evidence of opposition between the Śvātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika.

33 Satyadvayavibhaṅgapañjikā (Derge No. 3883 sa 42b5, Peking No. 5283 sa 36a6):
‘di ni bsgrub pa’am thal bar bsgrub pa zhig tu ’gyur grang stel mam pa gzhan ni med pa’i phyir rol/

34 Matsumoto [1984b] (pp. 30-32 note 18) argues that it is doubtful that Śāntarakṣita knew of the terms autonomous inference and the prasaṅga method because he uses a term sādhana (bsgrub) but not svatantra. He supposes that use of these terms in contrast had not possibly been common until Kamalaśīla who, as far as we know, first used them after Candrakīrti.
In addition to Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla distinguishes the two types of proof and very briefly states that he employs syllogism but not the *prasaṅga* method in the *Madhyamakāloka*:

[3-6]

Also by adducing an undesired consequence (*prasaṅgāpatti*) the desired object cannot be established because an undesired consequence like that is not proof. [This is] because only invalidation in the opponents’ thesis takes place by means of the proof by an undesired consequence, but it is not establishment of one’s own thesis and this requires another proposition to be established for both sides.35

Matsumoto gives the following passage of the *Madhyamakāloka* as evidence of Kamalaśīla’s use of the terms *svatantra* and *prasaṅga* in contrast.

[3-7]

[Objection]: Also regarding those who say “all entities lack intrinsic nature because they lack one intrinsic nature and many”, if it is the proof by an undesired consequence (*thal bar sgrub*), then because opponents do not admit such [proof], inferential reason is not established and do not in any case admit entities lacking one intrinsic nature and many. For this very reason, even if it is autonomously [employed] proof (*rang dgar sgrub*), inferential reason is not established for the other side.36

35 *Madhyamakāloka* (Derge ed. No.3887 sa 136b5-6, Peking ed. No. 5287 sa 147a5-6):
thal bar bsgrubs pas kyang mgon par 'dod pa'i don mi 'grub stod de lta bu'i thal ba nyid ma grub pa'i phyir rol/ thal bar sgrub pa'i sgo nas ni gzan gyi phyogs la gnod pa tsam du 'gyur gyi/ rang gyi phyogs 'grub pa ni ma yin te/ de ni gni ga la grub pa'i gan tshigs gzan la blos pa'i phyir rol/

36 *Madhyamakāloka* (Derge ed. No.3887 sa 138b6-7, Peking ed. No. 5287 sa 149b4-6):
gang dag dngos po thams cad ni geig dang du ma'i rang bzhin dang bral ba'i phyir rang bzhin med pa'o zhes zer ba de la yang gal te thal bar sgrub na ni de'i tshe gzhan dag de lta bu khas ni len pa'i phyir gan tshigs ma grub pa yin te/ geig dang du ma'i rang bzhin dang bral ba'i dngos po ni su yang khas ma len to/ de nyid kyi phyir rang dgar sgrub na yang gan tshigs cig

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These passages suggest that it will be appropriate to call Kamalaśīla a Svātantrika because he was aware of the difference between proof and the *prasaṅgāpattī*, and rejects the latter. It is, however, not clear whether this is an objection to those who made use of the *prasaṅga* method or just a declaration of his view of reasoning. At least, Śāntarakṣṭa and Kamalaśīla were conscious of the difference of two kinds of methods, and the latter did not regard the *prasaṅga* method as an appropriate means of proof. Kamalaśīla also mentions proof by an undesired consequence and autonomously [employed] proof.

To conclude, we have not found any convincing evidence that suggests existence of an opposition between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika before the 9th C. Candrakīrti does not seem to have been highly regarded by Tibetans during the earlier dissemination of Buddhism into Tibet. His trace is hardly found in the record of translation of Buddhist texts or in doxographical texts in this period. The same applies in India, too. Compared with Bhāviveka one of whose text is quoted by Śāntarakṣṭa and another is commented on by Avalokitavrata and Gūpadatta, Candrakīrti drew much less attention from the Indian Mādhyamikas in this period. In addition, we have not found any statement which suggests an opposition of the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika. The first teacher who clearly mention a difference between *svatantra* inference and *prasaṅga* method after Candrakīrti seems to be Kamalaśīla.

It is, therefore, impossible to confirm, on the ground of reliable evidence, that there was some kind of opposition between those who followed Bhāviveka and those who followed Candrakīrti before this period. Especially, how Candrakīrti’s thought was treated by the Mādhyamikas between the 7th C and the 9th C is unknown. It is certain, however, that while before the 9th C Bhāviveka’s side seems to have been far more dominant than Candrakīrti’s, Candrakīrti received more attention after the 10th C. It seems that there was a shift of the trend of the Madhyamaka thought around the 9th C. In this case, there is a possibility that these two different positions did not exist in the same period as opposed among the externalist Mādhyamikas. In other words, the externalist

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*shos la ma grub pa yin no//
Mādhyamika first postulated the Svātantrika view and altered it to the Prāṣaṅgika view later.

Below in this chapter, therefore, I will attempt to locate the Svātantrika and the Prāṣaṅgika elements in late Madhyamaka works in order to trace change of trends to the earliest possible source. For this purpose, I will first examine what is the point of controversy between Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti. Because I consider that the difference of attitude towards the use of logic appears in definitions of the two truths, as pointed out by Ejima and others,37 we will then examine the definitions of the two truths by Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti in relation to the use of inference, and then compare them with those of the later Indian Mādhyamika teachers.

### 3.2 Svātantrikas' Use of Inference

The distinction of the Svātantrika and the Prāṣaṅgika is understood to be based on their methodology that is their preference to use a particular style of reasoning, namely svatantra anumāna (autonomous inference) and prasaṅgāpatti (adducing of undesired consequence or ‘prasaṅga method’). They are used to establish non-arising (anutpatti), which is the teaching of Nāgārjuna. It is this non-arising that the Mādhyamikas consider as the ultimate. The ultimate truth is, on the other hand, beyond expression. Here arises the problem how to establish this teaching of non-arising. The Svātantrika and the Prāṣaṅgika resort to different approaches.

It is accepted by the Mādhyamikas that the ultimate truth is free from discriminative thought (prapañca) and from conceptual construct (vikalpa), as Nāgārjuna expresses in the Madhyamakakārikā, verse 18:9:

> Being not dependent on others, calm, not discriminated by discriminative thought (prapañca), free from conceptual construct (vikalpa) and without

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37 Ejima [1980a] (pp. 192-3).
objects differentiated: This is the characteristic of the reality. (v. 18:9)³⁸

The highest reality is thus beyond any verbal or conceptual activity. Therefore it is indeed impossible to explain something from the point of view of the ultimate truth. It is, on the other hand, necessary for the Mādhyamikas to explain what the ultimate truth is, to a certain extent, in order both to prove it against opponents and to realise it for themselves. The difference of the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika can be understood as a difference of methods to establish the ultimate truth, that is to say, inference and the prāsaṅga method.

We will first look at the difference of attitude towards inference between Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti, then see how Bhāviveka understands its role. Bhāviveka’s attitude towards reasoning is clearly expressed at the beginning of the Prajñāpradīpa, a commentary on the Mālamadhyamakārikā:

[3-9]

The venerable ācārya [Nāgārjuna] teaches, in verses only, inference (*anumāṇa) and refutation (*dāśaṇa) which are clear and true, and expounds the way of prajñāpāramitā, which eliminates the net of wrong views. Among fellow practitioners, however, some do not understand it.

Wishing to make them understand, therefore, I shall explain the Madhyamakaśāstra (Mālamadhyamakārikā) according to scriptural authority.³⁹


slob dpon gyi zhal snga nas kyi¹⁰ tshig le’ur byas pa dag kho nas rjes su dpag pa dang/ sun dbyung ba’i gsal ba dang/ de kho na dag bstan pa dang/ lta ba ngan pa’i dra ba zhi bar byed pa dang ldan pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’i tshul bka’ stsal mod kyi tshangs pa mtshungs par spyod pa rams las kha eig gis mi rtogs pas/ de’i phyir de dag gis rtogs par bya bar ’dod nas lung ji lta ba bzhin du dbu ma’i bstan bcos bshad par bya’ol/ (1) Em. kyi, D: kyi, Ed. P: omit.
In this statement, Bhāviveka understands that Nāgārjuna’s *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* is a work consisting of reasoning. According to Ejima’s study on this passage of the *Prajñāprādīpa*, if inference here means syllogism with a three-fold inferential mark (*traṇīpyalīṅga*) and refutation means indication of a fault in an opponent’s syllogism, it is impossible for Nāgārjuna to know the concept of these terms because it seems that a three-fold inferential mark as a condition of valid inference is introduced around the 5th C.\(^\text{40}\) However, it can be understood, as Ejima maintains, that Bhāviveka intends to interpret the teaching of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* in the form of syllogism. It is the teaching of non-arising that Nāgārjuna teaches in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, as shown in the very first verse:

\[
\text{[3-10]}
\]

No entities at all that have arisen from themselves, nor from another, nor from both, nor from a non-cause ever exist anywhere. (v. 1:1)\(^\text{41}\)

Bhāviveka therefore considers that the Nāgārjuna’s teaching of non-arising should be established by means of syllogistic inference. This attitude of Bhāviveka is also found in the criticism of Buddhapālita, who does not employ syllogistic inference. Buddhapālita’s comment on ‘non-arising from oneself’ in verse 1:1 of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* is as follows:

\[
\text{[3-11]}
\]

Of these, firstly, entities do not arise from themselves, because their arising would become pointless and because their arising would become an infinite regress.

To explain, entities existing in themselves also would have no purpose to arise again. Because if something arose although it exists, it would

\(^{40}\) Ejima [1982] (pp. 154-155)

\(^{41}\) *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, v. 1:1 (La Vallée Poussin [1903-13] p. 12, 13-14):
\[
\text{na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyaṁ nāpy āhetutāṁ ā}
\text{utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvačaṁ kecana kecana II 1:1 II}
\]
never stop arising, that [arising from themselves] is again not accepted. Therefore, firstly, entities do not arise from themselves.\textsuperscript{42}

Here Buddhapālita points out two logical faults in the theory of arising from themselves. First, there is no point for entities to arise again if they are already existent. Second, if they arose, this arising would be the nature of these entities and therefore they would keep arising. This negation of arising from themselves given by Buddhapālita is obviously in the \textit{prasaṅga} method, which points out faults in the opponents’ reasoning without giving Buddhapālita’s own proposition. It is, therefore, criticised as faulty by Bhāviveka in the \textit{Prajñāpradīpa}, as follows:

\begin{quote}
[3-12]

This is not appropriate because neither an inferential reason nor an example is mentioned and because the fault mentioned by the opponent is not avoided. And because there is manifestation of ‘what is to be proved’ (sādhya) and its property (dharma) which have an inverted meaning by inversion of the meaning in question due to a statement with possibility of [an objection], there would be a contradiction to [your] doctrine that entities arise from another, because arising is purposeful and because arising stops.\textsuperscript{43}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{42} \textit{Buddhapālitaśāntamālakhyakavyātti} (Welleser [1913] p. 11, 5-11, Derge ed. No. 3842 tsa 161b3-5, Peking ed. No. 5242 tsa 182a6-8):
\begin{verbatim}
de la re zhi gos po rams bdag gi bdag nyid las skye ba med de/ de dag gi skye ba don med pa nyid du 'gyur ba'i phyir dang/ skye ba thug pa med par 'gyur ba'i phyir rol/ 'di lar dngos po bdag gi bdag nyid du yod pa rams la yang skye ba dgos pa med do/ gal te yod kyang skye na nam yang mi skye bar mi 'gyur bus de yang mi 'dod de/ de'i phyir re zhi gos po rams bdag las skye ba med do/
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Prajñāpradīpa} (Welleser [1914] p. 11, 18-p. 12, 4, Derge ed. No. 3853 tsha 49a6-b1, Peking ed. No. 5253 tsha 58b8-59a2):
\begin{verbatim}
de ni rigs pa ma yin te/ gtan tshigs dang dpe ma brjod pa'i phyir dang/ gzhan gyis smras pa'i nyes pa ma bsla ba'i phyir rol/ glags yod pa'i tshig yin pa'i phyir te/ skabs kyi don las bzlog pas sgrub par bya ba dang/ de'i chos bzlog pa'i don nging pas dngos po rams gzhon las skye bar 'gyur ba dang/ skye ba 'bras bu dang beas pa nyid du 'gyur ba dang/ skye ba thug pa yod par 'gyur ba'i phyir mdzad pa'i mtha dang 'gal bar 'gyur rol/
\end{verbatim}

Quoted in the \textit{Prasannapada} (La Vallée Poussin [1903-13] p. 14, 4-p. 15, 2)
Here, Bhāviveka points out three faults in Buddhapālita's reasoning of non-arising from oneself: (1) there are neither an inferential reason nor an example, (2) he does not reply to the opponent's objection and (3) his negation establishes the opposite of non-arising from oneself, i.e. arising from another. I do not examine (2) here because it does not concern the way of reasoning. With regard to (1) Bhāviveka clearly expresses that it is necessary to show an inferential reason and an example to establish non-arising. This means that Bhāviveka regards syllogistic inference as the essential means to establish non-arising. In (3) he points out that the *prāsaṅga* method that adduces undesired consequences in opponent's inference leaves a possibility of an opposite conclusion, which is, in this case, arising from another and so on. This matter has much to do with two kinds of negation, *paryudāsa* and *prasaṅgapratisedha*. Before we look into them, we examine Candrakīrti's objection to this view of Bhāviveka.

Concerning this argument, Candrakīrti in the *Prasannapadā* makes an objection to Bhāviveka's criticism against Buddhapālita. He argues that it is not necessary to show an inferential reason and an example, as follows:

\[3-13\]

Of these, first, it is not appropriate that it is said [by Bhāviveka], “because neither an inferential reason nor an example is mentioned.” Why? Because the opponent who accepts arising from oneself is asked about the purpose of arising again.\[45\]

Candrakīrti explains that Buddhapālita uses the *prāsaṅga* method, which adduces the opponent's fault and it is, therefore, not necessary to show an inferential reason and an example.

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\[44\] It may not be appropriate in a strict sense to consider that this second fault pointed out by Bhāviveka does not concern the way of reasoning. Buddhapālita here uses the *prāsaṅga* method whose function is negation of an opponent's proposition and not rebuttal of an objection to the Mādhyamika. It is necessary only for those who have their own position to rebut criticism from opponents in order to protect that position. Therefore, the Prāsaṅgika does not necessarily have to reply to an opponent's objection.

\[45\] *Prasannapadā* (La Vallée Poussin [1903-13] p. 15, 3-5):

\[
\text{tatra yat tāvataḥ uktaḥ hetuśrūṣṭānabhidhānād iti tad ayuktam ī kārāgam ī yasmat paraḥ svata utpattim abhivyapagacchān vidyāmānasya punarupāde prayojanaṃ pratyagaye ān}
\]

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an example in rejecting the opponent’s view. This implies that Candrakīrti considers that syllogistic inference is dispensable in showing non-arising. He further explains why he does not adopt syllogistic inference:

[3-14]

[Objection]: Why is it the case that the opponent does not yield [even] if [he is] criticised to this extent, wherefore there should be an advantage of employing an inferential reason and an example?

[Answer]: However, the opponent does not yield even by criticism of contradiction in the view he accepts. In that case, he, likewise, will never yield even with an inferential reason and an example, because of his shamelessness. And we do not argue with an intoxicated person.

In any way, the ācārya [Bhāviveka], resorting to inference although it is not a suitable occasion, exposes only his own attachment to inference.46

Bhāviveka may make an objection that an inferential reason and an example are necessary because the opponent will not yield even when the faults that Buddhapālita mentions above are pointed out. Candrakīrti replies to this that if it is impossible to convince the opponent by means of the prasāṅga method, it is likewise impossible by means of syllogistic inference. This shows Candrakīrti’s belief that the prasāṅga method is not a less effective way to refute an opponent than inference. He further explains another fault of inference with quotations:

[3-15]

It is not appropriate for a Mādhyamika to use inference autonomously

46 Prasannapādā (La Vallée Poussin [1903-13] p. 15, 8-p. 16, 2):

(svatantram) by himself (svatas), because there cannot be acceptance of other theses. And it is said by Āryadeva [in the Catuḥśataka]:

It is impossible, even after a long time, to refute one who has no position postulating that [things are] existent, non-existent or both. (Catuḥśataka v. 16:25)\(^{47}\)

Following this quotation, he quotes Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartani to explain why the Mādhyamikas should not rely on inference:

[3-16]

It is said in the Vigrahavyāvartani:

If I had some proposition (pratijñā),\(^{48}\) then necessarily (eva) I would have a fault. And I do not have any proposition. Therefore I never have a fault. (Vigrahavyāvartani, v. 29)\(^{49}\)

It is thus clear that Candrakīrti criticises the autonomous use of inference, on the ground that it has a proposition, which is always associated with a fault. This is to say that Candrakīrti does not consider non-arising as his proposition but as mere denial of

\(^{47}\) Prasannapadā (La Vallée Poussin [1903-13] p. 16, 2-5):

na ca mādhyamikasya svataḥ svatantram anumāṇam kartum yuktam pākṣāntarābhivyupa-gamāḥbhāvāt tathā coktām āryadevena

sad asat sadāc ceṭī yasya pakṣo na vidyate I

upālabhaś cireṇāpi tasya vaktum na śakyaite II (Catuḥśataka v. 16:25)


\(^{48}\) With regard to what this ‘proposition’ means, see Ruegg [1983] and Matsumoto [1997] (pp. 371-385).

\(^{49}\) Prasannapadā (La Vallée Poussin [1903-13] p. 16, 6-8):

vighrahavyāvartanyāṁ coktām I

yadi kācana pratijñā syān me tata eva\(^{10}\) me bhaved dōṣāh I

nāsti ca mama pratijñā tasmān naivāsti me dōṣāh II (Vigrahavyāvartani, v. 29)

(1) La Vallée Poussin’s edition has eva but de Jong [1978] (p. 29) and Yotsuya [1999] (p. 59) chose esa seemingly according to the Vigrahavyāvartani (Johnston and Kunst [1951] p.127). While esa seems to be more appropriate according to the Vigrahavyāvartani, it is also difficult for me to give up eva because it more clearly indicates the inevitable relationship between a proposition and a fault.
the opponent’s positions that are arising from oneself, from another and so on. If he were
to establish the proposition ‘non-arising’ by denying arising from itself, there would be a
fault that he establishes arising from another. As long as one does not have a proposition
by only denying the opponent’s position, he will not reach any other conclusion, which
is reverse of his proposition, such as arising from another.

This argument of Candrakīrti is related to the third fault of Buddhapālita’s reasoning
of non-arising given by Bhāviveka. There Bhāviveka points out that the prasaṅga method
that adduces undesired consequences in an opponent’s inference leaves the possibility
of an opposite conclusion, which is, in this case, arising from another and so on. Here
Candrakīrti conversely states that it is not appropriate for the Mādhyamika to use an
inference autonomously because there cannot be acceptance of other theses. This suggests
that Candrakīrti considers that employment of inference leads to acceptance of the opposite
conclusion, i.e. arising from another. In short, Candrakīrti here points out the same fault
that Bhāviveka points out in Buddhapālita’s reasoning. This argument is caused in relation
to the two kinds of negation. Bhāviveka explains, as follows:

[3-17]

This negation ‘not from themselves’ (na svatas: Miilamadhyamakakārikā,
1:1) should be understood in the sense of prasajyapratisedha, because it
has negation as principal and because it is intended [by Nāgārjuna] that
cognition free from conceptualisation that has all knowable as an object
is established by negating all nets of conceptualisation.

If paryudāsa is adopted, it deviates from our doctrine because it teaches
non-arising by affirming that “phenomena are non-arising” because it has
affirmation as principal. It is because it is said in the scripture that if [one]
practises non-arising of material things (gzugs, rūpa), it is not the practice
of the perfection of wisdom (shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa, prajñā-
pāramitā)\(^{50}\)

No. 5253 tsha 58a3-7):
Here [in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, verse 1:1] a restriction [with eva] should be placed as “Entities never (*naiva) arise from themselves” (dngos po rnams bdag las skye ba med pa kha na’o, *naiva svata evotpānā bhāvāḥ).

If restriction is placed in a different way, [the sentence should be] “[Entities] do not arise only from themselves” (bdag kho na las skye ba med, *na svata evotpānā). On the contrary, it is ascertained, “[Entities] arose from another.” Similarly, [if restriction is placed in a different way, the sentence should be] “[Entities] do not arise only from themselves” (bdag kho na las skye ba med, *na svata evotpānā). On the contrary, it is ascertained, “[Entities] arise from themselves and another.” This is not maintained because it deviates from our doctrine.

In the first passage, Bhāviveka distinguishes two kinds of negation, namely prasaṇyapratisedha and paryudāsa (pratisedha). The former is considered to have negation as principal and the latter affirmation as principal. Further explanation is shown in the second passage. Bhāviveka explains that if a negative na is used to negate only the predicate (uptpānā in this case) and restrictive eva emphasises na, it will not establish...

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\[3-18\]


51 Cf. Prasannapada (La Vallée Poussin [1903-13] p. 13, 4): nanu ca naiva svata uttpānā ity avadhārayamāne

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the opposite. However, if a restrictive eva is used to limit negation only to ‘from themselves’ (svatats) and exclude anything else from negation, it can become affirmation of ‘from another’ and so on. The two kinds of negation is also explained in the Tarkajvālā in a slightly different way:

[3-19]

If one asks what is the difference between these two [kinds of negation, namely] prasajyapratisedha (med par dgag pa) and paryudāsapratīsedha (ma yin par dgag pa), [it is answered as follows]:

Paryudāsapratīsedha is, by negating the nature of a thing, to affirm the nature of another thing which is similar to that [thing] but different from that [thing]. To explain, it is just like by the negation “This is not a Brahman,” it establishes that [he] is a Śūdra poor in penance, learning and so on, who is not a Brahman, similar to him but different from him.

Prasajyapratisedha is merely to negate only the nature of a thing. It does not, however, establish the nature of a thing similar to it but different from it. To explain, it is just like [negation] “A Brahman should not drink wine” merely negates only that. It does not, however, mean that [he] should or should not have drink different from it.53

Thus prasajyapratisedha is negation in nature and does not establish a different conclusion. On the other hand, paryudāsa, although it is negation, establishes a different (usually the opposite) conclusion because it is affirmation in nature. If the negation “Entities do not arise from themselves” is paryudāsa, it affirms arising from another. As

53 Tarkajvālā (Derge ed. No. 3856 dza 59b4-6, Peking ed. No. 5256 dza 63a6-b1):

med par dgag pa dang ma yin par dgag pa zhes bya ba de gnyis5 kyi bye brag ji lta bu zhe na/ ma yin par dgag pa ni dmongs po'i ngo bo nyid dgag pas de dang 'dra ba de las gzhan pa'i dmongs po'i ngo bo nyid sgrub par byed pa ste/ dper na 'di bram ze ma yin no zhes dgag pas bram ze de 'dra ba de las gzhan pa bram ze ma yin pa dka' thub dang thos pa la sogs pas dman pa' i dmangs53 rig s, yin par bsgrubs pa lta bu'ol/ med par dgag pa ni dmongs po'i ngo bo nyid tsam zhig 'gog par zad kyi de dang 'dra ba de ma yin pa gzhan gyi dmongs po sgrub par mi byed pa ste/ dper na bram zes chang btung bar mi bya'o zhes bya ba de tsam zhig 'gog par zad kyi de las gzhan pa'i btung ba btung ngo zhe 'am mi btung ngo zhes mi brjod pa lta bu'ol/

(1) D: gnyis, P: grangs (2) D: dmangs, P: omit

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it is expressed in verse 18:9 of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, the ultimate truth is free from conceptual construct (vikalpa) or discriminative thought (prapañca). By negating wrong ideas, it is possible to eliminate conceptual construct. However, if negation is paryudāsa, because affirmation that has a conceptually constructed content is involved in it, it is not possible to eliminate conceptual construct. It is, therefore, important for the Mādhyamikas to understand negation as prasajyapratisēdha. Now it is clear that when Bhāviveka criticises Buddhapālita, he points out that Buddhapālita’s negation is not prasajyapratisēdha but paryudāsa. On the other hand, when Candrakīrti supports Buddhapālita and replies to Bhāviveka’s objection, he says, “It is not appropriate for a Mādhyamika to use inference autonomously by himself, because there cannot be acceptance of other theses.” This shows that Candrakīrti considers that inference can be only paryudāsa, that affirms a contradictory conclusion or other theses, but not prasajyapratisēdha. It is understood that Candrakīrti regarded Buddhapālita’s negation as prasajyapratisēdha, from the following passage in the Prasannapadā:

[3-20]


[Answer] It is not reached because arising from another is also negated because prasajyapratisēdha is intended.

This shows that Candrakīrti agrees with Bhāviveka that negation of arising from oneself expressed in verse 1:1 of the Mūlamadhyamakārikā must be prasajyapratisēdha. Bhāviveka insists that Buddhapālita’s reasoning is faulty because it is not syllogistic inference but the prasāṅga method and because it is not prasajyapratisēdha but paryudāsa.

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54 See [3-8] (p. 128).
55 [3-15] (p. 133)
56 Prasannapadā (La Vallée Poussin [1903-13] p. 13, 4-6):

nanu ca naiva svāta utpāna iti avadhiyamāṇe parata utpāna ity anīṣṭam prāptoti 1 na prāpto 1 prasajyapratisēdhasya vivakṣitavat parato ’py utpadaśya pratiśetyamāṇatvāt 1
Here it is not clear if Bhāviveka considered that the prasāṅga method could not express prasajyapratisedha. On the other hand Candrakīrti seems to maintain that autonomously employed inference is always paryudda. This is probably because Candrakīrti considered that establishing something by inference always involves affirmation of a proposition. For Candrakīrti, autonomously employed inference establishes, i.e. ‘affirms’ the proposition <na svata utpannā> and cannot be prasajyapratisedha, which must be negation in nature. The prasāṅga method, on the other hand, negates the opponent’s proposition <svata utpannā> and is prasajyapratisedha. This is what is meant by saying that the Mādhyamika should not have any proposition.

The opposition between Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti arose concerning verse 1:1 in the Mālamadhyamakakārikā. Here Bhāviveka insists that non-arising from oneself and so on should be understood as inference consisting of a proposition, an inferential reason and an example and as prasajyapratisedha which does not incur any affirmation of the opposite conclusion. On the other hand, Candrakīrti also considers that negation of arising must be prasajyapratisedha, but maintains that the Mādhyamika should not have any proposition because establishing, i.e. affirming, a proposition does not help to eliminate conceptualisation. This is supported by the words of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva. Nevertheless it is not the case that Candrakīrti completely abandons syllogistic inference. A hypothetical opponent (a Svētantrika) insists that even though a proposition cannot be established in common for both sides in a debate, it is still necessary to show inference with the thesis, the inferential reason and the example:

[3-21]

[Objection]: Because the Mādhyamikas do not autonomously set forth inference (svatantrānumānānabhidhāyitvā) due to no establishment of a thesis, an inferential reason and an example, there may not be proving, by [the Mādhyamikas] themselves, of the matter in the proposition that is negation of arising or refutation of an opponent’s

57 [3-15] and [3-16] (pp. 133-134)
proposition by inference established for both sides. However, when [the Mādhyamikas] impel an opponent’s proposition to contradict inference by none but [the Mādhyamikas] themselves (svata eva), there must be [proving of the matter in the proposition and refutation of the opponent’s proposition] by means of a thesis and others, [i.e. an inferential reason and an example,] [presented] by none but [the Mādhyamikas] themselves (svata eva) that are free from faults of a thesis, an inferential reason and an example. Therefore, because they, [i.e. a thesis, an inferential reason and an example,] are not set forth and because the fault [mentioned by the opponent] is not avoided, that very fault [mentioned earlier remains].

[3-22]

[Answer]: It is not like that. What is the reason? Because the one who

58 Prasannapadda (La Vallée Poussin [1903-13] p. 18, 5-9):

mādhyamikānaṁ paṃśhahetudṛṣṭāntānaṁ asiddheḥ svatantrānumānaḥabhidhāyitvāḥ svata utpaṭṭipratipratiṣṭhātānāṁ svattā eva (1) bhavāsiddānaṁ paraṣṭānāṁ pariśramaṇoḥ (2) svatā eva paṃśhahetudṛṣṭāntānapaṃśhālaṅkaṁ (3) pakṣādmibhir bhavātavyām | tātāṁ ca tadanabhidhānāṁ taddoṣāpanipāhanāṁ ca sa eva dva ṣa iti l


MacDonald [2000] (p. 174) states:

The grammatical subject of bhavātavyāṁ, if not taken to be codanayā, can only be pāṃśhādibhiḥ, and construed with pāṃśhādibhiḥ it yields the sense “there must be a thesis, etc.”; the preceding paṃśhahetudṛṣṭāntālapaṃśhālaṅkaṁ (as found in LVP) modifies paṃśhādibhiḥ, and cannot be taken together with bhavātavyām as forming the predicate to a logical subject assumed to be pāṃśhād. However the subject of bhavātavyām can be “sādhanaṁ and “nirākaraṇaṁ” from the previous sentence, which seems to me to be the most appropriate. It seems svaṭantra is used in the sense of ‘to establish one’s own view’, in contrast to virodha-codanā. Therefore here (Candrakīrti’s) Bhāviveka maintains that the Mādhyamika should not utilise inference to establish his own view (svatantra) but can use it to show contradiction of opponent’s proposition.

With regard to the term svaṭantrinumāna, we find svaṭantram anumāna three times (La Vallée Poussin [1903-13] p. 16,2, p. 34,4, p. 34,4) and svaṭantrānumānaḥabhidhāyitvāḥ twice (p. 16,11, p. 18,5) in the Prasannapaddā. I inclined to translate svaṭantram in adverval sense, i.e. as ‘automonously’ but not ‘autonomous’. At least, we cannot find a compound ‘svaṭantrinumāna’ itself as a karmadharaya compound. Therefore I provisionally adopt, in some cases, a translation ‘automonous inference’ for svaṭantra anumāna in this thesis, meaning (any) inference which is autonomous’, rather than for svaṭantrānumāna as a karmadharaya compound which implies a special kind of inference.

Concerning the fault mentioned before, see [3-12] (p. 131).
proposes a matter (artha) should show the opponent the argument by which the matter is known “according to his intention to produce certainty to others, just like the ascertainment to himself.” Therefore, first, it is the general rule that the proof of the matter maintained and proposed by [a proponent] himself should be accepted by none but the opponent.

Candrakīrti thus refuses a compromise made by the Svātantrika who even discards ‘autonomous’ use of inference. Nevertheless, he later accepts the Svātantrika’s claim that the Mādhyamika also should employ inference with the thesis, an inferential reason and an example although these inference, inferential reason and example are not established for the Mādhyamika. This seems to be the point up to which he can make a concession, and as far as the argument in the Prasannapadā is concerned, a compromise is made between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika. Candrakīrti gives an example of such inference that has a subject which is only recognised by the opponent in the Prasannapadā:

[3-23]

For one who maintains that they arise from themselves, things other than Spirit (puruṣa) — only after this [restriction, should the rest of syllogism follow] — do not arise from themselves.

Because they themselves already exist.

Like Spirit (puruṣa).

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60 Prasannapadā (La Vallée Poussin [1903-13] p. 19, 1-3):

61 Prasannapadā (La Vallée Poussin [1903-13] p. 22, 3-4):
This is a good contrast to a similar inference given by Bhāviveka in the Prajñāpradīpa:

[3-24]

Ultimately (don dam par, paramārthatas), internal sense fields (skyem ched, āyatana) do not arise from themselves.

Because they exist.

Like the Universal Soul (caitanya). 62

Even though Candrakīrti succeeds in exhibiting syllogistic inference, there is a condition in the proposition “for one who maintains that they arise from themselves.” 63 Since this condition shows that the proposition given here is not his own proposition, even though Candrakīrti employs a syllogism it does not necessarily deviate from the Mādhyamikas’s principle of no proposition. This kind of inference is employed in order to refute an opponent but not to eliminate conceptual construct by the Mādhyamika himself. It can be regarded as an activity on the conventional level because Candrakīrti accepts valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa), such as direct perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāṇa) only conventionally. 64

On the other hand, Bhāviveka, too, imposes a condition ‘ultimately’ (paramārthatas) in his syllogistic inference. Here a question arises. What is the use of inference for Bhāviveka if the ultimate truth is not accessible to any conceptual activity including inference, and if establishment of a proposition consists of conceptual constructs? To


don dam par nang gi skyе mched mams bdag las skyе ba med par nges te/ yod pa'i phyir dper na shes pa yod pa nyid bzhin no//


na paramārthata adhyātmikā āyatānamī svatā utpānāmi l vidyāmānaatvāt l caitanyavad iti l

63 In order to prove a proposition through syllogistic inference, it is considered in Buddhist logic systematised by Dignāga and others that the proposition must be accepted by both proponents in a debate. See Yotsuya [1999] (pp. 73-74). Therefore, Candrakīrti’s syllogistic inference does not satisfy the condition for valid inference in a strict sense.

64 Prasannapada (La Vallée Poussin [1903-13] p. 73, 9-p. 75, 13)
answer this question, it is necessary to clarify the relation between the ultimate truth and inference for Bhāviveka. First, let us examine Bhāviveka’s interpretation of the ultimate (paramārtha). In the Prajñāpradīpa on verse 24:8 of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā,65 he interprets the ultimate truth as follows:

[3-25]

With regard to paramārtha, it is paramārtha because it is the object (artha) and is also ultimate (parama) (karmadhāraya compound). Or, it is paramārtha because it is the object (artha) of the ultimate (parama) cognition which is non-conceptual (tatpuruṣa compound). It is the reality (de kho na, *tattva) whose definition is “being not dependent on others” (aparapratyayaṇ, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 18:9)66 and so on. Due to being the truth (satya) which is nothing but paramārtha, it is the ultimate truth (paramārthasatya), since it stays in that way for all times in all aspects.

A non-conceptual cognition whose object is that [ultimate] is also paramārtha due to its way of not having objects, because it takes paramārtha [as the object]. The explanation of non-arising and so forth, which accords with elimination of that [object], and the wisdom arisen from hearing, thinking and meditation are also paramārtha, because they are unmistaken due to being the means of understanding paramārtha (bahuvrīhi compound).67


dve satye samapaśritya buddhānām dharmadeśanā|
lokasaṃśvitisatyāṃ ca satyaṃ ca paramārthataḥ || 24:8 ||

66 [3-8] (p. 128)

67 Prajñāpradīpa (Derge ed. No. 3853 tsha 228a3-6, Peking ed. No. 5253 tsha 286a7-b3):

don dam par ni de don kyang yin la/ dam pa yang yin pas don dam pa’an/ mam par mi rtog pa’i ye shes dam pa’i don yin pas/ don dam pa stel/ de kho na gzhon las shes pa ma yin pa la sogs pa’i mtshan nyid dol/ don dam pa nyid bden pa yin pas/ don dam pa’i bden pa stel de dus thams cad dang mam pa thams cad du de bzhin du gnas pa’i phyir rol/ mam par mi rtog pa’i ye shes de’i yul can yang yul med pa’i tshul gyis don dam pa stel de la don dam pa yod pa’i phyir rol/ de ’gog pa dang rjes su mthun[1] pa skye ba med pa la sogs pa bstan pa dang/ thos pa dang bsams[5] pa dang/ bsgoms[5] pa las byung ba’i shes rab kyang don dam pa[0] stel/ don dam pa rtags pa’tuhs kyi phyir phyin ci ma log pa’i phyir rol/


143
According to these passages, Bhāviveka interprets the compound *paramārtha* in different ways: as *karmadhāraya*, *tatpuruṣa* and *bahuvrihi* compounds. Of these, in the first interpretation, he takes *paramārtha* as the ultimate object. The second, as a *tatpuruṣa* compound, means the object of the ultimate cognition without conceptual construct (*nirvikalpa-jñāna*). Thus the first two interpretations are the ultimate object and the object of the ultimate cognition, which are explained as the reality defined in verse 18:9 of *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. Therefore they are considered non-conceptual and cannot be expressed with words. He, then, explains *paramārtha* as a *bahuvrihi* compound in three ways: (1) non-conceptual cognition whose object is that *paramārtha*, (2) explanation of non-arising and so forth and (3) wisdom produced from hearing, thinking and meditation. Of these only the first one is considered non-conceptual. Not only the ultimate object but also the cognition of it is called *paramārtha*. The second is regarded as the teaching of the Madhyamaka as Nāgārjuna postulates in the very first verse of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, which is quoted earlier in this chapter. According to Avalokitavrata, this conceptual *paramārtha* interpreted as a *bahuvrihi* compound is called concordant ultimate truth (*brdar brags pa'i don dam pa'i bden pa, *sāṅketikaparamārthasatya*). This interpretation as a *bahuvrihi* compound may require some more explanation. In the *Tarkajvālā*, Bhāviveka explains the meaning of *paramārtha*, as follows:

[3-26]

As for [the term] *paramārtha*, because *artha* is what is to be known, *artha* means what is to be examined and to be grasped. *Parama* is the term denoting ‘absolute’. The compound *paramārtha* is:

1. The ultimate object because it is the object (*artha*) and is ultimate (*parama*). (*karmadhāraya* compound) Alternatively, (2)
the object (*artha*) of the ultimate (*parama*). It is the object of the ultimate because it is the object of the ultimate cognition which is non-conceptual. (*tatpurusa* compound) Alternatively, (3) what is conformable to *paramārtha*. It is conformable to *paramārtha* because the wisdom which accords with understanding of *paramārtha* takes *paramārtha*. (*bahuvṛihi* compound) ‘Ultimately’ (*paramārthatas*) is ultimately also at the level of that very ultimate [as a *bahuvṛihi* compound].

In this way Bhāviveka first explains the meaning of *artha* and *parama*. Then he interprets the compound *paramārtha* in a similar way to the interpretations in the *Prajñāpradīpa*. These first two are explained as the ultimate object and the object of the ultimate cognition. These two are non-conceptual and are a designation of emptiness. However, the third interpretation does not indicate it, but ‘that which is conformable to *paramārtha*’ or ‘that which takes *paramārtha*’. This explanation is slightly different from that in the *Prajñāpradīpa*. There, non-conceptual cognition that takes *paramārtha* as its object is also called *paramārtha*. Here, however, the wisdom which is concordant with the understanding of *paramārtha* that takes *paramārtha* is called *paramārtha*. The former is non-conceptual and the latter conceptual even though their expression is similar. Therefore, in the *Tarkajvālā*, the interpretation of *paramārtha* as cognition without conceptual construct (*nirvikalpaḥṇa*) is missing.

The restriction ‘ultimately’ in Bhāviveka’s proposition is used in the sense of
paramārtha conformable to paramārtha, i.e. the concordant ultimate. According to the Prajñāpradīpa, the teaching of non-arising is considered to be this concordant ultimate. The teaching of non-arising is nothing but verse 1:1 of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, which Bhāviveka considers inference (anumāna) and refutation (dīṣaṇa). Because the concordant ultimate is not non-conceptual but designated ‘ultimate’ in the sense of being ‘conformable to the ultimate’, inference concerning the ultimate can operate at this level.

In this way, Bhāviveka classifies the teaching of non-arising into the concordant ultimate, which is not the ultimate truth in a strict sense. As we have seen, Bhāviveka expresses that Nāgārjuna’s work consists of inference and refutation in the beginning of his commentary on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, and insists that Nāgārjuna’s teaching, non-arising, should be established through syllogistic inference. This explains the difference of attitudes towards inference between the Śvātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika. The Śvātantrika postulates the concordant ultimate in which the teaching of non-arising is included so that inference with regard to the ultimate can become valid. Thus the Śvātantrika considers that establishment of non-arising through syllogistic inference which is also regarded as ultimate conforms to the ultimate truth where there is no conceptual activity. Therefore, this concordant ultimate is understood as an important characteristic of the two truths theory maintained by the Śvātantrika.

Candrakīrti, on the other hand, interprets paramārtha only as the ultimate object (karmadhāraya compound) as is seen in the Prasannapadā:

[3-27]

That which is an object (artha) and is ultimate (parama) is paramārtha.73

Although it is not interpretation of the word paramārtha, in the Madhyamakāvatāra, he interprets the ultimate reality as ‘the object of correct perception’ in a similar way to

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72 [3-9] (p. 129) and [3-10] (p. 130).
73 Prasannapadā (La Vallée Poussin [1903-13] p. 494, 1):
   paraṇaś cāsāv arthaś ceti paramārthaḥ
the *tatpurusa* interpretation of *paramārtha*:

[3-28]

All entities bear a twofold nature whose being is perceived by correct and wrong perception [respectively]. It is said that the object of correct perception is real (*tattva*) and that of wrong perception is the conventional truth. (v. 6:23)\(^\text{74}\)

Thus Candrakīrti accepts the interpretation of *paramārtha* as the ultimate object, i.e. as a *karmadhāraya* compound and he may also take it as the object of ultimate cognition, i.e. as a *tatpurusa* compound. He, however, does not adopt the interpretation as a *bahuvrīha* compound. It is probably worth noting that he, as Bhāviveka does, distinguishes different levels of *paramārtha* in the *Madhyamakāvātarābhāṣya* on verse 6:28:

[3-29]

Of these [conventional truth and mere convention], what is *paramārtha* for ordinary people is just the mere convention (*kun rdzob tsam, *saṃvṛtimātra*) for nobles whose objects are associated with appearance. However, what is emptiness of intrinsic nature of that [mere convention] is *paramārtha* for nobles.

*Paramārtha* for Buddhas is just intrinsic nature. Because it does not falsify, it is ultimate truth (*don dam pa'i bden pa, *parainārthasatya*) but it must be known individually by them.

Because the conventional truth falsifies, it is not the ultimate truth.\(^\text{75}\)

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\(^\text{74}\) *Madhyamakāvātara*, v. 6:23 (as cited in the *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*, La Vallée Poussin [1901-14] p. 361, 4-7):

\[
\text{samyagmṛṣādā śaśāna labdhadhanvāṇaṁ rūpadvayaṁ bhīhṛata sarvabhāvāḥ} \\
\text{samyagdṛśāṁ yo viśayāḥ sa tattvāṁ niṣādīṛśāṁ saṃvṛtisatyaṁ uktam} \ll 6:23 \ll
\]


\(^\text{75}\) *Madhyamakāvātarābhāṣya* (La Vallée Poussin [1907-12] p. 108, 13-20):

\[
de la so so'i skye bo mams kyi don dam pa gang yin pa de nyid 'phags pa snang ba dang bcas pa'i spyod yul can mams kyi kun rdzob tsam yin la/ de'i rang bzhin stong pa nyid gang yin pa
\]
In this passage, Candrakīrti first distinguishes mere convention (saṃvṛtimātra) and the conventional truth (saṃvṛitisatya). What is real for ordinary people is paramārtha for them but the mere convention for āryas. Here paramārtha is used in the sense of an ultimate object (as a karmadhāraya compound). Emptiness of intrinsic nature of conventional existence is paramārtha for āryas. This seems to be an explanation of the conventional truth. Again paramārtha is used in the sense of an ultimate object. Paramārtha for Buddhas is just intrinsic nature. While āryas perceive the emptiness of intrinsic nature of conventional existence, Buddhas perceive just intrinsic nature, i.e. emptiness. Here paramārtha for Buddhas is meant to be non-conceptual and non-discriminative. Therefore it must be just emptiness, not emptiness of something that is discriminative. Although Candrakīrti distinguishes three different levels of paramārtha, their difference are not related to use of inference, and paramārtha is not interpreted as a bahuvrīhi compound.

Now the difference of understanding of paramārtha between Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti is very clear. Bhāviveka postulates, as an interpretation of paramārtha as a bahuvrīhi compound, the concordant ultimate which is the teaching of non-arising and others. Even though it is not paramārtha in a strict sense, he regards it as paramārtha because it is conformable to paramārtha. By postulating this concordant ultimate, Bhāviveka provides inference with the locus where it can operate for the ultimate truth. On the other hand, Candrakīrti does not interpret paramārtha as a bahuvrīhi compound. Although paramārtha for āryas seems to correspond to the concordant ultimate postulated by Bhāviveka, Candrakīrti considers that it is the conventional truth because it falsifies. Thus Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti disagree over the use of inference, and this disagreement is reflected in their understanding of paramārtha.

76 Compare this to Jñānagarbha’s understanding of inference. He, there, explains that inference does not belie. See [3-31] (p. 150).
Chapter 3 Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika

3.3 Later Svātantrikas’ Use of Inference and the Two Truths

The characteristic of the Svātantrika is found in Bhāviveka’s interpretation of paramārtha as the concordant ultimate. In this section, we examine if this is accepted by the later Svātantrikas. In addition to this, it is worth noting the influence of Dharmakīrti, who systematised Buddhist logic, on the Svātantrikas. Although Dharmakīrti’s influence is not found in Bhāviveka’s thought because he is later than Bhāviveka, it is so significant as to affect the later Svātantrikas. According to Matsumoto, the later Mādhyamikas can be defined as those who interpret Dharmakīrti’s logic and epistemology in line with the Madhyamaka view. Matsumoto maintains that there was a controversy regarding the position of Dharmakīrti between those who regarded him as a Yogācāra and those who considered that he was a Mādhyamika. The origin of disagreement in interpreting Dharmakīrti lies in the verses 3:3-4 of the Pramāṇavārttika:

[3-30]

What is capable of causal efficiency (arthakriyā) is here called ultimately real (paramārthasat) and the other is conventionally real (saṃvṛtisat). They have the characteristics of particular and universal. (3:3)

If one objects that everything is incapable, [I answer that] capability of seeds and so forth to sprouts and so forth is experienced. If one says that it is maintained at the conventional level, [I answer] it must be so. (3:4)

In these verses, thus, there is a contradiction. In the former verse, causal efficiency is said to be ultimately real. On the other hand, capability of seeds to produce sprouts is said to be conventional in the latter. In other words, Dharmakīrti says that while what has

77 This is first suggested by Matsumoto [1980c] (pp. 101-102).
78 Pramāṇavārttika, vv. 3:3-4 (Sāṅkṛtyāyana [1938] p. 54, 9-10 and 12-13):

(1) Ed: sarvam.
(2) Ed: dṛṣṭā śaktih matāḥ sa cet saṃvṛtāya yathā tathāḥ tathā 3:4

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causal efficiency is ultimate, causality is observed conventionally. According to Matsumoto,\textsuperscript{79} the Yogācāras are those who interpret Dharmakīrti’s thought in conformity with the third verse, and the Mādhyamikas are those who take the fourth verse as his real intention. It seems that the Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas such as Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalāśīla, Haribhadra and Jitāri interpret Dharmakīrti’s view in line with the latter way. Therefore although they adopt the idea of arthakriyā in the verse 3:3 of the Pramāṇavārttika, they do not regard it as ultimate but as conventional so that it should distinguish the true and the false convention. Concerning the ultimate truth, these Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas agree in classifying the teaching of non-arising into paramārtha, as Bhāviveka does. As a result they postulate two different levels of the ultimate.

3.3.1 Jñānagarbha

Jñānagarbha (ca. 8th C) is often classified by Tibetan doxographers as a Svātantrika.\textsuperscript{80} As we examined, Bhāviveka sets the concordant ultimate where inference operates. In the case of Jñānagarbha, inclusion of inference in paramārtha appears in his Satyadvayavibhaṅga and his auto-commentary Vṛtti. In these works, he explicitly states that reasoning (nyāya) is ultimate:

\begin{quote}
Truth regarding the ultimate is the ultimate truth, and the meaning is that this is the truth which is accordant with reasoning (nyāya).\textsuperscript{81} Why is this?
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{80} See Mimaki [1982a] p. 27-38.

\textsuperscript{81} Eckel [1987] (p. 110, note 7) points out that v 17 of the Satyadvayavibhaṅga is quoted in the Abhisamayālaṃkāralokā of Haribhadra, from which we know the original Sanskrit of rigs pa.


\begin{quote}
1. 'un rdzob de bzhin nyid gang yin// de nyid dam pa’i don gyis bzhad//
thaa dad min phir rigs de yang// ji lar snang ba bzhin du gnas// 17 //
\end{quote}


\begin{quote}
samyutes tathā yaiva paramārthasya sā matā l
abhedat so ’pi hi nyāyo yathādarśnam āsthitāḥ l
\end{quote}

150
Reasoning that does not falsify is ultimate (v. 4ab)$^{82}$

Ascertainment of objects by means of reasoning does not falsify. Therefore cognition produced by a three-fold inferential mark is also paramārtha, because it is ultimate (parama) and is also a means (artha). The object determined by it is also paramārtha, it is treated just as *pratyakṣa and so on [which can mean an object of direct perception (pratyakṣa)].$^{83}$

Because the negation of arising and so forth is conformable to reality (yang dag pa, *tattva), it is held to be [the ultimate]. It is clear that there is no negation in reality (yang dag tu, *tattvatas) because there is no object of negation. (v. 9)$^{84}$

Jñānagarbha's explanation is somewhat different from Bhāviveka's and difficult to understand. He explains that cognition produced from inference is paramārtha. Jñānagarbha puts more emphasis on inference than Bhāviveka because he explains the ultimate truth on the basis of reasoning, i.e. inference that does not falsify,$^{85}$ by describing the ultimate truth as 'accordant with reasoning’. It is also shown that not only is cognition produced from inference but also its object is considered to be ultimate.

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 avismānāvādako nyāyāḥ paramārtha iti

Also see [3-51] (p. 166) in 3.3.5.


\[
\begin{array}{l}
\text{don dam par bden pa ni don dam pa'i bden pa stc/ de ni rigs pa'i rjes su 'gro ba can gyi bden pa nyid ces bya ba'i tha tshig go/ gang gi phyit/} \\
\text{slu ba med pa'(1) rigs pa ni/ don dam yin te/ (4ab)} \\
\text{rigs pa'i stobs kyi don la nges pa ni slu bar mi 'gyur te/ de'i phiyir tshul gsum pa'i rtags kyi bsyed pa'i rtags pa gang yin pa de ni dam pa yang yin la/ don yang yin pas don dam pa'o/}
\end{array}
\]

des gzhan la phab pa'i don kyang don dam pa stc/ mngon sum la sog pa bzhiin du brjod do/

(1) Ed: pas, Em: pa. See the previous note.

$^{84}$ Satyadvayavidhāṅga, v. 9 (Eckel [1987] p. 161, 3-12):

\[
\begin{array}{l}
\text{skyi la sog pa bka' pa yang// yang dag pa dang mthun phiyir 'dod/}
\end{array}
\]

dgag bya yod pa ma yin pas// yang dag tu na bka' med gsal/

$^{85}$ Remember that Candrakīrti also considers that the ultimate truth does not falsify. See 3.2.
He does not mention which ultimate reasoning is. According to the sub-commentary, however, verse 4 is an explanation of the ultimate conformable to the ultimate (don dam pa dang mthun pa'i don dam pa, paramārthāṇumālikāparamārtha). It is perplexing that Jñānagarbha does not take artha in the sense of an object as Bhāviveka does. He seems to interpret it as a karmadhāraya compound in the sense of the ultimate (parama) means (artha). Bhāviveka, on the other hand, takes paramārtha primarily as a karmadhāraya compound in the sense of ‘ultimate object’, and cognition is secondary as a bahuvrihi compound in the sense of ‘that which takes the ultimate object’. For Jñānagarbha, however, the object of paramārtha is paramārtha in the secondary sense in the way not only direct perception (pratyakṣa) but an object of direct perception is also called pratyakṣa. This interpretation of paramārtha is peculiar in that Jñānagarbha does not understand the concordant ultimate as a bahuvrihi compound. In verse 9, on the other hand, he explains the negation of arising is the concordant ultimate which is conformable to reality. This corresponds to the explanation of the concordant ultimate given by Bhāviveka in the Tarkajvala and the Prajñāpradīpa. It is, therefore, certain that Jñānagarbha postulates the concordant ultimate that is non-arising and so forth even though his interpretation of paramārtha in the commentary on verse 4ab is somewhat different from that of Bhāviveka.

On the other hand, he defines the conventional truth as follows:

[3-33]

Only what is ‘consistent with seeing’ (ji ltar snang, yathādarśana) is the conventional and the other is opposite, [i.e. the ultimate truth]. (v. 3cd)


87 Here, artha is not used in the sense of an ‘object’ as is known from the similar example of direct perception. I therefore interpret it as a means, although I am not entirely sure. See Apte [1957] (p. 224). Eckel [1987] (p. 115 note 14) also discusses this interpretation of Jñānagarbha.

88 It should be noted that it is pointed out by Matsumoto [1997] (p. 346) that reality (tattva) is often used to denote the non-conceptual ultimate rather than paramārtha.

89 Regarding yathādarśana, see footnote 81 on p. 150 as well as Eckel [1987] (p. 110, note 7).

90 Satyadvayavibhanga, v. 3 cd (Eckel [1987] p. 156, 4-5):

ji ltar snang ba 'di kha' na// kun rdzob gzhan ni cig shos yin// 3cd //
Moreover, Jñānagarbha explains that the convention is twofold in verse 12 of the
Samyadvayabhaṅgā:

[3-34]

It is also taught that the convention is twofold:

Although [they are] similar in appearance, according to their
capability and incapability of causal efficiency, the distinction of
the convention as true and untrue is made. (v. 12)

Although cognitions are similar in appearance, i.e. a manifest image,
having been ascertained by whether or not it falsifies regarding causal
efficiency (arthakriyā) corresponding to seeing, water and others and a
mirage and others are [respectively] understood by the world as true and
  yang kun rdzob ni rnam pa gnyis su bstan te/
  snang du 'dra yang don byed dag// nus pa'i phyir dang mi nus phyir//
  yang dag yang dag ma yin pas// kun rdzob kyi ni dbye ba byas// 12 //
  zhes bya ba'o// shes pa gsal ba'i rnam pa snang ba can du 'dra yang/ ji liar snang ba bzhin du
don byed pa la slu ba dang mi slu ba yin par nges par byas nas chu la sogs pa dang smig rgyu
la sogs pa dag 'jig rten gyis yang dag pa dang yang dag pa ma yin par rtags so/}

Jñānagarbha first defines the convention (sainvṛti) as ‘consistent with seeing’ in
verse 3cd. This is further distinguished into the true and the untrue depending on their
capability of causal efficiency (arthakriyā). Water and a mirage are similar in appearance
but the former has causal efficiency (arthakriyā) to relieve thirst, for example, and the
latter does not. He thus adopts causal efficiency (arthakriyā) as the criteria which
distinguishes conventional phenomena into true and untrue. This should be compared
with verse 3:3 of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika, which explains that what has causal
efficiency (arthakriyā) is ultimately real (paramārthasat) and what does not is

\footnote{Satyadvayabhaṅgā, v. 12 and its Vṛtti (Eckel [1987] p. 163, 20-29):}
conventionally real (*samvrtisat*). As we have seen, Dharmakīrti, on the one hand, explains in verse 3:3 of the *Pramāṇavārttika* that causal relation is ultimate but, on the other hand, accepts that it is conventional in verse 3:4. Here Jñānagarbha re-interprets verse 3:3 so that it conforms to verse 3:4, which is acceptable for the Mādhyamika. Then he states, in verse 14 of the *Satyadvayavibhanga*, that four alternative ways of arising are impossible ultimately to show that causal relationship is conventional but not ultimate:

[3-35]

There cannot be any causal relationship [ultimately], as below:

Many [entities] do not produce one entity. Many [entities] do not produce many [entities]. One [entity] does not produce many entities. One [entity] does not produce one [entity], either. (v. 14)

Thus Jñānagarbha considers that reasoning, i.e. cognition produced by a three-fold inferential mark, is the concordant ultimate and that causal relationship is conventional. This is a reflection of Jñānagarbha’s adaptation of Dharmakīrti’s logic and, at the same time, of his Mādhyamaka interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s epistemology and ontology.

3.3.2 *Bodhisattvacaryāvatāravyākhyānāpiṇīkā*

As Saito’s study shows, the anonymous author of the *Bodhisattva-
caryāvatāravyākhyañapañjikā follows the view of Jñānagarbha in terms of his understanding of the two truths. First, when he comments on the second half of verse 8:2 of the 9-chapter version of the Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra of Akṣayamati, which introduces the two truths, he explains the ultimate truth as follows:

[3-36]

The ultimate is not accessible for apprehension (blo). Apprehension and words are conventional. (v. 8:2cd)

[3-37]

Then [if one asks] how this ultimate is not accessible for apprehension, [I answer] the ultimate is consistent with reasoning, and no entity remains established if it is examined with reasoning.

[3-38]

Also because it is said in the Satyadvaya[vibhangabhāṣya]:

"Because [it is] reality (*tattva), it is neither empty, [nor non-empty]..."

and so on, if it is examined with reasoning, apprehension and words [can] never have referent because [an entity] is never established.

96 Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra, 9-chapter version, 8:2cd (Saito [2000] p. 49, 9-10):

don dam blo'i spyod yul myin// blo dang sgra ni kun rdzob yin// 8:2 cd//

97 Bodhisattvacaryāvatāryākhyañapañjikā (Saito [1993] p. 58, 22-24):

'On te don dam pa de ji lta blo'i spyod yul ma yin snyam pa la/ don dam pa ni rigs pa ji lta ba bzhin du yin la/ rigs pas dpjad na dang po gang yang ma grub stel/...

Between this passage and the next, i.e. the quotation from the Satyadvayavibhaṅgabhāṣya of Jñānagarbha, there are quotations from the Lankāvatārasūtra and from Nāgārjuna, which I omit here.


deq nyid phyir na de stong min// mi stong ma yin yod med min//
mi skye ma yin skye min zhes// de la sogs pa bcom ldan gungs//

99 Bodhisattvacaryāvatāryākhyañapañjikā (Saito [1993] p. 59, 8-12):

bden pa gnāyis las kyung/

deq nyid phyir na de stong min//
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Alternatively, because the ultimate is simply the elimination of discriminative thought that is superimposed on [entities] dependent on other [entities], apprehension and words [can] never have referent at that [ultimate].

In this commentary, the anonymous commentator distinguishes two kinds of ultimate: the ultimate ‘consistent with reasoning’ (rigs pa’i lta ba bzhin du, *yathānyāya) and the ultimate that is simply elimination of discriminative thought. As Saito points out, understanding of the ultimate as ‘consistent with reasoning’ is quite similar to ‘accordant with reasoning’ (rig pa’i rjes su ’gro ba can, *nyāyānusārin) in the Satyadvaya-vibhanga of Jñānagarbha. His debt to Jñānagarbha is ascertained also from his quotation. This ultimate accordant with reasoning is considered as interpretation of the concordant ultimate in the Satyadvaya-vibhangabhāṣya. The same is applied in this text since he gives an explanation of the non-conceptual ultimate afterwards, saying that the ultimate is simply the elimination of discriminative thought. Thus we find that the anonymous commentator interprets the ultimate in the Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra in line with the Svātantrika interpretation. This does not necessarily mean that Akṣayamati (Śāntideva?), the author of the Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra, is a Svātantrika. However, if we consider the fact that Tibetan doxographers almost unanimously classify Śāntideva as a Prāsaṅgika, this is quite an exceptional case.

In addition to this, the anonymous commentator defines the conventional truth as ‘consistent with seeing’, as follows:

zhed bya ba la sogs pa gsungs pas gang ltar yang ma grub pa’i phyar/ rigs pas dpyod na blo dang sgras ji ltar yang yul du ybar med dol/

100 Bodhisattvacaryāvatāravyākhyānapaṇīkā (Saito [1993] p. 59, 13-16):
yang na don dan pa zhes bya ba ni / gzhan gyi dhang gi mthchan nyid la/ sgro biags pa’i spros pa naam par chad pa tsam du zad pas/ de la ni blo dang sgras ji ltar yang yul du ybar med de/ dgag pa tsam ni ci yang ma yin pa’i phyar ro/

101 Saito [2000] (p. 99, note 9). In the Bodhisattvacaryāvatāravyākhyānapaṇīkā, the ultimate and conventional truths are defined respectively as ‘consistent with reasoning’ and ‘consistent with seeing’. Saito points out that this interpretation basically follows Jñānagarbha’s.

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[3-40]

It is [Aksayamati’s] thought that [apprehension and words are conventional] because the convention is consistent with seeing (ji ltar snang, yathādarsana). Because it should be understood accurately in other Madhyamaka treatises, further [discussion will] not be made here.\(^{103}\)

As was previously mentioned in this thesis,\(^{104}\) not only does he define the conventional truth as ‘consistent with seeing’, but also considers that it has the ability of causal efficiency (arthakriyā). Thus, this anonymous commentator interprets the two truths in a similar way to Jñānagarbha. According to the commentator, in addition, Aksayamati is an externalist Mādhyamika. In the Bodhisattvacaryāvatāravyūkhyāna-pañjikā, therefore, Aksayamati, the author of the Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra, is understood as a Svātantrika who maintains existence of self-awareness and of external objects conventionally. This view could properly called the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka. It may suggest that the commentator himself also maintains this Svātantrika view close to Jñānagarbha. We can tentatively assume that Jñānagarbha was considered an externalist Mādhyamika, too, even though it is not impossible that the commentator did not consider that the views of Aksayamati and Jñānagarbha agree on conventional existence.

3.3.3 Śāntarakṣita

In terms of the concordant ultimate and causal efficiency (arthakriyā), Śāntarakṣita also has a similar view to Jñānagarbha. Although Śāntarakṣita, in the Madhyamakālaṃkāra, does not mention reasoning or inference when he explains the ultimate truth, he considers the teaching of non-arising as the concordant ultimate in almost the same way as verse 9 of Jñānagarbha’s Satyadvayavibhaṅga:\(^{105}\)

\(^{103}\) Bodhisattvacaryāvatāravyūkhyānapañjikā (Saito [1993] p. 60, 5-8):

kun rdzob ni ji ltar snang bzhin yin pa’i phyir ro snyam du bsam pa’ol/ zhib tu ni dbu ma’i bstan bcos gzhan dag las kyang shes par bya ba yin pa’i phyir/ ’dir nga ma bskyed dol/

\(^{104}\) Sec [2-27] (pp. 93-95) in 2.9.

\(^{105}\) [3-32] (p. 151)
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Therefore, there is no entity which is established in reality. Tathāgatas, therefore, taught the non-arising of all phenomena. (v. 69)

Because it is conformable to the ultimate (dam pa'i don dang mthun pa, *paramārthānukīla), this [teaching of non-arising] should be called ultimate. In reality (yang dag tu, *tattvatas), the [ultimate] is free from all accumulation of discriminative thought (spros pa, *prapañca). (v. 70)

Here it is clear that Śāntarakṣita mentions two different paramārtha: ‘that which is conformable to paramārtha’ (paramārthānukīla) which is the teaching of non-arising, and paramārtha which is free from discriminative thought (prapañca). This is also in line with Bhāviveka’s two different ways of interpretation of paramārtha: paramārtha that is free from discriminative thought and paramārtha that is conformable to paramārtha, in which teaching of non-arising is included. In the Madhyamakālaṃkāra, verse 64, on the other hand, Śāntarakṣita defines the true convention:

It is understood that that which is pleasing only as long as it is not examined, which is characterised by arising and cessation and which has the nature of capability of causal efficiency (arthakriyā) is [true] convention. (v. 64)

Thus Śāntarakṣita too sets the concordant ultimate and regards what has causal efficiency (arthakriyā) as conventional. This is also relevant to the interpretation of the

---

   de phyir yang dag nyid du na// dngos po gang yang grub pa med//
   de phyir de bzhin gshegs mams kyi//chos mams thams cad ma skyes gsungs// 69 //
   dam pa'i don dang mthun 10 pa'i phyir// 'di ni dam pa'i don zhes bya//
   yang dag tu na spros pa yil// tshogs mams kun las de grol yin// 70 //
   (1) Ed: 'thun.

   ma brtags gcig pu nyams dga' zhing// skye dang 'jig pa'ichos can pa//
   don byed pa dag sus mams kyi// rang bzhin kun rdzob pa yin rtogs// 64 //
Pramāṇavārttika, verse 3:3-4, in the same way as the Satyadvayavibhaṅga, verse 12 of Jiñānagarbha. This is understood from the following verses of the Madhyamakālaṃkāra:

[3-43]

That which is pleasing as long as it is not examined is also the arising of each subsequent similar result depending on each previous cause of its own. (v. 65)

Therefore it is right also to say, “If there is no conventional cause, it is irrational.” If its material cause (nyer len pa, *upādāna) is real, explain it. (v. 66)

These verses are considered to be Śāntarakṣita’s interpretation of the Pramāṇavārttika, verse 3:3-4. Here Śāntarakṣita insists that causality is conventional but denies the view that causality does not exist even conventionally as well as the view that it does exist ultimately. Therefore, it is concluded that Śāntarakṣita accepts the concordant ultimate, that is to say, non-arising, apart from non-conceptual ultimate, and understands that arthakriyā is the criterion to distinguish the true convention from the false convention but not the ultimate from the conventional.

His debt to Dharmakīrti is found in his reasoning on emptiness. In the Madhyamakālaṃkāra, Śāntarakṣita attempts to establish lack of intrinsic nature at the ultimate level, as follows:

[3-44]

The entities postulated by others and us lack intrinsic nature in reality because they lack one intrinsic nature and many, like a reflection. (v. 1)

---

   brtags pa ma byas nyams dga’ ba’ang/ bdag rgyu snga ma snga ma la/
   bten nas phyi ma phyi ma yi // ’bras bu de ’dra ’byung ba yin// 65 //
   de phyir kun rdzob rgyu med na/ rung min zhes pa’ang legs pa yin/
   gal te ’di yi nyer len pa/ yang dag yin na de smros shig// 66 //

109 [3-30] (p. 149)


159
Later in the same text, Śāntarakṣita expounds this theory of ‘lack of one intrinsic nature and many’ by examining existence that is proclaimed by others. Then he concludes in verse 61, as follows:

[3-45]

When a thing is examined, then it does not have one [intrinsic nature].
What does not have singleness does not have plurality. (v. 61)\textsuperscript{111}

In the commentary on this verse, he quotes two and three halves of verses from the third chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika in order to reinforce his argument:

[3-46]

The nature with which entities are recognised does not exist in reality, because they do not have one nature or many. (v. 3:360)

If singleness is not possible in objects appearing in various ways, how is that one cognition that has appearance in various ways [possible]? (v. 3:208)

The further things are examined, the more they are destroyed. (v. 3:209cd)

Therefore, because of lack of characteristics, lack of intrinsic nature is proclaimed. (v. 3:215cd)

That which the wise teach is obtained clearly. (v. 3:209ab?)\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{111} Madhyamakālamkāra, v. 61 (Ichigō [1985b] p. CXXV, 1-4):
dngos po gang gang mam dpyad pa// de dang de la geig nyid med//
gang la geig nyid yod min pa// de la du ma nyid kyang med// 61 //

\textsuperscript{112} Madhyamakālamkārvṛtti (Ichigō [1985b] p. 178, 2-15):
gang gis dngos mams nges brtags nas// yang dag tu na dngos de med//
'di ltau de dag geig pu dang// du ma'i rang bzhin yod ma yin// (Pramāṇavārttika, v. 3:360)
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Thus Śāntarakṣita quotes verses from the Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakirti to show the validity of his reasoning. It is not entirely clear if he considers that Dharmakirti is indeed a Madhyamika. Anyhow, Śāntarakṣita manipulates Dharmakirti’s words so that they fit his view of the Madhyamaka.

In Śāntarakṣita’s works, we find the characteristic of the Śvātantrika in his explanation of the ultimate truth and his debt to Dharmakirti in his definition of the conventional truth as well as in his reasoning of lack of intrinsic nature. He evidently distinguishes the two levels of ultimate truth, the non-conceptual ultimate truth and the concordant ultimate truth. On the other hand, his distinction between the true convention and the false convention is made according to the ability of causal efficiency that is utilised by Dharmakirti to distinguish the ultimately real and the conventionally real. His reasoning of lack of intrinsic nature has influence from Dharmakirti in terms of denial of one nature and many.

3.3.4 Kamalāśīla

Kamalāśīla (ca. 740-797), a direct disciple of Śāntarakṣita, also interprets


bhāvā yena nirūpyante tadrūpam nāsti tattvataḥ I
yasmaḥ ekam aneṣam và rūpaṁ teṣāṁ na vidyate I 3:360 II

citrāvabhāsesv artheṣu yady ekatvam na yujyate I
saivam vastubalāyātam yad vaddanti vipaścitah II
yang yathārthāś cintyante viśiyante(1) tathā tathā II 3:209cd II
ato lakṣaṇāśūṇyatvān niḥsvabhāvāḥ prakāśitāḥ II 3:215cd II


Ejima [1980a] (pp. 223-226) reports that Śāntarakṣita quotes the Pramāṇavārttika, vv. 3:360, 209, 210cd and 216 (3:360, 208, 209cd and 215 in his numbering) in the Madhyamakālaṁkāraśāstra and examines the relation between verses 1 and 61 of the Madhyamakālaṁkāra and verse 3:360 of the Pramāṇavārttika. It is worth mentioning that Ejima points out that Kamalāśīla in the Madhyamakālaṁkāraśāstra explains that these verses of Dharmakirti are stated when he explains the view of the Yogācāra and that they concern the imagined nature but not the perfected nature. Thus Kamalāśīla considers that they do not directly relate to lack of intrinsic nature.

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paramārtha as a bahuvrihi compound in the Bhāvanākrama and the Madhyamakāloka:

[3-47]

And it is taught [in the Dharmasamgītisūtra] that non-arising is the truth because it is conformable to the ultimate truth (paramārthānukūlatvāt).

However, ultimately there is neither arising nor non-arising. It (the ultimate truth) is beyond all common usage (vyavahāra).

[3-48]

Thus this non-arising also should be called the ultimate because it is conformable to the ultimate, but not in actualities (dngos su, *vastutas).

For, actually, the ultimate is beyond all discriminative thought (spros pa, *prapañca).

Kamalāśīla thus understands that non-arising is the concordant ultimate both in the Bhāvanākrama and the Madhyamakāloka in the sense of paramārthānukūla, and distinguishes it from paramārtha in a strict sense, i.e. that free from discriminative thought (prapañca). Furthermore, he gives a detailed account in the Madhyamakālamkāra-pañjikā on verse 70 of the Madhyamakālamkāra, which is previously quoted.

[3-49]

Then one [might criticise]:

If apprehension (blo) produced by a three-fold inferential mark is meant by the word ‘ultimate’ (paramārtha), then because

113 Bhāvanākrama (Tucci [1958] p. 199, 7-9):

etac ca paramārthānukūlatvād anutpādaḥ satyam ity uktam 1 paramārthatas tu notpādo nāpy anutpādaḥ 1 tasya sarvavyavahārātītatvāt 1

114 Madhyamakāloka (Derge ed. 3887 sa 149a5, Peking ed. 5287 sa 161b4-5):

dc la tna skyae ba med pa ‘di yang don dam pa dang mthun pa’i phyir don dam pa zhes bya’i dngos su ni ma yin te/ dngos su ni don dam pa spros pa thams cad las ’das pa’i phyir rol

115 [3-41] (p. 158)

116 Ichigō [1985b] (p. 233) points out the similarity of the expression ‘cognition produced by a three-fold inferential mark’ to that in the Satyadvayavibhāgavṛtti, ad. v. 4ab (Eckel [1987] p. 156), which is previously quoted in this thesis ([3-31] p. 150).
also is conventional, how [can it simultaneously] be ultimate? Also if entities’ lack of intrinsic nature is established by means of that [apprehension], then by what should that [apprehension] be established? It is not possible to establish it from that [apprehension] itself because of contradiction of the activity on itself. Nor is it from other valid means of knowledge because of the undesired consequence of infinite regress. If [you say that lack of intrinsic nature] is established [for everything] except for that one apprehension, then selflessness of all objects is not established.

The criticism that is mentioned above is rejected in this way:

That [apprehension] can also be ultimate because it is conformable to the ultimate but a lack of intrinsic nature is also established by it alone. There is no contradiction of operation on itself because state of having no intrinsic nature is established for all phenomena universally. For apprehension is also included in this universal characteristics.

For example, when there is a proof for destruction concerning all phenomena by reasons of their existence and so on, this does not leave out [the proof] itself. In this case also, thus, the objection is not appropriate because [apprehension] is similar to this [example].

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"[Des na gang la la gal te tshul gsum pa'i rtags kyi bskyed pa'i blo don dam pa'i sgar brjod na ni de'i tshe de yang kun rdzob kyi ngo bo yin pa'i phyir ji ltar na don dam pa nyid yin/ gal te yang de'i dbang gis dngo po rams rang bzhiin med pa nyid du rnam par 'jog na de yang gang gis bzlag par bya/ de nyid kyiis bzlag tu ni rigs pa ma yin te/ rang gis bdag nyid la byed pa 'gal ba'i phyir ro/]

"tshad ma gzhul gyis kyang ma yin te/ thug pa med par thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro/ ji ste blo de geig pa ma tshogs par 'jog go zhe na/ 'o na ni yul thams cad bdag med par ma bsgrubs par 'gyur ro

"zhes rgol ba gang yin pa de yang 'di nyid kyiis lan btab pa yin te/ de yang don dam pa dang mthun pa'i phyir don dam pa nyid yin la rang bzhiin med pa yang de nyid kyiis rnam par 'jog go/ rang gis bdag nyid la byed pa 'gal ba yang med de/ spyi'i ngo bor chos thams cad rang bzhiin med pa nyid du rnam par 'jog pa'i phyir la/ blo'i rang gi ngo bo yang spyi'i mtshan nyid der 'dus pa'i phyir ro/"
Kamalaśīla, thus, explains that apprehension produced by a three-fold inferential mark is the concordant ultimate, and maintains that even though it lacks intrinsic nature, it is possible to establish lack of intrinsic nature in all phenomena. This explanation of the concordant ultimate is similar to Jñānagarbha’s. Jñānagarbha explains that both cognition produced by a three-fold inferential mark and its object are called ultimate. As understood from the Bhāvanākrama and the Madhyamakāloka, Kamalaśīla considers that non-arising is the concordant ultimate because it is conformable to the ultimate (paramārthānukūla), and distinguishes it from the ultimate free from discriminative thought (prapañca). This explicitly shows the Svātantrika attitude towards inference. Here apprehension produced by a three-fold inferential mark as well as non-arising (anutpāda) or lack of intrinsic nature (nihsvabhāva), which is understood through that apprehension, is called ultimate because they are conformable to the ultimate. Thus Kamalaśīla’s view on the ultimate truth is basically the same as that of Jñānagarbha and Śāntarakṣita in terms of his distinguishing the non-conceptual ultimate and the concordant ultimate.

Concerning the conventional truth, on the other hand, he analyses in the Madhyamakāloka the problem of arthakrīyā caused by the inconsistency of verse 3:3 and 3:4 of the Pramāṇavārttika as follows:

[3-50]

Ācāryas [such as Dharmakīrti], concerning those who cannot enter the very profound ocean by Way of the ultimate, in order to wash off the dirt of wrong views such as permanence and annihilation, for the purpose of guiding an ignorant person, taught this definition of the ultimate, “that which has causal efficiency is ultimately real” (Pramāṇavārttika, v. 3:3), according to what is widely known [in the world], in conformity with...
equipment of merit and wisdom. But it should be understood that it is not in order to teach correctly the ultimate that is the exclusive aim because that [causal efficiency] does not exist ultimately as it is explained previously. Therefore, it is said in the Pramāṇavārttika, “it must be so” (v. 3:4).\footnote{Matsumoto [1980c] (pp. 108-109), and is also discussed in Kaneko [1998] (pp. 25-26).}

Here Kamalaśīla clearly expresses his position that he does not take the statement “that which has causal efficiency is ultimately real” in the Pramāṇavārttika, verse 3:3 literally, but understands it in line with verse 3:4. What is widely known in the world (lokaprasiddha) is the definition of the convention. Therefore what causal efficiency is real for ordinary people. He seems to consider that Dharmakīrti’s view accords with the Madhyamaka view of the two truths because in verse 3:3 of the Pramāṇavārttika, Dharmakīrti’s real intention is not expressed but he teaches it in order to eliminate wrong views and to guide an ignorant person.

To sum up, with regard to the ultimate truth, Kamalaśīla distinguishes two types of paramārtha. One is the non-conceptual ultimate and the other is the concordant ultimate. Therefore he is regarded as a Svātantrika. He attempts to reconcile verse 3:3 of the Pramāṇavārttika to the Madhyamaka view, which does not accept causal efficiency ultimately.

3.3.5 Haribhadra

Previous studies\footnote{Amano [1967], Moriyama [1989] and Kaneko [1998].} show that the Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā of Haribhadra (ca. 800)
contains many passages parallel to the works of Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣīta and Kamalaśīla, and therefore his view is placed in the same line as theirs. When he mentions the concordant ultimate and causal efficiency, his understanding seems to be indebted to these predecessors. Haribhadra’s explanation of the concordant ultimate is almost identical with Kamalaśīla’s which is quoted above:120

[3-51]

[Objection]: ‘Ultimately’ (paramārthatas) is a meaningless adverb. To explain, in [the statement] “reasoning which does not falsify is ultimate”, the word ultimate (paramārtha) designates apprehension (buddhi) produced from a three-fold inferential mark.121 In this case, because this [apprehension] also is conventional, how [can it simultaneously] be ultimate? Also if entities’ lack of intrinsic nature is established by means of such [apprehension], then how can [a lack of intrinsic nature] be established for that apprehension? It is not possible to establish it from that [apprehension] itself because of the contradiction of operation on itself. Nor is it from other valid means of cognition because of the undesired consequence of infinite regress. So [a lack of intrinsic nature] is established [for everything] except for that one apprehension. Therefore, the selflessness of all objects has not been proved.

[Answer]: This is right. However, the apprehension in question can be ultimate because it is conformable to the ultimate which is free from all discriminative thought. And also a lack of intrinsic nature is [established] by it alone. There is no contradiction of operation on itself because the state of having no intrinsic nature is established for all phenomena universally. For, in this case, too, that apprehension is included in universal nature. For example, there being a proof for destruction concerning all phenomena by reasons of their existence

120 [3-49] (pp. 162-163).
121 See verse 4ab of Jñānagarbha’s Satyadvayavibhaṅga, [3-31] (p. 150) in 3.3.1.
and so on, this does not leave out [the proof] itself. Thus it should not be criticised.\(^{122}\)

In this way, Haribhadra accepts apprehension produced from a three-fold inferential mark as the ultimate in the sense of that which is conformable to the ultimate that is free from discriminative thought (prapañca). We find parallel passages in Kamalaśīla’s *Madhyamakālaṃkāra-paṇḍita*. However, the phrase, “reasoning which does not falsify is ultimate”, which is quoted from the *Satyadvaya-vibhaṅga* of Jñānagarbha is not found in the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra-paṇḍita*. Here, ‘reasoning’ is rephrased as apprehension produced from a three-fold inferential mark. Therefore what Haribhadra considers to be the concordant ultimate is not only the fact that all phenomena lack intrinsic nature, but also reasoning of it. This also corresponds to Bhāviveka’s definition of the concordant ultimate, ‘explanation of non-arising and so on’. It should also be noted that these passages are related to the validity of the term ‘ultimately’ (*paramārthata*). As we have seen, the term is also used in Bhāviveka’s inference. In this way, we can see Haribhadra’s debt, as a Svātāntrika, to Bhāviveka, Jñānagarbha and Kamalaśīla.

Concerning the convention, on the other hand, he distinguishes the true convention and the untrue convention.

[3-52]

Then, having pointed out that what are capable and incapable of proper causal efficiency are the two conventional truths by distinction of true

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\(^{122}\) *Abhisamayālaṃkāralokā* (Wogihara [1932] p. 636, 14-26):

\(\text{na} \text{nup paramārthata iti viśeṣaṇam anarthakam tathā liy avisamvādako nyāyaḥ paramārthā iti paramārthaśabdena trirūpa-pāṇgajjānitā buddhir abhūdbhūyate tāḍā tasyā api samyutā pāṇgajjā kathāṃ paramārthatavam yadi ca tadvāśād bhāvāṃ niḥsvabhāvavāṃ vyavasthāpyate tāḍā tasyāś ca buddheḥ kuto vyavasthāpyaniḥ ṇa na tata eva satyapitum yuktam svātmapi vyātihāl(1) 1 nāpi pramānāntarato 'navasthānaprasaṅgāt 1 alaś tām ekāṃ buddhisp muktavā vyavasthāpyate 1 na tarhi sarvasvāsainārātmacya pratipāditaṃ bhavatātāt 1 saśādhv etat 1 kṣiptu sakalaprapaṇicarivarjita-paramārthasyāmūkālātvād yathoktabuddheḥ paramārthatavam niḥsvabhāvavātā 'pi ca tata eva 1 na ca svātmapi vyātihālāḥ sāmīyārṇapēca sarvadharmanām niḥsvabhāvatā vyavasthāpanāt 1 tāra ca sāmāyālakṣaṇe tadbuddhi-rūpasyāntaratva-vād yathā sarvadharmesu sattvādhihetubhyāṃ vināśvātvyatayo bhavan nāṁmaneḥ viṇāśvya bhavatātāt 1 acodyam 1 (1) Ed: svātmā-nivṛtti-vidhāt. Cf. *Bodhicaryāvatārāpaṇijikā* (La Vallée Poussin [1914] p. 392, 1-2)
and untrue, depending on its own previous successive causes that are pleasing only as long as they are not examined and having remained in the true convention, one, in consistency with seeing (yathādārsanam), should undertake giving and so forth, as if he is an illusory man, and ultimately (paramārthatas) cultivate non-arising.\(^{123}\)

Haribhadra thus uses ‘in consistency with seeing’ (yathādārsanam) that defines the convention in the opposing sense to ultimately (paramārthatas). He shows that the conventional truth is divided into two according to capability and incapability of causal efficiency (arthakriyā). This is almost a prose explanation of verse 65 of the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* of Śāntarakṣita.\(^{124}\) He is also aware of the problem caused by the *Pramāṇavārttika*, verse 3:3:

[3-53]

In order to deny the attachment of people who understand that a Tathāgata arisen in dependence by relation between causes and results reached through the valid means of knowledge is real, based on the statement “That which has causal efficiency is here ultimately real” (*Praṃṇavārttika*, verse 3:3ab) [Dharmodgata] says [to Sadāprarudita in the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*], “Just as if, son of a good family, a flute...” \(^{125}\)

It seems that Haribhadra here maintains that a Tathāgata that appears in front of


\[ \text{tadanu samyagarthakriyāśu yogyaṃ ayogyaṃ tathātathyabhedena sanvṛtīsatyadvayaṃ avicārakaramyapūrvapūrvavakāraṇādhiḥānaṃ nirdīśya tathyasamvyātou sthitā yathādārsanam māyāpuruseṇeva dānādy ācaritavyaṃ paramārthato 'nupādaś ca bhāvavītavyaḥ} \]

\(^{124}\) See [3-43] (p. 159) in 3.3.3.

\(^{125}\) *Abhisamayālaṃkārikā* (Wogihara [1932] p. 969, 18-21):

\[ \text{yad arthalcriyāsamartham tad atra paramārthatas} \ (=\text{Praṃṇavārttika, 3:3ab)} \]

\[ \text{iti vacanāt pramāṇopapannakāryakāraṇaṃbandhabalāt pratītyasamutpanna eva tāttvikas tathāgata ity aupalamihikajānanābhiniveśiṇedhārtham āha l tud yathā 'pi nāma kulaputra viṇāyā ity ādi l} \]

See Kaneko [1998].
people and carries out activity is indeed conventional. He considers that that which has causal efficiency belongs to the conventional truth. However he is aware that people may be misguided by Pramāṇavārttika, verse 3:3 and understand it is ultimately real. This means that he takes the Pramāṇavārttika, verse 3:4 as the true intention of Dharmakīrti. In this respect, too, Haribhadra follows Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla.

3.3.6 Jitāri

Jitāri (late 10th C-early 11th C), in the Sugatamatanvibhangabhāṣya, discusses the matter of causal efficiency in detail. He mentions the problem between verse 3:3 and 3:4 of the Pramāṇavārttika and states as much as Dharmakīrti is a Mādhyamika. Here an opponent raises an objection with regard to emptiness of the capability of causal efficiency because it contradict verse 3:3 of the Pramāṇavārttika. Jitāri explains as follows:

Moreover, then, if one asks why the capability of causal efficiency is empty because ‘what is to be proved’ (bsgrub bya, *sādhyā) should be established [by causal efficiency] if the Mādhyamikas’ establishment of ‘what is to be proved’ (bsgrub bya, *sādhyā) depends on means of proof (sgrub byed, *sādha/sādhana), as is said [by Dharmakīrti in the Pramāṇavārttika, 3:3] “that which has capability of causal efficiency is here ultimately real”, this is the answer:

If causal efficiency belonged to the ultimate, this would happen, [but] because the agent and action lack one intrinsic nature and many, why is it that this [causal efficiency] belongs to the ultimate? There is no valid means of knowledge that establishes the relation between causes and results. But because there unobjectionably exists [the valid means of knowledge] that invalidates it, then the capability of causal efficiency is not appropriate for the definition of ‘ultimately real’. Because there is [too] much to be

126 This is pointed out by Shirasaki [1978] p. 438.
said about this, I leave it for a while.

Concerning this, because the author of [Pramāṇa]vārttika (Dharmakīrti) described the definition of ultimately real depending on common usage, this does not deviate from his intention. The supreme master of reasoning [Dharmakīrti] is ultimately nothing but a Mādhyamika, because he says:

If [one objects] that everything is incapable, [I answer that] capability of seeds and so forth to sprouts and so forth is experienced.

If one says that it is maintained at the conventional level, [I answer] it must be so. (Pramāṇavārttika, 3:4)\(^{127}\)

Jitārī thus understands that causal efficiency that is mentioned in the Pramāṇavārttika, verse 3:3 is actually conventional, on the basis of verse 3:4 which states that causality is conventional. Following this verse, he quotes verses 3:208, 209, 210 and 360 from the Pramāṇavārttika to show Dharmakīrti is a Mādhyamika. Of these, verses 3:208, 209, 360 are also quoted in the Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti of Śāntarakṣita on verse 61.\(^{128}\) In this way, concerning his view of the convention and negation of one nature and many, he has a close relation to Śāntarakṣita and to Dharmakīrti.\(^{129}\)

\(^{127}\) Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya (Derge ed. No.3900 a 64a7-b3, Peking ed. No.5868 nyo 353b6-354a4):

gzhan yang 'o na gal te dbu ma pa rnams kyi bsgrub bya grub pa sgrub\(^{10}\) byed la rag lus na 'o na bsgrub bya grub par byed pas don byed nus pa ji ltar stong pa yin te/

don byed nus pa gang yin pa/ de 'dir don dam yod pa yin/

zhes gang gsungs pa'o zhe na/ brjod pa/ gal te don byed pa don dam pa pa yin na 'dir 'gyur ba zhiq na byed pa po\(^{20}\) dang las dag geig dang du ma'i rang bzhin gyis stong pas na 'di don dam pa pa zhes bya ba ji ltar yin/ rgyu dang 'bras bu'i ngo bo sgrub par byed pa'i tshad ma ni ci yang med la/ gnod par byed pa ni kha na ma tho ba med par yod pas na du\(^{15}\) don byed nus pa don dam par yod pa'i ntshan nyid du mi rigs sol/ 'di ni brjod par bya ba mang bas re zhiq bzhag\(^{6}\) ste/ 'dir ram 'gre'i mdzad pas ni tha snyad la brten pa'i don dam par yod pa'i ntshan nyid gsungs pa yin pas de'i dgon gsa ba dang mi 'gal lo/ rigs pa'i dbang phyug mchog de ni don dam par na dbu ma pa kho na ste
gal te thams cad nus med na/ sa bon soqs ni myug soqs la/
nus mthong gal te de kun rdzob/ 'dod na ji ltda\(^{5}\) de ltda yin/

zhes gsungs pa'i phyir rol/


\(^{128}\) See [3-46] (p. 160).

\(^{129}\) Shirasaki [1978] shows a close relation between Jitārī and Śāntarakṣita based on these quotations

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On the other hand, I have not found any discussion on the two levels of ultimate truths in Jitäri’s works. Although there is no explicit passage in his works showing that he indeed postulates the concordant ultimate apart from non-conceptual ultimate, we can gather that he does, from an examination of his understanding of the four alternatives. Commenting on verse 8 of the Sugatamatavibhaṅga, he explains the meaning of the four alternatives based on existence and non-existence:

Then if [one asks] how do the Mādhyamikas, who deny that consciousness established by the Yogācāras is the reality after refutation of external objects, [establish] the reality, [I answer]:

Neither existent, nor non-existent, nor both existent and non-existent, nor even the nature of neither [existent nor non-existent].

The Mādhyamikas know that the reality (tattva) is free from the four alternatives (catuskoti). (v. 8)¹³⁰

‘The four alternatives’ [and so on means that] the truth free from the four kinds [of alternatives] is suitable for those who practice the Way of the Madhyamaka. Here, ‘not existent’ [means that] there is no nature of existence because existence of both the perceiving subject and the perceived object cannot be established. ‘Not non-existent’ [means that] it is not the case that they are non-existent conventionally because it is impossible to deny the convention. Also the characteristics of the two with the nature of existence and non-existence are not [possible] because existence and non-

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¹³⁰ Sugatamatavibhaṅga, v. 8 (Derge ed. No. 3899 a 8a3, Peking ed. 5296 ha 64b7-8):

yod min med min yod med min // gnyis kyi bdag nyid du yang med //

mtha’ bzhis dag las nges grol ba // dbu ma de nyid mkhas pa ’dod //

However, the same verse in the Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya is translated differently (Derge ed. No. 3900 a 60b3, Peking ed. No. 5868 nyo 348b5-6):

yod min med min yod med min // gnyis ga min pa’i bdag nyid min//
de nyid mtha’ bzhis las grol ba// dbu ma pa yis rttogs pa yin//
existence are contradictory. Also the nature of neither of the two different from existence and non-existence is not [possible] because, excluding the two, the nature whose arising is not denied cannot be established.\\(^{131}\)

Here it is expressed that the ultimate truth for the Mādhyamika is free from the four alternatives (catuskoṭi). It is, therefore, understood as non-conceptual without any discriminative thought (prapañca). When Jitāri explains why it is free from existence, he says that the perceiving subject and the perceived object are denied. This is the state where even the consciousness that Yogācāras hold to be existent is rejected. On the other hand, concerning why it is not non-existent, he says that it is not non-existent conventionally. This implies that Jitāri conventionally accepts, or more precisely, does not deny, existence but denies it ultimately. Nevertheless, the truth for the Mādhyamikas is free from both of them. Therefore, Jitāri presupposes the non-conceptual ultimate free from the four alternatives, the convention which is not non-existent and the state of non-existence.

This last state is nothing but the concordant ultimate where the Svātantrikas establish non-arising by means of reasoning. This will become clearer when we compare Jitāri’s commentary on verse 8 of the Sugatamati vibhaṅga with Bodhibhadra’s commentary on verse 28 of the Jñānasūrasamuccaya. These two verses are almost identical. Bodhibhadra explains verse 28 of the Jñānasūrasamuccaya as follows:

\[^{131}\text{Sugatamati vibhaṅga bhāṣya (Derge ed. No. 3900 a 6062-5, Peking ed. No. 5868 nyo 348b5-349a1): ji ste phyi rol gi don sun 'byung}^{10}\text{ ste mal 'byor spyod pas mam par gzha}^{12}\text{ pa'i mam par shes pa yang de kho na yin pa spong ba'i dbu ma pa maams de kho na ji Ita bu zhig tu Ita zhe}^{14}\text{a/}
\]
\[\text{yod min med min yod med min/ gnyi ga min pa'i bdag nyid min/}
\[\text{de nyid mtha' bzhi las grol ba/ dbu ma pa yis rtogs pa yin// 8 //}
\]
\[\text{mtha' bzhi ste/ mam pa bzhi las grol ba'i de kho na dbu ma'i sgrub pas spyod pa maams kyi/}
\[\text{rigs pa yin no/ 'di llar yod min te/ yod pa'i bdag nyid ni ma yin te/ shes pa dang shes bya gnyi ga yod pa mi 'thad pa'i phyir rol/ med min kun rdzob tu yang med pa ma yin te/ kun rdzob la bsnyon}^{13}\text{ gdab par mi nus pa'i phyir ro/ yod pa dang med pa'i bdag nyid kyis gnyi ga'i ngo bo yang ma yin te/ yod pa dang med pa 'gal ba' phyir rol/ yod pa dang med pa las gzhan pa}^{14}\text{ gnyi ga ma yin pa'i rang bzhiin yang ma yin te/ gnyis las phyi rol du}^{15}\text{ gyur pa ma bsal ba'i rang bzhiin mi 'thad pa'i phyir rol/ (1) D, P: phyung, Em: 'byung. (2) D: gzha, P: bzha. (3) D: bsnyon, P: brnyon. (4) D: omit, P: gzhan pa. (5) D: du, P: tu.}\]
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[3-56]

If [one asks] what then these Mādhyamikas postulate, [I answer that] they do not postulate anything and it is said:

Neither existent, nor non-existent, nor both existent and non-existent, nor even the nature of neither [existent nor non-existent].

The Mādhyamikas know that the reality is free from the four alternatives (*catuskōṭi*).\(^{132}\)

The conclusion of the Yogācāras is existence and it also is not maintained.

\(^{132}\) *Jñānasārasamuccaya*, v. 28 (Mimaki [2000] p. 241):

\[\text{na san nāsan na sadasan na cāpy anubhayātmakam l catuskōṭivinirmitkaṁ tatvaṁ mādhyāmikā vidūḥ l 28 l}\]

However, the Tibetan translation of this verse is problematic (Mimaki [1976] p. 188, 20-23, Derge ed. No. 3851 tsha 27b3-4, Peking ed. No. 5251 tsha 30b2):

\[\text{yod min med min yod med min // gnyis ka’i bdag nyid kyang min pas // mtha’ bzhì las grol dbyu ma pa // mkhas pa mam kyi de kho na’o //}\]

In the translation, the fourth alternative has only one negative. The first three are 'not existent', 'not non-existent' and 'neither existent nor non-existent'. To complete the four alternatives, the fourth should be 'not neither existent nor non-existent'. However the translated verse has "not even the nature of both [existent and non-existent]" (*gnyis ka’i bdag nyid kyang min*). The same problem is seen in the Tibetan translation of the same verse quoted in the *Bodhicaryavatārapañjikā* (Derge ed. No. 3872 la 191a6-7, Peking ed. No. 5273 la 213a8):

\[\text{yod min med min yod med min / gnyis kyi bdag nyid du yang med/ mtha’ bzhì dag nges grol ba / de nyid dbyu mar mkhas mams bzhed/}\]

The fourth alternative is translated as *gnyis kyi bdag nyid du yang med* (not even the nature of the two). This is quite similar to the fourth alternative in the *Jñānasārasamuccaya*, verse 28, which is *gnyis ka’i bdag nyid kyang min pas* in terms of its having only one negative. The original Sanskrit of the verse quoted in the *Bodhicaryavatārapañjikā* is, however, as follows (La Vallée Poussin [1914] p. 358, 10-11):

\[\text{na san nāsan na sadasan na cāpy anubhayātmakam l catuskōṭivinirmitkaṁ tatvaṁ mādhyāmikā vidūḥ l}\]

In this verse, the fourth alternative has two negatives as *na cāpy anubhayātmakam* (not even the nature of neither of the two).

Similarly, the fourth alternative has only one negative in the *Sugatamatavibhāṅga*, v. 8 but the same verse in the *Sugatamatavibhāṅgagāthāya* has two.

*Sugatamatavibhāṅga*, v. 8 (Derge ed. No. 3899 a 8a3, Peking ed. 5296 ha 64b7-8):

\[\text{yod min med min yod med min // gnyis kyi bdag nyid du yang med // mtha’ bzhì dag las nges grol ba // dbyu ma de nyid mkhas pa ‘dod //}\]

*Sugatamatavibhāṅgagāthāya* (Derge ed. No. 3900 a 60b3, Peking ed. No. 5868 nyo 348b5-6):

\[\text{yod min med min yod med min // gnyi ga’i bdag nyid min // de nyid mtha’ bzhì las grol ba/ dbyu ma pa yis rtags pa yin/}\]

This inaccuracy of the Tibetan translation is probably the cause of confusion in Bodhibaṭrā's commentary on the *Jñānasārasamuccaya*. Also see the next footnote.

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The Lokāyata and others [hold] non-existence and it also is not maintained. If one says that then he holds the two as one, it is said that neither existent nor non-existent because an undesired consequence arises due to both faults. If they have the nature deprived of the two, it is said that even not the nature of [n]either because the third group [could] arise.\(^{133}\)

Bodhibhadra thus does not understand the four alternatives in connection with the levels of the truths. This becomes clearer from his account following the passage above:

[3-57]

Thus being free from the four alternatives (mtha’ bzhi, catuṣkoṭi) described above, those who avoid them are, at the level of the conventional truth, the Madhyamikas because they avoid extremes (mtha’, koṭi)...\(^{134}\)

\(^{133}\) Jñānasūrasamucayānibandhana (Mimaki [1976] pp. 204-206, 4, Derge ed, No. 3852 tsha 44a2-4, Peking ed. No. 5252 tsha 51a7-b2):

\[^{134}\] Jñānasūrasamucayānibandhana (Mimaki [1976] pp. 206, 12-14, Derge ed, No. 3852 tsha 44a5-6, Peking ed. No. 5252 tsha 51b4-5):
Thus these two extremes, i.e. existence and non-existence, are denied at the level of the conventional truth. If we take into account that Bodhibhadra was a direct teacher of Atiśa, it is very likely that he was not a Svātantrika. He indeed does not relate his interpretation of the four alternatives to the levels of truths. From this difference of interpretation of the four alternatives, we can indirectly assume that Jītārī also maintains the concordant ultimate.

3.3.7 Summary

In this way, concerning the ultimate truth, Bhāviveka, Avalokitavrata, Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla Haribhadra and Jītārī, who are generally regarded as Svātantrikas, as well as the anonymous author of the Bodhisattvāvatāravyākhyānapāṇīkā distinguish two levels of the ultimate. One is the concordant ultimate truth (brdar btags pa'i don dam pa'i bden pa, *sāṅketikaparamārthasatyā) or the ultimate truth that is conformable to paramārtha (don dam pa dang mthun pa, paramārthānukīla), and the other the ultimate truth which is defined as free from discriminative thought (prapañca), free from conceptual construct (vikalpa) and beyond common usage (vyavahāra). The former is derived from the interpretation of paramārtha as a bahuvrīhi compound and includes the teaching of non-arising and so forth that are ascertained by cognition produced by a three-fold inferential mark. As seen in the Mālamadhyamakakārikā, v. 1:1, the teaching of non-arising is the main subject of the Madhyamaka teaching, and this teaching is carried out by means of syllogistic inference according to the Svātantrikas. It is, therefore, considered that inference is employed at the level of the concordant ultimate to bridge the gap between the conventional truth and the ultimate truth. This reflects the Svātantrika view that inference is an effective means to reach the ultimate truth. As Candrakīrti only gives an interpretation as a karmadhāraya compound, which indicates the ultimate without

pas kun rdzob kyi bden par dbu ma pa ste...

Although koti in catuskoti also has the meaning of 'extreme', I translate it as 'alternative' throughout the present thesis because I could not find an English word that has both meaning. However, in this passage, koti is used more in the sense of 'extreme' than 'alternative'.

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discriminative thought (*prapañca*), he does not regard inference and its locus, the concordant ultimate, as a means to bridge the conventional truth and the ultimate truth. Therefore, this can be used as a criterion to distinguish the Svātāntrika and the Prāsaṅgika.

This inclusion of reasoning into the concordant ultimate reflects the debts of the later Svātāntrikas to Dharmakīrti. The Svātāntrikas’ attempt to prove non-arising involved adoption of Dharmakīrti’s system of logic. This must have made it possible for the Mādhyamika to insist on the view of a lack of intrinsic nature of all phenomena against Buddhist and non-Buddhist opponents through the accepted process of reasoning.

At the same time, Dharmakīrti’s view of causality is also adopted by the Svātāntrikas conventionally. They adopted the idea of causal efficiency to distinguish the true convention and the false convention by re-interpreting verse 3:3 of the *Pramāṇavārttika* in conformity to verse 3:4 of the same text. Neither Bhāviveka nor Candrakīrti distinguishes the convention in this way. This re-interpretation can be understood as Svātāntrikas’ efforts to show that they do not deviate from Dharmakīrti’s teaching. It is clear that Dharmakīrti is highly regarded by the later Svātāntrikas, especially from the fact that Jītārī regards him as a Mādhyamika.

It is, furthermore, plausible that acceptance of Dharmakīrti’s view of causality conventionally meant acceptance of mind-only conventionally. The separation of the Svātāntrika into the externalist and the internalist might have happened over interpretation of Jñānagarbha as far as Śāntarakṣita and the anonymous author of the *Bodhisattvavatāravyākhyānapanjikā* are concerned. While the former made a commentary on the *Satyadvayavibhangabhūṣya* of Jñānagarbha from the view of the internalist Mādhyamika, the latter seemingly considers that Jñānagarbha is an externalist Mādhyamika. This uncertainty of his position is also reflected in Tibetan doxography of the Indian Mādhyamika. Although Jñānagarbha’s understanding of the conventional truth such as ‘consistent with seeing’ is adopted by the later externalist Mādhyamikas, we cannot find the characteristics of the Svātāntrika in the later externalist Mādhyamikas. In fact, the later Svātāntrika teachers known to us are almost exclusively internalist, and we hardly
find an externalist Svātantrika in the late period. Therefore becoming an internalist Mādhyamika might have been an inevitable consequence of being a Svātantrika.

Keeping these points in mind, we now move on to the examination of the view of the later Prāsaṅgikas.

3.4 Later Prāsaṅgika’s View on Inference and the Two Truths

Atiśa (982-1055) is one of a few Indian teachers who are classified as a Prāsaṅgika by Tibetan doxographers. After Candrakīrti, there is no other famous Indian Madhyamaka teacher who is regarded as a Prāsaṅgika except Śāntideva (ca.650-700). In Śāntideva’s works, we cannot find any criticism of the Svātantrika although he seems to adhere to the prasaṅga method. There are hardly any clues in his works that enable us to decide that there was an opposition between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika. It is, therefore, necessary to examine Atiśa’s view of the two truths in order to judge whether or not Candrakīrti’s view was followed by later teachers and if there was an opposition between the two factions.

3.4.1 Atiśa’s View on Inference and the Two Truths

In the Satyadvayavatāra, Atiśa presents his view on the two truths. This work is quite concise consisting of just 29 verses. However, it contains many elements that help our understanding of late Madhyamaka thought. Lindtner and Ejima have already undertaken extensive studies of this work and much of following is indebted to them. However examination and a clear understanding of Atiśa’s theory of the two truths are indispensable in order to clarify the classification of the late Mādhyamikas into the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika. We will, therefore, examine his view on the two truths in

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135 Regarding this matter, the date of the anonymous author of the Bodhisattvavatārvaryākhyānapaṇiṣṭika is very important. Regrettably, though, I have not found any evidence that can narrow his date.

136 For a Tibetan source, see translation of I Kang skya’s Grub pa’i mtha’i rnam par bzhag pa in Lopez [1987] (p. 260) as well as Mimaki [1982a] (pp. 27-38).

137 Lindtner [1981] and Ejima [1983].
Chapter 3 Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika

As we have seen in the previous sections, the Svātantrikas postulate the concordant ultimate and accept the idea of causal efficiency (arthakriyā) in order to distinguish the true and the false convention. Now, by examining the Satyadvayāvatāra, we will attempt to find out whether there are any differences in Atiśa’s view of the two truths. In the very first verse, he distinguishes the two truths, which is translated as follows:

[3-58]

The teaching of Dharma by Buddhas should depend on two truths: the conventional truth of the world and the ultimate truth. (v. 1)\(^ {138} \)

After this introductory verse Atiśa goes on to explain the convention (saññvṛti) in verses 3 and 4, which we will examine later. Then he explains the ultimate truth in verses 4-9:

[3-59]

The ultimate is only one. Others hold that it is twofold. How can the nature of reality (chos nyid, *dharmatā), which cannot be established as anything, be two, three and so on? (v. 4)

[The ultimate] is defined as non-arising, non-cessation and so forth according to the formula [given] by treatises. Because of the way in which different ultimates do not exist, there is neither a subject (chos can, *dharmin) nor its property (chos nyid, *dharma) [for inferential reasoning]. (v. 5)

There is not any differentiation in emptiness. It can be expressed as a conventional designation that emptiness is seen if [it is seen] through cognition by way of no conceptual construct. (v. 6)

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sangs rgyas rnam snyes chos bstan pa // bden pa gnyis la yang dag brten//  
’jig rten kun rdzob bden pa dang // de bzhin don dam bden pa’o // 1 //
Chapter 3 Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika

It is said in the very profound sūtras that the state of non-seeing is seeing the [ultimate truth]. In that [ultimate truth], there is no seeing or no seer. There is calmness without beginning or end. (v. 7)

[The truth is] devoid of existence and non-existence, free from conceptual construct, free from objects, without locus, without staying, coming or going and does not admit comparison. (v. 8)

[It is] inexpressible, invisible, unchangeable and unconditioned. If a Yogin understands it, the obscuration of the defilements and the knowable is eliminated. (v. 9)\(^{139}\)

Concerning Atiśa’s understanding of the ultimate truth, he maintains in verse 4 that the ultimate is only one. As we have seen in the previous sections,\(^ {140}\) the distinction of the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika can be made based on the definition of the ultimate truth (paramārthasatya). While Candrakīrti interprets paramārtha as a karmadhāraya compound, Bhāviveka gives three different interpretations of the term paramārtha: that which is ultimate (parama) as well as an object (ariha) (interpreted as a karmadhāraya compound), that which is an object (ariha) of ultimate [cognition] (parama) (interpreted as a tatpurusa compound) and that which takes paramārtha or that which is conformable to paramārtha (interpreted as a bahuvrihi compound). Even though paramārtha which is

\(^{139}\) Satyadvayāvatāra, vv. 4-9 (Ijima [1983] pp. 362-363):

\(^{140}\) See 3.2 (p. 128 ff.) and 3.3 (p. 149 ff.).
conformable to *paramārtha*, the concordant ultimate, is not the ultimate truth in a strict sense, the Svātantrikas give it the name *paramārtha*. According to the Svātantrikas, the teaching of non-arising belongs to this concordant ultimate and inference is employed to prove non-arising at this level of the ultimate. Atiśa obviously does not accept the interpretation of *paramārtha* as that which is conformable to *paramārtha* (*paramārtha-nukūla*) given by Bhāviveka and other Svātantrikas. It is evident that the only ultimate maintained by Atiśa is non-conceptual as expressed in verses 6, 8 and 9. With regard to non-arising, however, he considers that it should belong to this non-conceptual ultimate as described in verse 5. There is, thus, a difference in interpretation of the ultimate between Atiśa and the Svātantrika teachers in that the former maintains that the ultimate is only one, and non-arising is a characteristic of it, but the latter hold that non-arising belongs to the concordant ultimate but not to the non-conceptual ultimate. In this regard, Atiśa definitely understands the ultimate in a different way from the Svātantrikas.

The most fundamental difference between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika is whether or not they adopt inference (*anumāna*) as a means to reach the ultimate. Concerning this point, too, Atiśa is regarded as a Prāsaṅgika. His negative attitude towards the valid means of knowledge (*prāmaṇa*), including inference (*anumāna*), is seen in verses 10-13:

[3-60]

A fool who sees this side says that Buddhists accept these two: direct perception and inference [and] understand emptiness by the two. (v. 10)

[If they did,] it would follow that even outsiders and the Śrāvakas understand the nature of reality (*chos nyid, *dhammatā*), not to mention the proponents of representation[-only], and the Mādhyamikas would be no different [from them]. (v. 11)

Therefore, all doctrines would also agree because they understand [the doctrines] through the valid means of knowledge. Because all reasonings are not in agreement, does the nature of reality (*chos nyid, *dhammatā*)
which is understood through the valid means of knowledge not become manifold? Direct perception and inference are unnecessary. The learned make use of [them] to refute the objection of outsiders. (vv. 12-13)

Atiśa here denies the view that Buddhists accept direct perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna) to understand emptiness. He argues that if the valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa) are perfectly reliable, everyone who resorts to them should have the same view. It is, however, not the case. He therefore denies the validity of them. Nevertheless, he does not reject them entirely. The purpose of inference is confined to 'refute the objection of outsiders', as is seen in verse 13.

As Ejima points out, the same attitude is seen in the Bodhimārgaprādirānapaṇīṭikā:

[3-61]

Why were many treatises composed by Dharmaśri, Dharmaśhita and others? The learned composed [them] to refute the objection of outsiders.

In this way, the purpose of composing texts concerning the valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa) is, according to Atiśa, to refute outsiders but not to attain the ultimate truth. It seems that he mentions Dharmaśri and Dharmaśhita as authors of these treatises. However, it is not clear if 'others' include the Svātantrikas, especially Bhāviveka. Although it is not clear if ‘others’ include the Svātantrikas, especially Bhāviveka.


143 Bodhimārgaprādirānapaṇīṭikā (Derge ed. No. 3948 khi 282b5, Peking ed. No. 5344 ki 326b6-7):
attitude towards the valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa) is evident. This limitation of the use of inference reminds us of Candrakīrti’s use of syllogistic inference in the Prasannapadā, where he employs syllogistic inference whose proposition is not his own. 144 Thus Atiśa does not maintain the concordant ultimate or inference as an effective means to attain emptiness.

He, in addition, refers to Candrakīrti in verse 15 and 19:

[3-62]
If one asks who understood emptiness, [I reply] Nāgārjuna, who was predicted by the Tathāgata and saw the truth of the nature of reality, and his disciple Candrakīrti. (v. 15)145

[3-63]
The ācārya Candrakīrti says as follows:
Those who do not know the distinction of the two, the conventional truth as a means and the ultimate truth as the purpose, get a bad birth because of erroneous conceptualisation. (v. 19)146

Thus Atiśa considers that Candrakīrti, who was Nāgārjuna’s disciple, understood emptiness. Atiśa does not hold the concordant ultimate and does not adopt the valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa) including inference (anumāṇa) in order to reach emptiness.

144 See discussion in 3.2 (p. 128 ff. especially pp. 139-142).

ston gyi gang gis rtogs she na// de bzhin gshegs pas lung bstan zhid// chos nyid bden pa gzigs pa yil// klu sgrub slob ma zla grags yin// 15 //

slob dpön zla grags 'di skad du// thobs su gyur pa kun rdzob bden pa dang// thabs las byung ba don dam bden pa dag// gnyis po'i bya ba gang gis mi shes pa// de dag log par rtogs pas ngan 'gro 'gro// 19 //
Chapter 3 Svātāntrika and Prāsaṅgika

This evidence indicates that Atiśa can be classified as a Prāsaṅgika.

On the other hand, there is some perplexing evidence which opposes this conclusion. Firstly, Atiśa’s definitions of the conventional truth obviously differ from those of Candrakīrti. Candrakīrti gives the following interpretations of *saṃvṛti* in the *Prasannapadā:*

\[3-64]\)

*Saṃvṛti* means covering completely because *saṃvṛti* is said to be ignorance for it completely covers the reality of all things. *Saṃvṛti* alternatively means the origination from each other through being in dependence on each other. Or rather *saṃvṛti* means conventional symbols, common usage of the world.\[147]\)

Here Candrakīrti interprets *saṃvṛti* in three different ways: (1) concealment of the true nature of things, i.e. ignorance, (2) interdependent origination, and (3) conventional symbols (*saṃketa*) or common usage of the world (*lokavyavahāra*). Atiśa, on the other hand, explains the true convention, as follows:

\[3-65]\)

The convention (*kun rdzob, *saṃvṛti*) is held to be twofold: the false and the true. The former is twofold: the moon [reflected on] water and imagination of wrong doctrines (*grub mtha’, *siddhānta*). (v. 2)

A phenomenon which is pleasing only as long as it is not examined, which arises and ceases to exist and which is capable of causal efficiency is held to be the true convention. (v. 3)\[148]\)

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\[147] Prasannapadā (La Vallée Poussin [1903-13] p. 492, 10-12):

saṃvṛtād varaṇānāṃ saṃvṛtāhi ājñānānāḥ hi samantāt sarvapadārthata tattvāvacchādānāt saṃvṛtān

itya ucyate t parasparasamaprabhavanaṃ vā saṃvṛtān anyonyasamāśrayante arthaḥ ī athavā saṃvṛtān

saṃketo lokavyavahāra ity arthāḥ ī.


kun rdzob rnam pa gnyis su ’dod// log pa dang ni yang dag goll

dang po gnyis te chu zla dang// grub mtha’ ngan pa’i rto ga’ ol/ 2 ī

ma brtags gcig pu nyams dga’ bai/ skye ba dang ni ’jig pa’i chos//
don byed nus dang ldan pa nil/ yang dag kun rdzob yin par ’dod/ 3 ī

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In verse 2, Atiśa distinguishes the true and the false convention. He does this according to their capability or incapability of causal efficiency as seen in verse 3. He also defines the true convention as (1) pleasing only as long as it is not examined, (2) arises and ceases to exist, and (3) capable of causal efficiency. This is almost identical with the definition of the true convention given by Śāntarakṣīta but not one given by Candrakīrti. In the Madhyamakālaṃkāra, verse 64, Śāntarakṣīta explains as follows:

[3-66]

It is understood that that which is pleasing only as long as it is not examined, which is characterised by arising and cessation and which has the nature of capability of causal efficiency is the [true] convention. (v. 64)\textsuperscript{49}

Moreover, as in verses 21-3 of the Satyadvayāvatāra, Atiśa defines the convention (saṃvṛti) as ‘consistent with seeing’ (ji ltar snang ba, yathādarśana):

[3-67]

If this convention which is ‘consistent with seeing’ (ji ltar snang ba, yathādarśana) is examined logically, nothing is acquired. The state of non-acquirement is the ultimate and the nature of reality (chos nyid, dharmatā) which stays perfect. (v. 21)

The convention, which is ‘consistent with seeing’, is established as being produced by causes and conditions. If it were impossible to establish it, by who would the moon in water and the like be produced? (v. 22)

Therefore, all appearances are established as being produced by various causes and conditions. If the continuance of conditions is interrupted, it

\textsuperscript{49} Madhyamakālaṃkāra, v. 64 (Ichigō [1985b] p. CXXV):

\begin{verbatim}
ma brtags gcig pu nyams dga' zhing// skye dang 'jig pa'i chos can pa/
don byed pa dag nus rams kyi// rang bzhiin kun rdzob pa yin stogs// 64 //
\end{verbatim}
does not arise even conventionally. (v. 23)\textsuperscript{150}

Thus Atiśa considers that the convention is ‘consistent with seeing’ and it is produced by causes and conditions. The idea of ‘consistent with seeing’ is not seen in Candrakīrti’s works, but in Jñānagarbha’s \textit{Satyadvayavibhaṅga}:

\textbf{[3-68]}

Only what is consistent with seeing is the conventional and the other is opposite, [i.e. the ultimate truth]. (v. 3.cd)\textsuperscript{151}

Moreover, Atiśa classifies the convention, i.e. what is consistent with seeing, into the true convention and the false convention in verse 2 and 3 of the \textit{Satyadvayāvatāra}. The true convention is, as shown above, defined as ‘capable of causal efficiency’. An example of the false convention is images reflected on water, which do not have causal efficiency. This is different from the view of Candrakīrti who postulates the mere convention and the conventional truth.\textsuperscript{152} Atiśa’s understanding of the convention is close to that of Jñānagarbha, who explains that the convention is twofold depending on its ability of causal efficiency in the \textit{Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti}:

\textbf{[3-69]}

It is also taught that the convention is twofold:

Regardless of similarity in appearance, the distinction of the...
convention as true or untrue is made according to their capability or incapability of causal efficiency. (v. 12)

Cognitions are similar in appearance, i.e. a manifest image. But having been ascertained by whether or not it falsifies causal efficiency corresponding to appearance, water and others and a mirage and others are understood by ordinary people as true or untrue.\textsuperscript{153}

In this way, Atiśa’s understanding of the conventional truth is in line with that of the Svātāntrikas such as Jñānagarbha and Śāntarakṣita who interpret verse 3:3 of Dharmakīrti’s \textit{Pramaṇavārttika} from the Madhyamaka point of view. It may be the case that Dharmakīrti was so highly regarded among the Madhyamikas that they, regardless of being a Svātāntrika or a Prāsaṅgika, all adopted this view of the conventional. Atiśa, anyhow, does not strictly follow Candrakīrti’s view in terms of the definitions of the convention.

Secondly, Atiśa quotes Bhāviveka to explain his view of the two truths in verse 14, and verse 20 is also quoted from the \textit{Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā}:

\[3-70\]

The \textit{ācārya}, learned Bhavya says that [the ultimate] cannot be clearly understood even from scriptural authority [or] by [either of] two thoughts: that with conceptual construct or without conceptual construct. (v. 14)\textsuperscript{154}

\textsuperscript{153} \textit{Satyadvayavibhaṅga}, v. 12 and its \textit{Vṛtti} (Eckel [1987] p. 163):

\begin{verbatim}
yang kun rdzob ni mam pa gnyis su bstan te/
    snang du 'dra yang don byed dag// nus pa'i phyir dang mi nus phyir//
yang dag yang dag ma yin pas// kun rdzob kyi ni dbye ba byas// 12 //
zes bya ba'o// shes pa gsal ba'i ram pa snang ba can du 'dra yang/ ji laar snang ba bzhin du
don byed pa la slu ba dang ni slu ba yin par nges par byas nas chu la sogs pa dang smig rgyu
    la sogs pa dag 'jig rten gyis yang dag pa dang yang dag pa ma yin par rtags polo/
\end{verbatim}

See 3.3.1 for Jñānagarbha’s view on the two truths.


\begin{verbatim}
lung las kyang ni gsal po ru// rtag bcas rtag pa med pa yil//
    shes pa gnyis kyiis mi rtags shes// slob spon mkhas pa bha bya gsung// 14 //
\end{verbatim}

\textit{Ejima} [1983] (p. 384 note 11 and p. 389 note 65) points out similarity between \textit{pāda} bc and verse
Without depending on common usage (tha snyad, vyavahāra), the ultimate is not understood. Without a ladder of true conventions, it is impossible for a learned man to reach the top of the palace of reality. (v. 20)155

Although Atiśa quotes from Bhāviveka, since these are not verses that support the use of inference to prove emptiness, they may be negligible in terms of evidence to distinguish the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika. Nevertheless, it is clear that he does not regard Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti as rivals who have opposing views concerning the two truths.

These points are remarkable in that while Atiśa is aware of controversy over the interpretation of paramārtha, he does not mention any opposition between Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti who are regarded as a Svātantrika and a Prāsaṅgika respectively. This conformity of Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti is also found in the accounts of his lineage. Therefore we now move on to an examination of his understanding of the Madhyamaka lineage that descends from Nāgārjuna to Atiśa himself.

3: 285cd of the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā as well as the verse 5: 6 of the Madhyamakaratnapradipa.


\[
savikalpāvikalpena jñānenāpy esa durḍrṣaḥ 1\]

Madhyamakaratnapradipa, v. 5: 6 (Derge ed. No. 3854 tsha 272a6, Peking ed. No. 5254 tsha 342b6):

\[
rtog bcas rtog pa med pa yi// shes pa gnyis kyis 'di mi rtogs\\
sgra dang tshad ma'i tha snyad dag// de don bsgom la dgos pa med// 155
\]


\[
tha snyad la ni ma bsren par/ dam pa'i don ni rtogs mi 'gyur/ yang dag kun rdzob mams kyis skas// med par yang dag khang chen gyi/ steng du 'gro bar byed pa ni// makhas la rung ba ma yin nor// 20 //
\]


vyavahāram anāśritya paramārtha na deśyate 1


tathyaśaṃśītyisopanām antareṇa vipaścitaḥ 1
tattvaprāśādāśikharārohaṇaḥ na hi yujyate 1


tattvaprāśādāśikharārohaṇaṁ na hi yujyate 1
tathyaśaṃśītyisopanām antareṇa yatastataḥ 1 3:12 11

3.4.2 Atiśa’s Understanding of the Madhyamaka Lineage

In the Satyadvayāvatāra, Atiśa does not mention any opposition between Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti. It seems that it is not problematic for Atiśa to give their names side by side as his teachers. The same is observed in Atiśa’s account on his lineage in the Bodhimārgapradīpaṇājikā. He mentions both Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti as teachers in his lineage:

[3-72]

The learned in the continent of Jambu declare:

The noble Asāṅga explained a method of teaching. He taught that the meaning of prajñāpūramitā was representation-only (*vijñaptiṃtra).

At present the guru Svarṇadvīpa and the guru Śānti pa (Ratnākaraśānti) hold in this way.

The ācārya Nāgārjuna explained the essence of teaching. He understood that the meaning of prajñāpūramitā was the meaning of the great Madhyamaka, which transcends existence and non-existence.

It is said in this way in the lineage of other learned men. At present, the guru Bodhibhadra and the reverend Kusulu pa hold in this way.

The nectar of the venerable noble Nāgārjuna had satisfied Āryadeva, Candrakīrti, Bhavya and Śāntideva, down to Bodhibhadra. A little has been sprinkled even on me.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁶ Bodhimārgapradīpaṇājikā (Derge ed. No. 3948 khi 280a4-7, Peking ed. No. 5344 ki 323b4-8):
Here Atiśa clearly shows that both Bhavya (Bhäviveka) and Candrakirti are in his lineage. It is also known that Bodhibhadra is his teacher. Then when he explains the words in verse 51,\textsuperscript{157} he states as follows:

\[3-73\]

The very [meaning of] ‘Mūla’ should be explained. The ‘Mūlamadhyamaka’ means the root (mūla) of wisdom of the Madhyamaka.

“And so forth” refers to the Akutobhayā, the Yuktisaṣṭikā, the Vigrahavyāvartani, the Śūnyatāsaptati, the Ratnāvali, the Mahāyānaavimsīkā, the Aksarasataka, the Śālistambhavṛtti and so forth.\textsuperscript{158}

“And so forth” also refers to the teaching written by the true disciples of the noble ācārya [Nāgārjuna], the reverend Āryadeva, the ācārya Candrakirti, the ācārya Bhavya Bhāviveka (bha bya snang bral), the ācārya Śāntideva and so forth. And the reverend Āryadeva wrote the Mahāmadhyamakavaidalya, the Hastavāla, the Aṅgulikapavīśhāla, the Jñānasārasanuccaya and so forth. The ācārya Candrakirti wrote the Madhyamakāvatāra and the Yuktisaṣṭikāvṛtti, the Madhyamaka Pañcaskandhāprakaraṇa, the Prasannapadā, and so forth. The ācārya Bhavya Bhāviveka (bha bya snang bral) wrote the Madhyamaka Tarkajvāla, the Prajñāpradīpa and so forth.\textsuperscript{159}

\(1\) Bodhipatharaddita, v. 51 (Drege ed. No. 3947 khi 240a7, Peking ed. No. 5343 ki 276b7-8): In the reasoning of Śūnyatāsaptati and the Mūlamadhyamaka and so forth, the proof that the intrinsic nature of entities is empty is mentioned.

\(\text{stong nyid bdun bcu'i rigs pa dang/} \text{dbu ma rtsa ba so s las kyang/}
\text{dngos po mnams kyi rang bzhiin ni}/\text{stong pa nyid du/}\text{grub bshed pa/}
\(1\) D: ni, P: gyi (2) D: du, P: ni.

\(157\) Lindtner [1981] (p.209) takes rigs pa as Yuktisaṣṭikārikā.

\(158\) On these texts ascribed to Nāgārjuna, see Lindtner [1981] p. 212, note 13.

\(159\) Bodhimmārgaraddipapanjika (Derge ed. No. 3948 khi 280b2-6 Peking ed. No. 5344 ki 324a4-b1):
\(\text{rtsa ba nyid bshed par bya sti/} \text{dbu ma'i rtsa ba zhes bya ba ni dbu ma'i rtsa ba shes rab bo/}
\text{sogs zhes pas ni ga las}/\text{jigs med dang/} \text{rigs pa drug cu pa dang/} \text{rtsod pa bzhog/}

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In this way, Ati\'sa shows that Bhavya Bh\'aviveka is in his lineage together with Candrak\'irti. He does not mention any difference in their position. Additionally, Bodhibhadra, whom Ati\'sa mentions as his direct teacher, does not mention Candrak\'irti when he classifies the M\'\adhyamikas into the externalists and the internalists. According to Ati\'sa, Bodhibhadra is in the lineage that descended from N\'\ag\'\arjuna through Candrak\'irti to Ati\'sa himself. If we assume that Ati\'sa adopts the Pr\'\asa\'ngika view taught by Bodhibhadra, it is indeed strange that Bodhibhadra, whose teaching Ati\'sa follows, mentions Bhavya (Bh\'aviveka) as the representative figure of the externalist M\'\adhyamikas, but not Candrak\'irti.

Lastly and most significantly, even though Ati\'sa translated 104 texts into Tibetan, together with Tibetan translators, he translated only two works of Candrak\'irti, the \textit{Pa\'ncaskandhaprakarana} and the \textit{Trisaranasaptati}, which are not currently regarded as his major works. On the other hand, he translated the \textit{Madhyamakahrdayakarika}, a genuine work of Bh\'aviveka, and its commentary, \textit{Tarkaj\'\v{a}l\'a}, as well as the \textit{Madhyamak\'arthasang\'gra\'ha} and the \textit{Madhyamakaranaapradip\'a}, which are ascribed to him but not currently regarded as his genuine works. This is very strange if he is a Pr\'\asa\'ngika, who is supposed to follow Candrak\'irti rather than Bh\'aviveka. In this way, while it seems that he is negative on the usage of the valid means of knowledge (pram\'\ana),

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item D: \textit{las}, P: \textit{ta}. (2) D: \textit{b\'zhog}, P: \textit{z\'og}. (3) D: \textit{snang bral gyis}, P: \textit{snang}.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
including inference, in order to reach the ultimate truth and therefore regarded as a Prāsaṅgika, some evidence shows that he does not follow Candrakīrti but espouses Bhāviveka.

In addition to this, we find a very interesting classification of the Madhyamaka teachers in Atiśa’s Ratnakarāṇḍodghāṭa Madhyamakopadeśa. According to Miyazaki’s study, Atiśa classifies Buddhist teachers into five exoteric and five esoteric branches according to their works. His classification of the five exoteric branches and distribution of Indian teachers are as follows:

[3-74]

The former acāryas wrote their respective views.

The acāryas Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and others wrote texts on the valid means of knowledge (tshad ma, *pramāṇa) in detail.

The acāryas Dharmatrīta, Buddhadeva, Vasumitra, Ghoṣaka, Manojñā (?) and others wrote scriptural authorities (*āgama) of the Śrāvaka Vaibhāṣika in detail.

The acāryas Śubhagupta, Dharmottara, the early Vasubandhu and others wrote texts of the Śrāvaka Sautrāntika in detail.

The acāryas Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Sthiramati, Prajñākaragupta, Kaliṅka, Devendrabuddhi, the upāsaka guru Asvabhāva and others wrote texts of the Sākāra and the Nirākāra [Yogācāra] in detail.

The acāryas Bhavya, Buddhapālita, Devaśarman, Avalokitavrata, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśila and others wrote texts of the Madhyamaka in detail.

The acārya Candragomin, the acārya Śūra, the acārya Sāgaramegha, the acārya Śāntideva, the acārya Luntaka (?) and others wrote, for novices just after generation of mind (*cittopāda), texts of very extensive practice beginning from four infinities (*apramāṇa) and the four things of attraction.
Those texts written by the five *ācāryas*, the *ācārya* noble Nāgārjuna, the *ācārya* Āryadeva, the *ācārya* Maticitra, the *ācārya* Kambala and the *ācārya* Candrakīrti, are the foundation (*phyi mo, *mālikā*) of all the Madhyamaka texts. Because they are the roots (*rtsa ba, *mūla*) of all the Madhyamaka texts, there is no rival. 162

Atiśa thus distinguishes teachers of exoteric Buddhism into five: (1) the authors of the texts on the valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa, iṣṭad ma*), (2) the authors of the *āgamas* of the Śrāvaka Vaibhāṣika (*nyan thos bye brag tu smra pa*), (3) the authors of

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162 Ratnakarandodghūta (Miyazaki [1993] pp. 19-20, Derge ed. No. 3930 ki 112b3-113a1, Peking ed. No. 5325 ha 126a2-b2):

sngon gyi slob dpon mams kyis phyogs re re mdzad de/
slob dpon phyogs kyi glang po dang/ dha rma k'i rti la sogs pas tshad ma'i
gzhung rgyas par mdzad do//
slob dpon chos skyob dang/ slob dpon sangs rgyas lda dang/ dbyig bshes dang/
dbyangs sgrogs dang/ yid 'ong la sogs pas nyan thos bye brag tu smra ba'i lung
gryas par mdzad do//
slob dpon dge bsun bag dang/ chos mchog dang/ dbyig gnyen snga ma la sogs pas
nyan thos mdo sde pa'i gzhung rgyas par mdzad do//
slob dpon thugs med dang/ dbyig gnyen dang/ blo bstan dang/ shes rab 'byung
gnas shas pa dang/ ka li ngka dang/ lha dbang blo dang/ dge bsnyen btsun pa
ngo bo nyid med pa la sogs pas ni mam bcas mam med kyi gzhung rgyas par
mdzad do//
slob dpon bha bya dang/ bu ddha p'a li ta dang/ de ba shar ma dang/ spyan ras
gzigs brtul zhung dang/ sh'a nta ra kshi ta dang/ ka ma la sh'i la la sogs pas ni
dbu ma'i gzhung rgyas par mdzad do//
slob dpon tsa ndra go mi dang/ slob dpon dpa' bo dang/ slob dpon rgya mtsho
sprin dang/ slob dpon sh'a nta de ba dang/ slob dpon lu nta ka la sogs pas sens
bskyed ma thag pa las dang po pa'i phyir tshad med pa bzhi dang/ bsdu ba'i
dngos po bzhi dang/ pha rol tu phyin pa la sogs pa ji ltar nyams su blang ba'i
spyod pa rgya chen po'i gzhung rgyas par mdzad do//
slob dpon 'phags pa klu sgrub dang/ slob dpon a'a rya de ba dang/ slob dpon ma
ti tsi tra dang/ slob dpon kha ma la dang/ slob dpon zla ba grags pa dang/ slob
dpon lha boi mzdad pa'i dhu ma'i gzhung de dag ni dhu ma'i gzhung thams
cad kyi phyi mo yin no// dhu ma'i gzhung thams cad kyi rtsa ba yin pas 'gran
zla med pa yin no//

Concerning the Sanskrit names of teachers, I followed Miyazaki [1993]. He explains that Candrakīrti is classified into the *mūla* authors because Atiśa considers Tantrism more important as he translates a work of Tantrist Candrakīrti. In my opinion, however, Atiśa just thought Candrakīrti was a predecessor of Blāviveka.

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the texts of the Śrāvaka Sautrāntika (nyan thos mdo sde pa), (4) the authors of the texts of the Sākāra (rnam bcas) and the Nirākāra (rnam med) Yogācāra and (5) the authors of the texts of the Madhyamaka. Then the authors of Madhyamaka texts are again divided into three. (1) Bhavya, Buddhāpālita, Devasarman, Avalokītavrata, Sāntaraksita and Kamalaśīla are classified under the authors of texts of the Madhyamaka (dBus ma). (2) Candragomin, Śūra, Sāgaramegha, Śāntideva and Luntaka are regarded as the authors of the texts of practice. (3) Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Maticitra, Kambala and Candrakīrti are considered the authors of the root texts of all the Madhyamaka texts.

Unfortunately, Atiśa does not mention what they postulate and it is not clear what is the criterion of this classification. This is neither classification of the Sautrāntika and the Prāsaṅgika nor that of the externalist and the internalist. However, if we pay attention to the Madhyamaka (1) and (3), we realise some important points. The texts of the five Madhyamaka teachers in (3) are explained to be the foundation (phyi mo) or the roots (mūla, rtsa ba) of all the Madhyamaka texts. The term phyi mo is used in the classification of the Madhyamaka of the fundamental texts (gzhung phyi mo'i dBus ma pa) and the partisan Madhyamaka (phyogs 'dzin pa'i dBus ma pa) by Tsong kha pa, for example.163 If Atiśa and Tsong kha pa use the term in the same way, those teachers in (1) can be regarded as the partisan Mādhyamikas. Bhāviveka in the Prajñāpradīpa criticises Buddhāpālita, and Śāntaraksita distinguishes the externalist Mādhyamikas and the internalist Mādhyamikas in the Madhyamakālaṃkāra and its Vṛtti.164 Avalokītavrata and Devasarman are considered by Atiśa the two commentators on Bhāviveka’s Prajñāpradīpa in the Bodhimārgapradīpapāṇijīka.165 Kamalaśīla is a disciple of Śāntaraksita. In this way, it is likely that these teachers were thought to have had different views in some way and therefore to be partisan. On the other hand, the five teachers who are the authors of the root texts are problematic. As Tibetan accounts describe, it is considered that at the

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163 Lam rim then mo (p. 571, 17-19).
164 See the second chapter of the present thesis (p. 54 ff.).
165 Bodhimārgapradīpapāṇijīka (Derge ed. 3948 khi 281a1-2, Peking ed. No. 5344 ki 324b3-4): de la shes rab sgron ma la t'i ka chen po gnyis yod de/ a'a ts'a rya sphyan ras gzig brul zhub gzugs kyis mdzad pa dang/ a'a ts'a rya de ba sha rmas mdzad pa'i dBus ma dkar po 'char ba'ol
time of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, the Mādhyamikas did not have different doctrinal views. However, Candrakīrti is regarded as a Prāsaṅgika because he criticised Bhāviveka’s usage of inference. Moreover, Kambala is sometimes regarded as a Nirākāra-Cittamātra and sometimes classified as a Nirākāra-Mādhyamika.  

Now, if we integrate Atiśa’s classification of the Madhyamaka teachers in the Bodhimārgapradīpapāṇīkā and Ratnakarandodghāṭa, we can conclude that Atiśa places himself at the end of the Madhyamaka lineage from Nāgārjuna through Āryadeva, Candrakīrti, Bhavya, and Śāntideva to Bodhibhadra. This is peculiar in that he places Candrakīrti before Bhavya. He classifies Candrakīrti as an author of the mūla texts of all the Madhyamaka texts and Bhāviveka as an author of Madhyamaka texts. It seems therefore that Bhāviveka is the first partisan Mādhyamika. This is supported by the accounts of Bodhibhadra, Atiśa’s direct teacher, who mentions Bhāviveka and Śāntarakṣita as representative figures of externalists and internalists respectively in the Jñānasāra-samuccayanibandhana. Assuming that Bodhibhadra shares the same understanding of the Madhyamaka lineage, he may well regard Bhāviveka as the representative of the externalist Madhyamaka because Candrakīrti is understood to be one of the authors of the mūla texts.

Putting the pieces together, Atiśa’s understanding of the Madhyamaka lineage can be shown as follows:

\[
\text{Nāgārjuna} \rightarrow \text{Āryadeva} \rightarrow \text{Candrakīrti} \\
\text{Bhavya} \rightarrow \text{Buddhapālita(?)} \rightarrow \text{Śāntideva} \rightarrow \text{Bodhibhadra} \rightarrow \text{Atiśa} \\
\text{Śāntarakṣita} \rightarrow \text{Kamalaśīla}
\]

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166 See Lindtner [1985] (pp. 111-112). Kurihara [1991] (p. 42) points out that the Grub mtha’ chen mo, the lCan skya grub mtha’, the Grub mtha’ rin chen phreng ba and the Grub mtha’ shel gyi me long classify Kambala as a Nirākāra-Mādhyamika.

167 See 2.3 (p. 65 ff.).

168 It is not clear how Atiśa considers Buddhapālita. It may be the case that he considers that Buddhapālita was later than Bhavya, because he places Buddhapālita after Bhāviveka in the Ratnakarandodghāṭa, which is quoted previously (passage [3-74] p. 191).
In this way, Atiśa does not seem to distinguish the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika among the externalist Mādhyamikas and places himself in the externalist lineage. However it is not clear how he understood the passages in the Prasannapadā with which Candrakīrti criticised Bhāviveka. It is also not clear, from the examination of Atiśa’s works alone, why Candrakīrti, Matīcitra and Kambala are included in the authors of the mūla texts and whether they were really the writers of the mūla texts.

To sum up, judging from the facts that Atiśa does not postulate the concordant ultimate, that he does not accept pramāṇa as a means to reach the ultimate, that he quotes from Candrakīrti and that he regards Candrakīrti as a teacher in his lineage, we may regard Atiśa as a Prāsaṅgika. Nevertheless, there are many pieces of evidence that indicates the contrary. Atiśa states that Bhāviveka (or Bhavya) belongs to the very same lineage Candrakīrti belongs to and refers also to Bhāviveka in his works. His teacher, Bodhibhadra, regards Bhavya, not Candrakīrti, as a representative figure of those who hold the existence of external objects. Atiśa, in addition to this, does not translate any works of Candrakīrti but two that are not regarded as his major works. Furthermore, his definition of the conventional truth is very similar to those given by Śāntarakṣita and Jiñānagarbha although he is indeed a Prāsaṅgika in that he rejects the concordant ultimate and is against the use of pramāṇa to attain emptiness. It seems that Atiśa’s view on the two truths is based on the ideas of Candrakīrti, Bhāviveka and Śāntarakṣita, who are respectively regarded by Tibetan scholars as a Prāsaṅgika, a Sautrāntika-Svātantrika and a Yogācāra-Svātantrika. It is, therefore, extremely difficult to decide whether he is a Prāsaṅgika or not because different pieces of evidence lead in opposite directions. Also it seems to be almost impossible to explain the late Madhyamaka history on the basis of a simple dichotomy between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika, which follow Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti respectively. In addition to this, Atiśa’s explanation of his lineage and his classification of the Madhyamaka teachers are different from the classification accepted by modern scholars. He includes both Candrakīrti and Bhāviveka in his lineage in the Bodhimārgapradīpapāṇijīkā and classifies Candrakīrti as an author of the mūla Madhyamaka texts but Bhāviveka and Buddhapālita as authors of the (ordinary)
Chapter 3 Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika

Madhyamaka texts in the *Ratnakaraṇḍaṭodghāṭa*. He does not seem to have the idea that the Madhyamaka was divided into two after Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti. From these works of Atiśa, therefore, we find both types of evidence, each suggesting that there was and was not the dichotomy of the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika among the externalists in India.

There are, in my opinion, two different hypotheses which may solve this problem and explain Atiśa’s position and the late Indian Madhyamaka classification. The first one is the theory that there was no distinction between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika as Atiśa includes both Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti in the single lineage that descends to himself. As I noted at the beginning of this chapter, this is a quite tempting hypothesis because there is little evidence which shows the dichotomy of the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika in terms of both the history of the Tibetan translation of texts in the earlier dissemination of Buddhism into Tibet, and reference to this classification by Indian Madhyamaka teachers before the 9th C. This point does not contradict the fact that Atiśa’s understanding of the Madhyamaka lineage does not seem to be based on the dichotomy of the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika. In this case, this classification of the Madhyamaka may have been made up by Tibetan translators of the later dissemination, even though Tsong kha pa does not agree with it. If this is the case, however, it is still necessary to explain how the difference of the view on the two truths is dealt with by Indian Madhyamikas, because, as we examined, there are two different views that disagree on interpretation of the concordant ultimate. Furthermore, if we classify Atiśa simply according to his attitude towards inference, regardless of the fact that he follows the Svātantrika teachers in some points, he is no doubt a Prāsaṅgika. Then, we also have to explain how the current within the externalist Madhyamaka changed from the Svātantrika which was the main stream at least until the end of the 8th C to the Prāsaṅgika which became popular after 1000 AD.

The other hypothesis is the theory that there were Prāsaṅgikas who were not ‘pure’ Prāsaṅgikas. In other words, there was a Prāsaṅgika system which does not strictly follow Candrakīrti’s. This might sound abrupt, but it seems to me that the attitude of Atiśa towards formal logic is surely that of the Prāsaṅgika. This theory could also
explain most of the problems surrounding Atisa's position.

The clue which may solve this problem is the existence of (at least) two Bhāvivekas: one is the author of the Prajñāpradīpa and the Madhyamakārthdayakārikā, and the other of the Madhyamakaratinapradīpa,169 whom I henceforth call Bhāviveka and Bhavya respectively for the purpose of convenience. As is stated in the Bodhimārgaprādīpapapañjikā, Atisa mentions the lineage of his teachers: Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Candrakirti, Bhavya-Bhāviveka, Śāntideva and Bodhibhadra. If we assume that this is in a chronological order, it is very likely that he regarded Bhavya-Bhāviveka as later than Candrakirti. This suggests that he attaches importance to the Madhyamakaratinapradīpa of Bhavya, which refers to Candrakirti on many occasions. To give an example, verse 6:80 of the Madhyamakāvatāra, which is quoted in the Satyadvayāvatāra170 is also quoted in the Madhyamakaratinapradīpa of Bhavya.171 In addition to this, the five mūla teachers Atisa

169 Through the examination of quotations, Yamaguchi [1943] concludes that the Madhyamakaratinapradīpa is not a genuine work of Bhāviveka.

170 Verse 19 of the Satyadvayāvatāra. See 3.4.1, passage [3-63] (p. 182).


so so skye bo'i dus na'ang stong pa nyid thos nas//
nang du rab tu dga' ba yang dang yang du 'byung//
rab tu dga' ba las byung mchik mas mig bslan zhih//
lus kyi ba spu ldang bar gyur ba gang yin pa/6:4//
de la rdzogs pa'i sangs rgyas bto yi sa bon yodd/
de nyid nye bar bstan pa'i snod ni de yin tsets/
de la dam pa'i don gyi bden pa bstan par byall/
de la de yis rjes su 'gro ba'i yon tan 'byung//6:5//
The original Sanskrit is found in the Subhūtisamgraha (Bendall [1905] p. 13, 19-25):

prtagjanate 'pi nisamya sīnyataṃ pramodam antar labhate mulur mululi /
prasādajāśrāvanipātalocanāh tanūnhotphullatamsa ca jāyate ll
yat tasya sambodhidhiyo 'stī bijāṇa tattvopadeśasya ca bhājanam sah l
ākhacyam asmai paramārthhasatyaṃ tadanvayāś tasya guṇā bhavanti ll

These verses are quoted in the Madhyamakaratinapradīpa, as follows (Derge ed. No. 3854 tsha 277b5-6, Peking ed. No. 5254 tsha 349b7-8):

so so skye bo'i dus na stong nyid thos(1) //nang gi dga' ba yang dang yang ni 'byung//
dga' ba las byung mig ni mchil mas gang//lus kyi ba spu ldang ba 'ang skye bar 'gyur//
gang yin de la byang chub sa bon yodd//don dam bden pa de la bstan par byall//
de rtogs(2) pa yi yon tan de las byung//

They are quite different from the Tibetan translation of the Madhyamakāvatāra shown above. The quotation of the same verses is found in the Bodhimārgaprādīpapapañjikā of Atiśa (Derge ed. 3948 khi 269a7-b1, Peking ed. No. 5344 ki 310b8-311a1):

so so skye bo'i dus na stong nyid thos//nang gi dga' ba yang dang yang du 'byung//
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mentions in the Ramakaranādghaṭa are all found in the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa. Maticitra is mentioned by name in the seventh chapter\(^{122}\) and verse 13 of Kambala's Ālokamālā is quoted in the fifth chapter.\(^{123}\) It is evident that Atiśa regards Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Maticitra, Kambala and Candrakīrti, who are found in the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa of Bhavya, as the authors of the mūla Madhyamaka texts and seemingly considers that the Madhyamaka was divided into different branches after Bhāviveka. Atiśa's dependence on the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa can also be known from the history of his translation. Among the works ascribed to Bhavya or Bhāviveka which were translated into Tibetan by Atiśa, the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa is the first one which was translated when he was still in India.\(^{124}\) In the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa, moreover, Bhavya refers to the Pañcaskandhaprakarāṇa\(^{125}\) of Candrakīrti by name and quotes on four occasions from the Triśaraṇasaptati\(^{126}\) of Candrakīrti. They are the only works of Candrakīrti translated by Atiśa.\(^{127}\)

Therefore, it is almost certain that Atiśa has the later Bhavya in mind when he mentions Bhavya-Bhāviveka\(^{128}\) in the Bodhimārgapradīpapannikā even though it seems that Atiśa does not realise that Bhāviveka, the author of the Prajñāpradīpa and the

\[
\begin{align*}
da' ba las byung mig ni mchi mas gang // lus kyi spu ldang ba yang skye bar 'gyur//
gang yin de la byang chub sa bon yod// don dam bden pa de la bstan par bya//
der rto gs pa yi yon tan de las 'byung//
\end{align*}
\]

This difference may have been caused in the process of translation and the original Sanskrit may have been the same. However, lack of pāda b in verse 6:5 quoted in the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa and the Bodhimārgapradīpapannikā seems to suggest more relation between the two texts. It may be, on the other hand, nothing significant if we consider the fact that the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa was translated into Tibetan by Atiśa.

\(^{122}\) Madhyamakaratnapradīpa (Derge ed. No. 3854 tsha 282a2, Peking ed. No. 5254 tsha 355b2).

\(^{123}\) This is pointed out by Yamaguchi [1943] p. 87.

\(^{124}\) Madhyamakaratnapradīpa (Derge ed. No. 3854 tsha 272b4-5, Peking ed. No. 5254 tsha 343a2-3).

\(^{125}\) This is pointed out by Lindtner [1982a] p. 175.


\(^{127}\) Madhyamakaratnapradīpa (Derge ed. No. 3854 tsha 266b4, Peking ed. No. 5254 tsha 335b3).

\(^{128}\) Madhyamakaratnapradīpa (Derge ed. No. 3854 tsha 284b6, Peking ed. No. 5254 tsha 327b2-3 [=v. 3 of the Triśaraṇasaptati], D. 272a7-b1, 275b6, P. 342b5, 347a6 [=v. 28] and D. 284b6, P. 359a3 [=v. 4]). See Lindtner [1982a] p. 175.


\(^{130}\) Pānṭa [1983] and Lindtner [1981] point out that Atiśa's Satyadvayāvatāra has close relation to Bhavya's Madhyamakaratnapradīpa.
Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā, and Bhavya who wrote the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa are not identical. In this case, Bhavya’s view which Atiśa assumes and Bhāviveka’s view that we know as a Svātantrika may not possibly be the same and reference to Bhavya by Atiśa probably amounts to little regarding the classification of Atiśa as a Prāsaṅgika. On the other hand, it should be noted that Atiśa may not have been very interested in Candrakīrti himself. It is probably because Bhavya mentions the Triśaraṇasaptati and recommends reading the Pañcaskandhapракarana that Atiśa translated these works of Candrakīrti into Tibetan. If he considered Candrakīrti’s works more important than those of Bhāviveka’s, he would have translated other works of Candrakīrti, especially the Madhyamakāvāvatāra and the Prasannapadā into Tibetan although we have to note that the Triśaraṇasaptati and the Pañcaskandhapракarana as well as the Madhyamakāvāvatāra are considered Candrakīrti’s own works that are not commentaries on his predecessors.

In order to assure ourselves of this matter, it is now necessary to examine the view of the two truths in the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa of Bhavya.

3.5 Bhavya

In the previous section, I examined Atiśa’s view of the two truths in order to decide his position in terms of the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction. Assuming that the Mādhyamikas who do not accept the concordant ultimate are the Prāsaṅgika, as we discussed above in this chapter, Atiśa is classified as a Prāsaṅgika. However, some evidence shows that he considers Bhāviveka, whom he does not distinguish from Bhavya, more important than Candrakīrti. I hypothesised that Atiśa followed Bhavya’s position that was expressed in the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa, which was possibly different from that of Bhāviveka expressed in the Prajñāpradīpa and the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā. In this section, therefore, we will examine the view of the two truths expressed in the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa and compare it with those in the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā.

179 Even if we take this position and assume that Atiśa considers that the final position of Bhavya/Bhāviveka is expressed in the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa, it is not clear how he reconciled two different views of Bhavya and Bhāviveka, whom he does not distinguish.

180 Therefore it is also possible that Indian teachers at Atiśa’s time, unlike modern scholars, considered the Triśaraṇasaptati and the Pañcaskandhapракarana were the main works of Candrakīrti.
and the *Satyadvayavatāra*. Substantial studies on the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* have already done by Yamaguchi, Hasuba, Lindtner, Ejima and Miyazaki.\(^{181}\) Hasuba, Lindtner and Ejima have already translated the *satyadvaya* chapter.\(^{182}\) Therefore, I will show only passages relevant to the matter concerning us.

With regard to the date of this text, we do not know for certain when it was written. It is impossible to trace from the author because it is ascribed to Bhavya, who has traditionally been understood as Bhāviveka. As a result, it has to be decided by examining the contents and the history of translation. As we have seen, in the fifth chapter of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, Bhavya mentions the distinction of the externalist and the internalist within the Madhyamaka, which must have occurred after Śāntarakṣita (724-788). Also his definition of the conventional truth is very similar to that of Śāntarakṣita. Therefore, Bhavya is, in all probability, after Śāntarakṣita. It also quotes from Padmavajra’s *Guhyasiddhi* Saraha’s *Dohakośa*, Nāgārjuna’s *Pañcakrama* and Āryadeva’s *Śvādīśṭhānakramaprabhedha*. Although it is not certain exactly when these texts were written, it is considered to be around the 9th C.\(^{183}\) On the other hand, Atiśa (982-1055) translated the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*. According to its postscript, he translated it in Somapuri. This means that it is before he left India for Tibet in 1040. Therefore, the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* is tentatively placed between the later half of the 9th C and the beginning of 11th C. If we take into consideration that it can take a considerable duration of time for a forged work to obtain authenticity, it is most probable that it was composed in the late 9th C or in the first half of the 10th C.


\(^{182}\) See Lindtner [1981] pp. 169-177, Ejima [1980b] and [1983] pp. 374-382. Ejima [1983] examines the relationship between the *Satyadvayavatāra* and the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*. Here I mainly follow his study and there is not much to add concerning their relationship. However, he does not give a conclusion concerning the historical position of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* and leaves it as a point to be examined in the future. Lindtner [1982a], on the other hand, considers that the author of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* is the same as that of the *Prajñāpradīpa* and the *Madhyamakasūtrakārikā* (whom he calls Bhavya). Nevertheless, the view on the two truths in the former seems to me to be different from that in the latter two.

Therefore, although the most of this section overlaps with the studies of Lindtner and Ejima, it is necessary to show the similarity of the two texts here again in order to ascertain the view of the two truths and the historical position of Bhavya and the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*.

\(^{183}\) Hadano maintains that the date of Jñānapāda, the teacher of Padmavajra is ca. 750-800 and Padmavajra’s date is the late 8th C to the early 9th C.
Chapter 3 Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika

The Madhyamakaratnapradīpa consists of 9 chapters. Of these, the first one is allotted to an examination of the two truths. As already pointed out by Ejima, its contents are strikingly similar to those of Atiśa’s *Satyadvayāvatāra*, which also deals with the two truths. Atiśa’s view on the two truths is rather strange in terms of its having both characteristics of the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika. While Atiśa does not accept the concordant ultimate in line with Candrakīrti, his explanation of the conventional truth is quite similar to those of Jñānagarbha and Śaṅtarakṣita. He considers the conventional truth to be ‘consistent with seeing’ as Jñānagarbha does, and defines the true convention as (1) pleasing as long as it is not examined, (2) subject to arising and cessation and (3) capable of causal efficiency, in the same way as Śaṅtarakṣita. As Ejima points out, these characteristics are also found in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*. For example, the definitions of the conventional truth are very similar to that in the *Satyadvayāvatāra*:

[3-75]

That which is pleasing as long as it is not examined, arises from a cause and is capable of causal efficiency, like a stem of plantain, is the [true] convention (*saṃvṛti*) of those who see this side.185

In this way, the convention is defined as (1) pleasing as long as it is not examined, (2) causally produced and (3) capable of causal efficiency in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* in a similar way to the *Satyadvayāvatāra* of Atiśa. Although these definitions are generally regarded as those of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas because they are found in

185 *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* (Derge ed. No. 3854 tsha 260a2, Peking ed. No. 5254 tsha 326b7-8):

chu shing gi ni phung po bzhin// ma brtags nyams dag'i mtshan nyid can//
rgya las skyes dang don byed nus// tshu rol mthong ba'i kun rdzob yin//

Cf. the *Satyadvayāvatāra*, v. 3 (3.4.1, passage [3-65] p. 183):

A phenomenon which is pleasing only as long as it is not examined, which arises and ceases to exist and which is capable of causal efficiency is held to be the true convention.

ma brtags gcig pu nyams dga' ba'i// skye ta dang ni 'jig pa'i chos//
don byed nus dang Idan pa ni// yang dag kun rdzob yin par 'dod// 3 //

The similarity of these two verses is pointed out in Ejima [1983] p. 387, note 42.
Śāntarakṣita’s *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, it seems that they are widely accepted by the late Mādhyamikas irrespective of their view on conventional existence. Bhavya also describes the conventional truth as ‘consistent with seeing’:

[3-76]

The convention is entities “consistent with seeing” (*ji liar snang ba*) such as material things (*gzugs pa, *rūpa*).  

There are also some passages which seem to be taken from the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* and the *Prajñāpradīpa*. However, as Ejima points out, these passages are re-arranged so that they mean that *pramāṇa* is unimportant. In the fifth chapter of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, Bhavya states as follows:

[3-77]

This [ultimate truth] is not understood by two cognitions: that with conceptual construct and that without conceptual construct. The common usage (*tha snyad, *vyavahāra*) of verbal authority (*sgra, *sabda*) and the valid means of knowledge (*thsad ma, *pramāṇa*) are not necessary for cultivation towards the goal.  

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186 The definition based on *arthakriyā* is found in Jñānagarbha’s *Satyadvayavibhanga* and can be traced back to Dharmaññiki. See Eckel [1987] p. 54, and 3.3 of the present thesis.

187 *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* (Derge ed. No. 3854 tsha 260b5, Peking ed. No. 5254 tsha 327b7): kun rdzob ces bya ba ni gzugs la sogs pa ji liar snang ba’i dngos po’o/

188 *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* (Derge ed. No. 3854 tsha 272a6, Peking ed. No. 5254 tsha 342b6): rtog bcas rtog pa med pa yul/ shes pa gnyis kyi/ di mi rtogs/ sgra dang tshad ma’i tha snyad dag/ de don bsgom la dgos pa med/

Ejima [1983] (p. 384, note 11), gives the original verse in the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā*, v. 3:285:

.savikalpavikalpena jñānenāpy esa dūrdśaḥ ll

It is difficult to see this [dharmakāya] with thought either with conceptual construct or without conceptual construct.

According to Ejima, this verse of the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* concerns the dharmakāya. It does not seem, therefore, that it mentions the connection between the ultimate truth and the valid means of knowledge. However, Bhavya quotes this half verse and utilizes it to deny accessibility to the ultimate truth by the valid means of knowledge.


The ācārya, learned Bhavya says that [the ultimate] cannot be clearly understood even from
Chapter 3 Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika

On the occasions when one refutes the objection of outsiders and a treatise is large, verbal authority and the valid means of knowledge should be mentioned, as written by previous teachers.\(^{189}\)

In the *Madhyamakarainapradīpa*, it is explained that verbal authority (śabda) and the valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa) are not necessary for cultivation of the reality and only used to refute outsiders. It seems to me that Bhavya accepts them conventionally and denies their validity ultimately. Atiśa probably holds the same view in the *Satyadvayāvatāra* and the *Bodhimārgaprādīpapañjikā*. He states in the latter, as follows:

\[
\text{[3-78]}
\]

Why were many treatises composed by Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara and others? The learned composed [them] to refute the objection of outsiders.

\(=\text{[3-61]}\)\(^{190}\)

In this verse, Atiśa mentions Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara. Verbal authority (śabda) and the valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa) that Bhavya mentions are replaced by ‘many treatises composed by Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara and others’ in the *Bodhimārgaprādīpapañjikā* of Atiśa. Ejima understands that Atiśa here criticises Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara. However he does not consider that ‘others’ include Bhāviveka, Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and Śrīgupta, who accept the concordant

\[
\text{scriptural authority [or] by [either of] two thoughts: that with conceptual construct or without conceptual construct...}
\]

\[
\text{lung las kyang ni gsal po ru// rtog bcas rtog pa med pa yil//}
\]

\[
\text{shes pa gnyis kyis ni rtog shes// slob dpon mkhas pa bha bya gsung// 14 //}
\]


\(^{189}\) *Madhyamakarainapradīpa* (Derge ed. No. 3854 tsha 272b1-2, Peking ed. No. 5254 tsha 342b6): pha rol rgol ba bzlog pa dang// bstan bcos chen po'i dus dag tu//

\[
\text{snong giy mi mkhas pas bkod pa bzhiin// sgra dang tshad ma'ang smra bya//}
\]

Cf. *Satyadvayāvatāra*, v.13cd:

The learned make use of [pramāṇa] to refute the claim of outsiders.

\[
\text{mu stegs rgol ba bzlog pa'i phyir // mkhas pa rams kyis byas pa yin// 13cd //}
\]

\(^{190}\) *Bodhimārgaprādīpapañjikā* (Derge ed. No. 3948 khi 282b5, Peking ed. No. 5344 ki 326b6-7):

\[
\text{chos grags chos mchog la sogs pas// gzhung mang byas pa ji lla bu//}
\]

\[
\text{mu stegs rgol ba bzlog pa'i phyir// mkhas pa rams kyis byas pa yin//}
\]

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ultimate. As the reason for this, Ejima points out the fact that when Atiśa gives the four kinds of reasoning to prove lack of intrinsic nature in the same text, he accepts the reasoning of Śāntarakṣita and Śrīgupta. Nevertheless this is not tenable if Atiśa here follows Bhavya because we find a similar expression again in the seventh chapter of the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa:

[3-79]

On occasions when one refutes the claims of outsiders, a large treatise is written and a large dispute should happen, the Madhyamaka texts of reasoning should be mentioned.

In this verse, instead of verbal authority and the valid means of knowledge or many treatises composed by Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara and others, the Madhyamaka texts of reasoning (rigs pa'i dbu ma'i gzhung) are mentioned. Again they are not regarded as an effective means to reach the ultimate truth, but as a means to refute outsiders and so forth. Even though Bhavya does not mention who the authors of these texts are, it is likely that they are the Svātantrikas. Therefore if Atiśa expresses the same view in the Bodhimārgaprādīpapañjīkā, he may include the Mādhyamikas who wrote the texts concerning reasoning in ‘others’. It should also be pointed out that Bhavya does not necessarily criticise the Madhyamaka texts of reasoning in this verse. On the contrary, this verse should be understood as his acceptance of these texts at the conventional level. It is neither the Madhyamaka texts of reasoning nor the treatises composed by Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara and others, but those who consider that these texts are valid to attain the ultimate truth that are here criticised by Atiśa.

In the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa, thus the valid means of knowledge and reasoning


192 This is the reasoning of 'lack of one intrinsic nature and many' which is quoted as [3-44] (p. 159). Also see Tillemans [1984] (p. 361 and p. 371 note 16).

193 Madhyamakaratnapradīpa (Derge ed. No. 3854 tsha 281a3, Peking ed. No. 5254 tsha 354a5-6):
pha rol rgyal ba bzlag pa dang/ bstan bcos chen po'i gzhung dang ni/
rtsod pa chen po byung dus su/ rigs pa'i dbu ma'i gzhung smra byal/
are constantly given only a low position in the conventional world. In addition to this, Bhavya’s definitions of the ultimate truth lack the most important mark of the Svātantrika:

[3-80]

\[ \text{Artha [of paramārtha] means what is to be examined and to be grasped.} \]

\[ \text{Parama is ultimate. Alternatively (1) [paramārtha means] the ultimate object because it is the object and is ultimate. (karmadhāraya compound)} \]

\[ \text{Alternatively (2) [paramārtha means] the object of the ultimate. It is the object of the ultimate because it is the object of the ultimate wisdom. (tatpuruṣa compound) The truth should not falsify.}\]

These interpretations of the ultimate (paramārtha) are almost identical with those in the Tarkajñāla, except that there is no interpretation as a bahuvrihi compound which is a sign of the Svātantrika interpretation of the ultimate truth. This implies that Bhavya composed a treatise based on Bhāviveka’s works but eliminated the Svātantrika elements. It is therefore appropriate to classify Bhavya, the author of the Madhyamakaratnapradipa, as a Prāsaṅgika in that he does not accept the concordant ultimate. It is also conceivable that it is absolutely necessary for Bhavya to admit that ‘the Madhyamaka texts of reasoning’ should be mentioned when one refutes outsiders in order to keep consistency, to a certain extent, because while inference is positively employed in the Prajñāpradīpa and the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā, the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa, which is supposed to be composed by the same author is written from the point of the view of the Prāsaṅgika.

Thus it is evident that Atiśa follows the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa of Bhavya who can be regarded as a Prāsaṅgika, concerning the two truths. Even though Atiśa’s definitions of the convention are almost identical with that of the Svātantrika, they are

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194 Madhyamakaratnapradīpa (Derge ed. No. 3854 tsha 260b6-7, Peking ed. tsha 327b8-328a1):

don zhes bya ba ni brtag par bya ba dang/ go bar bya ba’o II dam pa ni mehog go / yang na
don yang yin la / dam pa yang yin pas don dam pa’o II yang na dam pa’i don de ye shes dam
pa’i don yin pas na dam pa’i don no II bden pa ni mi bslu ba’o//

Compare this with the Tarkajñāla, passage [3-26] (p. 144).

195 Also this can be the first reference to the Svātantrika by the Prāsaṅgika after Candrākīrti.
not his original but traced back to Bhavya. In addition, his understanding of the Madhyamaka lineage is very strange at a glance, but it can be explained clearly depending on the Madhyamakaratnapradipa. Here being a Prāsaṅgika does not necessarily mean to be a follower of Candrakīrti. I rather define it as a Mādhyamika who does not accept the concordant ultimate and accepts the valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa) including inference (anumāṇa) only for conventional purposes, such as the refutation of outsiders.

3.6 Conclusion

Generally speaking, both by Tibetan doxographers and modern scholars, the history of the Madhyamaka has been explained in the following simple way: After Nāgārjuna founded the Madhyamaka, there was no distinction until Bhāviveka criticised Buddhapālita, and Candrakīrti, in support of Buddhapālita, objected to Bhāviveka’s use of inference. This created the distinction of the Svātantrika of Bhāviveka and the Prāsaṅgika of Candrakīrti. Then Śāntarakṣita founded the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka by postulating mind-only conventionally and the Svātantrika was divided into two, the internalist and the externalist, namely the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka and the Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka. This can be shown as follows:

```
Nāgārjuna-Āryadeva
  ↓
Bhāviveka
  ↓
Śāntarakṣita - Kamalaśīla (Yogācāra-Svātantrika)
    ↓
Candrakīrti
```

Atiśa (Prāsaṅgika)

(Sautrāntika-Svātantrika)

As we discussed in the first chapter, however, there has been a doubt about existence of the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika distinction in India after Candrakīrti. At least, we have not found the term ‘Svātantrika’ and ‘Prāsaṅgika’ in Indian sources in a strict sense. Nevertheless, it is evident that there were sharply divided opinions on how to interpret the ultimate (paramārtha) at the time of Atiśa. The Svātantrika teachers whom I mentioned in this chapter, Bhāviveka, Avalokitavrata, Jñānagarbha, the anonymous
author of the Bodhisattvacaryāvatāravākyākhyanapaññikā, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, Haribhadra and Jītāri, distinguish the concordant ultimate, which is teaching of non-arising from the non-conceptual ultimate. They mostly explain the former ultimate as ‘one which is conformable to paramārtha’ (paramārthānukūla), consistent with reasoning (*yathāanyāya) or the concordant ultimate (*saṅketikaparamārtha), and secure the validity of inference at the ultimate level. On the other hand, Candrakīrti, a Prāṣaṅgika, maintains only one paramārtha, which is beyond any conceptualisation. Since the Svātantrikas, too, concede that paramārtha is free from any conceptual activity, disagreement between the two sides is based on the use of inference as a means to reach the ultimate truth and on inclusion of it in paramārtha as the concordant ultimate. The system of Bhāviveka, which postulates different levels of the ultimate, is followed by many Svātantrika teachers, with some modification, throughout the middle and the later period of the Madhyamaka.

Although they are classified into the Svātantrika according to their understanding of the ultimate, they have different views on the convention. While it is not clear who is the first to maintain the mind-only conventionally among the Svātantrikas, it is generally accepted that Śāntarakṣita is the founder of the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka. Śāntarakṣita himself, on the other hand, comments on the Satyadvayavibhanga of Jñānagarbha from the point of view of the internalist Madhyamaka. Jñānagarbha himself seems to have held the internalist view as well. Jñānagarbha is, nevertheless, often regarded as an externalist Mādhyamika by dGe lugs doxographers of Tibet and probably also by the anonymous author of the Bodhisattvacaryāvatāravākyākhyanapaññikā. Therefore, it may be the case that the bifurcation of the internalist and the externalist occurred because of a dispute over how to understand Jñānagarbha’s view.

While we are able to trace the Svātantrika thought reasonably well back to Indian sources, it is difficult for us to do the same with regard to the Prāṣaṅgika thought. Although the Prāṣaṅgika has been regarded as the main stream of the Madhyamaka in Tibet since Tsong kha pa, there are hardly any distinctive traces of it in India for some 200 years after Candrakīrti (ca. 600-650) until Bhavya (ca. 9-10th C). Ye shes sde (early 9th C), in the Ita ba’i khyad par, one of the earliest doxographical accounts written in Tibet, does not mention Candrakīrti but Bhāviveka, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla.
Additionally, during the earlier dissemination of Buddhism into Tibet, only one work of Candrakīrti was translated into Tibetan. Śāntideva, the author of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, is the only Indian teacher after Candrakīrti before the 9th C who is widely considered as a Prāsaṅgika. The older version of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, which consists of 9 chapters and is ascribed to Aṃśūyamati, is commented upon by the above mentioned anonymous commentator from the point of the view of the Svātantrika. There is, thus, virtually no clue that indicates what happened to the Prāsaṅgika before the 9th C. It is therefore impossible for us to know whether or not it kept a separate lineage from the Svātantrika. Anyway, we can assume that Candrakīrti did not win popularity for a long time. It is, however, not difficult to explain why there are many accounts of Bhāviveka but not of Candrakīrti.

By Dignāga (5-6th C) and Dharmakīrti (ca. 600-660), Buddhist logic was systematised. After Dignāga, use of formal logic in the form of syllogism was considered necessary to prove the legitimacy of one’s view. In this period, the Madhyamikas who took advantage of inference to explain non-arising taught by Nāgārjuna, followers of Bhāviveka, were able to dispute with their rivals. On the other hand, Candrakīrti who was not positive in his use of inference might have been easily underestimated. The systematisation of Buddhist logic and epistemology by Dharmakīrti probably caused further changes in the Madhyamaka. As we examined in this chapter, it is those who interpreted Dharmakīrti’s theory from the Madhyamaka point of view who are later called the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamikas. Śāntarakṣita quotes many verses from Dharmakīrti in the Madhyamakālaṃkāra-vṛtti and Jītārī regards him as a Madhyamika in the Sugatavibhaṅgabhaṣya. To follow Dharmakīrti’s theory conventionally may have meant acceptance of mind-only conventionally. This may possibly have resulted in establishment of the internalist Madhyamaka, which is generally called the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka.

We do not know thus if the externalist Madhyamikas formed two distinct lineages, the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika, but, if they did, the situation seems to have changed towards the time when the Madhyamakaratrānapradīpa was composed. This forged work was most probably intended to make everyone believe that Bhāviveka was indeed a
Prāsaṅgika, and to integrate the two factions, although it is not known whether this current of integration was created depending on the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa or had existed before it. Once this text became authoritative, the valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa) was adopted by the externalist Mādhyamikas only to refute outsiders but not as means to reach the ultimate. If we take into account that no work of the externalist Svātantrika-Madhyamaka written after 1000 AD. is known to us, we can tentatively assume that the two branches of the externalist Mādhyamikas, if they had existed, were integrated, in the way we can see in the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa and the Satyadvayāvatāra, which can be called Prāsaṅgika in the sense that they do not regard inference as a means of cultivation towards the ultimate. On the other hand, if the externalist Mādhyamikas did not form two factions after Candrakīrti, they may have altered their view from the Svātantrika of Bhāviveka to the Prāsaṅgika of Bhavya, in opposition to the internalist Madhyamaka.

Either way, Dharmakīrti’s logic and epistemology and the systematisation of the internalist Madhyamaka played an important role in deciding the direction of the externalist Madhyamaka in the late period. It should be noted that even though the externalist Mādhyamikas were probably almost exclusively Prāsaṅgika after the 10th C, their view was not the same as that of Candrakīrti, especially concerning the definition of the conventional truth. On the other hand, the Svātantrika seems to have become almost exclusively internalist.

Thus if the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa was widely regarded as an authoritative work of Bhāviveka in India, it is possible for us to explain why we can hardly find any evidence of the distinction between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika in the late Madhyamaka works and why Candrakīrti obtained popularity after 1000 AD.

To conclude, it seems that what actually happened in the Indian Madhyamaka history after Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti is more complicated than is generally understood. In the middle period, while Candrakīrti was not recognised, Bhāviveka appears frequently in the history. It is not certain if the Prāsaṅgika thought had a separate lineage in this period. After the 10th C, on the other hand, trace of the externalist Svātantrika-Madhyamaka is hardly found and Candrakīrti reappears in the history. The latest text that contains the
externalist Svātantrika view is, as far as I know, the *Bodhicaryavatāravyākhyaṇapāñjikā*. The earliest text that clearly mentions Candrakīrti and the Prāsaṅgika thought is the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* (ca. late 9th-10th C). Therefore it is plausible that this presumed shift of the externalist view happened around the 9th C. This seems to be the result of integration of the externalist Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika or the externalist Svātantrika altering its view into that of the Prāsaṅgika. We can assume, therefore, that the externalist Madhyamaka was the Prāsaṅgika and the internalist Madhyamaka was the Svātantrika after this period. The *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* is considered to have played a crucial role in this change.

As we have seen in the previous chapter, there was another shift from sākāra to nirākāra in the externalist Madhyamaka. If we take both shifts into consideration, it is possible to draw the following conclusion. The externalist Madhyamaka maintained the conventional existence of external objects and self-awareness that is cognition with images, as is seen in the *Bodhisattvacaryavatāravyākhyaṇapāñjikā*, and was Svātantrika at the early stage of the late Madhyamaka. This seems to have changed by the time of Atiśa, so that it maintained conventional existence of external objects and cognition without images through denial of self-awareness, and became Prāsaṅgika. The most likely explanation is that this was caused in contention with the internalist Madhyamaka which denied the conventional existence of external objects, maintained self-awareness that is cognition with images and was Svātantrika so that their thoughts hold a clear contrast. As a result of this, their position became as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>external objects</th>
<th>self-awareness</th>
<th>ākāra</th>
<th>Prāsaṅgika/Svātantrika</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Externalist</strong></td>
<td>existence of external objects</td>
<td>no self-awareness</td>
<td>nirākāra</td>
<td>Prāsaṅgika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internalist</strong></td>
<td>no external objects</td>
<td>self-awareness</td>
<td>sākāra</td>
<td>Svātantrika</td>
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</table>

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Now we can explain the reason why we cannot find the dichotomy of the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika explicitly in Indian sources. There was probably no distinction of the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika in the externalist Madhyamaka after the 10th C as we examined in this chapter. The actual opposition existed between the internalist Madhyamaka and the externalist Madhyamaka. Because being the Svātantrika or the Prāsaṅgika was just an attribute of the internalist Madhyamika or the externalist Madhyamika, they were named according to their view on external objects and were probably not given another name that was only based on their view on inference. In addition, in the late period, this dichotomy did not exist in the externalist Madhyamaka, in the way we would expect from an opposition between Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti.
Chapter 4 Māyopamādhyamakā and Sarvadharmāpratisthānāvādīn

As Ruegg mentioned it in the *Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India*, the classification of Mādhyamikas into the Māyopamādhyamakā and the Sarvadharmāpratisthānāvādīn is present in the *Tattvaratnaśāla* of Advayavajra (ca. 11th C). It is, however, not entirely clear, from the very obscure description in the *Tattvaratnaśāla*, what is the difference of views between these proponents. Ruegg does not discuss much about what they postulate, either. As we examined in the first chapter, Tibetan accounts do not help for a definite answer due to their disagreement. Some dGe lugs teachers, such as lCang kya and 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, interpreting Tsong kha pa’s description, regard this classification as a different way of describing the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika. Others in the dGe lugs order deny validity of this classification. Tsong kha pa himself explains that this classification is based on different views of the ultimate truth according to some former teachers, and that these teachers consider it something to do with appearance (*snang ba*). On the other hand, according to Mi bskyod rdo rje, who belongs to the bKa brgyud pa, Advayavajra holds the view of the Nirākāra-Yogācāra-Mādhyamikā. In short, Tibetan accounts of this classification are divided into at least three different views. Some relate this classification to the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika in one way or another and some to the Sākāra-Nirākāra distinction. Others deny validity of this classification entirely. Fortunately, some other works written by Advayavajra survive. Of these, in the *Pañcataṭhāgatamudrāvivaraṇa*, he mentions a little more about this classification. Moreover, Ratnākaraśānti (B) seems to mention this way of classification in the *Triyānavyavasthāna*, but does not use the terms Māyopamādhyamakāvādīn and Sarvadharmāpratisthānāvādīn. The following sections are allotted to the examination of these Indian texts and others in order to ascertain the reliability of these Tibetan accounts and to clarify the difference of views between the Māyopamādhyamakāvādīn and the

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1 Ruegg [1981a] (p. 58 note 174).
2 Ilayashi [1999] maintains that the Ratnākaraśānti who is the author of the *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* and the *Mādhyamakālaṃkāropadeśa* is different from the Ratnākaraśānti who wrote the *Triyānavyavasthāna*. In this thesis, I call the former Ratnākaraśānti or Ratnākaraśānti (A) and the latter Ratnākaraśānti (B), following Ilayashi’s study.
Chapter 4 Mäyopamädvayavädin and Sarvadharmäpratiṣṭhānavädin

Sarvadharmäpratiṣṭhānavädin as well as who they are.

4.1 Mäyopamädvayavädin and Sarvadharmäpratiṣṭhānavädin described by Advayavajra

4.1.1 Tattvaratnavali

Advayavajra seems to have lived around the 11th C in Vikramaśīla. According to the Deb ther sngon po, he was a contemporary of Ratnakaraśānti (A).³ Therefore we know roughly when he lived but are not sure about his doctrinal position.⁴ As Ruegg reports, it is in the Tattvaratnavali that the classification into the Mäyopamädvayavädin and the Sarvadharmäpratiṣṭhānavädin is mentioned. I will therefore, first present the translation of its passages that concern this classification:

[4-1]

The superior is the Mädhyamika. Of the [Mädhyamikas], the explanation of the Mäyopamädvayavädin [is as follows]:

Neither existent, nor non-existent, nor both existent and non-existent, nor even the nature of neither [existent nor non-existent].

The Mädhyamikas know that the reality is free from the four alternatives (catuskoti). (v. 25)

And this is its meaning. Not existent because [existence is] subject to a contradiction. Nor even non-existent because [it would result in] non-appearance. Nor even both because of the combination of both faults. Nor

³ According to the Deb ther sngon po, Näro pa was a teacher of Ratnakaraśānti and Advayavajra (Roerich [1976], p. 380, the Deb ther sngon po, 336, 4-5). Iladano [1987] (p. 172,19-p. 173,5) places his lifetime between 986-1065 with 12 years tolerance.

⁴ Takada [1965] reports that Advayavajra expressed that he was a Sarvadharmäpratiṣṭhānavädin in the Caturmudropadesa. It is, however, not clear what his statement is based on. Some scholars have questioned the authenticity of the text because the name Advayavajra is mentioned in it. (See Hayashi [1999] p. 12, note 44) Therefore, it is possible that the Caturmudropadesa was composed by his disciple. On the other hand, Hayashi [1999] holds that Advayavajra is a Mäyopamädvayavädin. Nevertheless, I consider that Advayavajra is a Sarvadharmäpratiṣṭhānavädin. This will be discussed later.
even neither of both because there would be no perception in that way.\(^5\)

[4-2]

On the other hand, this is the examination of the Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavādin:

It is not maintained everything is permanent. And it is not postulated that they are annihilating. They are not a pair of permanent and annihilating. Nor [are they] neither which is without the two. (v. 27)

The wise know the reality of things when not abiding in any [position]. Then this mind which does not perceive its being mind is never conceptualisation. (v. 28)

Because as long as there is superimposition on all [objects], all these never exist in any way, the teaching of Middle is without superimposition. How can there be denial or affirmation there? (v. 29)

Effortless cognition is said to be unthinkable. That which is unthinkable after being considered cannot be unthinkable. (v. 30)

For a wise person by whom the world is understood as unproduced and apprehention (buddhi) is purified through his intelligence, the world is the truth of his own without an effort. (v. 31)\(^6\)

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\(^5\) *Tattvaratnaivalī* (Ui [1952], p. 5, 5-9):

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adhimātṛ mādyamātī kalī l tatra māyopamādvyāvādīnaḥ vivṛtiḥ -
na san nāsan na sadasan na cāpy anubhāyatmakam l
catuṣkoṭivinirmuktam tatvamā mādhyanīkiā vidūl l
asya cāyaṃ arthaḥ l na sad bādhāyogāt, asad api na cābhāsaṇaṇavaśāt, tatha doṣadvandvāt
ublayām api na, nāpy anubhāyam tathābodhābhāvād iti l
(1) Ed. doṣād dvandvād.
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\(^6\) *Tattvaratnaivalī* (Ui [1952], p. 5, 13-23):

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sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavādināṃ tv nyāṃ vicāraḥ -
na mataṃ śāśvataṃ viśvaṃ na cochedi samihitaṃ l
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It is not entirely clear what these two sub-schools maintain from these passages as well as what these passages mean. However, the point which draw our attention most is the difference between the four alternatives (catuskoti). The Māyopamādvayavādins hold that the four alternatives are based on existence and non-existence. The four alternatives for the Sarvadharma-pratiṣṭhānavādin are based on permanence and annihilation. Verse 25 of the Tattvaratnavali is identical with verse 28 of the Jñānasūrasamuccaya. Bodhibhadra, in the commentary on verse 28 of the Jñānasūrasamuccaya, introduces the externalist Madhyamikas and the internalist Madhyamika. However, he does not mention the difference of the four alternatives. Therefore, it is not likely that the distinction of the Māyopamādvayavādin and the Sarvadharma-pratiṣṭhānavādin is the same as that of the internalist and the externalist.

As seen in the first chapter, some dGe lugs doxographers identifies the Māyopamādvayavādin and the Sarvadharma-pratiṣṭhānavādin with the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika. As we examined in chapter 3, nevertheless, it is very likely that the externalist Madhyamika and the internalist Madhyamika were the Prāsaṅgika and the Svātantrika around the 11th C, on the basis of the examination of Atiśa’s accounts. If this is the case, and if the externalist Madhyamika and the internalist Madhyamika both maintain the four alternatives based on existence and non-existence, the Māyopamādvaya-
vādin and the Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānāvādin cannot be respectively identical with the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika. It is possible for us to be sure of this from the fact that this verse mentioning the four alternatives based on existence and non-existence is found also in the Sugatamatavibhaṅgakārikā of Jitārī⁸ and the Bodhicaryāvatārapaṇḍīka of Prajinākaramati.⁹ Jitārī is regarded as a Svātantrika as seen in the previous chapter. Also the dGe lugs doxographers accept it.¹⁰ On the other hand, because we can safely assume that Prajinākaramati accepts the conventional existence of external objects, it follows that the externalist Mādhyamikas maintain that the four alternatives are based on existence. Prajinākaramati’s position concerning the use of inference is not clear. However, he comments on the Bodhicaryāvatāra following Candrakīrti and it would not be acceptable for the dGe lugs doxographers that he is regarded as a Svātantrika. Both Jitārī and Prajinākaramati adopt the four alternatives based on existence, which are maintained also by the Māyopamādvavādin, and neither of them mentions any distinction in views of the four alternatives. Therefore, although dGe lugs teachers, such as 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa and lCang kya, hold that the Māyopamādvavādin and the Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānāvādin are other designations of the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika, we cannot readily believe it.

While the verse which gives the four alternatives based on existence is found in some other texts,¹¹ those based on permanence and annihilation, which the

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⁸ Shirasaki [1986] p. 15. Sugatamatavibhaṅga, v. 8 (Derge ed. No. 3899 a 8a3, Peking ed. 5296 ha 64b7-8):
yod min med min yod med min // gnyis kyi bdag nyid du yang med //
mtha’ bzhi dag las nges grol ba // dbu ma de nyid mkhas pa ’dod //

However, the same verse in the Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya is as follows (Derge ed. No. 3900 a 6063, Peking ed. No. 5868 nyo 348b5-6):
yod min med min yod med min // gnyi ga min pa’i bdag nyid min//
de nyid mtha’ bzhi las grol bal// dbu ma pa yis rtogs pa yin//

Shirasaki [1986] also shows that Advayavajra’s commentary on this verse is similar to that on the verse 8 of the Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya by Jitārī. See passage [3-55] (p. 171) quoted above.

⁹ Bodhicaryāvatārapaṇḍīka (La Vallée Poussin [1914] p. 358, 10-11):
na san nāsan na sadasan na cāpy anubhayātma Bestam i
catuskoṭi viśnirūpta tattvamādhyamikā vidūtii

¹⁰ dKon mchog ’jigs med dbang po, for example, classifies Jitārī as a Nirākāra-Mādhyamika that is classified into the Svātantrika. See, l.1.

¹¹ Subhāṣitasaṃgraha (Bendall [1905] p. 15, 9-10):
Sarvadharmāpratisthānāvādin maintains, are less common. It is, however, probably worth mentioning that Bhavya, in the Madhyamakaratanapradīpa, quotes the verses which teach the four alternatives based on existence and non-existence and those based on permanence and annihilation from a work of Āryadeva\textsuperscript{12} and that Atiśa also mentions both kinds of the four alternatives in the Bodhimārgapradīpapañjīkā.\textsuperscript{13} This may suggest that the distinction of the two kinds of the four alternatives is not important for Bhavya and Atiśa. If we regard Bhavya and Atiśa as Prāsaṅgikas,\textsuperscript{14} this also shows that the Prāsaṅgika accepts both kinds of the four alternatives. Unfortunately, having mentioned both kinds of the four alternatives, they do not explain anything about the difference between the two and we need other clues in order to find out the difference.

Thus we can find a criterion to distinguish Māyopamādvavyāvādin and the Sarvadharmāpratisthānāvādin in the Tattvaratnāvali, but it does not help us understand the views which they respectively hold or the difference in their views. Therefore, we now go on to examine the Paścātathāgatamudrāvivāraṇa, in which Advayavajra explains the views of the Māyopamādvavyāvādin and the Sarvadharmāpratisthānāvādin. In the following section, the translation is first given in its entirety, although it is slightly long.

\begin{verbatim}
na san nāsan na sadasan na cāpy anubhayātmakam I
catūṣkoṭiṣvinirmuktā tattvāṃ mādhyamikā vidūḥ II
Cf. Sarvadarśanasamgraha (Abhyankar [1924] p. 29):
atas tattvāṃ sadasadubhayātmātmaḥcatatūṣkoṭiṣvinirmuktā śūnyam eva I
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{12}Madhyamakaratanapradīpa (Derge ed. 3854 tsha 272a6-7, Peking ed. No. 5254 tsha 342b3-4):
\begin{verbatim}
    rje btuṅ a’ā rya de bas kyang//
yod min med min yod med min// gnyi ga med pa ma yin lα//
    mu bzhi las ni mam grol ba// de nyid dbu ma pa yis rig//
    rtag pa ma yin chad pa min// rtag dang chad pa gnyi ga min//
    mtha’ bzhi las ni mam grol ba// de don dbu ma pa yis rig//
ces gsungs so//
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{13}Bodhimārgapradīpapañjīkā (Derge ed. 3948 khi 282b6-7, Peking ed. No. 5344 khi 326b8-327a1):
\begin{verbatim}
yod min med min yod med min// gnyi ga min pa’ang ma yin pa’i//
    mtha’ bzhi las ni mam grol ba’i// de nyid dbu ma pa yis rig//
    rtag min chad min rtag chad min// gnyi ga min pa’ang ma yin pa’i//
    mu bzhi las ni mam grol ba’i// de nyid dbu ma pa yis rtogs//
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{14}For the position of Bhavya and Atiśa, see chapter 3.
4.1.2 Translation of *Pañcatathāgatamudrāvivarana*

[4-3]

Homage to Vajrasattva.

Material things (rūpa) and other [constituents] which arise dependently, which are devoid of conceptualisation, which are empty, which are not substantially existent by nature, which are not subject to destruction, whose sole nature is various mind and which are the five Jinas are supreme. (v. 1)

The five Tathāgatas are the five constituents. Of these, the [first] four, [i.e. rūpa, vedana, saṃjñā and saṃskāra] are sealed with Aksobhya to explain the state of being representation-only (vijñaptimātrata). For this reason, the images of external [objects] are mind-only. Therefore, because of there being no perceived object, there is no perceiving subject, there remains only consciousness which is free from the perceived object and the perceiving subject, which is ultimately existent and which is mere awareness. For the Nirākāravādins, nothing but this fundamental cognition spreading like the spotless autumn sky at midday should be realised.

Also it is said:

That [consciousness], which is empty of the imagined nature, without manifestation, without form and which is existence, awareness and mere pleasure is confused with the accumulation of subsequent images. (v. 2)

It is said:

[The dharmaññakāya is first] but the two rūpakāyas are later.15

Moreover:

\[\text{15 Ratnagotravibhāga, v. 2:61b (Johnston [1950] p. 88).}\]
The dharmakāya of the great Sage is free from discriminative thought (prapañca) and from manifestation. The two rūpakāyas produced from that [dharmakāya] remain like an illusion subsequently. (v. 3)  

[4-4]  
[Objection]: Since [mind-only is] realised only through the mudrā of Akṣobhya, why then does scriptural authority say Akṣobhya is sealed with Vajrasattva?  
[Answer]: If one says that it is as much as to explain emptiness of conceptualised images, [I answer] it is not, because it has already been realised through the previous mudrā [of Akṣobhya] alone. Therefore, it should be understood that in the way consciousness is fundamental and other[s] are subsequent by the mudrā of Akṣobhya alone, in that way consciousness, in turn, is subsequent and vajra is fundamental by the mudrā of Vajrasattva.  

It is said in the Vajraśekhara:  

The essence which is firm, without a gap, whose characteristic is unbroken and inseparable; that is emptiness which is neither burnt nor perishable; [it] is said to be vajra. (v. 4)  

If [it is understood that] material things and others are subsequent from the fundamental consciousness by the mudrā of Akṣobhya, then why, on earth, is it not understood that saliva is subsequent by the 'nudrā of vajra? If one says that saliva is also subsequent, then there would be the undesirable consequence of nihilism because there is no compassion.

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16 Quoted in the Tattvaratnavali (v. 18, Ui [1952] p. 4, 12-13) where this is shown as the doctrine of the Nirākāra-Yogaicāra.

17 Also quoted in the Caturmudrānīścaya of Nāgārjunagarbha (Mikkyo [1989] p. 114, 1-2).
Chapter 4 Māyopanādvyayavādin and Sarvadharmāpratīṣṭhānavādin

But there should be [compassion].

Emptiness is meant by vajra, and cognition-only by sattva. The identity of these two is realised from the nature of Vajrasattva. (v. 5)

The distinction of emptiness and compassion is like that of a lamp and its light. The sameness of emptiness and compassion is like that of a lamp and its light. (v. 6)

Emptiness is not different from entities, and without that [emptiness] there is no entity. [There exists] the law of necessary connection [between them] just as [it exists] between the artificial and the impermanent. (v. 7)

As there is no destruction of the convention when the truth is being stated, so the truth is not acquired without the convention. (v. 8)

and so on.

[4-5]

If [one argues] that there is thus the sameness of Akṣobhya and Vajrasattva, [I answer] that if [one] does not abandon the nature of consciousness and others, the Citrādvaitavāda will be best.

It is said:

My view is indeed that of the Sākāra that is mind-only accompanied with various [images], empty of all conceptual constructs. Other respectable people assert the doctrine of the Middle, just like the sensation of grass for a walking person. (v. 9)

But, the consciousnessness which is, for the Citrādvaitavādins, ultimately existent is not attractive because it is refuted that the consciousness whose
nature is Akṣobhya that is citrādvaita without the perceived object and the perceiving subject is substantially existent, because of the mudrā of Vajrasattva.

Thus it is said:

[Even] if consciousness [is shown to be] empty of the conceptual construct of material things and others because of the mudrā of Akṣobhya, it is refuted that it is substantially existent because of the mudrā of Vajrasattva. (v. 10)

Besides, it is not the case that emptiness of constructed images of representation-only is taught by [the mudrā of] Vajrasattva, because as above it is not settled. (v. 11)

In this way, because the cause of pain (śalya) that it (consciousness) is ultimately existent vanishes, the doctrine of the Madhyamaka realised by the awareness in the non-dual stream effortlessly combined (anūbhogayuganaddhādvayavāhī) characterised by non-abiding in any position is best. And this is understood through the kindness of a good teacher.

[4-6]

If [one says] as an objection that if there is realisation of awareness in this state, there is an opportunity that it is the Māyopamādhyavāda, and it is not ‘non-abiding in any position’, [I answer] it is not [the case].

That which arises in dependence does not arise by nature. How is it that that which does not arise by nature arises? (v. 12)\(^{18}\)

And awareness arises in dependence. Therefore there is only awareness whose footing is unproduced, and which is not abided in. Moreover:

Awareness is indeed unproduced. Also being substantially existent is as such. But the Sage taught the world has the nature of Vajrasattva. (v. 13)

Moreover, Mañjuśrī is asked by the Tathāgata:

Which is this unthinkable element?

Mañjuśrī answers:

The element which is not to be thought, not accessible by mind, not to be ascertained by mind and not to be perceived by mind and consciousness is said to be the unthinkable element.

Moreover, O, Bhagavat, nothing but mind is the unthinkable element. Why is that? It is because mind does not exist in non-mind. It is because mind is the state not to be thought, for mind perceives according to reality. Then all images of the Bhagavat are the unthinkable elements.

It is also said elsewhere:

O, one whose thought is not conceptually constructed, whose mind is not abided in, who has no mindfulness nor mentation and who is not dependent, homage to you. (v. 14)²⁹

In the Candrapradīpa [it is said]:

That which arises through causes indeed does not arise. Its arising is not by nature. That which arises depending on causes is said to be empty. One who thinks of emptiness is not intoxicated. (v. 15)²⁰

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²⁰ Anavataptanāgarajapurīṣṭhāna (Derge ed. No. 156 pha 230b2-3, Peking ed. No. 823, pu 238a6). Quoted in the Prasannapadā (La Vallée Poussin [1903-13] pp. 239, 491, 500 and 504), the Bodhicaryāvatārāpanījātika (La Vallée Poussin [1914] p. 355, 10-14) and Subhāṣitasaṃgraha (Bendall 222
In the Ārya-Lankāvatāra [it is said]:

If after one removed all errors, appearance (nīmitta) still arose, he would have that very error just as an impaired eye that is not faultless [always has an error]. (v. 16)

Likewise:

Let there not be abiding in consciousness. Therefore the Sage, for fear of this, having taught the truth (dharma) again and again according to emptiness, divides the teaching. (v. 17)

It is also said in the Hevajra[tantra]:

And intrinsic existence does not arise from the beginning and is neither real nor false. (v. 18)

Moreover,

All tenets of those with subtle sense faculties (sūkṣmāśīka) and sufficient intellect (aksāmadhī), when they are analysed, [would be] the same, if there were not the teaching of ‘emptiness’ alone here, which divides the Buddhist and the non-Buddhist. (v. 19)

Also denying emptiness [in the sense] of nihilism, he says:

But those who see the true state (tathatā) in conformity to the doctrine of the Middle are indeed the knowers of reality (tattva)

[1905] p. 21, 22-p. 22, 1)

24 Ālokamāla v. 274 (Lindtner [1985] p. 204). This verse is also quoted in Rāmapāla’s Sekanirdesapapāja (folio 12a, 1-2), Sahajavajra’s Tattvadāsakaṭikā (Derge ed. No. 2254 wi 165b5-6, Peking ed. No. 3099 mi 181a7) and Jitāri’s Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya (Derge ed. No. 3900 a 63b4, Peking ed. No. 5868 nyo 352b8-353a1).
and happy if (yadi) they perceive directly. (v. 20)\(^25\)

It is said in the .getDocumentText()\(\text{Đākinīvajrapañjara:}\):

It is indeed the teaching of the Buddha, Dharma and Saṅgha in which mind which is not separated both from emptiness and compassion is cultivated. (v. 21)\(^26\)

Therefore, because the five aspects which arise in dependence have the nature of five Tathāgatas and because intrinsic nature is not separated from emptiness and compassion, it is established that the world is not separated from emptiness and compassion.

This very meditation is not interrupted because of the teaching of a right teacher.

By following the reality of mantra, as the continuity of flow of a river, like non-ceasing of the light of a lamp [incessant meditation is obtained]. (v. 22)

Likewise the venerable Nāgārjuna says:

This temple palace is not the triple world. These people are not living beings. I am neither a human ruler here, nor object, nor sense faculties, nor earth, etc. Nor are there these material things and others because of the nature of reality (dharmatā). All these things are members of a maṇḍala. O mind, why are you agitated for one who sees everything as maṇḍalacakra? (v. 23)

Everything is apparent only because they arise in dependence like the city of Gandharvas. Neither do they exist by nature, nor are they [imaginary] like a sky lotus. (v. 24)

It is also said in the Hevajra[tantra]:

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\(^25\) Identical with the Sekanirdesa, v. 31 (Mikkyo [1991] p. 58, 3-4).

\(^26\) Đākinīvajrapañjara (Derge ed. No. 419 nga 54b7-55a1, Peking ed. No. 11 ka 289b7).
These phenomena are indeed nirvāṇa [but] in the form of cyclic existence because of ignorance. (v. 25)\textsuperscript{27}

\textit{Pañcatathāgatamudrāvivaraṇa} completed

4.1.3 Examination of \textit{Pañcatathāgatamudrāvivaraṇa}

In this text, Advayavajra mentions the names of four different proponents, namely the Nirākāravādin, the Cāitrāvaitavādin, the Māyopamādvāvādin and the Sarvadharma-pratisthānāvādin. Of these the first two proponents are Yogācāras and the latter two are Mādhyamikas. The Cāitrāvaitavādin is considered to hold the sākāra view. We also find the position of Advayavajra as well as the tenets of the Māyopamādvāvādin and the Sarvadharma-pratisthānāvādin in this text. As it is said “If [one says] as an objection that if there is realisation of awareness in this state, there is an opportunity that it is the Māyopamādvāvāda, and it is not ‘non-abiding in any position’ (sarvatrāpratisthāna)” in [4-6], Advayavajra regards himself as the Sarvadharma-pratisthānavādin. This is supported by his word in [4-5], “In this way, because the cause of pain (śalya) that it (consciousness) is ultimately existent vanishes, the doctrine of the Mādhyamaka established by the awareness in the non-dual stream effortlessly combined (anābhogayuganaddhādvayavāhi) characterised by non-abiding in any position (sarvatrāpratisthāna) is best.”

The views of these two proponents of the Mādhyamaka can be known from the structure of this text. In this text, it seems that the procedure of practice is shown with seals (mudrā) of Tathāgatas as symbols. First, the first four Tathāgatas, Vairocana, Ratnasambhava, Amitābha and Amoghasiddhi, that correspond to ṛūpa, vedanā, saṃjñā and saṃskāra, are sealed with Aksobhya to explain the state of being representation-only (vijñāpiṁśrātā). Then this Aksobhya is sealed with Vajrasattva which is emptiness and compassion. This shows the procedure of practice from mind-only of the Yogācāra to emptiness of the Mādhyamaka.

\textsuperscript{27}Hevajratantra, v. II-iv-34ab (Snellgrove [1959] p. 66, 15).
This text introduces the four different proponents according to their views on cognition. First in [4-3], the view of the Nirākāra-Cittamātra is shown and it is used to explain the seals of the four Tathāgatas by Akṣobhya:

[4-3a]

The five Tathāgatas are the five constituents. Of these, the [first] four, [i.e. rūpa, vedanā, saṃjña and saṃskāra] are sealed with Akṣobhya to explain the state of being representation-only (vijñaptimātratā). For this reason, the images of external [objects] are mind-only. Therefore, because there being no perceived object, there is no perceiving subject, there remains only consciousness which is free from the perceived object and the perceiving subject, which is ultimately existent and which is mere awareness. For the Nirākāravādins, nothing but this fundamental cognition spreading like the spotless autumn sky at midday should be realised.

Thus, Advayavajra explains the view of the Nirākāravādin with the seals (mudrā) of the five Tathāgatas. However Akṣobhya, which shows mind-only, is again sealed with Vajrasattva, as shown in [4-4]:

[4-4a]

[Objection]: Since [mind-only is] realised only through the mudrā of Akṣobhya, why then does scriptural authority say Akṣobhya is sealed with Vajrasattva?

[Answer]: If one says that it is as much as to explain emptiness of conceptualised images, [I answer] it is not, because it has already been realised through the previous mudrā [of Akṣobhya] alone.

While both the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika postulate emptiness, its meaning is different. The Mādhyamika understands emptiness as emptiness of intrinsic nature in all phenomena. For the Yogācāra, on the other hand, emptiness means emptiness of images
(ākāra) of the subject and the object. Here the mind-only is symbolised by Akṣobhya, and emptiness (and compassion) by Vajrasattva. The opponent argues, from the point of view of the Nirākāra-Yogācāra that emptiness, symbolised by Vajrasattva, means emptiness of images. Advayavajra explains that emptiness of images is realised through the mudrā of Akṣobhya. This may imply that Advayavajra, a Sarvadharmāpratisthānavādin, holds the Nirākāra view conventionally since he shows the stages from the Nirākāra-vādin of the Yogācāra ([4-3]) to the Madhyamaka ([4-4]).

Then he refutes the view of the Citrādvaitavādin, i.e. the Sākāra-Yogācāra. Here he criticises the Citrādvaitavādins who postulate the ultimate existence of mind, as he says:

[4-5a]

If one argues that there is thus the sameness of Akṣobhya and Vajrasattva, [I answer] that if [one] does not abandon the nature of consciousness and others, the Citrādvaitavāda will be best.

[4-5b]

But, the consciousness which is, for the Citrādvaitavādins, ultimately existent is not attractive because it is refuted that the consciousness whose nature is Akṣobhya that is citrādvaita without the perceived object and perceiving subject is substantially existent because of the mudrā of Vajrasattva.

Here in [4-5], the Citrādvaitavādins are considered to maintain the identity of Akṣobhya and Vajrasattva. They are criticised by Advayavajra because they regard consciousness as substantially existent (vastusat).

In [4-6], the hypothetical opponent mentions the view of the Māyopamādvayavādīn very briefly:

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28 As we know from verse 9 of the Pañcatathāgatamudrāvivaraṇa, the Citrādvaitavādins are the Sākāra-Yogācāras. ([4-5] p. 220)
If [one says] as an objection that if there is realisation of awareness in this state, there is an opportunity that it is the Māyopamādvayavāda, and it is not ‘non-abiding in any position’, [I answer] it is not [the case].

It is clear from this passage that the distinction of the Māyopamādvayavādins and the Sarvadharmāpratisthānavādins is based on the realisation of awareness. It is, however, not entirely clear what level this is about. While it is unlikely that a Mādhyamika would postulate something other than emptiness at the ultimate level, this may possibly be a distinction at the ultimate level, because this passage comes just after the refutation of representation-only held by the Citrādvaitavādins, which is considered conventional by the Mādhyamika. If this passage concerns the realisation of self-awareness at the ultimate level, this could justify the view of the former teachers which Tsong kha pa presents, to a certain extent.29 They understand that this distinction is based on how they assert the ultimate, and maintain that “the Māyopamādvayavādins, who assert that collection of the two, appearance and emptiness, is an ultimate truth” may be right even though the existence of cognition at the ultimate level does not necessarily guarantee the existence of appearance at the ultimate level. On this point, Advayavajra expresses his view in the Madhyamaśātka:

The illumination (prakāśa) is free from the four alternatives, has the characteristic of falsity and non-dual like an illusion (māyopamādvaya).
This tenet is associated with conception. (v. 3)30

This shows that māyopamādvaya is derived from the description of the illumination

30 Madhyamaśātka, v. 3 (Mikkyō [1988] p. 86, 6-7):
catuskotivinirmuktaḥ prakāśa iliṣkaśaṇaḥ I
māyopamādvayaś eaiṣa Siddhānto mānasāṅgataḥ II 3 II
Also see [4-14] with regard to the Mādhyamikas who postulate that illumination is false.
that is the basis of cognition. This distinction is considered to be based on cognition at the ultimate level because the illumination is free from the four alternatives. It is thus understood that the Māyopamādvyavādins ultimately accept illumination (prakāśa) that is the nature of self-awareness without the duality of the perceiving subject and the perceived object, although it is said to be false.

Then in [4-7] Advayavajra explains the view of the Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavādīn. It is the most important to notice that verses 17 and 19 are quotations from the Alokamālā of Kambala, who is regarded as a Nirākāra-Mādhyamika by Sahajavajra. This fact could be an indication that the Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavādīn is the Nirākāra-Mādhyamika. We will discuss this point later in 4.3 when we examine the tenet of the Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavādīn.

To conclude, the contents of the Pañcataṭāgatamuḍḍavivarana is understood as follows: explanation of the stages from the Nirākāra-Yogācāra [4-3] to the Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavādīn [4-4], refutation of the Citrādvaitavādīn [4-5], refutation of the Māyopamādvyavādīn [4-6] and explanation of the tenet of the Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavādīn [4-7]. This shows that Advayavajra adopts the procedure of cultivation from the Nirākāra-Vijñaptimātra to the Mādhyamaka of the Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavādīn. From now on, therefore, examination of this classification is undertaken on the assumption that the Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavādīn accepts the nirākāra view conventionally. Although the Māyopamādvyavādīn may possibly hold the citrādvaita view conventionally in contrast, this cannot be ascertained from this text because Advayavajra does not mention any relationship between the Māyopamādvyavādīn and the Citrādvaitavādīn.

4.1.4 Other Texts Related to the Classification

Next, we look into passages of the Trīyānayavasthāna in which Ratnakarasānti (B) mentions the classification of the Mādhyamaka which is based on two sets of four alternatives (caturśkoṭi), in a similar way to that in the Tattvaratnavālī:

[4-9]
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The Way with profundity and extensiveness is of two types: that only with profundity and that with both profundity and extensiveness. They say ‘Mahāyāna’ for both of them, and with regard to the distinction into two types [of Mahāyāna] a former teacher also employs [the terms] Mahāyāna of Pāramitānaya and of Mantranaya.\(^{31}\)

[4-10]

By distinction of the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika, the Way only with profundity is of two types. The Yogācāras are again of two types by distinction of cognition with images (\(^*sākāra\)) and that without images (\(^*nirākāra\)).\(^{32}\)

[4-11]

Likewise, the Mādhyamikas are of two types by distinction of those who assert that the convention is images of cognition and those who assert that it is latent impressions (bag chags, \(^*\text{vāsanā}\)).\(^{33}\)

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\(^{31}\) *Triyānāvyavasthāna* (Hayashi [1996] p. 53, 9-p. .54, 1, Derge ed. No. 3712 tsu 101a3-4, Peking ed. No. 4535 nu 112a2-3): zab cin\(g\) rgya che ba dang ldan pa’i theg pa ni mam pa gnyis te/zab pa ’ba’ zhi\(g\) dang ldan pa dang/ zab pa dang/ rgya che ba gnyi ga dang ldan pa’ol/ ’di dang nyid la theg pa chen po zhes brjod cing/ dbye ba mam pa gnyis nyid la slob dpön snga mas pa rol tu phyin pa’i tshul dang/ gsang sngags kyi tshul gyi theg pa chen bo zhes kyang gz\(h\)ag pa’ol/

\(^{32}\) *Triyānāvyavasthāna* (Hayashi [1996] p. 61, 8-13, Derge ed. No. 3712 tsu 103a3, Peking ed. No. 4535 nu 114a6-7): m\(a\)l ’byor spyod pa dang/ dbu ma pa’i dbyc pas z\(a\)b pa tsam dang ldan pa’i theg pa ni mam pa gnyis yin la/ m\(a\)l ’byor spyod pa r\(a\)m\(a\)s kya\(n\)g/ s\(h\)es pa r\(a\)m pa dang bcas pa dang/ r\(a\)m pa med pa’i bye brag\(^{(1)}\) gyis mam pa gnyis so\(l\)l
(1) Ed: drag, D, P: brag.

\(^{33}\) *Triyānāvyavasthāna* (Hayashi [1996] p. 61, 8-13, Derge ed. No. 3712 tsu 103a4, Peking ed. No. 4535 nu 114a7-8): de bzhin du dbu ma pa yang kun rdzob s\(h\)es pa’i r\(a\)m pa smra ba dang/ de bag chags su s\(m\)ra ba’i bye brag\(^{(1)}\) gis mam pa gnyis so\(l\)l
(1) Ed: drag, D, P: brag.
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[4-12]

The Mādhyamikas who assert the convention is images of cognition maintain that mind and cognition do not exist, through accumulation of reasoning of the ultimate, but consider that everything conventionally established in this way is nothing but the persistence of images which are mind and thought as object. Likewise, the contention of those who assert that the convention is latent impressions is that while the ultimate truth is as the former, what are conventionally established are nothing but latent impressions but mind does not appear as the nature of image and manifestation.

These two agree on contention of the nature of dependent origination, negation of mind and self-awareness and application of reasoning. But some say that respectively the distinction of four alternatives is not the same because in order to refute other views these two respectively say:

Existent, non-existent, both existent and non-existent and neither existent nor non-existent.

and

Eternal, non-eternal, both eternal and non-eternal and neither eternal nor non-eternal.\(^\text{31}\)


dbu ma pa kun rdzob shes pa'i rnam par smra ba rnam ni don dam par rigs pa'i tshogs kyi sems dang ye shes dag yod pa ma yin par smra la/ kun rdzob tu 'di ltar rnam par bzhag pa thams cad sems dang yid kyi rnam pa yul du gnas pa kho nar rtog go/

de bzhin du kun rdzob bag chags su smra ba rnam kyi 'dod ba ni don dam pa'i bden pa snga ma lta bu las kun rdzob tu rnam par bzhag pa rnam ni bag chags rnam kho na yin gyi/ sems ni rnam pa dang/ 'gro ba'i bdag nyid du snang ba ma yin no zhes par ro/ 'di gnyi gas rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba'i bdag nyid 'dod pa dang/ sems dang rang rig pa 'gog/ rigs pa sgrub pa ni nithun no/

kha cig na re 'di gnyis kyi sba ba gzhan scon ba na rim bzhin du/
yod dang med dang yod med dang/ yod med gnyi ga min pa ste/
zhes bya ba dang/
rtag dang mi rtag rtag mi rtag/ rtag dang mi rtag gnyi ga min/
zhes pas go rims bzhin du mu bzhis rnam par rtog pa mi 'dra'o zhes zer ro/
From this passage we understand that the Mādhyamikas are classified into two: the Mādhyamikas who assert that the convention is images of cognition and the Mādhyamikas who assert that convention is latent impressions (*vāsanā). Matsumoto identifies the former with the Sākāra-Mādhyamikas and the latter with the Nirākāra-Mādhyamikas. It is the Sākāra-vādin’s view that what we think is the external world is indeed images which are nothing but mind, and that these images are real. On the other hand, the Nirākāra-vādin maintains that images are not identical with mind, that they arise as a result of latent impressions (vāsanā) and that these images are false. The two Mādhyamaka proponents follow these views respectively at the conventional level, but neither proponent accepts the reality of mind ultimately.

The other point that draws our attention is that these two proponents apply different sets of four alternatives to show emptiness. These sets of four alternatives are based on existence and permanence respectively. They are very similar to the different sets of four alternatives described in Advayavajra’s Tattvaratnavalī. According to Advayavajra, the Māyopamādvyavādin employs the four alternatives based on existence and non-existence:

[4-13]

In the [Mādhyamika], the explanation of the Māyopamādvyavādin [is as follows]:

Neither existent, nor non-existent, nor both existent and non-existent, nor even the nature of neither [existent nor non-existent].

The Mādhyamikas know that the reality is free from the four propositions (catuṣkoti). (v. 25)

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Matsumoto [1980] quotes these passages from the Tīrīkhyāvasthāna in order to show that there was a distinction between the Sākāra-Yogācāra-Mādhyamika and the Nirākāra-Yogācāra-Mādhyamika. Ruegg [1981] (p. 123) also understands that this classification is that of the Sākāra-Mādhyamika and the Nirākāra-Mādhyamika. My discussion here mainly follows theirs in terms of understanding that the Mādhyamikas who assert that the convention is images of knowledge and the Mādhyamikas who assert that the convention is latent impressions are the internalist Sākāra-Mādhyamika and the internalist Nirākāra-Mādhyamika respectively.

See [4-1] (p. 213).
The Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavādin, on the other hand, employs those based on permanence and annihilation:

[4-14]

On the other hand, this is the examination of the Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavādin:

It is not maintained everything is permanent. And it is not concluded that they are annihilating. They are not a pair of permanent and annihilating. Nor [are they] neither which is without the two. (v. 27)37

Therefore, while the Māyopamādvayavādin mentioned by Advayavajra is identified with the Mādhyamika who asserts that the convention is images of cognition described in the Triyānayavavasthāna, who is regarded as the internalist Sākāra-Mādhyamika, the Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavādin is identified with the Mādhyamika who asserts that the convention is latent impressions, who is regarded as the internalist Nirākāra-Mādhyamika.38 This is also in line with our hypothesis that the Māyopamādvayavādin and the Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavādin respectively hold the sākāra and the nirākāra views conventionally.

As I mentioned in the first chapter, Sahajavajra, a disciple of Advayavajra, indeed classifies the Madhyamaka into the Sākāra-Madhyamaka and the Nirākāra-Maddhyamaka:

[4-15]

Or, “Neither Sākāra nor Nirākāra” (Tattvadāśaka, v. 2a)39 means that the

37 See [4-2] (p. 214).
38 Umino [1983b] points out similarity of the two sets of the four alternatives between Advayavajra's classification of the Mādhyamika and Ratnakaraśaṇti (B)’s. Nevertheless he does not consider that the proponents that convention is images of knowledge and the proponents that convention is latent impressions are the Sākāra-Mādhyamika and the Nirākāra-Mādhyamika.
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Sākāra-Madhyamaka (rnam pa dang bcas pa’i dbu ma) and the Nirākāra-Madhyamaka (rnam pa med pa’i dbu ma) are these two main [tenets] to be highlighted.

For the previous venerable Śāntarakṣita and others accept only the Sākāra-Madhyamaka...

And the Nirākāra-Madhyamaka is accepted by Kambala and others.⁴⁰

It is important that this statement is made by one of Advayavajra’s disciples. Sahajavajra may classify the Madhyamaka in the same way as his teacher but call them in a different way. Here, the Sākāra-Madhyamaka (rnam pa dang bcas pa’i dbu ma) and the Nirākāra-Madhyamaka (rnam pa med pa’i dbu ma) are the designations of views held respectively by Śāntarakṣita and Kambala. Then it may also be the case that Śāntarakṣita is regarded as the Māyopamādvayavādīn that accepts the Sākāra-Madhyamaka and Kambala as the Sarvadharmāpratīṣṭhānavādīn that accepts the Nirākāra-Madhyamaka. It is not contradictory to our speculation that Advayavajra probably follows Kambala’s view on the basis of the fact that in the Pañcatathāgaṭamudrāvivaraṇa he quotes verses 248 and 274 of the Alokamālā of Kambala.

This can be, nevertheless, very problematic if we consider that the distinction of the Māyopamādvayavādīn and the Sarvadharmāpratīṣṭhānavādīn is based on how they postulate the ultimate truth, as we speculated from our examination of the Pañcatathāgaṭamudrāvivaraṇa. According to Ratnākaraśānti (B), the Mādhayamikas who assert that the convention is images of cognition and the Mādhayamikas who assert that the convention is latent impressions have different views on the conventional world, but

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⁴⁰ Tattvadāsakāṭā (Derge ed No. 2254 wi 164b5-6 and 165a6-7, Peking ed. No. 3099 mi 180a5-6 and 180b8):

rnam bcas ma yin mam med min //
zhes bya ba ni rnam pa dang bcas pa’i dbu ma dang/ mam pa med pa’i dbu ma gsal(1) bar bya ba’i gtsos bo ‘di dag go(2) //
gang gi phyir zhi ba ’tsho’i zhal snga nas la sog pas rnam pa dang bcas pa’i dbu ma nyid khas len par byed de /...
rnam pa med pa’i dbu ma yang la ba’i na bza’ can la sog pas khas len te/...
their views on the ultimate truth are the same.

In the second chapter, we briefly looked at how Ratnākaraśānti (A) classifies the Mādhyamikas in the *Madhyamakālaṃkārapadesa*. There, he distinguishes the Sākāra-Mādhyamika and the Nirākāra-Mādhyamika. Therefore we now turn to the classification of the Mādhyamika shown by Ratnākaraśānti (A) in order to compare it with those shown by Sahajavajra and Ratnākaraśānti (B). Ratnākaraśānti (A), in the *Prajñāpāramitopadesa*, rebuts an objection from the Sākāravādin as follows:

Of these, I have already refuted those that assert that external objects exist and the Mādhyamikas that assert that cognition possesses images (shes pa rnam pa dang bcas par smra ba dbu ma pa, *sākārajñānavādinārāṇāya-mādhyamika*) because they are avoided due to its deviation from scriptural authority, treatises and the valid means of knowledge. Only the Cittamātra that asserts that images do not exist (rnam par med par smra ba'i sems tsam pa, *nirākāravādicittamātra*) is left. Why do they (de dag) [Mādhyamikas] insist that illumination is false? If [they say] that [it is] like blue and so on because [illumination] is not different from images of blue and so on, which are false, [I answer] it is not established that [illumination] that is not superimposed is not different from [images that are false]...

Here some maintain that illumination is not different from images. They consequently insist if images are false, illumination is false. On the other hand, it is not established, according to Ratnākaraśānti (A), that illumination is not different from images.

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41 *Prajñāpāramitopadesa* (Derge ed. No. 4079 hi 150a4-5 Peking ed. No. 5579 ku 170a4-6): de la phyi rol gyi don yod par smra ba dang/ shes pa mam pa dang bcas par smra ba dbu ma pa/ dag ni lung dang bstan bcos dang tshad ma dag las phyi rol tu gyur bas sugar bzlog zin to// mam pa med par smra ba'i sems tsam pa 'ba' zhhig lus par 'gyur to/ de dag kyis ci'i phyir gsal ba brdzun ba yin par 'dod dol// sngon po la sogs pa'i rnam pa brdzun pa dang tha mi dad pa'i phyis/ sngon po la sogs pa bshin no zhe na/ sgro ma btags pa'i tha dad pa med pa ni ma grub la/

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Here, the argument is clear. Nevertheless, past studies concerning this passage disagree on who ‘they’ (underlined) are. Umino, Shirasaki and Katsura\(^42\) understand that ‘they’ indicates the Nirākāra-Cittamātra that appear just before ‘they’. It seems that these scholars consider that the Cittamātra that asserts that images do not exist includes the Nirākāra-Yogācāra-Mādhyamika, who accepts ‘Cittamātra’ conventionally. It is, to a certain extent, rational to conclude in this way because ‘they’ consider that illumination (gsal ba, prakūsa) which has to be real for the Yogācāra is false. ‘They’ surely hold that images are false and look as if they postulate the nirākāra view. This is nevertheless different from the views of the Nirākāra-Mādhyamikas mentioned by Sahajavajra and of the Mādhyamikas who maintain that the convention is latent impressions (vāsanā) mentioned by Ratnākaraśānti (B). According to Sahajavajra, the Nirākāra-Mādhyamikas conventionally hold cognition (illumination) without the perceiving subject and the perceived object which the Nirākāra-Yogācāras consider ultimate.\(^43\) This means that when the Nirākāra-Mādhyamikas deny cognition’s reality, they do not depend on the reason that illumination and images are not different because they do not accept this relation between illumination and images on the conventional level. The same is applied to the Mādhyamikas who maintain that the convention is latent impressions mentioned by Ratnākaraśānti (B). They maintain that the conventional world that is images of cognition arises due to latent impressions. This means that if latent impressions (vāsanā) disappear, the images, too, disappear because of their causal relationship. Thus they do not postulate identity of images with cognition.

On the other hand, Matsumoto takes ‘they’ as the externalist Mādhyamikas and the Sākāra-Mādhyamikas.\(^44\) I consider, partly following Matsumoto, that ‘they’ at least include the Sākāra-Mādhyamikas because it is the proponents of the sākāra view who


\(^{43}\) We will examine this later in 4.3 (p. 259 ff.).

\(^{44}\) Matsumoto [1980b] (p. 156). However, he takes phyi rol gyi don yod par smra ba dang shes pa rnam pa dang beas par smra ba dbu ma pa dag as the Mādhyamikas who assert that external objects exist and the Mādhyamikas who assert that cognition possesses images. However Ratnākaraśānti criticises those who assert external objects (not necessarily the Mādhyamika) before his refutation of the Sākāra-Mādhyamikas. Therefore, I take ‘they’ as the Sākāra-Mādhyamaka and the externalist.
maintain that images are not different from illumination. Here ‘they’ insist that illumination is false because images which are not different from it are false. After this passage Ratnakarashanti (A) himself shows that this reason that illumination is not different from images is the way of the Sākāra:

[4-17]

Moreover, why do you maintain that existence of illumination is denied? If [you say] that it is maintained that dependent origination and the ability of causal efficiency are denied, [I ask] what is the valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa) that causes to invalidate them.

If [you say] that it lacks one [intrinsic nature] and many, [I answer that] there is no invalidation of ability because there is no invalidation concerning the intrinsic nature of illumination, even though it directly invalidates ability by means of invalidation concerning the intrinsic nature of material things.

[Objection]: It is not invalidation as long as intrinsic nature is concerned, even though it is [that] of blue and the like. If [you ask] why, [I answer that] there is no invalidation concerning the intrinsic nature of blue.

[Answer]: If [you say] it would indeed have the ability, [I answer that] in this case because blue and illumination have no difference, the way of the sākāra would be accepted, and it is rejected before.45

Here the first opponent is the Madhyamika, who asserts the lack of intrinsic

45 Prajñāpāramitopadeśa (Derge ed. No. 4079 hi 150b5-151a1, Peking ed. No. 5579 ku 170a6-171a3):

Here the first opponent is the Madhyamika, who asserts the lack of intrinsic
nature. They establish it through the reasoning, ‘lack of one [intrinsic nature] and many.’ However, Ratnakarasānti (A) insists that it is only applied to material things which have spatiality. As we have seen in chapter 3, the ability of causal efficiency is the nature of the ultimate existence for the Yogācāra while it belongs to the true conventional for the Madhyamika. It seems to me that the second opponent is the Sākāra-Yogācāra who maintains the reality of the intrinsic nature of images as well as that of illumination. He argues that if illumination which is not a material thing is not invalidated by that reasoning, then images of blue and the like cannot be invalidated because they are not material things, either. However, Ratnakarasānti clearly denies the ability of causal efficiency of images such as blue. This means that he considers that images that have no ability are not real. On the other hand, he maintains the ability of illumination. Thus Ratnakarasānti’s view of the Nirākāra-Yogācāra is clearly expressed here as he considers that illumination is real while images are not. Most importantly, he understands that it is the way of the sākāra that accepts no difference between illumination and images such as blue.

This view of the sākāra that images are not different from illumination is also found in the Madhyamakālaṃkāropadeśa:

[4-18]

If some Yogācāras and Madhyamikas who assert cognition with images argue:

If blue and illumination were false and not false [respectively], it is not possible to be identical because of the difference of their characteristics. However, if they were not identical, blue and others could not be illuminated. [But they are illuminated.] If blue and others are illumination, blue and so on are either not superimposed or the real because they are not superimposed or nothing but illumination of the real existence.

47 See 3.3 (p. 149 ff.).
Moreover, with regard to this inferential reason "Images, which [you, Ratnakarasanti, maintain] are false, are real because they are not different from illumination," if [you argue] that they are not different by nature of things, [I answer that] it is not established.

The Sakara-Yogacara and the Sakara-Madhyamika maintain that images are not different from cognition. Therefore if cognition is real, images must be real. The process of reasoning is the same as the statement in passage [4-16], which says that illumination is false like blue and so on because it is not different from images of blue and so on, which are false. The conclusion is however totally opposite: real and false. Considering that the Sakara-Madhyamika maintains the view of the Sakara-Yogacara conventionally but denies it ultimately, we understand that the Sakara-Madhyamika maintains the reality of cognition and image conventionally, and postulates the falsity of both ultimately, because cognition is not different from images.

4.1.5 Summary

To sum up, these two classifications, that of the Mayopamadvayavin and the Sarvadharma-pratishthavin and of the Madhyamikas who assert that the convention is

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48 Madhyamakalamkaropadesa (Derge ed. No. 4085 hi 228a3-5, Peking ed. No. 5586 ku 262b6-8):
mal 'byor spyod pa pa dang/ dbu ma pa shes pa man pa dang bas par smra ba kha eig na re/ sngon po gsal ba dag brdzun pa dang brdzun pa ma yin par 'gyur na thos 'gal ba nyid kyis na de'i bdag nyid du 'thad par mi 'gyur la/ de'i bdag nyid ma yin na/ sngon po la sogs pa gsal bar mi 'gyur na/ sngon po la sogs pa ni gsal ba yin no zhe na/ sgru ma btags pa'am dngos por 'gyur ba'i gsal ba las gzhan ma yin pa'i phyir/ sngon po la sogs pa ni sgru ma btags pa'am/ dngos por 'gyur ba yin no zer te/...

A parallel passage is found in the Prajnaparamitopadesa (Derge ed. No. 4079 hi 148b1-2, Peking ed. 5579 ku 168a4-6).

49 Madhyamakalamkaropadesa (Derge ed. No. 4085 hi 228b1-2, Peking ed. No. 5586 ku 263a5-6):
gang yang gsal ba las tha mi dad pa'i phyir rnam pa brdzun pa yang dngos por 'gyur ro zhes pa'i gan tshigs 'di la gal te dngos po'i rang bzhin du tha mi dad do zhe na gan tshigs ma grub par 'gyur ro/ (1) D: omat, P: la
images of cognition and the Mādhyamikas who assert that the convention is latent impressions (vāsanā) are identified depending on the four alternatives that they respectively maintain. From this it is speculated that while the Māyopamādvyayavādin conventionally holds the sākāra view, the Sarvadharmāpratisthānavādin conventionally accepts the nirākāra view.

We know of two Indian teachers, Ratnakaraśānti (A) and Sahajavajra, who classify the Sākāra- and the Nirākāra-Mādhyamika/Madhyamaka. The former provides detailed accounts of the sākāra view when he attempts to refute it, although he does not give any name of the Sākāra-Mādhyamika or of the Nirākāra-Mādhyamika. On the other hand the latter explains that Śaṅtarakṣita maintains the Sākāra-Madhyamaka and Kambala the Nirākāra-Madhyamaka. Ratnakaraśānti (A) considers that the Sākāra-Mādhyamika maintains that cognition and images are not different. On the other hand, Ratnakaraśānti (A), being a Nirākāra-Yogācāra himself, maintains that images do not have the ability of causal efficiency that is the characteristic of a real entity, while illumination does.

This connection of three different ways of classification gives rise to a problem. According to Ratnakaraśānti (B), both the Mādhyamikas who maintain that the convention is images of cognition and the Mādhyamikas who maintain that the convention is latent impressions deny mind and cognition ultimately. In short, they both accept self-awareness conventionally and deny it ultimately. Therefore they do not disagree on the denial of self-awareness at the ultimate level. In that case, it is necessary to clarify at what level the Māyopamādvyayavādin establishes self-awareness. Advayavajra considers that the establishment of awareness is the criterion of the classification of the Māyopamādvyayavādin and the Sarvadharmāpratisthānavādin and we provisionally concluded that the Māyopamādvyayavādin understands that there is illumination that is non-dual like an illusion at the ultimate level on the basis of the Madhyamakasāṣṭaḥ.

With regard to the matter of who are these proponents, it is plausible that the Māyopamādvyayavādin follows Śaṅtarakṣita and the Sarvadharmāpratisthānavādin follows Kambala. It is then necessary to examine whether or not the view of sākāra is found in Śaṅtarakṣita and his followers. It is also necessary to find whether there is any connection between Kambala’s view and Advayavajra’s if we consider that the Sarva-
Chapter 4 Māyopamādvayavādin and Sarvadharmāpratīṣṭhānavādin

dharmāpratīṣṭhānavādin holds the nirākāra view. In the following sections, therefore, we will examine the works of Śāntarakṣita and his followers, and the relationship between Advayavajra and Kambala.

4.2 Examination of Māyopamādvayavādin

It is ascertained that Advayavajra is a Sarvadharmāpratīṣṭhānavādin through examination of the Pañcatathāgatamūrdhvivaraṇa. However, we do not know, for sure, who is the Māyopamādvayavādin. According to Tsong kha pa, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are held to be Māyopamādvayavādins by some teachers. Also in the Grub mtha’ rin chen phreng ba of dKon mchog ’jigs med dbang po, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are regarded as Sākāra-Yogācāra- Mādhyaṃkas. Therefore it is indicated in Tibetan sources that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are the Māyopamādvayavādin and it does not contradict our hypothesis that the Māyopamādvayavādin is the Sākāra-Yogācāra- Mādhyaṃka.

As for the Indian sources, Sahajavajra, a disciple of Advayavajra, considers that Śāntarakṣita and others accepts the Sākāra-Mādhyaṃka, when he classifies the Mādhyaṃka into the Sākāra-Mādhyaṃka and the Nirākāra-Mādhyaṃka although he does not explain what the Sākāra-Mādhyaṃka is. It is possible that Sahajavajra, being a disciple of Advayavajra, classifies the Mādhyaṃka in the same way as Advayavajra but designates it in a different way.

If we thus consider that the Māyopamādvayavādin maintains the Sākāra-Mādhyaṃka, it can be the case that Śāntarakṣita and his followers are Māyopamādvayavādins. There is, furthermore, a passage which indicates that Śāntarakṣita was considered to have held the citrādvaita view. As was mentioned above in chapter 2, Bodhibhadra classifies the Mādhyaṃkas into the internalist and the externalist in the

50 However, he seems to consider the Nirākāra-Mādhyaṃkas as those who conventionally accept the cognition of the completed nature (parinispānasvabhāvav) which is held by the Nirākāra- Yogācāras. It is, therefore, very likely that the Sākāra-Mādhyaṃkas accept the view of the Sākāra- Yogācāra conventionally.

51 See 2.3 (p. 65 ff.).

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Those who do not consider appearance are Bhavya (Bhāviveka) and others, and those who assert that things which appear are not as they are [thought to be external], but only internal cognition manifesting in various ways are Śāntarakṣita and others.\textsuperscript{52}

In this passage, Bodhibhadra explains that Śāntarakṣita and others hold that internal cognition appears in various ways. It is the citrādvaita view that a single mind manifests as manifold images. Therefore, it is very likely that Śāntarakṣita was regarded already in India as an internalist Mādhyamika who accepts the citrādvaita view conventionally although Bodhibhadra’s explanation is so short that we cannot be absolutely certain. In the \textit{Pañcatathāgatamudrāvivaraṇa} Advayavajra mentions the four proponents, the Nirākāravādin, the Citrādvaitavādin, the Māyopamādvyavādin and the Sarvadharmā-pratisthānavādin. It may be the case, therefore, that he understands that the Māyopamādvyavādin conventionally postulates the view of the Citrādvaitavādin. Bodhibhadra and Advayavajra are said to have been direct teachers of Atiśa (982-1055)\textsuperscript{53} probably at Vikramāśīla. It is possible, therefore, that Śāntarakṣita was considered to hold the citrādvaita view conventionally by teachers around the 11th C, including Advayavajra, although it is again not absolutely certain at the moment whether Advayavajra regarded Śāntarakṣita as the Māyopamādvyavādin.

It is also worth noting that this passage is in the commentary of verse 28 of the \textit{Jñānasūtrasamuccaya}, which denies the four alternatives based on existence:

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Jñānasūtrasamuccayanibandhana} (Mimaki [1976] p. 206, 27-30, Derge ed. No. 3852 tsha 44a7-b1, Peking ed. No. 5252 tsha 51b-8):

\begin{quote}
\texttt{snang ba la ni 'jāl ba ni slob dpon bha bya la sogs pa dang/ snang ba'i dangos po ji ita ba ma yin gyi nang gi shes pa khon sna tshogs su snang bar smra ba slob dpon zhi ba 'tsho la sogs pa'o //}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{53} Atiśa himself states that Bodhibhadra was his teacher in the \textit{Bodhimārgapradīpapāṇīkā} (Derge ed. No. 3948 khi 280a4-7, Peking ed. No. 5343 khi 323a4-8). See [3-72] (p. 188). According to the \textit{Deb ther sgon po}, Advayavajra was a teacher of Atiśa (Rocrich [1976], p. 244).
Neither existent, nor non-existent, nor both existent and non-existent, nor even the nature of neither [existent nor non-existent]. The Mādhyamikas know that the reality is free from the four alternatives (catuskoti).  

When Bodhibhadra comments on this verse, he mentions the difference of views between Bhavya and Śāntarakṣita. However, he does not mention the difference in the two sets of the four alternatives. In other words, he does not mention that based on permanence and annihilation. Therefore, he possibly considers that Śāntarakṣita as well as Bhavya uses the four alternatives based on existence and non-existence.

Now the question is whether or not Śāntarakṣita himself holds the citrādvaita view conventionally. He mentions the theory of the citrādvaita in the Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti on verse 33:

Moreover, it is not possible that it is not conventional designation (gdags pa, *prajñāpī) that “even the cognition of various images like the piebald of imitation, genuine butterflies and the like, which do not have one nature, has one intrinsic nature.”

If one takes the sākāra view ultimately, a contradiction that single cognition has manifold images follows. If mind is a single entity its image must be a single entity, too, because they are not different. However, the images we perceive are not single but various. Śāntarakṣita maintains that this citrādvaita view that single mind sees plural

na san nāsan na saddasān na cāpy anubhayātmaḥ
Catuskotivijnirnuktāṁ tatvamāt madhyamikā viduḥ lII 28 ll
Also see 3.3.6 of this present thesis for the detailed examination of this verse and its commentary concerning the Tibetan translation of this verse.

55 Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti, ad. v. 33 (Ichigō [1985b] p. 98, 2-4):
gzhan yang bcos ma dang bcos ma ma yin pa'i phyce ma leh khra bo la sogs ji ltar geig pu'i bdag nyid ma yin pa de bzhin du mam pa sna tshogs pa'i mam par shes pa de yang geig pu'i rang bzhin du gdags pa ma yin par 'thad pa med dol/
images is not acceptable at the ultimate level and it should be only conventional. Being a Mādhyamika, Śāntarakṣita does not accept the existence of the subject or the object ultimately, based on these contradictions. We, however, conventionally perceive objects in some way. It seems that he here does not positively express his acceptance of the citrādvaita view because it is only useful to explain conventional cognition and cannot bear an examination from the viewpoint of the ultimate truth. In addition to this, as we have seen in chapter 2, explaining the two different views on conventional existence, he describes the view of the internalist after showing the view of Bhāviveka, an externalist Mādhyamika:

[4-23]

Even though it is postulated that visual appearance and others (*rūpādi) which are considered to be external are existent separately from cognition, experience [of them] is not established because there is no cause in close contact simultaneously or non-simultaneously, like an eye. Therefore perception of those [visual appearance and others] is perception of images such as blue which are not different [from perception]. It is like perception of appearance in a dream, an illusion and so on because of the nature of perception.

If it is inferred that there is even another object that produces images of cognition separately from the result, [i.e. images,] even so it is not established through direct perception but only inferred. Even so that [external object] is not established because certainly there is an immediate cause (*samantarapratyaya) and atoms and others are denied.57

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 gzugs la sogs pa phyi rol du 'dod pa rams shes pa las gud na yod par bzhug na yang mig la sogs pa bzhin du dus mnyam pa dang mi mnyam pa'i tshe na rab tu nye ba'i rgyu med pas rig par mi 'grub bo/ de lta tas na de dag myong ba ni tha dia pa ma yin pa'i sngon po la 5' sngon po la 9) sogs pa'i mam pa myong ba sice/ myong ba'i ngo bo yin pas mri lam dang sgyu ma la sogs pa'i gzugs myong ba bzhin no/

 gal te shes pa'i mam pa bskyed pa'i don gzhan zhiig 'bras bu las gud na yod par rjes su dpog na/ de lta na yang mgon sum du grub par ma gyur gyi rjes su dpag par zad do/ de lta na

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Śāntarakṣita here explains how the view of the internalist is established. First he
denies perceptibility of external objects in the way the Sautrāntika does. Causal relationship
between external objects and sense faculties is rejected and external objects are only
inferred. It is explained that our cognition is, in fact, cognition of images which are not
different from cognition itself. If we define, as we examined in the previous section, that
the Sākāravādin is one who maintains that images are not different from cognition, and
that the Nirākāravādin is one who considers images are produced by latent impressions
(vāsanā), this can be regarded as the view of the Sākāravādin.

Meanwhile, Jītārī is also one of the Mādhyamikas who maintain the identity of
cognition and images. In the Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya, he states as follows:

[4-24]

In this way, we maintain that because cognition of blue and so on is not
different from those [blue and so on], [cognition] is false in the same way
as that [blue].

This shows that Jītārī holds the sākāra view because he maintains that cognition
and images are not different. As Shirasaki points out, this passage corresponds to a
passage in the Prajñāpāramitopadesa of Ratnakarasānti (A) that criticises the
Sākāravādin. If we take into account that he accepts the four alternatives (catuskoti)
based on existence and non-existence in the Sugatamatavibhaṅgakārikā, he is most
probably a Māyopamādyavāvinī. As we have seen in chapter 3, in addition, Jītārī has a

yang ‘di med par grub stel/ de ma thag pa’i rkyen nges par yod pa dang/ rdul phra mo la sogs
pa bkag pa’i phyir roll/
(1) Omit as Peking ed.

Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya (Derge ed. No. 3900 a 47b7-48a1, Peking ed. No. 5868 nyo 332a8-b1):
de ltar sngon po la sogs pa’i zhcs pa ni de dag dang tha mi da d pa na de dang ‘dra bar brdzun
pa yin no zhcs kho bo cag gis brjod pa yin rol/

Shirasaki [1992] (p. 109). Also see passage [4-17] (p. 237). Shirasaki considers that Jītārī is a
Nirākāravādin because here he says that blue and so on [=images] are ‘false’. However Jītārī is not
talking about the conventional existence of self-awareness. The Mādhyamika, regardless of whether
he is a Sākāravādin or a Nirākāravādin, does not accept anything as real ultimately. As Ratnakarasānti
(A) defines, it is the Sākāravādin who maintains that cognition is not different from images.

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close relation to Śāntarakṣita who is considered by Sahajavajra to maintain the Sākāra-Madhyamaka. It is therefore quite certain that Jitāri is a Śākāra-vādin according to Ratnākaraśānti’s criteria and it is accordingly doubtful that Jitāri was considered in India as a Nirākāra-Madhyamika although some Tibetan doxographers maintain that he is a Nirākāra-Madhyamika.

According to Advayavajra, the Māyopamādvayavādin postulates awareness presumably at the ultimate level. Now we go on to examine whether Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla maintain awareness and images ultimately. The view on cognition held by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla has been studied in detail by Ichigō. He reports that when Śāntarakṣita criticises the Nirākāra-vādin in verse 60 of the Madhyamakālaṃkāra, he expresses his view on cognition at the ultimate level in its auto-commentary Vṛtti:

[4-25]

Therefore, because it is not established that images such as blue are connected to delusion and also to its latent impressions (vāsanā), even when being completely pure after that [delusion] disappears, it is not possible that all images disappear. If there is no connection, it cannot be ascertained that as a result of one’s disappearance the other disappears, as a cow and a horse and so forth [do not have a connection and even if a cow disappears, a horse and so forth do not necessarily disappear].

On this point, Kamalaśīla comments as follows in the Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā:

[4-26]

[If one argues that] if it was possible for all images to disappear in the

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61 Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti, od. v. 60 (Ichigō [1985b] p. 166, 4-7):
  de bas na sngon po la sogs pa’i rnam pa ni ‘khrul ba dang de’i bag chags dang yang ’brel bar ma grub pas/ de log ste shin tu rnam par dag pa’i dus na yang rnam pa thams cad ldog pa ni rigs te/ ’brel pa med na geig log pas gzhan yang ldog par nges pa med de/ ba lang dang rta la sogs pa bzhin no/
pure state, then this [cognition of one intrinsic nature\(^{62}\)] must be possible, [I answer] in this way: Even though delusion disappears, disappearance of images is not possible because there is no connection between delusion and images.\(^{63}\)

These passages show that Śāntarakṣita does not hold that all images disappear in the completely pure state and Kamalaśīla also considers that he does not. Strictly speaking it is not certain that Kamalaśīla has the same opinion as Śāntarakṣita because this is Kamalaśīla’s commentary on the work of Śāntarakṣita. It does not necessarily mean that the former had the same view as the latter. However, I here assume that Kamalaśīla himself also maintains that there is no connection between delusion and images.

Anyway it should be noted that Śāntarakṣita does not accept the connection between delusion, its latent impressions (vāsanā) and images conventionally as well as at the completely pure state. Thus Śāntarakṣita and probably Kamalaśīla postulate some sort of images at the completely pure state. If this 'completely pure state' means the ultimate truth, it may justify the classification of these two teachers as Māyopamādvyāvādins, which is shown by Tsong kha pa as some former teachers’ view, because the Māyopamādvyāvādin is said to maintain that images and emptiness are the ultimate truth. According to Ichigō, who has studied these passages in detail, Śāntarakṣita does not accept the connection between delusion and images because he postulates self-awareness and is a Sākāravijñānavādin.\(^{64}\) If we accept that those who maintain that

\(^{62}\) In the Madhyamakālankāra, Śāntarakṣita attempts to prove emptiness of all dharmas with ‘lacking one and many’ theory (See [3-44]):

The entities postulated by us and others lack intrinsic nature in reality because they lack one intrinsic nature and many, like a reflection. (Madhyamakālankāra, v. 1)

\(^{63}\) However the Nirākāra-Cittamātra insists, according to Ichigō [1985a] (pp. 61-62), that the inferential reason “because they lack one intrinsic nature and many” is unproven due to a doubt (samudigdhasiddha) because cognition is various in the impure state, but it becomes single and non-dual in the perfectly pure state when delusion disappears.

\(^{64}\) (Translated by the present author)
images arise from latent impressions (vāsanā) is the Nirākāravādin, Śāntarakṣita should not be classified as a Nirākāravādin.

It is also very interesting that Haribhadra quotes a passage almost identical with Kamalaśīla’s, as Ichigō points out. This suggests that Haribhadra does not maintain the connection between delusion, its latent impressions (vāsanā) and images just as Śāntarakṣita and seemingly Kamalaśīla do not. Then he can be classified as a Māyopamādvyavādin together with Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla in that he does not consider that even when delusion disappears at the pure state, images do not necessarily disappear. Furthermore, he should not be a Nirākāra-Yogācāra-Mādhyamika since a proponent who holds a causal relation between latent impressions (vāsanā) and images (ākāra) is regarded as a Nirākāravādin.

Śāntarakṣita and Haribhadra do not, therefore, consider images disappear at the completely pure state. Kamalaśīla does not seem to oppose them. If this state is meant to be the ultimate truth, they maintain some kind of cognition at the ultimate level. Although I have not yet found any passage of Śāntarakṣita mentioning a Yogin’s cognition, Kamalaśīla explains it in detail in the Madhyamakālaṃkārapāñjikā, as follows:

[4-27]

If [one asks whether] at that state [of the ultimate truth] any Yogin exists and anything is seen, [I answer that] ultimately nothing is seen and no Yogin exists at all, either. But conventionally in the way it is explained that “Devadatta sees and hears”, for example, there is no fault [in saying a Yogin sees and so forth] as a Yogin also is the same as that [Devadatta].

If [one asks] what is cognition of a Yogin which is without appearance of non-dual cognition and whether it is understood as being non-appearance by anything: first it is not by itself because of contradiction of activity on

65 Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka (Wogihara [1932] p. 634, 5-8):
yadi hi viśudhdhavasthāyāṃ sarvesām ākārāṇāṃ nivṛttiḥ sambhavet taddaś sambhāvyata evaitat I yāvatā bhūrintiniyṛttav api nākārāṇāṃ nivṛttiḥ sambhavati I tatra teṣām yathoktanyāyena pratibandhābhyavat II

66 This is indeed against the opinion of dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po and 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, who hold that Haribhadra is a Nirākāra-Yogācāra-Mādhyamika. See chapter 1. (p. 10 ff.)
itself, and not by others, either, because of the undesirable consequence of infinite regress, [I answer as follows]:

This is not a fault. As it is established by cognition which is acquired after [cognition] is perceived by self-awareness as being non-dual and being non-appearance but activity on itself is not contradictory, lack of intrinsic nature is [established] in the same way. Also because self-awareness is established [among people] up to a cowherd, it cannot be refuted. It is not infinite regress, either. Because two cognitions take everything as object, everything is equal in the same way as [cognition] of the Vaibhāṣika, for example. 67

Here, Kamalaśīla maintains, on the one hand, that a Yogin does not see anything ultimately. On the other hand, he explains that in conventional terms, he is said to see something. In other words, he has ‘cognition which is without appearance of non-dual cognition.’ It is also noted that Kamalaśīla considers that this cognition is based on self-awareness. It is not clear how Kamalaśīla understands the ultimate cognition by explaining it as cognition which is ‘without appearance’. Concerning this term, ‘cognition which is without appearance of non-dual cognition’, Kamalaśīla gives an explanation also in the Bhāvanākrama, as follows:


gal te de'i gnas skabs na mal 'byor pa gang zhib yod/gang zhib ni lta zhe na/ don dam par ni 'ga' yang lla ba med la mal 'byor pa yang med mod kyil kun rdzob tu dper na lhas byin lla'o nyan to zhes bya ba la sogs pa ston pa lta mal 'byor pa yang de dang 'dra bas nyes pa med do/

ji ste mal 'byor pa'i shes pa gnyis med pa'i shes pa snang ba med par byed pa gang yin pa de yang gang zhib gis snang ba med pa nyid du khong du chud/ re zhib de nyid kyi ni na yin te/ bdag nyid la byed pa 'gal ba' pbyir ro/ gzhun dag gyes kyang ma yan te thug pa med par thal bar gyur ba'i pbyir ro zhe na/

de ni nyes par mi gyur te ji lta gnyis med pa nyid dang snang ba med pa nyid du rang rig pas nyams su myong su phyis rjes su thub pa'i shes pa nam par 'jog par byed la rang la bdag nyid byed par 'gal ba yang ma yin pa lat/ rang bzhin med pa yang de dang 'dra'o/ rang rig pa yang gnag rdzi yan chad la grub pa'i phyir klan kar yang ni rang ngo/ thug pa med pa yang ma yin te/ shes pa gnyis kyi thams cad yul kho nar byed pa'i phyir dper na bye brag tu sma ba namgs kyi dang 'dra bas thams cad mshungs so/

This part of the Paññikā is quoted and discussed in Ichigō [1985a] p. 65.
In this way, having gone beyond cittamātra, [a Yogin] should also go beyond the cognition in which there is no appearance of duality (dvayanirābhāsa), because it is impossible for entities to arise from themselves [or] from others. And he should examine that because the perceived object and the perceiving subject are false, for they are not different from those [entities], it (advayajñāna) also cannot be true. The meaning is that he should eliminate attachment to reality with regard to even this cognition of non-duality and should abide only in cognition without the appearance of understanding of cognition of non-duality. This being the case, he comes to abide in understanding that all phenomena lack intrinsic nature. Because he who is abiding there enters the ultimate reality, [this is] entering into meditation without conceptualisation. Likewise, when a Yogin abides in cognition without the appearance of cognition of non-duality, then he sees the Great Way because he abides in the ultimate reality. 

This cognition without the appearance of cognition of non-duality (advayajñānanirābhāsa jñāna) is considered the ultimate cognition which a Yogin acquires at the culmination of meditation. It is placed at the end of practice through denial of external objects, denial of cognition of duality of the perceiving subject and the perceived object and denial of the cognition of non-duality. Here, the highest state held by the Yogācāra, i.e. the cognition of non-duality, is not the highest according to Kamalaśīla, a Mādhyamika. He clearly states “when a Yogin abides in cognition without the appearance of cognition of non-duality, then he sees the Great Way because he abides in the ultimate reality.”

This cognition without the appearance of cognition of non-duality (advayajñānanirābhāsa jñāna) is considered the ultimate cognition which a Yogin acquires at the culmination of meditation. It is placed at the end of practice through denial of external objects, denial of cognition of duality of the perceiving subject and the perceived object and denial of the cognition of non-duality. Here, the highest state held by the Yogācāra, i.e. the cognition of non-duality, is not the highest according to Kamalaśīla, a Mādhyamika. He clearly states “when a Yogin abides in cognition without the appearance of cognition of non-duality, then he sees the Great Way because he abides in the ultimate reality.”

68 Bhāvanākrama (Tucci 1958 p. 211, 10-20):

evam cittamātram atikramya tad api dvayanirābhāsam yaj jñānaṃ tad atikramet l svataḥ parato bhāvānāṃ janmāṇupapatteḥ 1 grāhyagrāhakayoś cālīkate tadavatātrekāt tasyāpi satyavam ayuktam iti vicārayet 1 tatrāpy advayajñāne vasutvābhūhīnasaḥ tyajet, advayajñānanirābhāsa eva jñāne ātiśhed ity arthaḥ 1 evan sami sarvadharmanwabha bhavatāpratīPTau sthito bhavati 1 tatra sthitasya paramatattvapravacṣāl, nirvikalpasamādhipravacṣaḥ 1 tathā cādvayujñānaṁ nirābhāse jñāne yadā sthito yogi tadā paramatattve sthitavā, mahāyānaṁ sa pāsyaḥ 1
realities. Thus he indeed maintains some sort of cognition at the ultimate level.

Kamalasila thus holds cognition without the appearance of cognition of non-duality, although it is, of course, empty and without intrinsic nature. However, it is not clear what kind of cognition this is. Moreover, he explains, in the Madhyamakālaṃkārāpāñjikā, “If [one asks whether] at that state [of the ultimate truth] any Yogin exists and anything is seen, [I answer that] ultimately nothing is seen and no Yogin exists at all, either.” On the other hand, he says “But conventionally in the way it is explained that “Devadatta sees and hears”, for example, there is no fault [in saying a Yogin sees and so forth] as a Yogin also is the same as that [Devadatta].” It seems that Kamalasila holds no cognition as existent at the ultimate level and considers that a Yogin is said to see something only in conventional terms. This may explain the contradiction between Advayavajra and Ratnakarasanti (B). Advayavajra holds that the Māyopamādvyavādīn employs the four alternatives based on existence and non-existence and maintains awareness presumably at the ultimate level. On the other hand, Ratnakarasanti (B) maintains that the Mādhyamikas who maintain that the convention is images of cognition employs the four alternatives based on existence and non-existence, but do not accept existence of mind and cognition ultimately.

As we have discussed above, concerning epistemology, Haribhadra is very likely to have followed the view of Sāntarakṣita and Kamalasila, which can be regarded as the Sākāra-Yogācārā-Madhyamaka although some Tibetan doxographers classify him as a Nirākāra-Yogācārā-Mādhyamika.69 Therefore it is worth mentioning his view on cognition. As Shirasaki reports,70 in the Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā, we find the term māyopamādvaya which is probably the origin of the term Māyopamādvavādin used by Advayavajra. According to Haribhadra, this term, māyopamādvaya, describes cognition as the nature of the dharmakāya:

[4-29]

Venerable Buddhas characterised by the perfection of wisdom (prajñā-

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69 See chapter 1.1 (p. 11 ff.).
70 Shirasaki [1993].
Thus the term _māyopamādvaya_ is used by Haribhadra to denote the characteristic of cognition of the _dharma-kāya_, but it is not clear what it is from this brief passage.

In the passage of the _Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka_ which we examined in the first chapter, however, Haribhadra mentions this cognition when he explains a Yogn’s procedure of cultivation in a very similar way to Kamalaśīla:

[4-30]

[Then a Yogn should] ascertain that nothing but the non-dual (advaya) cognition is existent in reality.

[4-31]

[Then he should] meditate that in reality that [non-dual cognition (advayajñāna)] also lacks its intrinsic nature like an illusion because it arises in dependence, and free from the nature of one sided reflection of existence, non-existence and so on. When the power of the meditation is completed, and like some people’s knowledge of jewel, silver, and so on, there arises apprehension illuminating by itself like an illusion (māyopamūtpatibhāsadhī), with all causes of faults eliminated, free from conceptualisation and which is somehow individually known, the Yogn should completely abandon the obscuration of what can be known (jñeyāvaraṇa).

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71 _Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka_ (Wogihara [1932] p. 268, 12-13):

dharma-kāya māyopamādvayajñānasvabhāvāḥ prajñāpāramitātmakā buddhiḥ bhagavanta iti

72 _Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka_ (Wogihara [1932] p. 884, 24-25):

advayajñānam eva kevalaḥ bhāvato bhāvārūpam ity niścitya...


tad api praṇītyasamutpattavān māyāvan niśvabhāvan tattvato 'pagataikāntabhāvābhāvādi-

parāmarṣārūpam iti bhāvayan l bhāvanābalaniṣpaitau keśaṃcita manirūpyādiśānasudda utsārta-
sakalarūtaṁśimuttvā māyopamātpatibhāsadhīyo nivikalpāyāḥ kathaṃcit praṇītām-
vedyāyāḥ samutpāde jñeyāvaraṇaḥ samyag yogi prajñāyat
Thus the term māyopamādvaya is found in Haribhadra’s work and it is very likely that the name Māyopamādvayavādin is derived from this state of meditation held by Haribhadra. He postulates self-awareness which is like an illusion after rejecting existence of non-dual cognition. This is in line with Advayavajra’s exposition in the Pañcatathāgatāgamudrāvivaraṇa “if there is realisation of awareness in this state, there is an opportunity that it is the Māyopamādvayavāda, it is not ‘non-abiding in any position’ (sarvatrāpratisthāna).”

The term māyopamādvayajñāna seems to be derived from cognition of the dharmakāya that is the cognition of non-duality (advaya) without dichotomy of the perceiving subject and the perceived object that is fictitious like an illusion. This passage is strikingly similar to the passage in the Bhāvanākrama of Kamalasīla that was presented above. Kamalasīla shows the stages of cultivation from denial of external objects, through denial of the cognition of duality of the perceiving subject and the perceived object and denial of the reality of the cognition of non-duality, and finally to cognition without cognition of non-duality. According to Haribhadra, on the other hand, it is non-dual cognition like an illusion (māyopamādvayajñāna), that comes after denial of the reality of the non-dual cognition, and it is explained as the nature of the dharmakāya.

Nevertheless, extra caution is necessary regarding Haribhadra’s theory of buddhakāyas because Haribhadra postulates four buddhakāyas: svabhāvikakāya, dharmakāya, sāṃbhogikakāya and nairṛtikakāya in the Abisamayālaṃkāra Sphutartha as well as in the Abhisamayālaṃkāra Sphutartha:

[4-32]

And the dharmakāyābhisaṃbodha is fourfold according to the distinction of the svabhāvikakāya and others. As it is said:

The svabhāvikakāya of the Sage is characterised by primordial essence (prakṛti) of undefiled dharmas which have obtained all

74 See passages [1-9] to [1-13] (pp. 21-22)
forms of purity. (v. 8:1)

The first is, the svabhāvikakāya of the Sage, i.e. of the Buddha Bhagavat, which is obtained through the understanding that all phenomena and consciousness are like an illusion — because it is an uncreated object, that is to say, it is obtained, not created, through the supramundane path. It is characterised by non-arising, that is the primordial essence, i.e. intrinsic nature, of application of awareness (smṛtyupasthāna) and other [dharmas], which is characterised by cognition, supramundane and undefiled because of the nature of the dharmadhātu, which have obtained all kinds of purity characterised by innate isolation, because impurities are adventitious.

The remaining three bodies appearing at the level of the true convention, have the nature of reality (dharmatā) ultimately, are made visible in accordance with the inclination [of those who see], and are established according to their being accessible to Buddhās, Bodhisattvas, Śrāvakas and others.75

Thus Haribhadra classifies the appearance of three kāyas other than the svabhāvikakāya as the true convention. This is evident in his exposition of the dharmakāya in the Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka:

[4-33]


sa ca dharmakāyābhisaṃbodhiḥ svabhāvikakāyādibhedena caturvyutpattam i tathā coktaṃ l
sarvakāraṃ viśuddhim ya dharmah prāptā nirāsravā l
svabhāviko muneḥ kāyaṃ teṣāṃ prakṛtilakṣaṇaiḥ ll 8:1 ll

prathamo ye smṛtyupasthānādayo jñānātmakā lokottarā dharmadhāturūpatvād anāsravā malānāṃ āgantukatvena sarvapraKarāṃ viśuddhiṃ prāṇītiviktalakṣaṇāṃ prāptas teṣāṃ ya prakṛtiṃ svabhāvo 'nutpādārūpam 'yaṃ muneḥ buddhasya bhagavanto lokottāreṇa mārgaṅga prāpyate na kriyata ity akṣtrimārthena māyopamāvijñānasarvadharma-pratipatīya 'dligataḥ svabhāvikāh kāyaḥ l

pariṣṭākāyatrayam tathāyamatraḥ prātiśhāsamanāṃ paramārthato dharmatārūpaṃ yathā-dhimokṣaṃ prabhāvitaṃ buddhabodhisattvāsāvākādigocaratvena vyavasthāpitam...
The dharmakāya with function, which has arisen from the equipment of merit (puñyasaṃbhāra) and is the domain only of Tathāgatas, should surely be accepted as all kinds of mind and mental concomittance which are non-dual and which are transformed [into the pure state] by fundamental transformation and have causal efficiency such as teaching of the truth by producing appearances as excellent objects at the level of Yogins’ convention.76

Thus the dharmakāya ‘with function’ is considered conventional because it has causal efficiency. As what has causal efficiency (arthakriyā) is conventional for the Mādhyamika, it is necessary for Haribhadra to separate the dharmakāya which has function from the svābhāvikakāya, which is the ultimate truth, although they are considered identical by proponents of three kāyas.77 Moreover, the dharmakāya is considered to have non-dual cognition (advayajñāna) by proponents of the three-kāya theory. As we have examined, according to Haribhadra, the meditation of a Yogin proceeds from denial of external objects (mind-only) through denial of the perceiving subjects and perceived objects, i.e. non-dual cognition (advayajñāna) to realisation that even that non-dual cognition is like an illusion (māyopamādyavajñāna). Therefore, the dharmakāya consisting of non-dual cognition cannot be ultimate. Thus Haribhadra is forced to place this dharmakāya at the conventional level.

This is apparently caused by verse 1:17 of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, which mentions ‘the dharmakāya with its function’:

[Dharmakāya section (8th chapter)] is explained in four parts: the svābhāvikakāya, the sāṃbhogika[kāya], and the naṁmaṇika[kāya] as

76 Abhisamayālaṃkāroloka (Wogihara [1932] p. 20, 28-p. 21, 2):
avaśyam evābhyupagantavyo yogisamvṛtya viśiṣṭarthapratibhāsa-sa-viṣayaparāva-vyā pārāvṛttā dharmadeśanādyarthakriyākārīgo ’dvayaś citteśamālaḥ sarvākāraś tathāgataś eva
gocarō janasaṃbhārajaḥ savyāpāro dharmakāya ity...
well as the *dharmakāya* with its function.\(^7\)

In this way, Haribhadra, when commenting on the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, chapter 8, takes the *four-kāya* theory. Nevertheless, in other places he seems to hold the *three-kāya* theory by regarding the *dharmakāya* as ultimate, as Isoda and Sakuma argue.\(^7\) For example, just before passage [4-29] quoted above, he mentions the *dharmakāya*:

\[4-35\]

For this is the real body of Tathāgatas.

Because this is the real, i.e. ultimate (*pāramārtha*) body, i.e. the *dharmakāya*...\(^8\)

After this passage, he describes that the *dharmakāya* has the nature of non-dual cognition like an illusion (*māyopamādyayajñāna*). Therefore, I regard the *dharmakāya* described in passage [4-29] as the ultimate *dharmakāya* with the nature of non-dual cognition like an illusion (*māyopamādyayajñāna*) but not as the conventional *dharmakāya* with its function. If Advayavajra regards Haribhadra as the Māyopamādyayajñānavādin and understands that the ultimate *dharmakāya* possesses non-dual cognition like an illusion (*māyopamādyayajñāna*), we can conclude that the distinction between the Māyopamādyayavādin and the Sarvadharmāpratīṣṭhānavādin is related to the ultimate truth. In verse 3 of the *Madhyamāsaṭṭka*, Advayavajra, explaining the tenet of the Māyopamādyayavādin, says that the illumination (*prakāśa*) is free from the four alternatives and non-dual like an illusion (*māyopamādyaya*).\(^8\) Because the ultimate truth is regarded as ‘free from the four alternatives’, non-dual cognition like an illusion must be ultimate.

\(^7\)*Abhisamayālaṃkāra* (Wogihara [1932] p. 21, 13-14):

\[
\text{svābhāvikāh āśāmbhiḥ naṁ māyāpāparas tathā l}
\]

\[
\text{dharmakāyāḥ sakārītraśa caturdhiḥ samudīrītaḥ ll}
\]


\(^8\)*Abhisamayālaṃkāralokā* (Wogihara [1932] p. 268, 1-3):

\[
\text{etad dhi tathāgatānāṁ bhūtarthaṁ śārīraṁ l}
\]

\[
\text{yāvad etad bhūtarthikaṁ parāmārthaṁ śārīraṁ dharmakāyaḥ ...}
\]

\(^8\) See [4-8] (p. 228).
This is, nevertheless, not entirely certain, because a later Madhyamaka teacher, Abhayakaragupta, understands that Haribhadra maintained that the conventional dharmakāya with function possessed non-dual cognition like an illusion (māyopamādvyājñāna):

[4-36]

Therefore, there never is any teaching that [the body of the Buddha which has] supramandane bodhiyaṅgas and others [and] the nature of wisdom that is non-dual like an illusion is the dharmakāya, and is the fourth one. This teaching is [known] from Haribhadra and should be rejected.82

This is regarded as Abhayakaragupta’s objection of Haribhadra’s interpretation of verse 1:17 of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra.83 Abhayakaragupta holds the three-kāya theory and here attempts to reject Haribhadra’s four-kāya theory, which separates the conventional dharmakāya from the svabhāvikakāya. Therefore ‘the fourth’ dharmakāya mentioned here is the conventional one with function, but he considers that according to Haribhadra it has the nature of wisdom that is non-dual like an illusion.

This may be related to the following statement by Haribhadra:

[4-37]

And then, the lords of Yogins, who, by means of reasoning and scriptural authority, have fully understood their mind as like an illusion and whose intellects are engaged in the perception of reality and non-reality, establish with knowledge consisting of hearing and consideration that non-dual mind like an illusion has the nature of the true convention (tathyasampryti).

[Then] according to the nature of reality (dharmatā) that is dependent

82 Munimatālaṃkāra (Derge ed. No. 3903 a 217b3-4, Peking ed. No. 5299 ha 285a6-7):

dc'i phyir ’jig rten las ’das pa’i byang chub kyi phyogs la sogs pa rams sgyu ma lta bu’i gnyis su med pa’i ye shes kyi ngo bo ni chos kyi sku ste bzhi pa’o zhes gang du’ang rnam par bzhag pa med del rnam par bzhag pa de ni seng ge bzang po’i rang dbang las te spang bar bya’ol/

83 See [4-34] (p. 255).
Chapter 4 Mäyopamädvayavädin and Sarvadharmäpratisthäusernavädin

origination, they, cultivating by means of the special concentrated and long uninterrupted cultivation in the order of eight clear realisations (aṣṭābhīṣamaya), such as the state of knowing all forms, cause [mind] that has accumulated all conceptual constructs, and which is connected to existence, to reach continuity only of non-dual consciousness like an illusion. 84

I am not confident if I understand this passage correctly. However, it seems that Haribhadra here implies that non-dual cognition like an illusion (mäyopamädvayajñāna) has the nature of the true convention although here the term advayaṁ mäyopamacittam is used. It is likely, therefore, that it does not necessarily belong to the ultimate truth. He may have thought that the dharmakāya, irrespective of the state, possesses non-dual cognition like an illusion (mäyopamádvaJayajñāna). Assuming that Haribhadra postulates the same cognition as cognition without the appearance of cognition of non-duality maintained by Kamalasīla, we should interpret that the term ‘like an illusion’ (mäyopamá) means that it appears conventionally and does not appear ultimately. In this case, it is understood that the conventional dharmakāya has non-dual cognition appearing like illusion, and the ultimate dharmakāya has cognition without the appearance of cognition of non-duality. It is thus very likely that this classification of the Mäyopamädvayavädin and the Sarvadharmäpratisthäusernavädin is based on what cognition the dharmakāya has.

To summarise, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalasīla, Haribhadra and Jītāri can be classified as Sākāra-Mādhyamikas based on their understanding of the relationship between images (ākāra) and cognition or between images (ākāra) and latent impressions (vāsanā). Of these, according to Tsong kha pa, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalasīla are said by some Tibetan teachers to be Māyopamāvādins. Jītāri uses the four alternatives based on existence,


tatas ca yuktyāgamābhābhyām parviditamāyopamacitàm tattvātattvāvabodhābhyodyatamatayo”
dvayaṁ māyopamacitam iṣṭhayasvāpyātirūpam eva śrutacintāmayena jīvānena vyavasthāpya
pratityasamutpādadharmatāya sarvākārajñatādyāṣṭābhīṣamayaśrutam eva sādānirantaradṛṣṭha-
kālaviśeṣabhaṭvānya bhāvavantaḥ sanātasaṅkalavikālpanāḥ bhavān anubuddhāṁ
māyopamādvaJayājñānamātraprabandham āsādayanti yogiśāḥ II

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which is a characteristic of the Māyopamāvādin. Meanwhile the term, Māyopamādvaya-
vādin, is probably derived from māyopamādvayajñāna mentioned in the Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka of Haribhadra. According to Haribhadra, the dharmakāya possesses non-dual cognition like an illusion (māyopamādvayajñāna). In fact, Advayavajra’s explanation in his works is so brief that it is difficult for us to ascertain if he means that Haribhadra is a Māyopamādvayavādin. However, we can speculate that the classification of the Māyopamādvayavādin and the Sarvadharmāpratisthānavādin is related to the cognition of the dharmakāya described in the Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka of Haribhadra, on the assumption that the Māyopamādvayavādin is the Sākāra-Mādhyamika and Haribhadra is indeed a Sākāra-Mādhyamika.

Nevertheless neither does this mean that there was the classification of the Mādhyamaka into the Sākāra-Mādhyamaka and the Nirākāra-Mādhyamaka at the time of Śāntarakṣita, Kamalāśīla or Haribhadra, nor that they regarded themselves as Sākāra-Mādhyamikas. While Śāntarakṣita and Kamalāśīla mention the two Mādhyamikas who do not agree on conventional existence, they do not mention the distinction of the two Mādhyamikas concerning images. We have to wait for this classification more or less until the time of Ratnākarasānti (A). This means only that they can be classified into the Sākāra-Mādhyamika depending on the criteria created at a later time.

The same is applied to the classification of the Māyopamādvayavādin and the Sarvadharmāpratisthānavādin. We find this classification in the works of Advayavajra but can hardly go back any further.

4.3 Examination of Sarvadharmāpratisthānavādin

At the beginning of this chapter, we affirmed that Advayavajra classified the Mādhyamikas into the Māyopamādvayavādin and the Sarvadharmāpratisthānavādin. It is, however, not clear what their positions are from the ambiguous description in verse 27-31 of the Tattvaratnāvalī.⁸⁵ We, however, hypothesised that the Māyopamādvayavādin and the Sarvadharmāpratisthānavādin respectively maintain the Sākāra-Mādhyamaka and

⁸⁵ Passage [4-2] (p. 214).
the Nirākāra-Mādhyamika.

Some Tibetan doxographers classify Haribhadra, Jitāri and Kambala as Nirākāra-Mādhyamikas, and Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśila as Sākāra-Mādhyamikas, as we examined in the first chapter of the present thesis. On the contrary, in terms of epistemology, Haribhadra has a close relation to Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśila who are often classified as Sākāra-Mādhyamikas. The examination in the previous section revealed, in addition, that he uses the term mayopamādvyavajñāna to explain cognition of the dharmakāya. This seems to relate to the designation of the Māyopamādvyavādin. Jitāri also seems to be a Māyopamādvyavādin because he uses the four alternatives based on existence and non-existence. He again has a close relation to Śāntarakṣita. It is therefore doubtful that Haribhadra and Jitāri are regarded as Nirākāra-Mādhyamikas in India.

It is certain, on the other hand, that Śāntarakṣita and Kambala were respectively classified as a Sākāra-Mādhyamika and a Nirākāra-Mādhyamika in India around the 11th C as Sahajavajra maintains in the Tatvadāśakaṭīka. If the Sarvadharmāpratisthānavādin is the Nirākāra-Mādhyamika, as we hypothesised, and Kambala is considered a Nirākāra-Mādhyamika, there should be some relation between Kambala and the Sarvadharmāpratisthānavādin, such as Advayavajra. In this section, therefore, we examine the relationship between the two in order to establish whether our hypothesis is tenable.

First, in the Tatvadāśakaṭīka, after naming Śāntarakṣita and Kambala respectively as the representatives of the Sākāra-Mādhyamika and the Nirākāra-Mādhyamika, Sahajavajra quotes 12 verses, 11 of which are identified as verses in the Ālokaṃālā of Kambala. Then he explains the tenet of the Nirākāra-Mādhyamika as follows:

[4-38]

The Yogācāras who are proponents of nirākāra, too, postulate the same cognition of perfected [nature], i.e. the nature of self-awareness without the perceiving subject and the perceived object is not non-existent. The

86 See [4-15] (p. 233).
Mādhyamikas who are proponents of nirākāra postulate that the perfected [cognition] has the nature of the convention of Yogins and does not arise ultimately. This is the difference.\^\text{88}

Here Sahajavajra explains that the Nirākāra-Yogācāras consider that the non-dual cognition without the perceiving subject and the perceived object is the perfected nature. In other words, they understand that self-awareness is not non-existent at the ultimate level. On the other hand, the Nirākāra-Mādhyamikas consider that it is conventional and does not arise at the ultimate level. Thus the Nirākāra-Mādhyamika is explained as the Mādhyamika who accepts cognition (self-awareness) without images (nirākāra) conventionally and denies it ultimately as empty. Nevertheless, the Sākāra-Yogācāras also postulate the non-dual cognition without the perceiving subject and the perceived object. Therefore this explanation only implies that the Nirākāra-Mādhyamikas maintain the view of the Nirākāra-Yogācāra conventionally, but it is not necessarily a basis for the distinction between the Sākāra-Yogin and the Nirākāra-Yogin. However, if we examine verses quoted in the Tattvadāsakaṭikā from the Ālokamālā, we will be certain that this is the Nirākāra-Maṭhyamaka. Of these verses quoted in the Tattvadāsakaṭikā, in verse 243, Kambala explains the perfected nature, as follows:

\[4-39\]

However, when the perfect nature is perceived, everything has the nature of the single essence, without parts, without beginning and end, without images and without attachment.\^\text{89}

\^\text{88} Tattvadāsakaṭikā, ad v. 2 (Derge ed. No. 2254 vi 165b6-7, Peking ed. No 3099 mi 181a8-b1):
\begin{verbatim}
rmam pa med par smra ba'i mal 'byor spyod pa rams kyang yongs su grub pa'i shes pa de
nyid khas len par byed de/ gzung ba dang 'dzin pa dag gi\textsuperscript{10} stong pa'i rang rig pa'i ngo bo ni
med pa ma yin no/ rmam pa med par smra ba'i dbu ma pas ni yongs su grub pa yang mal 'byor
gyi kun rdzob kyi ngo bo yin te/ don dam par ma skyes pa nyid 'di ni byed brag go/
\end{verbatim}

\(1)\ D: gi, P: gis.

\begin{verbatim}
jñātci tu parinispanc sarvam ckaras itmakam I
nirvibbham anādyantaṁ nirākāraṁ nirāraham II
\end{verbatim}

Matsumoto [1980b] mentions this passage.
For the Yogācāras, the whole world is mind-only. Therefore ‘everything’ here means the mind of the perfected nature, which is devoid of the perceiving subject and the perceived object. It is said to be ‘without images’ (nirākāra). Whether Kambala himself is a Nirākāra-vādin is also ascertained from his own words because he holds that this entire world arises due to latent impressions (vāsanā) in verse 46 of the Ālokamālā, which is translated as follows:

[4-40]

Whence is the very origin of this entire [world] and where is the very end of it? It is from one’s own seed in the form of latent impressions (vāsanābija) placed in the store consciousness (ālayajñāna).

Thus Kambala understands that this world arises from latent impressions (vāsanā). For proponents of mind-only, the world we perceive is nothing but images in consciousness. Therefore this means that images arise from latent impressions (vāsanā). This is in line with the view of the Mādhyaṃika who postulates that the convention is latent impressions (vāsanā) described in the Triyānnavyavasthāna of Ratnakaraśānti (B). Therefore the Mādhyaṃika who postulates that the convention is latent impressions (vāsanā) is certainly understood as the Mādhyaṃika who holds the view of the Nirākāra-Yogācāra conventionally. This Mādhyaṃika who postulates that the convention is latent impressions is again identified with the Sarvadharma-pratisthānāvādin in that they both maintain the four alternatives (catuskoti) in a similar way. Then the Sarvadharma-pratisthānāvādin must be the Nirākāra-Mādhyaṃika. In addition, considering that Sahajavajra is the commentator on Advayavajra’s work and known as his disciple, we can assume that he may classify the Mādhyaṃikas in the same way as Advayavajra in the Tattvaratnāvali,

prabhavaḥ pralayaś caiva viśvasyāṣya kutaḥ kva vā l
vāsanābijataḥ svasmād ālayajñānasamsthātāt II

91 See 4.1.4, passages [4-12] (p. 231) and [4-15] (pp. 233-234). I here followed Matsumoto [1980b], who identifies the Mādhyaṃika who postulates that the convention (saṃvṛti) is latent impressions (vāsanā) in the Triyānnavyavasthāna and the Nirākāra-Mādhyaṃika in the Tattvadastūkāfikā.
but uses different terms.

It is next necessary for us to find evidence which indicates that Advayavajra follows Kambala. One piece of evidence is the fact that he, in the Pañcatathāgatamudrā-vivaraṇa, quotes verses 248 and 274 of Kambala’s Ālokamālā:

[4-41]

Let there not be abiding in consciousness. Therefore the Sage, for fear of this, having taught again and again according to emptiness, divides the teaching. (v. 17)\(^92\)

[4-42]

All tenets of those with subtle sense faculties and sufficient intelligence, when analysed, [would be] the same, if there were not the teaching of ‘emptiness’ alone here, which makes a distinction of a Buddhist and an outsider. (v. 19)\(^93\)

It seems to me that these verses are quoted in order to show that Advayavajra follows Kambala who was indeed a Mādhyamika. Verse 17 shows that the Buddha taught emptiness so that nobody should have attachment to consciousness, i.e. to the teaching of mind-only. Verse 19, on the other hand, shows that a distinction between Buddhist and non-Buddhist teachings is made depending on whether emptiness is taught. This means that emptiness is most important element that separates Buddhist teaching from non-Buddhist. They constitute the concluding part of the Pañcatathāgatamudrā-vivaraṇa, together with quotations from the Lankāvatārasūtra, the Hevajratantra, and the Sekanirdeśa of Advayavajra himself. It should be pointed out that these two verses are also quoted in the Tattvadāśakaṭīka of Sahajavajra as the view of the Nirākāra-

\(^{92}\) Pañcatathāgatamudrā-vivaraṇa, v.17 (=Ālokamālā, v. 248. See appendix 2, p. 281):

\[ \text{mā bhūt saṃvītāpratiṣṭhānam ata eva munir bhayāt} \]
\[ \text{bhinatti dēṣānā dharmaṁ uktvok-tvii} \, \text{śūnya-tātmanā} \]

\(^{93}\) Pañcatathāgatamudrā-vivaraṇa, v.19 (=Ālokamālā, v. 274. See appendix 2, p. 282):

\[ \text{sarvāḥ samānāḥ praviṁḥāyamānah śūkṣmākśikākṣamādhīyāṁ} \, \text{ṛṣṭāṇāḥ} \]
\[ \text{buddhāsya bālyasya vibhāgakartri na syād ihaikā yadi śūnya-tōtīṁ} \]
Madhyamaka when he distinguishes the Sākāra-Madhyamaka and the Nirākāra-Madhyamaka. This means that Sahajavajra understands that these two verses express the tenet of the Nirākāra-Madhyamaka. In addition to this, they are quoted in the Sekanirdeśapaññika of Rāmapāla on verse 19 of the Sekanirdeśa.

In the Pañcatathāgatamudrāvivaraṇa, which is quoted above, Advayavajra maintains that it is necessary to establish mind-only first, by showing that four Tathāgatas, Vairocana, Ratnasambhava, Amitābha and Amogasiddhi, who are respectively the four constituents (skandha), rūpa, vedanā, saṃjñā and saṃskāra, are sealed with Akṣobhya, who is mind. Then he states that Akṣobhya is again sealed with Vajrasattva, to show that mind is in fact empty. This same view is expressed in verse 19 of the Sekanirdeśa and Rāmapāla’s commentary after showing the similarity of tenets of outsiders to those of Buddhists:

[4-43]

Having mentioned similarity of outsider’s scriptures, he explains examination of his own scripture: “Moreover” and so on, [i.e.

Moreover, if mind without the perceived object and the perceiving subject (ādi), which is Akṣobhya, is taught [to be the reality], there will be a censure from our own authority because of absence of the mudrā of Vajrasattva. (v. 19)

Because, here, the goal examined according to the Madhyamaka and so forth is praised because of the result that has unity with the deity in the Way of Mantra. Having understood that that which is sealed with it has the nature of it, the four perceiving subjects beginning with the eye are taught to have the dependent nature in order to abandon the perceptibility

91 Tattvadaśakaññika (Derge ed. No. 2254 wi 165b5-6, Peking ed. No 3099 mi 181a7-8):

rang rig la gnas ma gyur zhcs// de phyir ‘jigs la thub pa yis// chos rams mtha’ dag bstan nas ni// stag pa’i bdag nyid bstan pa yin// thams cad mthungs pa rab tu dpyod byed nas// phra rab lta has blo yis thar byas nas// sangs rgyas pa dang phyi rol mam phye ba// geig kyang mi dmigs stong par smra ba byed//

95 See [4-7] (pp. 223-225), footnote 24.
of the perceived object whose nature is the four constituents beginning with rūpa. If Akṣobhya free from the perceiving subject and the perceived object is taught to be the perfected nature in order to seal them, then it contradicts the seal of Vajrasattva described in scriptural authority. 96

This passage thus shows that the four Tathāgatas, which are rūpa and so on are sealed with Akṣobhya that is mind without the perceiving subject and the perceived object. This is the same as what Advayavajra regards as Nirākāravarāda in the Pañcatathāgatamarudrāvidvaraṇa. In the Sekanirdeśapaṇḍikā, verses 248 and 274 of Kambala’s Ālokamālā are quoted after this passage, 97 to show that this mind without the perceiving subject and the perceived object, which is considered the perfected nature by the Nirākāra-Yogācāra, is not ultimate for the Mādhyamika. This implies that the Sarvadharma-pratiṣṭhānavādin’s position is the Madhyamaka cultivated conventionally on the basis of the nirākāra view. It is also worthwhile noting that the view rejected by Rāmapāla here is quite similar to that of the Nirākāra-Yogācāra given by Sahajavajra, which says, “The Yogācāras who are proponents of nirākāra, too, postulate the same cognition of perfected [nature], i.e. the nature of self-awareness without the perceiving subject and the perceived object is not non-existent.” 98

Both Sahajavajra and Rāmapāla wrote commentaries on works of Advayavajra and are known as his disciples. Therefore verses 248 and 274 of Kambala’s Ālokamālā are considered important among Advayavajra and his followers. Now it is clear, from

96 Sekanirdeśa, v. 19 (Mikkkyo [1991] p. 54, 4-5. This verse is inserted by the present author.) and Sekanirdeśapaṇḍikā (folio. 11b2-5):

97 Sekanirdeśapaṇḍikā (folio 12a1-2)

98 See [4-38] (pp. 260-261).
these two verses, that the Nirākāra-Mādhyamika mentioned in the *Tattvadaśakaṭikā* of Sahajavajra and the Sarvadharma-pratisthānāvādīn mentioned in the *Pañcatathāgata-mudrāvivaraṇa* of Advayavajra and in the *Sekanirdeśapañjikā* of Rāmapāla maintain the same view, in terms of their accepting the position of the Nirākāra-Yogācāra conventionally. As seen in the previous section, the Māyopamādvyavādīn is the Sākāra-Mādhyamika. It is, however, not evident what is the difference between these two proponents except for their understanding of conventionality and use of the different sets of the four alternatives. Therefore, we now proceed to examination of the view of the Sarvadharma-pratisthānāvādīn.

As I mentioned above, the *Sekanirdeśa* contains three verses (vv. 30, 32 and 34) identical with those in the *Tattvaratnāvali* (vv. 30, 29 and 31), which show the view of the Sarvadharma-pratisthānāvādīn. In addition, verse 31 of the *Sekanirdeśa* is identical with verse 20 of the *Pañcatathāgata-mudrāvivaraṇa*. Therefore, we can regard them as the most important verses that contain the essence of the tenets of the Sarvadharma-pratisthānāvādīn. As I admitted at the beginning of this chapter, their meaning is hardly clear. Rāmapāla’s commentary is helpful for us to understand these verses. Of these, verse 30 of the *Sekanirdeśa* (=verse 30 of the *Tattvaratnāvali*) is especially informative with regard to the view of the Sarvadharma-pratisthānāvādīn.

Advayavajra, in verse 30 of *Sekanirdeśa* states as follows:

[4-44]

And the effortless cognition is said to be unthinkable. That which is unthinkable after being considered cannot be unthinkable. (v. 30)\(^{100}\)

This verse describes the cognition which the Sarvadharma-pratisthānāvādīn postulates. In the previous section, on the other hand, we found that the term *māyopamādvaya* describes cognition of the dharmakāya. This may be, therefore, the point on which the Māyopamādvavādīn and the Sarvadharma-pratisthānāvādīn disagree.

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99 See [4-2] (p. 214).

100 *Sekanirdeśa*, v. 30 (Mikkyo [1991] p. 58, 1-2. Identical with v. 30 of the *Tattvaratnāvali*):

\[
\text{anābhogam hi yaj jñānam tac cācintyam pracaśyate l}
\]

\[
\text{samcintya yad acintyam vai tad acintyam bhaven na hi l}
\]
Rāmapāla explains this verse as follows:

[4-45]

Or, the cognition which is unthinkable is non-abiding, [but] the [cognition] produced from examination (vicāra) is not. How is it then? It is effortless, i.e. produced spontaneously.\(^{101}\)

The translation 'unthinkable' may not be appropriate for acintya. In English ‘unthinkable’ means something beyond one’s thought. Here acintya is used to describe cognition which takes effect effortlessly. It is compared by Rāmapāla with ‘examination’ (vicāra), which requires an effort. We should therefore understand that it almost means ‘without thinking.’ Rāmapāla glosses it as non-abiding (apratisthāna). Thus we find that both māyopamādvaya and apratisthāna are used in relation to cognition.

This contrast of unthinkable and examination is quite suggestive. Haribhadra explains, in the Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka,\(^{102}\) that “the lords of Yogins who have fully understood non-dual mind like an illusion according to reasoning and scriptural authority... ...establish that non-dual mind like an illusion has the nature of the true convention.” Thus he considers that non-dual mind like an illusion is understood according to reasoning, not effortlessly. Therefore, it is plausible that this passage concerning vicāra in the Sekanirdesapājikā is intended to refer to the Māyopamādvayavādin.

The other point which may be controversial between the Māyopamādvayavādin and the Sarvadharmāpratisthānavādīn is their understanding of the dharmakāya. As we saw in the previous section, Haribhadra holds the four-kāya theory which separates the dharmakāya from the svabhāvikakāya. This is probably another difference between the two because Advayavajra holds the three-kāya theory. He expresses this in the Tattvaratnaṇvali by quoting three verses from the Abhisamayālaṃkāra:

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\(^{101}\) Sekanirdesapājikā, ad v. 30 (18b3-4):

\[\text{tad väpratisthānam acintyam jñānam na tad vicāragatam I} \]
\[\text{kim tarhi, anābhogam svābhāvikagatam (1)} \]

\(^{102}\) See [4-33] (pp. 254-255).
And for him (the Mādhyamika) the establishment of the three-kāya [system] is taught by Maitreyanātha [in the Abhisamayālaṃkāra]. To explain:

The nairmāṇīkakāya of the Sage with which [he] equally causes various benefits for the world is not interrupted as long as [the world] exists.

This [body] characterised by thirty two marks and eighty signs is considered the sāṁbhogikakāya of the Sage.

The svābhāvikakāya of the Sage is characterised by the primordial essence (prakṛti) of undefiled dharmas which have obtained all forms of purity.\(^{103}\)

In addition to the fact that the Māyopamādvayavādīn and the Sarvadharmāpratisthānavādīn have different ideas with regard to images in cognition at the conventional level, we can thus tentatively assume that the difference between the two also lies in their understanding of the bodies of the Buddha because Haribhadra postulates the four-kāya theory but Advayavajra the three-kāya theory.

4.4 The Origin of the Classification

So far we have discussed doctrinal aspects of the Māyopamādvayavādīn and the Sarvadharmāpratisthānavādīn. It is probably worth noting a historical aspect of the classification briefly. It is not clear when the dichotomy of the Māyopamādvayavādīn and the Sarvadharmāpratisthānavādīn came into existence or how their tenets are

\(^{103}\) Tattvaratnavali (Ui [1952] p. 5, 32-p. 6, 7):

kāyatrayavyavasthā cāsya maitreyanātha’pir uktaḥ tathā ca
karo’ti yeśa citrāṇi hitāni jagataḥ samam ā
ā bhavāt so ‘nupacchitunmā kāyo nairmāṇikō muneḥ
 dvātriṃśallakṣaṇaśītiṣṭaḥjanatmā muneḥ ayam ā
sāṁbhogiko mataḥ kāyo mahāyānopabhogataḥ
 sarvākāraṃ viśuddhiḥ ye dharmāḥ pārāpati nirāsraṃ ā
svabhāvikō muneḥ kāyas teṣaṃ prakṛtiḥlakṣaṇaḥ
(\textit{Abhisamayālaṃkāra}, v. 8:33)

(\textit{Abhisamayālaṃkāra}, v. 8:12)

(\textit{Abhisamayālaṃkāra}, v. 8:1)
transmitted. However, it is known from past studies that Haribhadra's Yogācāra-Madhyamaka is transmitted to Jñānapāda and his followers. Jñānapāda wrote a commentary on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, entitled the Prajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstrābhisamayālaṃkāra-vivṛtti Prajñāpradīpīpāvalī. This work consists of many quotations from Haribhadra's Abhisamayālaṃkāra-lokā, and Jñānapāda clearly accepts Haribhadra’s four-kāya theory in the text. According to Yoshimizu’s study, followers of Jñānapāda, such as Viśālaka, postulated the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka view. When they establish that mind, which the Yogācāras consider ultimate, is actually conventional, they rely on ‘lack of one and many’ reasoning of Sāntaraksita. Yoshimizu also points out that some of the followers of Jñānapāda quotes verse 64 of the Madhyamaṅgalaṃkāra of Śāntarakṣita to show that mind-only is conventional. Therefore, we can tentatively assume that what is later called the Sākāra-Madhyamaka was transmitted in so-called Jñānapāda school of the Guhyasamāj tradition. It is, however, not clear if they accepted non-dual cognition like an illusion (māyopamādvyayajñāna) because I have not found the term in their works.

On the other hand, Lakṣmī postulate the Nirākāra-Madhyamaka in the Pañcakramaṭikā Kramārthaprakāśikā. The Pañcakramaṭikā is a commentary on the Pañcakrama, a set of authoritative works of the Ārya school which is other lineage belonging to the Guhyasamājā tradition. It is interesting to see the fact that Bhāvyā in the Madhyamaṅkaraṭapradīpa, quotes verses from the Pañcakrama and the Svaḍhiṣṭhānakramaprabheda, which is also an authoritative work belonging to the Ārya school, to explain the view of the internalist Madhyamika. As we examined in 2.10, while these verses quoted in the Madhyamaṅkaraṭapradīpa contain an element of

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104 Kendai [1993]. Sakuma [1994] reaches the same conclusion on the basis of the examination of the Saṅcayaśākhāpanjikā.

105 Yoshimizu [1985]. However, Yoshimizu says that she does not find the view of the Yogācāra-Madhyamika, which holds that mind-only is conventional and lack of intrinsic nature is ultimate, in the works of Jñānapāda himself.

106 See [3-44] (p. 160).

107 See [3-66] (p. 184) for v. 64 of the Madhyamaṅkalaṃkāra. Yoshimizu [1985] points out that Viśālaka and Thagana quote this verse.

108 See 2.2 for Lakṣmī’s view.

109 See [2-34] as well as [2-35] (pp. 105-106).
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the sākāra view, the Sanskrit verses in the Pañcakrama and the Svādhīṣṭhānakramaprabheda which are currently extant are different from those quoted in the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa and do not have the sākāra element. Therefore, assuming that the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa retains the older version of these verses, we can speculate that the doctrine of the Ārya school gradually developed towards the nirṇakāra view. It is also suggestive that Lakṣmī does not rely on the reasoning or the definitions of the convention maintained by Śāntarakṣita but on the ‘neither from itself nor from another’ reasoning, which is expressed in verse 1:1 of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.

When Bhavya explains the internalist Madhyamaka, he does not quote from the Madhyamakālaṃkāra, but from the Pañcakrama and the Svādhīṣṭhānakramaprabheda. Here we can find two different ways of explanation of the internalist Madhyamaka: one follows the Madhyamakālaṃkāra of Śāntarakṣita and the other follows the Pañcakrama of Nāgārjuna and other texts that belong to the Ārya school.

Even though both Lakṣmī and Advayavajra are regarded as Nirnākāra-Mādhyaṃkās, it is not clear if there is a close relationship between the Ārya school and the Sarvadharmāpratīṣṭhānavādīns. As far as I know, only Isoda reports an example which may indicate their relationship. According to him, in the Sekanirdeśapāṇijikā, Rāmapāla quotes from Candrakīrti and Āryadeva when he interprets the four mudrās in relation to the five stages (pañcakrama) of the Ārya school. Isoda however considers that this interpretation is introduced by Rāmapāla. I have not found any quotation from texts of the Ārya school in Advayavajra’s works, either. After all, it is not entirely certain to what extent they are related. I will therefore confine myself to pointing out a possibility that the origin of distinction between the Māyopamādvyavādīn and the Sarvadharmāpratīṣṭhānavādīn may have had something to do with the Jñānapāda school and the Ārya school.

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110 Isoda [1979]

111 In the Sekanirdeśapāṇijikā (Derge ed. No. 2253 wi 158a4-b1, Peking ed. No. 3098 mi 174a4-175a1) Rāmapāla quotes from Candrakīrti’s Pradīpodyotana (Chakravarti [1984] p. 1, 9-18) and Āryadeva’s Āryadeva’s Carīṇaṃkārapradīpa (Pandey [2000] p. 2, 4-5).
4.5 Conclusion

Regarding doctrinal aspects, first, the Mäyopamädvayavädin and the Sarvadharmäpratisthänavädin are respectively regarded as the Säkära-Mädhyamika and the Niräkära-Mädhyamika. The former considers that the convention is appearance of mind and that the dharmakäya possesses the non-dual cognition that is like an illusion (mayopamädvayajnäna). According to Sahajavajra, Śaṅtarakṣita and others are the Säkära-Mädhyamikas. Kamalaśīla, Haribhadra and Jitäri can be included in ‘others’ depending on their understanding of the relationship between latent impressions (väsanā) and images (äkära) or between cognition and images (äkära). The term Mäyopamädvayavädin is probably derived from mayopamädvayajnäna mentioned in Haribhadra’s Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka. It does not necessarily mean, however, that Śaṅtarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra were conscious of such a classification since we have not found it in their works or in any other Indian sources prior to Advayavajra and Ratuäkaraśanti (A), who were roughly contemporary to Jitäri. In Haribhadra’s work, mayopamädvayajnäna is explained as ultimate as well as conventional. This is connected to his four-kāya theory in which the dharmakäya can be ultimate as well as conventional.

On the other hand, the Sarvadharmäpratisthänavädin considers that the convention arises from latent impressions (väsanā), and the Niräkära-Mädhyamika is represented by Kambala. Although it is doubtful that Kambala regarded himself as a Mädhyamika, the Sarvadharmäpratisthänavädins regard him as a Mädhyamika by quoting verses 248 and 274 of the Älokamäld. Due to the fact that Sahajavajra classifies Kambala as a Niräkära-Mädhyamika and quotes the same two verses from the Älokamäld, the Sarvadharmäpratisthänavädin is regarded as the Niräkära-Mädhyamika. The Sarvadharmäpratisthänavädin holds that the cognition of Buddhas works effortlessly without thinking but does not explain how it works because it is impossible for an unenlightened person to infer the content of Buddhas’ cognition that is beyond the capacity of human thought. It is not an object of examination although Haribhadra considers that it is. It is however explained as being free from conceptual construct. It is therefore not fixed to any particular view such as permanence or annihilation. This cognition is called non-abiding in any position (sarvatrāpratisthāna).
The examination undertaken in this thesis is far from explication of the view of the Sarvadharmapratisthānavādin and further study is necessary to understand it in detail. It is, however, sufficient to show that Tibetan accounts are not always reliable. As we saw in the first chapter, doxographical accounts in the dGe lugs tradition classify Haribhadra, Jitāri and Kambala as Nirākāra-Mādhyamikas. Of these, it is ascertained that Kambala is regarded as a Nirākāra-Mādhyamika by Indian teachers, but Haribhadra and Jitāri are not likely to be. We are, as a result, obliged to doubt the existence of further division in India, the Samala-Nirākāra-Mādhyamaka and the Nirmala-Nirākāra-Mādhyamaka. Moreover, some dGe lugs teachers understand that the Māyopamādvaya and the Sarvadharmapratisthānavādin are other designations of the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika. Because the Māyopamādvaya establishes non-dual mind like an illusion according to reasoning and the Sarvadharmapratisthānavādin refuses to do so, this can be regarded as the matter about the use of reasoning. It is, therefore, not so far-fetched to consider that the Māyopamādvaya and the Sarvadharmapratisthānavādin are other designations of the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika. However, as long as we define that the Prāsaṅgika follows Candrakīrti’s view, this is not appropriate because the Sarvadharmapratisthānavādin is regarded as the Nirīkṣa-Mādhyamika, who postulate mind-only conventionally, while Candrakīrti maintains external objects conventionally.

Regarding a historical aspect, we hardly know anything about the origin of this classification because we have not found the designations, Māyopamādvaya and Sarvadharmapratisthānavādin, in works before Advayavajra. However, assuming that the Māyopamādvaya and the Sarvadharmapratisthānavādin are respectively the Śākara-Mādhyamika and the Nirīkṣa-Mādhyamika, the origin of the classification may possibly be related to the Jñānapāda school and the Ārya school. Haribhadra employs the term māyopamādvaya in the Abhisamayālaṁkārālokā, and his epistemological view as well as the four-kāya theory is transmitted to Jñānapāda. Advayavajra, a Sarvadharmapratisthānavādin, is regarded as a Nirākāra-Mādhyamika. Meanwhile Lakṣmi, who wrote a commentary on the Pañcakrama, is also regarded as a Nirākāra-Mādhyamika. This hypothesis is, however, highly speculative and further studies are necessary to clarify.
historical development of the Māyopamādvayavādin and the Sarvadharmāpratīṣṭhānavādin.
Concluding Remarks

The purpose of this thesis is to show the classification the Indian Madhyamaka on the basis of late Indian sources that refer to the Madhyamaka doxography and compare it with Tibetan accounts such as Grub mtha'. There are many points of disagreement in Tibetan accounts as we examined in the first chapter. According to the later dGe lugs doxographers, however, it is shown as follows:

- Svātantrika
  - Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka ...................... Bhāviveka
  - Yogācāra-Madhyamaka
    - Sākāra-Madhyamaka ..................... Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla
    - Nirākāra-Madhyamaka ................. Haribhadra, Jitāri, Kambala

- Prāsaṅgika .......................................................... Candrakīrti

This classification is generally accepted by modern scholars, except for the classification of the Sākāra-Madhyamaka and the Nirākāra-Madhyamaka, which is not studied fully and scholars do not agree on. This bifurcation is also accepted as historically correct.

It is, however, now clear that development of the Madhyamaka thought, especially in the late period, was more complicated than dGe lugs doxographers show. First of all, the existence of the classification of the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika among the externalist Madhyamikas before the 9th C is very much in doubt. We have not found any opposition between them in any works of the major Madhyamaka teachers after Candrakīrti for almost 300 years. Moreover, the continuity of Candrakīrti’s thought is not confirmed from Indian sources. One evidence is the fact that there is no commentary of Indian origin in a strict sense on Candrakīrti’s works except for his auto-commentary on the Madhyamakāvatāra. It is also doubtful that Atiśa imported Candrakīrti’s thought into Tibet because he clearly followed Bhāvya concerning the view on the two truths and the use of inference. On the other hand, we cannot find any work of the externalist Svātantrika
Concluding Remarks

that was evidently written after the 10th C. It is, therefore, very likely that the externalist Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika were integrated in the way of Bhavya's Prāsaṅgika maintained in the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa. It is, nevertheless, necessary to notice that it is through Kashmir that Candrakīrti's thought was imported to Tibet. Jayānanda who wrote the Madhyamakāvatāratikā and Nyi ma grags who translated many works of Candrakīrti into Tibetan are both related to Kashmir. Texts dealt with in this thesis are limited to those related to the lineage that descends to Atiśa, who is connected to Vikramāśīla. Therefore it is possible that there existed a separate tradition of Candrakīrti's thought in Kashmir.

Because it is doubtful that there was a classification of the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika among the externalist Mādhyamikas, the existence of the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamaka, which is regarded as a branch of the Svātantrika, should also be questioned. It is also problematic to accept dGe lugs doxographers' explanation of the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika since it is considered that the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika holds the nirākāra view and denies self-awareness while the Sautrāntika, being a Śākāravādin, maintains existence of self-awareness. The accounts of dGe lugs doxographers on the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamaka rather resemble the view of the externalist Mādhyamikas after the 10th C, who were most probably Prāsaṅgikas, since they hold the nirākāra view. On the other hand, we find some Indian works that mention the externalist Mādhyamika who accepts self-awareness. The externalist Mādhyamikas who do and do not accept self-awareness do not seem to have existed side by side in opposition except for the time of its transition. Rather, the externalist Mādhyamikas changed their view on self-awareness as time passed. It is hard to believe, therefore, that the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika does not accept self-awareness.

In this way, our evidence shows that the externalist Mādhyamika changed their view from sākāra to nirākāra and from the Svātantrika to the Prāsaṅgika around the end of the 9th C or the beginning of the 10th C although it is not clear whether the changes with regard to epistemology and to the use of inference happened simultaneously. A possible reason for this change is the dominance of the internalist Mādhyamikas who are the Svātantrika and accept self-awareness. Another incident of this period that may have
Concluding Remarks

had something to do with this change is the arising of the Árya school. In the Madhyamakaratnapradipa, which I regard as the turning point of the externalist Madhyamaka from the Svātṛtika to the Prāsaṅgika, Bhavya quotes verses from the Dohakośa of Saraha and the Pañcakrama of Nāgārjuna among others.

With regard to the classification of the Sākāra-Madhyamaka and the Nirākāra-Madhyamaka, we know an Indian account that mentions this classification. Sahajavajra classifies Śāntarakṣita into the former and Kambala into the latter, but does not mention Haribhadra and Jitāri. However, the Māyopamādvyavāśin and the Sarvadharma-pratiṣṭhānāvāśin are regarded respectively as the Sākāra-Mādhyamika and the Nirākāra-Mādhyamika, and Haribhadra and Jitāri are classified as Māyopamādvyavāśins in most probability. As a result, the classification of Haribhadra and Jitāri made by dGe lugs doxographers is again doubtful. This is supported by the fact that their views have many similarities with Śāntarakṣita’s and Kamalaśīla’s and there are many parallel passages or common quotations among their works. It is, therefore, more appropriate to classify Haribhadra and Jitāri as Sākāra-Madhyamakas if Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are regarded as Sākāra-Mādhyamikas.

On the other hand it is possible to classify Kambala as a Nirākāra-Mādhyamika although he was probably a Nirākāra-Yogācāra. We are not certain about his date or development of the Nirākāra-Madhyamaka. We find clear Nirākāra-Madhyamaka views only in works written around 11th C or later.

Hitherto, studies of the Madhyamaka doxography have been conducted, to a large extent, on the basis of Tibetan accounts. They have also been limited to the examination of works of a small number of Indian Madhyamaka teachers. To give an example, the opposition of the Svātṛtika and the Prāsaṅgika has been studied only in relation to Buddhapālita, Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti. We hardly find any study with regard to how this opposition was taken over by later teachers. I consider that it is as important to trace lineage of a doctrinal view as to study the view of individual teachers independently. As far as this is concerned, I believe, problems with regard to the development of Madhyamaka thought that have not been solved are explicated to a certain extent in this thesis.
Appendices

Appendix 1

I'Ta ba'i khyad par

[1-21] dbu ma rnam gnyis kyi tshul ci lta bu zhe na/

[1-22] sngon ni dbu ma'i mkhan po a tsa rya na ga rdzu na dang/ a rya de bas dbu ma'i bstan bcos' mdzad par zad de/ rnam pa gnyis su phyec ba yang myed/

[1-23] de'i 'og tu a rya a sang ga dang/ ba su ban dus rnam par shes pa shes pa tsam du smra ba'i bstan bcos mdzad de/ phyi rol gyi yul myed kyi rnam par shes pa nyid yul du snang bar bsgrubs shing// rnam par shes pa dag pa gnyis su myed pa ni don dam par yang yod par bshad la// phyi dbu ma'i mkhan po 'ba' phbya shes bya ba'/ a tsa rya na ga rdzu na'i lugs kyi man ngag yod pa/ dongs grub bnyes pa zhig bzhugs pas/ rnam par shes pa tsam du smra ba sun phyung ste/ a tsa rya na ga rdzu nas mdzad pa'i / dbu ma'i ka ri ka'i 'grel pa/ shes rab sgron ma zhes bya ba dang/ dbu ma'i snying po zhes bya ba mdzad pa dang/

[1-24] bar gyi mkhan po shan ta rag shi ta zhes bya bas// a tsa rya a sang gas / rnam par shes pa tsam du bstan bcos rnal 'byor spyod pa mdzad pa la brten te/ kun rdzob du de'i lugs dang / mthun bar rnam par shes pa tsam du bsgrubs la/ don dam par nam par shes pa yang rang bzhin myed pa bshad pa'i dbu ma'i bstan bcos/ dbu ma'i rgyen ces bya ba zhig mdzad de/ dbu ma'i bstan cos lugs cung zad myi mthun ba gnyis bying bas/ a tsa rya 'ba' phyas mdzad pa la ni/ mdo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma zhes btags/ a tsa rya shan ta rag shi tas bzad pa la ni/ rnal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma zhes btags so/

[1-25] a tsa rya na ga rdzu na dang/ a rya de bas mdzad pa la ni/ phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol du phyin pa las bstsogs pa las 'byung ba bzhin du//

spyir dngos po rnam rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba yin bas/ kun rdzob du ni sgyu ma dang 'dra' ba tsam du skye ba yod la/ don dam par ni bdag dang gzhan gnyi ga dang/ rgyu myed pa las kyang skyer myi rung ste/ rang bzhin myed do//

zhes bshad pas/ dbu ma gnyi ga yang de la brten te/

[1-26] de la rnal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma'i lugs ni/ kun rdzob du rnam par shes pa tsam du smra ba dang mthun te/ rnam par shes pas yul shes pa yang/ yul nyid rnam par shes pa'i rang bzhin yin bas/ 'brel pa yod pa'i phyir// rang gi rig pas shes par rung gi/ yul gzhan yin bar 'dod na ni/ shes pa dang 'brel pa myed pas/ rig par myi rung ngo// phyi rol gyi rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba snang pa yang/ dper na/ rmyi lam na mthong ba'i rnam yul myed kyi/ sms nyid mthong ba dang 'dra stell/ lang kar gshegs pa las kyang//

phyi rol gzugs ni yod ma yin// nang gi sms ni phyi rol snang//

1 Tibetan text of the I'Ta ba'i khyad par is based on Pelliot no. 814 (Cf. Lalou [1939, 1950 and 1961]) as edited in Ueyama [1977] (p. 32,8-p. 35,5: 4b1-9b1 of Pelliot no. 814). Ueyama transcribed it preserving the characteristics of the manuscript. Therefore he does not attempt to emend mistakes but suggests emendation in notes. I emended the text according to Ueyama's suggestion in his notes. Concerning annotations I mainly referred to Matsumoto [1981 a].

2 It seems that both bstan cos and bstan bcos appear in this text.

3 Lankāvatārasūtra, v. 10:489ab (Nanjō [1923] p. 326, 8):
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zhès gsungs pa lta bu’o //

don dam par ni sems de yang geig dang du ma’i ngo bo nyid dang brel ba’i getan tshigs kyis yod par myi ‘grub stel/ ci lta zhe na/ yul nyid rnam par shes pa’i rang bzhin yin na/ yang na ni/ yul nams la dad pa mang po bzhin du sems kyang du mar ‘gyur ro/ yang na ni sems bzhin du yul yang sna tshogs su myi ‘gyur ro/ de lta bas na sems tsam la brten nas/ phyi rol gyi yul med par rig par bya’o // dbu ma’i tshul ’di la brten nas/ sems de yang bdag myed par rtogs par bya stel/ ’phags pa ’jig rten las ’das pa’i le’u las kyang/

kye rgyal ba’i sras/ khams gsum ni sems tsam stel/ dus gsum yang sems tsam du rtogs shing// sems de yang mita’ dang dbus med par rtogs po

zhe ‘byung ba lta bu’o // lang kar gshegs pa las kyang/

sems tsam las ni brten nas sul/ phyi rol don la myi bstag go/
de bzhin nyid la gnas nas sul/ sems tsam las kyang bzl bar bya/

sems tsam las ni bzl las nas sul/ snang ba myed la bzl [5] bar bya’/

snang myed gnas pa’i rnal ’byor pas// de’is theg pa chen po mthong

zhès gsungs stel/ de lta bas na dbu ma’i tshul ’dil/ mdo sde dang yang myi ’gal lo zhes ‘chad do/

[1-27] mdo sde dbu ma’i lugs ni/ a tsa rya na ga rdzu na mdzad pa’i lugs dang/ mthun bar phyi nang gyi dngos po thams cad rten cing ’brel par ’byung bar ’chad de// kun rdrob du ni rgyu rkyen las byung bas// sgyu ma tsam du yod la/ don dam par ni bdag dang/ gzhan gnyi ga dang rgyu myed pa las skyer myi rung zhes gan tshigs rnam pa bzhis dngos po rnam skye ba myed de//

’phags pa sa bcu ba las//

khamgs gsum pa sems tsam

zhès ‘byung ba ni// byed pa po dang za ba po dgag pa stel/ mdo de nyid las
de lta brten cing ’brel par ‘byung ba la/ rnam pa bcur rab du rtog cing bdag myed ra dang/ srog myed ra dang/ gang zag myed pa dang/ ngo bo nyid kyi stong pa dang/ rang bzhin gyis byed pa po dang/ tshor ba po myed par rab du rtogs pa’i tshe/ stong

vahirdhā nāsti vai rūpaṇa svacittām dūṣyate bāhiḥ l


punar apram, bho jinaputra, cittamātrām trairdhātukaṃ āvatārati tac ca cittam anantamadhyatāyatāvatārati

tathātāmbane sthātvā cittamātram atikramet l l 10:256 ll
cittamātraṃ atikramya nirābhāsāṃ atikramet l

nirābhāsāstitho yogī mahāyān ṣa na paśyate l l 10:257 ll

6 I omit the following part (Ueyama [1977] p. 33, 32-p. 34, 27).

7 Cf. Madhyamakahrdayākārīkā, v. 5:286c5 (Lindner [2001] p. 61, 8): sūtṛṣu cittamātroktiḥ kṣṛṭbhoktāṃśedhataḥ l l 5:286c5 ll
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pa nyid kyi rnam par thar pa'i sgo skyes pa yin8
zhe gsungs pa'i phyir rol/
'phags pa lang kar gshhegs pa las/
phyi rol gyi dong myed kyil/ sens de ltar snang ngo

zhes 'byung ba yang// dngos po don dam par yod par 'dogs pa dang/ sens tsam du bshad pas/ 'dul ba la phan gdags pa'i phyir/ rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba'i don/ rang bzhin gyis dngos por grub pa myed pa/ log pa'i rnam par rtog pas/ dngos por sgo btags pa la dngos nas/ de skad gsungs pa yin no zhes bshad do/

[1-28] a tsa rya ka ma shi las dhu ma'i bstan bcos/ dhu ma snang ba zhes bya ba mdzad pa las ni/

dhu ma rnam gnyis kun rdzob du cung zad myi mthun na yang/ don dam par phyi nang gi dngos po thams cad/ rang bzhin myed bar 'dog du 'dra bas na 'gal myed do zhes 'byung ngo//

Appendix 2

Pañcathāgatamudrāvivaraṇa':
[4-3]
namo vajrasattvāya l
pratītyajitāh parikalpaśūnyāḥ śūnyāḥ svabhāvena na vastusantaḥ l
nocchedinās citrīcdekarūpā rūpādayāḥ pañcajīnā jayanti l l l

Pañcaskandhāḥ Pañcathāgaṭatass, tatra catvāro vijñānamātṛatāpratīpādanaḥ aśobhyena mudryante l etena bāhyākāraṇāṁ cittamātratvāt grāhyābhāve grāhakaśūnyatayā grāhyagrāhakaraḥitaṁ paramūrthasat saṃvinmātraṁ vijñānam eva tiṣṭhate l l

idam eva śaradamalamadhyāṅgaganāgandāyaṁ nirākāravādināṁ maulāṁ jūnaṁ sādhyam l l tathā coktam

śūnyaṁ kalpitarūpeṇa nirābhāsam anākṛtī l
satsaṃvītsātmatraṁ vai prṣṭhākārācayākulaṁ l l l

tad uktaṁ l

rūpakāyau tu paścimāv

tasyaiṁ daśākāraṁ pratītyasamutpādaṁ pratīvadānāasaya l nirūtma niḥsattvato nirjivato niḥpadgalataṁ svabhāvāsūnyataṁ kārakavedakahitaṁ ca l pratīvadānāasaya śūnyatāvīmokṣaṁ ājātām bhavati l

\[1\] The text as well as annotations is mostly based on Mikkyo [1986] (pp. 46-56).

prathamu dharmakāyo 'tra rūpakāyau tu paścimāv l (v. 61ab)
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[4-4]
nāṇaḥ aksōbhyaṃdugrayaiva saddhavītā kimśarthī parhi aksōbhyaṃ vajrasattvena mudrītaṃ ity āgamaḥ, yāvat kalpitākāraśūnyatāpratipādaṇāīteti cet 1 taḥ na 1 pūrvaṃdugrayaiva saddhavītā 1 tasmād yathā 'aksōbhyaṃdugrayaiva jñānaṃ maulaṃ prṣṭham anyat tathā vajrasattvamudrayā vijñānam api prṣṭham maulaṃ vajram iti syāt 1 uktam ca vajraśekhare 1
dṛṭhaṃ śāram asaṃśīram acchedyābhedyālakṣaṇam 1
adāhi āvināśi ca śūnyatā vajram ucyate 1 4 ll

[4-1]
prṣṭham rūpādi cet maulajñānād aksōbhyaṃdugrayā 1
tad vajramudrayā sattvaṃ prṣṭham hanta gataṃ na kimīḥ 6 sattvaṃ api prṣṭham iti cet tarhi karuṇābhāvād 1 ucedavādaprāṣaṅgaḥ 1

[1057x328]280

3 This verse is shown as the doctrine of the Nirākāra-Yogācāra in the Tattvaratnavali (v. 18, Uij [1952] p. 4, 12-13, Shastri II. [1927] p. 18, 16-17).

4 Vajraśekharamahāgūhyayogatantra (Derge ed. no. 480 nya 149a7-81, Peking ed. no. 113 nya 170a3). Also quoted in the Caturmudraniscaya of Nāgārjunagarbha (Mikkyo [1989] p. 114, 1-2).

5 I followed Ms. T (Tokyo University, Matsunami Catalogue, no. 151. Cf. Mikkyo [1986]). Ed. has: prṣṭhe rūpādiṃ cet maulajñānād aksōbhyaṃdugrayā tad vajramudrayā sattvaṃ prṣṭhe 'ham tanna kim (?).
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ityādivistaraḥ
d[4-5]
evam akṣobhyavajrasattvayor aikyaṃ iti cet, tarhi vijñānarūpādhyāparyāge citrādvaitavādo jātāyaṇ ṵ
yad uktam

sacitracitātmrānaṃ aṣeṣakalpaśūnyanāḥ hi sākāramatam mātram me...
gacchattṛṇasparśasamānam6 anye tāmādhyamārthaṃ pravadanti santāḥ ll 9 ll
citrādvaitavādināḥ tu paramārthaḥ iti vijñānam aṣeṣaḥ iṃ grāhyagṛhakaśūnya-
citrādvaita-akṣobhayarūpajñānasya vajrasattvamudrayā vastusattānimrastvatā l
tad uktam

rūpādikalpaśūnyanāṃ ced jānām akṣobhyamudrayā l
tad vajrasattvamudrātō vastusattā nirasyate ll 10 ll

na ca vijñāaptimātrasaṃ kalpītakāraśūnyatā l
kriyate vajrasattvena pūrṇaṃ tasyānavasthitet l ll 11 ll
tad evaṃ paramārthaḥ iti śaḷyāpame sarvataṇāpratiṣṭhānārūpāṇābhabhogasyagunanaddhāvaya-
vāhīsaṃvedanasiddhadhyamakasiddhāntaḥ7 sreyaṇ l ayaṃ ca sadgurupādaprāsādād
avagamyaṃ l
d[4-6]
nanv atra saṃvedanasiddhau maṅgopādhyāvādaprāsaṅgaḥ na sarvatraṇāpratiṣṭhānam iti cet l
tan na l

yat pratītyasamutpānamāṃ notpānamāṃ svabhāvataḥ l
svabhāvena yan notpānam utpānam nāma tat katham ll 12 ll8

iti l
saṃvedanam ca pratītyasamutpānam tasmāt saṃvedanam evaṃpratiṣṭhitam ajātapadam l
tathā ca

saṃvedanam ajātaṃ vai vastusattāpi tādṛśī l
vajrasatvasvarūpaṃ tu jagad eva jagau muniḥ ll 13 ll
kim ca maṇjuśrīś tathāgatena pūṣṭaḥ l
katamo 'śāv acintyadhātuḥ l

7 Ed: -yuganaddhādvayaśā. Read: -yuganaddhādvayaśā.-

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yanatāpya uktam

avikalpitasanḍkalpa apratiṣṭhitamānasa l
asmṛtya amanasikāra nirālamba namo ’stu te ll 14 ll10

candrapradīpe

yaḥ pratayayair jāyati sa hy ajaśa na tasya utpāda svabhāvata ’sti l
yaḥ pratayādhīna sa śunya uktaḥ yaḥ śunyatāṁ jānati so ’pramattaḥ ll 15 ll11

[4-7]
aṅgalaṅkāvatātare

bhṛantim vidhūya sarvā hi nimittaṁ jāyati yadi l
saiva tasya bhaved bhṛantir asuddhaṁ timiraṁ yathā ll 16 ll12
tathā ca

mā bhūt samvitpratiṣṭhānām atā eva munir bhayāt l
bhinnati deśanā dharmam uktvokt̐a śūnyatātmānā ll 17 ll13

uktāṁ ca hevajre

9 Ed. bhagavat
10 Sarvabuddhaviṣayavatāraśaṅkārakāraḥśrīyāsīnasūtra (Ms. 25b6-7. Cf. Derge ed. no. 100 ga 299b6, Peking ed. no.768 khu 328a2-3):
avikalpitasanḍkalpa apratiṣṭhitamānasa l
asmṛtya amanasikāra nirālamba namo ’stu te ll


11 The Candrapradīpa is usually an alias of the Samādhiśrīyasūtra. However this verse cannot be found in it but in the Anavataptaśaṅkramanaprasādā. (Derge ed. no. 156 pha 230b2-3, Peking ed. no. 823, pha 238a6). See May [1959] p. 224, note 770 and Kajiyama [1964] p. 128. Also quoted in the Prasannapadā (La Vallée Poussin [1903-16] pp. 239, 491, 500 and 504) as the Anavataptaśaṅkramanaprasādā and in the Bodhicaryavatāraśaṅkhamānasūtra (La Vallée Poussin [1901-14] p. 355, 10-14) as well as the Subhāṣītasaṁgraha (Bendall [1905] pp. 21, 22-p. 22, 1) without mentioning the source.


13 Ed. has :
mā bhūt samvitpratiṣṭhānām atā eva munir bhayāt l
bhinnati deśanādharmam uktvoktā śūnyatātmānā ll

mā bhūt samvitpratiṣṭhānām atā eva munir bhayam l
bhinnati deśanā dharmam uktoktā śūnyatātmānā ll

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svabhāvaḥ caiva dyanotpannaḥ na satyam na mṛṣeṇ ca II 18 II

kiṃ ca l
sarvāḥ samānaḥ pravibhaityamānaḥ sūkṣmākāśādhyāyāḥ kṛtāntaḥ l
buddhaya bāhyasya vibhāgakartṛī na syād īhaikā yadi śūnyatoktiḥ II 19 II

āha ca ucchedaśūnyatāṁ apayan l

tathātāṁ ye tu paśyanti madhyamārthānusārataḥ l
te vai tattvavido dhānyāḥ pratyakṣaṁ yadi saṁvidāṁ II 20 II

tad uktāṁ dākinīvajrapaṇījare
śūnyatākarūṇābhinnāṁ yatra cittaṁ prabhāvyate l
sā hi buddhaya dharmasya saṅghasyāpi hi desanā l II 21 II

tasmāt pañcākāraṇaṁ pratityasamutpannāṁ pañcatathāgatasyavabhāvataḥ svabhāvasya ca
śūnyatākarūṇābhinnatvāt śūnyatākarūṇābhinnāṁ jagat iti sthitam l
etad eva sadguror upadeśat dhyānam avicchinnam

naddvrotapravāhena dīpajyotiprabandhat l
manatrattvānusārataḥ II 22 II

tathā cātur nāgājumāpaṇḍaḥ l
kūṭāgāram idaṁ na yat tribhuvanam na prāṇino amī janāḥ
cakreśaṁ 'smin na mānuṣo na viśayā nākṣāṇi na hy ādayaḥ l
rūpādyā na ca dharmaṭāmakatayaḥ te māṇḍaleyaḥ ime
viśvaṁ maṇḍalacakram ākalyataś cetaḥ kim udbhāmyasi II 23 II

pratityasaṁbhavād eva gandharvapuravat sphaṭam l
na svabhāvasthitam viśvaṁ nākāśāmbhojasāṃnibham l II 24 II

uktāṁ ca hevajre

amī dharmāṁ tu nirvāṇaṁ mohat saṁsārārupīṇaṁ l II 25 II

iti II

II pañcata thāgatamudrāvivaraṇaṁ saṁvāptam iti II

svabhāvaṁ ādyanotpannaṁ na satyam na mṛṣā tathā II

15 Ed. has:
sarvāḥ samānapratībhāityamānaḥ sūkṣmānāvaśīdhiś ca kṛtāntāḥ l
buddhasya bāhyasya vibhāgakartṛī na syād īhaikā yadi śūnyatokūti l

Ālokanādī v. 274 (Lindner [1985] p. 214, 9-12):
sarvāḥ [---] pravibhāityamānaḥ sūkṣmekāśādhyāyāḥ kṛtāntaḥ l
buddhasya bāhyasya vibhāgakartā na syād īhaikā yadi śūnyatokūti l


17 Dākinīvajrapaṇījara (Derge ed. no. 419 nga 54b7-55a1, Peking ed. no. 11 ka 289b7).


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(L) shows that an article starts from the left hand side when a Japanese journal has two sets of articles that start from each end. When a journal has two sets of page numbers, I show the one that starts from the left. Otherwise, page numbers go backwards.

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